Inflation of the word 'empathy' and emotivization of ethics

Abstract

The term empathy is not new, but has become more frequent with the popularization of the concept of emotional intelligence, which in both cases followed the discovery of the so-called. "Mirror-neurons". The discovery that we are neurophysiologically structured to enter into an empathic relationship with our fellow men is certainly fascinating and has a far-reaching significance. Some authors, however, are skeptical, not so much about this discovery, as about its interpretations, and (ab)uses. Regarding empathy, uncertainties about this notion result largely from different definitions its content and scope. In popular usage, empathy is identified with its affective component, which is related to the importance that is now attached to emotions. The overemphasis on affective empathy and on the role of emotions in social interactions, leads to emotivism in ethics. The objective of this article is to show that the consequence of the exaggeration of the role of the empathy and emotions is the underestimation of the role of higher and complex cognitive mechanisms, especially abstract thinking, in ethical reasoning, as well as in other areas where reasoning is necessary. It is especially problematic at a time when the media are exerting their huge influence by targeting human emotions. The largest number of definitions and explanations of empathy contains the basic problem to explain whether empathy is predominantly a cognitive (cognitive, mental, rational) or emotional phenomenon. Some definitions of empathy take into account both components, but the issue is further complicated by the fact that each of these components has multiple levels which correspond to different levels of complexity of empathy. So the question is does empathy cover the entire range of cognitive functions, i.e. can we attribute the mechanisms described by the theory of mind (theory of theory) and the simulation theory to empathy. In other words, is the scope of empathy as large as to encompass mental simulations, imaginative projections or constructions of the schemes of others– minds; or is the empathy (only) the necessary precondition or basis on which these processes build upon, strengthening the empathy in turn through a sort of feedback loop. It seems that we are faced here with the difference between a narrower and a wider definition of empathy. The view on whether and how the theory of mind or simulation theory and empathy differ therefore depends on how the latter is defined. If we define it as a primary, unconscious and almost mimetic mechanism, a phenomenon that is observed in all people as well as in higher mammals, then indeed empathy differs from the theory of mind and the simulation theory. But as we pointed out earlier, the psychology most commonly defines the empathy as the ability to put oneself into the place of another person and perceive her emotional states (affective empathy) and mental representations (cognitive empathy). Besides, some authors add the behavioral component as the behavior by which we communicate to the other person that we have understood her or him (empathically). These three aspects can be present together and at the same time, but not necessarily, in each situation. Issues about the content, scope and range of empathy are similar to those that surround the concept of emotions or feelings, and they concern the role they play in cognitive processes. According to some authors, it seems that there are as many definitions of emotions as there are theories or even scientists who deal with these issues. But the important outcome of a lot of research is that they have proven that emotions were not just blind affects, but that they had an epistemic function, which is true for empathy too. Common understanding of empathy emphasizes its role in perceiving and understanding the feelings of other people. That is its essential role, but not the only one. Empathy, like emotions, is a means of acquiring knowledge about the world. Furthermore, they both play a key role in discovering, learning and interiorizing social values, norms and rules, which is essential for each one–s moral development. However, the risk of empathic and emotional internalization of social norms is that it could be the norms of a mafia organization, fascist state, sect, street gang, and so on. As this internalization takes place through our perception and sensitivity to approval or disapproval of the other members of our community or group, we are not protected from harmful misconceptions and wrong orientations. Therefore, it seems reasonable to state that the claim of some philosophers and psychologists that emotions and empathy are necessary and sufficient for making moral judgments is not sustainable. Although recent scientific studies have proven that empathy and emotions play a crucial role in moral and other reasoning, there is no evidence that they are a sufficient condition to make proper moral judgments. This is because it is not only important how do we make moral judgments, but what are their contents.