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**A COLLOCATIONAL APPROACH TO
SEMANTIC DEFINITIONS**



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Table of contents

Typographical conventions
Abbreviations
Glossary of terms

Introduction

1 Semantic definitions

1.1 An overview

Tests for definitions

But-test

Connection between the primary and secondary meanings

Redundancy and pleonasm

Zeugma

Entailment

Paradox

Good-test

1.2 Typicality

Tests for typicality

Idiomatic expressions

But not-test

Obligatory adverbs

Unmodified nouns

Hedges

Canonical features

2 Collocation

2.1 Defining collocation

Directive and analysis
Classifying collocations
 Lexical and grammatical collocations
 Specialized language
 Importance of collocations
Compounds
Related collocations
Formal presentation of collocates
Lexical fields

2.2 Semantic roles

Agent
Patient
Experiencer
Objective
Stimulus
Instrument
Recipient and donor
Comitative
Result
Locative
Source
Goal and Locatum
Origin
Actor
Essive
Causation
Equivocation of roles
Speaker

2.3 Aspectualities

Stative verbs
 Privative verbs
 Relational verbs
Dynamic verbs
 Durative verbs
 Punctual verbs
 Achievements
Ambient verbs
Benefactive verbs

Evaluative verbs

2.4 The collocational method

Background of the collocational approach

The procedure

Marker and distinguisher

Agreement of defining semes

Transference

Semantic tailoring

2.5 Transitivity

Object

Double object

Lexical-syntactic alternation

Ditransitive verbs

Verbs of transfer

Triple object

Transitivity conversion

Unaccusatives

Detransitivization (Middle voice)

Reciprocal and reflexive verbs

3 Defining parts of speech and grammatical categories

3.1 Function words

Articles

The definite article

The indefinite article

Prepositions

Conjunctions

Pronouns

A portrait of *it*

Personal pronoun *it*₁

Phenomenon *it*₂

Ambient *it*₃

Emphatic *it*₄

Anticipatory *it*₅

Conclusion

3.2 Syntactic patterns and grammatical categories

Syntactic patterns

Countability

Non-finite clause

To be

Be + being

To-infinitive

Bare infinitive

Modal verbs

Passive

Subjunctive

That-clause

3.3 Adjectives

Connecting adjectives with nouns

Indirect connection

Indirect connection via entity

Non-inherent connection

Partonimic connection

Attributive and predicative uses of adjectives

Attributive adjectives

Classifying adjectives

Intensifying adjectives

Limiter adjectives

Predicative adjectives

Post-nominal adjectives

Order of adjectives

Connecting adjectives with prepositions

A portrait of wild

"Strong" adjectives

Stance adjectives

Discussion

3.4 Verbs

Connecting verbs with adjectives

"Legal" verbs

Performatives

Conclusion

Factive and non-factive verbs

"Strong" verbs

Have

"Light" verbs

Linking verbs: a portrait of remain

3.5 Nouns

Partonomy

Some relations of nouns with adjectives and verbs

Partitivity

Partitive transitivity

Connexity

"Strong" nouns

"Legal" nouns

3.6 Adverbs

Intensifying adverbs

4 Semantic hierarchy

4.1 Hyponymy and redundancy rules

5 General conclusions

Notes

References

Index of lexical items

Subject index

Typographical conventions

* An asterisk marks an anomalous or deviant connection of words.

? A question mark indicates a possibly deviant phrase or sentence

?? A double question mark indicates a dubious phrase or sentence

! An initial exclamation mark indicates a disharmonious connection of words in a particular meaning, but acceptable in another meaning.

' ' Single quotes enclose semes, i.e. meaning content.

[] Within definitions square brackets enclose redundant features. In quotations they signal inserted elements.

< > Angular brackets enclose semantic definitions.

{ } Braces enclose typical semes. Thus, 'true {and good}' should be understood as obligatory 'true' and typically 'good'.

< () > end of §3.5.0 Round brackets within a noun definition are used to represent two different sememes sharing a part of content, the one that is outside the brackets. With other parts of speech, the round brackets indicate an alternative alloseme; e.g. *with*₁ <sth_x | existing / making same phenomenon | at same time (and space) as «sth_y»>. Usually participants involved in *with*₁ share time and space, but owing to modern technology this need not be the case. When one speaker is talking with another over the telephone, they are talking at the same time but in different spaces. The definition of *in*₁ <using - occupying «_Γspace - area of_Γ thing - substance - (lack of) light»> covers both *in the sun* and *in the shadow*.

Hashes enclose directives (content of noun slots).

#() #... §3.3.1c I Round brackets within a subject directive enclose a directive expansion leading to indirect connection.

#(())#... §3.3.1 d Double brackets within a subject directive indicate a doubly indirect connection.

...(#) (#) §2.5.1a ii Bracketed hashes of a single object directive indicate a possible intransitive (pseudointransitive or “absolute”) use of an otherwise transitive verb.

...# #...# # §2.5.1b II Two pairs of object directive hashes without brackets indicate two object slots of which either or both can surface.

(#) (#)...# # §2.5.1b III Bracketed hashes of the first of two object directives indicate an indirect object.

(#) (#)...(#) (#) §2.5.1b Two pairs of bracketed hashes indicate two object slots of which only one can surface at a time.

...(#) (#)...(#) (#)...(#) (#) §2.5.1c Three pairs of bracketed hashes indicate a triple object.

<# (#...#) #> §2.5.2a Round brackets within a definition of a verb, straddling the subject slot and ‘make’ of the analysis, indicate an unaccusative verb.

<# # () > The use of round brackets within the analyses of adjectives and verbs indicates omissible parts, which do not constitute a definition proper, but still provide useful information on certain collocators. They can also signal cases when speakers’ opinions are divided about acceptability, or a single speaker is hesitant or inconsistent, as with *unexpected* and *ridiculous* (§ 3.6.3 d).

< ! ! > §3.2.6 Exclamation marks flank the content proper of an infinitive within its definition.

< « » > §3.1.2 Angle quotation marks enclose a directrix (corresponding to a prepositional object) within a definition of a preposition.

< [] > Square brackets enclose (i) an adverb proper within its definition (see §3.6); (ii) a redundant seme within a verb definition (see §2.2.3); (iii) additions to texts quoted or paraphrased from other sources.

<# Γ Γ...#> §3.3.1c III Two mirror-image angles enclose a directive expansion leading to the partonomic connection.

< - > A hyphen indicates alternative semes, one potentially exchanged for the other, e.g. 'heat - light' = 'heat' or 'light'. A hyphen separating a braced seme represents an alternative between an untypical and a typical seme (e.g. '{good} - true' is to be read as typically 'good' or nontypically 'true').

< / > A slash indicates alternative semes exchanging elements with more than one metalinguistic word (e.g. 'because of / concerning sth good' = 'because of sth good' or 'concerning sth good').

< | > The common content is to the left of a single bar and the alternative content is to the right (e.g. 'weak socially because | sth_x is viewed as bad/sb_y did sth bad' = 'weak socially because sth_x is viewed as bad + weak socially because sb_y did sth bad').

|| §2.4.4 A double bar is used to separate distinguishers from markers.

x', y', z Subscripts within definitions indicate identical or different referents. It is the order of appearances that is important here and the identity within the particular

definition. No correlation of subscripts across different definitions is intended. For example, the preposition *to*₉ has in its definition: <sb_x being in social role working for «sb_y with social power»>, while in the definition of the verb *appoint*, whose abridged version reads <#sb_x# using sb_x's social power to make sb_x's language be experienced as strong and true makes (#)sb_y(#) come to be in social role of #sb_y# working for sb_z>, sb_x of *to* has become sb_y of *appoint*, whereas the previous sb_y changed to sb_z. In a concrete case: *chairman* (sb_x) *to* the *board* (sb_y), but *They* (sb_x) *appointed* *him* (sb_y) *chairman* (sb_y) *to* the *board* (sb_z).

*book*₂ A numerical subscript below a lexeme form identifies a particular lexeme's sememe.

SMALL CAPITALS indicate: (i) semantic roles; (ii) syntactic patterns, such as N + V + N + N; (iii) conceptual metaphors, e.g. PERSON FOR X.

Underlined indicates (i) the content proper of a preposition or of a conjunction within its definition (see §§3.1.2 and 3.1.3); (ii) the content of a pertainym, the lexeme from which another word is derived, carried over to the definition of the derived word (e.g. in the definition of the verb *bait*, see §3.3.2a I), or the content of the primary sememe transferred to the definition of a secondary sememe, (e.g. *ride* in §2.1.5 c); (iii) the content of a non-finite clause (see §3.2.3).

Italics are used to mark language forms. Within definitions, they indicate pragmatic elements, like *this* or *using a lot of words*.

Abbreviations

adj adjective

AE American English

BE British English

DO direct object

Inf infinitive

IO indirect object

n noun

Past Part past participle

sb somebody, human living thing

sb_{sp} an implicit speaker (or an implicit writer, producer of speech or text), the source of subjective attitudes in definitions – see §2.2.18

sb_h the hearer (interlocutor, addressee)

sb_{indef} people in general or an unspecified individual

$sb_{more\ than\ one}$ more than one person, at least two people

$sb_{with\ power}$ sb_x invested with authority to make sb_y do as sb_x wants, i.e. strongly (= intensely) influential

sth something (includes semes 'sb', 'phenomenon', 'substance' and 'thing')

v, V verb

vi, VI intransitive verb

vt, VT transitive verb

Glossary of terms

alloseme – a particular contextual meaning of a seme. For example, the definition of *pervade* <#smell - sound# (comes to) be in all parts of #big space#> indicates two allosemes: (a) <#smell# (comes to) be in all parts of #big space#> *Smell pervaded the city. Odour pervaded the air.* (b) <#sound# (comes to) be in all parts of #big space#> *Hum begins to pervade the area. Silence pervaded the lab.* A sentence with both allosemes is possible: *The smell and sizzle of fried fish pervaded the room,* which proves that (a) and (b) are not distinct sememes.

analysis – §2.1.4 part of a definition lying outside the directive

classeme – 2.4.4 the cover term for “**directive**”, “**directrix**” and “**marker**”. (Some linguists use this term to refer to what we call “semes”, usually distinctive ones. It is close to Lyons’ definition (1977: 326): “Classemes [...] are very general sense-components that are common to lexemes belonging to several different lexical fields; and they tend to be, not only lexicalized, but also grammaticalized.”)

collocate – §2.1.3 a member of a collocation

collocator – §2.1.3 a collocate adjoined to a node, i.e. is the paradigmatically varying element of collocations when investigated by means of the collocational method

compound seme – a combination of simple semes. For instance, ‘bodily event’ is a compound seme that consists of two simple semes: ‘body’ and ‘event’.

directive – §2.1.4 part of the definition of an adjective or verb by hashes marking the slot to be filled by collocating noun sememes

directrix – §3.1.2 content of a prepositional object signalled by angle quotation marks

distinguisher – §2.4.4 defined negatively as the part of the noun definition that is not a **marker**. It is a seme that helps to distinguish one sememe from another when they share a common marker.

function – use of a word which plays an intralinguistic role. For example, the function of the relative pronoun *that* is to provide a **link** with the preceding noun and replace it.

link – an item in a definition that connects semes for a better understanding of the definition and does not add to the meaning like a seme does. Links are relative pronouns, whose **function** is to provide a connection with the preceding noun. The relative pronouns 'who' and 'which' simultaneously copy the noun's meaning 'sb' and 'not sb' respectively. A link is also the auxiliary 'do' when used in interrogative clauses or with 'not' to form negation.

marker – §2.4.4 initial part of a noun definition denoting the general notion of a class, and shared by other noun definitions

meaning – content of words either in system or in use that conveys a message about the extralinguistic world (**denotative meaning** in a language system, **referential meaning** in language use) and about the mental view taken by the speaker (**connotation**)

node – §2.1.3 the collocate that is treated as a fixed element in collocations during research

post-directrix – §3.1.2 part of a preposition's meaning following the directrix

pre-directrix – §3.1.2 part of a preposition's meaning preceding the directrix and including the seme preceding the underlined preposition's meaning proper

seme – part of meaning presented as a feature in a systematic way. In this book the main interest will be shown in the distinctive semes of semantic definitions, and thus *seme* will apply to them unless indicated otherwise, although some semanticists use the term "seme" only for non-distinctive features. Semes can be simple (consisting of one word) or complex. Simple semes are by definition always monolexemes in presentation, but their content can be complex and reducible to other simple semes, which in turn are most often reducible to semantic primes. Semes and homonymic lexemes are not the same. Semes are metalinguistic monosemic units, while lexemes belong to the manifest language.

Some semes in definitions are facultative in the sense that they become realized only when collocating with certain lexemes, and they have been included as a part of the definition (within brackets).

sememe – a particular semantic, systemic (invariant) meaning of a lexical or function word, or the semantic meaning of a grammatical structure or category, with its **structural meaning**

speech/text – a commutable term covering both words of mouth and words of letter if not otherwise specified

INTRODUCTION

This is a monograph on lexical definitions mainly but not solely worked out by dint of the collocational method as developed by the author during last twenty-odd years and minutely explained in the book. They will be called "semantic definitions" to distinguish them from lexicographic definitions. By applying this method familiar linguistic topics can be seen in new light and novel explanations be offered. The collocational method is applicable to any language whose collocations are sufficiently known. English has been chosen here for three reasons: the author is Anglist, data on English collocations abound and English is a language widely used for communication all over the world so that principles displayed here will be accessible to a great many linguists.

The ultimate aim of linguistics should be the same as that of any other scientific discipline including exact and fundamental sciences, such as mathematics, physics or chemistry. In that respect I have followed the aspiration of the Danish linguist Louis Hjelmslev, who believed that "if we can isolate the *relevant* relations among linguistic units, we should have as powerful a theory of language as we have in mathematics" (Dinneen 1967: 328).

To gain insight into language matters through valid semantic definitions is to give an explanation that in the long run leads to tautology. But this is more of a boon than of a bane because the most exact propositions rest on a revealing tautology of this kind. Both geometry and arithmetic are based on tautologies. To take an example, Pythagoras' theorem couched in terms of the statement "the square on the hypotenuse of a right-angled triangle

is equal to the sum of the squares on the other two sides (the catheti)" becomes a very insightful conclusion until we realize that it amounts to the glaringly obvious claim that a pair of two (= four) right-angled triangles that make two squares on the catheti equal the four right-angled triangles forming the bigger square on the hypotenuse. The statement that four equals four is an instance of banal repetitiveness. Likewise, facts of language should ultimately lead to such explanations that the reader could not but comment that their scientific presentation is self-evident, natural and the only possible. We cannot accept "that counting from 1 to 4 and from 1 to 5 repeats units as many times as counting from 1 to 9 is no tautology" (Schopenhauer 1851: §23) because eventually arithmetical operations rest on the linguistic definition of *two*: 'one sth_x together with one sth_y of the same kind'. The ideas of all other numbers are gained by adding or subtracting 'one's. The number of additions of 'one' must be the same in 4 + 5 and 9 because we have learned the linguistic meaning of the words *four*, *five* and *nine*.

The approach to language espoused in this book is like Dixon's (2005: 4), guided by "a basic linguistic theory", in which linguistics is treated as a natural science, in contrast to competing formal theories. Secondly, I have also adhered to Saussure's dictum: "each language must be studied as a whole system, not individual bits in isolation".

The general aim was to work out definitions that translate the mental dictionary of the speakers of English as much as possible. Semes are part of metalanguage but at the same time they are expected to correspond to psycholinguistic reality in the minds of speakers and they are not supposed to be merely units of a theoretical vocabulary.

This is a serious attempt at smoothing the path of collocation for linguists, because "[t]he status of collocation as a borderline phenomenon which defies

explanation solely based on established semantic and syntactic theories makes it especially difficult to give a formal and systematic account of the phenomenon in terms of one coherent linguistic theory" (Bartsch 2004: 27). To this end I have been searching for semantic definitions as "identity cards" of lexemes and constructions, which contain covert information on collocations. Semantic definitions should cater both to good formation and ill-formation of collocations, so that semantically deviant sentences can also become a source of semantic information.

The interconnection of grammar and lexis has been stressed throughout. The lexicalist point of view has been combined with the constructionist approach: Language production is one side of linguistic communication; the other is language reception, and both have been attended to. Thus, the meaning of individual lexemes determines the construction, while a construction leads the hearer to the lexical meaning (cf. Fillmore et al. 1977, Lakoff 1987, Langacker 1987/1991, Wierzbicka 1988, Goldberg 1995).

I have been principally interested in what Patrick Hanks calls "norms" (rules for using words in non-metaphorical and non-creative use). However, since the borderline between a normal use of a word and "exploitations", acceptable deviations from it, is vague, some of the latter have been included, especially metonymy.

As the scope of collocation and definition is wide while space and time for their treatment are limited, I made a representative selection of lexical items. Usually not all sememes of a lexeme were defined but only those that were relevant to the topic.

Because there is no affix that can be added to absolutely any base in the language (Bauer 1983: 100), the combinatory potential of an affix and its bases must lead to some kind of "selection restrictions". However, derivation by means of affixes and conversion have been sidestepped in this book since their treatment cannot be

quite the same as that of collocations and would need special devotion to the matter.

Readers can track down the way to discovering particular sememes' definitions by looking for the pertaining collocators and their definitions as presented in the book. For instance *learn* 'gain knowledge' is connexive with prepositions *about* and *from*, *wh*-words, the *to*-infinitive and the conjunction *that*. This sememe has been defined in §1.1.3c I by means of the definitions of these collocators, as well as by the common meaning of the collocating nouns *language*, *lesson*, *poem*, *skill*, *speech*. Particular clues to definitions have been explicitly and abundantly stated for "stance" adjectives (in §3.3.6), for performatives (§3.4.3) and "strong" verbs (§3.4.5). When no such clues are given, as it would take too much space to mention them each time, readers can find them themselves relying on their knowledge of collocates.

I have drawn examples from written sources not only because they are easier to access, but also because the authors of written texts in comparison to oral speakers take more care when choosing their words. These sources have been various: the British National Corpus (*BNC*), the Corpus of Contemporary American English, the *Oxford Collocational Dictionary for Students of English*, *The Cassell Dictionary of Appropriate Adjectives*, and the *Dictionary of Selected Collocations* among the most frequently consulted. Slang, literary style and specialized terms have been taken into account only exceptionally.

Several chapters build on reasoning expounded in previously published articles: Connexivity and Indirect Connection (in Hlebec 2003), A portrait of *wild* (in 2011a), *Have* (2011b), "Strong" adjectives and "Strong" nouns (2012), A portrait of *it* (2013), and Performatives (2015). The remaining chapters contain my ideas presented for the first time. The procedure for the collocational method was expounded in my *English Semantics* and *English Semantics for University Students*. Occasional passages from these two titles have been used throughout.

1 SEMANTIC DEFINITIONS

1. 1 AN OVERVIEW

1.1.1 There have been going around two popular metaphors that are meant to illustrate the eventual impossibility of precise defining. Because one is obliged to describe language by means of language, one popular image is that of making fire in a stove made of wood and the other is trying to lift oneself up by one's own bootstraps. On the contrary, the best way to describe language is by its own means, just as mathematicians do not need any other expedient beyond mathematics.

Charles Osgood was one of semanticists who searched for the solution to "the central problem of specifying a theoretically principled and empirically rigorous procedure for discovering the semantic features of word forms". He endeavoured to employ "the rules of usage of words in combination as a means of discovering the semantic features of the words thus combined" (Osgood 1970: 133). According to the same author, "[a]n ideal discovery procedure would meet the usual scientific criteria of objectivity (comparability of features discovered across observers), reliability (yielding the same features in repeated, independent observations), validity (yielding features that correspond to those discovered by other methods) and generality (applicability of the procedures to the discovery of features of all types)". We have pursued the same aim although to achieve it "is a large order, and no ideal discovery procedure may be attainable" (138).

Semantic definitions are aimed at elucidating general lexical and syntactic meaning by using a scientific method. By “lexical” and “syntactic meaning” we understand the content of words and constructions in a system, as well as combinatory rules (*langue*), rather than the content of words and constructions in use (*parole*). When lexical words are defined, “they consist of clusters of semantic components constituting a meaning potential” (Hanks 2013: 82). Meaning in system is as real as is meaning in use. They cannot exist one without the other, and in order to understand the process of activating meaning in speech and writing, the understanding of the systemic, lexical meaning is indispensable.

In her Introduction to *English Speech Act Verbs* Anna Wierzbicka (1987: 3) expresses a desire for linguistic science to develop adequate methodological tools for dealing with the lexicon, and mentions works of Mel’čuk, Zholkovsky and Apresjan from the Moscow semantic school as noteworthy ventures of this kind. They have described meanings of words in a special formal metalanguage that has its own vocabulary and syntax. These authors have made significant observations on lexicological definitions and semantic metalanguage. A huge step in lexical analysis has been made in Hanks (2013). His Theory of Norms and Exploitations (TNE) approach shows most affinity with the present approach, but also differs in relying heavily on statistics. Wierzbicka’s opus has contributed to this aim considerably, and our own research has been motivated by the same wish to lead to “a purposeful, methodical and revealing scientific study of this aspect of language” (Wierzbicka 1987: 2).

One among the earliest efforts to this aim was Ogden’s *Basic English* (1938) with 850 lexemes believed to be sufficient for defining other lexemes of Standard English, and it has been a signpost to a controlled vocabulary in more and more modern dictionaries. A well-

formed semantic definition should enable understanding and even anticipating semantic phenomena, and problems that have been beyond explanation ought to become easily solved. Definitions should perform all the four functions mentioned in Apresjan/Apresjan (2000: 218-219): (a) explain the meaning of the given linguistic unit; (b) serve as the basis in establishing its place in the semantic system of the language; (c) be a semantic rule which may be applied in the transition from a syntactic representation of an utterance to semantic representation; (d) serve as the basis for the rules of semantic interaction between the given unit and other units within the utterance. At the same time, definitions must not be circular, must be necessary and sufficient, must be hierarchically structured and explicit.

When lexicologists embark on defining, the general principle is that the sense of a lexeme is a compositional function of the senses of its parts (cf. Lyons 1985: 59), that words of the defining expression should be simpler and more frequent than the words they describe. "The definiens is always a complex sign, and if the definiendum is a complex sign, the definiens is a sign of greater complexity than the definiendum" (Sørensen 1967: 18). A theoretically ideal dictionary presenting semantic definitions should consist of indefinable words that correspond to semantic primes and words that can be reduced to primes in a small number of steps (cf. Apresjan/Apresjan 2000: 217 and the Natural Semantic Metalanguage of Andrzej Bogusławski, Anna Wierzbicka and Cliff Goddard; see §6). Ideal definitions should consist of defining elements that correspond to the so-called mental lexicon, to actual ideas and neurological patterns in the minds of speakers, even if subconscious. A semantic definition cannot be just an impressionistic phrase, but should be a scientifically controlled formulation, the identity card of a lexeme that enables a deeper insight into its behaviour and syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations.

Fuzziness is a normal and advantageous characteristic of language. It is context that narrows down lexical meaning, but sometimes even context is not sufficient and the meaning remains vague or fuzzy to a certain extent. In this way, “precision of stipulative definition, by stating necessary and sufficient conditions”, as “a basic requirement for hard science of a Newtonian kind” is combined with “[t]he supposed imperfection of natural language”, which is “a basic design feature, contributing power and flexibility within a robust framework” (Hanks 2013: 345-346). Any definition that can capture fuzziness and vagueness of the concepts expressed by lexemes is welcome, but at the same time it should be a fairly precise statement of what a word means, “precise because it is suitably vague” (Wierzbicka 1985: 14 in Hanks 2013: 8).

1.1.2 Those semes that make up a minimal definition, roughly corresponding to the distinctive features of the componential analysis (cf. Nida 1975: 229) and to Langacker’s schema (1987: 371 in Taylor 1989: 65-67), are invariant features sufficient to distinguish the meaning paradigmatically from the meanings of all other forms in the language (Bendix 1966). They occur in all contexts even though occasionally they may be defocused.

Definitions depict situations out of which particular aspects are chosen to be highlighted in a particular text. When speakers choose one particular preposition, they highlight one aspect of the adjective’s meaning, but automatically the whole content of the adjectival lexeme is activated, except for the material in brackets, which is optional; for example, in the collocations *obvious mistake/explanation* the seme ‘come to know’ is activated although no *wh*-word is present because *obvious* includes ‘come to know’ in its meaning. Likewise, when some of the arguments in a proposition are missing, as in

John teaches French.

(Person taught is not mentioned.)

Anybody who teaches teenagers should get double salary.

(Information on the subject is not supplied; Cruse 2004: 24), the underlying systemic meaning and the corresponding definition of *teach* remain the same, and the propositions retain three places for arguments as silently understood.

By a mechanism called "perspectivization" (Dirven et al. 1982 in Taylor 1989: 90) or "(contextual) modulation" (Cruse 1986: 52), different aspects of meaning of a lexeme can be highlighted, while other components are backgrounded. In like manner, having in mind word patterns, Hanks (2013: 142) states that "a model of words in use must show how the totality of the patterns in which each word regularly participates contributes to its meaning on any particular occasion when it is used, with more or less subtle changes of emphasis". Thus, *He cleaned the window* highlights 'glass', while *He opened the window* includes both 'glass' and 'frame'. In *They are demolishing our street*, *street* = 'houses', whereas in *They are resurfacing our street*, *street* = 'road surface'. Zeugma (see §1.1.3d) in *He opened the window and cleaned it*, and *Why are they resurfacing the street when they are going to demolish it?* shows that here we deal with allosemes rather than different meanings. F.G. Droste (1976: 31) says that the process of signifying is mobile and compares it to a spotlight illuminating only that part of the scene that is relevant for the message at the very moment.

Another such noun lexeme is *book* (cf. Cruse 2004: 113, 250) <solid flat man-made thing_x in which exist {a lot of} pieces_x of paper with space in which exists sth_x made in symbols {by use of language} in writing to express mental state_x experienced by sb_x concerning sth_y (that sb_x knows well) in order to make a lot of sb_y indet more than one experience state_x when sb_y {sees} - touches sth_x>. That there is no polysemy here is proven by

zeugma in *Put this book back on the shelf: it is quite unreadable* (Cruse 2004: 112). "Such [different] readings are labelled *facets*, and we may refer to the [TEXT] facet and the [TOME] facet [of the lexeme *book*]. There is considerable evidence of the discreteness of facets" (Cruse 2004: 112). Pustejovsky (1995) finds a deeper connection between these two interpretations joined in a "dot object", which is in this case 'contents' because *book* in both senses contains something (pages or information). The two kinds of content correspond to the alternative prominence given to 'in which exists' in our definition, roughly equivalent to 'containing' (Cf. *a book with₇ more than hundred pages; a book with₅ illustrations* – see §3.1.2. I.)

A single definition can be the source of lexical ambiguity when perspectivization is changed. The sentence *I almost killed her* is ambiguous between (a) 'I was on the point of carrying out an action which would have caused her to die' and (b) 'I acted in such a way as to cause her to be almost dead', which "suggests a functional autonomy for components [CAUSE] and [DIE] within the two meanings of *kill*" (Cruse 2004: 237). The semantic definition of *kill* <#sth {living thing_x}# makes #living thing_y# {during short time} come to not exist any more> provides the connection with this ambiguity, i.e. (a) 'almost make...' (b) 'almost not exist any more'. Since the definition of the noun *review* is <sth_x made by use of language in writing by sb_x for a lot of sb_y indef more than one concerning sth_y made by sb_z for a lot of sb_y to make sb_y experience good - bad- true mental phenomenon concerning sth_y>, *good review* can be either 'good sth_x' or 'good sth_y' (Apresjan 2000: 224).

Various collocations highlight different aspects of *man*₂ 'human male' and background others. *Man* in *We need a man to lift this rock* or in *dirty old man* have different contextual meanings ('strength' and 'sexual

potency' respectively). In *The man fell from the high rock* 'thing' is more foregrounded because the context brings the physical aspect to the fore, while in *The man remembered his youthful days* it is 'mind'. "Man lives in two environments, in two worlds: as a "body" he is among objects and events in the physical, spatio-temporal universe; as a "mind" he lives and communes with objects of a different kind; he perceives and acquires these, holds them and offers them in various ways to other citizens of this world, to other minds" (Vendler 1970: 92). The list of such features is not endless and can be formed in terms of typical semes. The core meaning of *man*₁ as reflected in the semantic definition outside the braces is always preserved, whereas those within vary: <male human living thing that is grown-up {strong, with sexual potency...}>. Moreover, the noun *man*₂ is a hyponym of *man*₁ 'human being' and repeats the meaning of *man*₁: <living thing that can move and use language, with body, mind, feelings, and senses {with thing_{more than one} to be put on body}>'.

We cannot substitute a definition for a linguistic unit defined without changing its communication adequacy (Wierzbicka 1980: 20). Even the best definition cannot represent a sememe fully. No definition, even with the most exact semes, can totally equal its *definiendum* because, as the ancient philosopher Seneca knew, to reduce something to its components is to destroy the whole and weaken its unifying force. Unspoken notions that correspond to semes in the unit to be defined are compact and closely interwoven, whereas a definition loosens the connection between semes by mentioning them explicitly (cf. Palmer 1981: 145; Leech 1990: 188-90). For this reason, when defined words are replaced by their semantic definitions, there is no total communicational equivalence. However, once lack of an exact match between the atomized and "zipped" meanings is

understood, in opposition to the proposition of Fodor et al. (1975), one should not abandon the definitional approach.

Lack of complete equivalence between a lexeme and its definition has another aspect that shows in situations when a definition can do the job that a single lexeme cannot. For example: *A person who plays a guitar brought one yesterday* is a valid sentence, but **A guitarist brought one yesterday* (Lakoff and Ross 1972: 121) is not valid although *guitarist* = 'person who plays a guitar'. Likewise, **John killed Mary young* is distinct from *John caused Mary to die young* (Morreall 1976: 518) – see the definition of *kill* above. The intended meanings are brought out by extracting 'guitar' from the definition to become *guitar* and by the explicit attachment of *young* to *die*.

Another drawback of semantic definitions is that the wording of some of them may be somewhat awkward, but this is the price that style has to pay for the sake of a deeper insight into content.

Identical complex semes sometimes occur in slightly different variants, and a further research might perhaps reduce them to a single one. Thus, for instance, 'made by sb_x who wants to make sb_y make phenomenon' equals 'made by sb_x when sb_x wants to make sb_y make phenomenon' and 'sb experiencing sth' alternates with 'sb experiences sth'.

Not all speakers share the same judgements about acceptability of collocations and sentences. There are variations across different idiolects and sometimes even individual speakers may waver in their own assessment. Depending on varying contexts, these judgements will also consistently vary, which brings about disagreement in informants' opinions when collocations are presented out of context. For instance, Dixon (2005: 365) says that *The prisoners were begun to be counted* and *The prisoners were begun being counted* "are rejected by perhaps the majority of native speakers, but judged as

perfectly acceptable by a significant minority". Sentences and phrases that are unacceptable to some speakers but not to others may pose problem when the need arises to explain the phenomenon. Such division in opinions requires a high degree of fine-tuning of definitions. Dixon's example can be explained if *begin* is defined as in §2.4.5. The two sentences quoted are based on *They began to count the prisoners* and *They began counting the prisoners*, which, unlike *She began the story/her career*, contains a semi-object in the forms of infinitive and gerund. Although the seme 'phenomenon' in the definition is active, the brackets are usually also operative. Now, some speakers take the infinitive and gerund as objects capable of being transformed into the subject of a passive sentence, others do not. Such dubious cases, indicated by a question mark, rest on the use of brackets in definitions.

The only reality are idiolects, spoken by individuals, while language is an ideal model which individuals strive to approach. This fact hinders actual speakers from reaching unanimous production of collocations and shatters a consensus about their acceptability. That acceptability is a scalar category was claimed in the past by Randolph Quirk (1968: Ch.17) and R. Lakoff (1977). In his article "Acceptability in language" Quirk made an investigation in this issue with native speakers using isolated sentences without reliance on extra-linguistic contexts. Having asked the informants to decide whether a sentence seems perfectly normal, quite abnormal, or somewhat dubious, he arrived at the result "that very few sentences in fact struck all subjects as either wholly acceptable [e.g. *He wants some cake*] or wholly unacceptable [*John works there either*]. The majority of sentences came somewhere between [*The old man chose his son a wife*], and a few even had a greater query score than either approval or disapproval [*He is regarded insane*]" (1968: 194, 197). "[A]cceptability is sharply dependent on the degree of sentence isolation"

and on the stylistic use – whether literal, metaphorical or jocular (195, 196). The existence of borderline cases in application (see §1.1.4) may also account for occasional disagreement about acceptability decisions. For example, Charles Osgood's subjects considered *contradict unceasingly* and *help appreciatively* to be apposite, while for Osgood himself they were anomalous (Osgood 1970: 178). The adverb *unceasingly* (e.g. *Traffic flowed u. Snow fell u. She criticizes her daughter u.*), defined as <event made [during strongly long time {, which is bad}]> suggests that for Osgood 'which is bad' is an invariant feature and, moreover, that for him *contradict* does not contain 'bad' or, more probably, that for him 'during strongly long (= 'strong') time' has to be 'without stop' as dictionaries often stress, while it is impossible to contradict or criticize without making breaks.

A collection of diverse essays on definition, from Plato and Aristotle to modern times, is presented in Sager (2000).

1.1.3 Tests for definitions

In order to determine senses of a definition, there are a number of tests. All these tests ultimately rest on the native speaker's intuition. This is only possible since it is the native speaker's competence that is the ultimate subject of a lexicologist's investigation. Information on defining senses can be obtained by the means stated below – cf. Cruse 1986: 12 ff.

1.1.3 a But-test

The testing frame X IS ___, BUT ... " is a powerful heuristic device for testing the definitional status of sentence" (Bendix 1965 in Weinreich 1966a: 448). For instance, **This is a chair, but one can sit on it* when coupled with

its questionable negation ??*This is a chair, but one cannot sit on it* insinuates that *chair* is <man-made thing_x> used when sb sits on thing_x> (Labov 1973: 351).

This test in combination with a likewise unacceptance-revealing *but not*-test leads to hyperonyms as defining elements (see §4.1), as in **It's a dog, but it's (not) an animal* ('animal' is a defining feature, part of the marker, of *dog* – see §2.4.4).

When both *but* and *but not* test produce oddness, a canonical feature is indicated (see §1.2.4). ??*It's a dog, but it barks* shows that ""barks" is an expected feature of *dog*" (Cruse 2004: 54; see §2.4.1). ?*It's a dog, but it does not bark* – cf. §1.2.3b.

1.1.3 b *Connection between the primary and secondary meanings*

A secondary meaning of a lexeme bears a significant interrelation with the lexeme's primary meaning. This fact can be made use of when deciding on the formulation of semantic definitions. The adjective *dead*₂ in *dead calm/centre/cert/faint/silence/stop*¹ is defined as: `#state - space when sth does not exist#, which is strongly strong degree', and it partly echoes the primary meaning of *dead*₁ (<#living thing# that does not exist any more, which is strongly strong degree of bad state>). The common ground for *dead*₁ and the metaphorically derived *dead*₂ is 'strongly strong degree of state when sth does not exist'. Under the impact of the primary, "shadow" meaning (Chafe 2000), *dead*₂ achieves a highly expressive connotation, such as would not be possible to achieve by near-synonymous adjectives such as *complete (calm)*, *exact (centre)*, *utmost (certainty)* etc. What is gained by juxtaposing a primary and a secondary sememe is the ascertainment and confirmation of parts of their

definitions by spotting the part they share.² (See also the relationship between *hedge*₁ and *hedge*₂ in §2.4.3b.)

The definition of *thick*₁ should be: *thick*₁ <#liquid - gas substance_x# that makes sb see things in substance_x with difficulty>; *The river looks t. after the rain. Blood is thicker than water; The water is t. with mud; t. air/cloud/foam/mist/soup.* Sememe *thick*₂ is defined as <#a lot of sth_{more than one} with parts_x# that are with little space_x between parts_x {so that it is difficult to come to exist in space_x}>, as in *The trees are t. with foliage. t. forest.* Sememes *thick*₁ and ₂ do not seem to be interconnected. But if with the help of *thick*₂ sememe *thick*₁ is reworded as <#a lot of liquid - gas substance_x particles_x more than one# that is with little space_x between particles_x {so that it is difficult for light to come to exist in space_x}>, a scientific definition is produced, although it is not satisfactory from the linguistic point of view. The definition <#substance# consisting of parts in great quantity per unit of volume> for *thick*₁ in Hlebec (1983: 271) is also scientifically based, but it likewise misses the linguistic reality of its ordinary pre-scientific and anthropocentric meaning.

1.1.3 c Redundancy and pleonasm

1.1.3 c I Redundancy

Isotopy, i.e. the repetition of a seme in the immediate context is theoretically redundant. However, it is often indispensable for language to function. According to Apresjan (1977: 5), N. N. Leont'eva (1967 in Apresjan 1977: 6) was the first to observe the reduplication of meaning as a redundancy phenomenon, and the iterativity that occurs among semes has been interpreted

as semantic agreement. Actually, the presence of the same semes in two interrelated sememes in a text is a prerequisite for chaining words into well-formed collocations. In *The bird flew to the nest*, the seme 'move in the air' is understood three times: (1) in *bird* through the definition <non-human living thing_x that can move {in air}, that grows first in easily breakable roundish thing_z, that is covered with a lot of small flat soft light things_y growing close, that has two thin body parts_x for moving, that has thin hard pointed body part_y of head through which thing_x takes substance / small things_z into thing_x's body> (cf. the full explication of *bird* in Wierzbicka 1985: 180 - 181), (2) in *fly* <(#sb# makes) #thing - substance# move in air>, and (3) in *nest* <thing with space made by bird_x and used by young bird_y> (where bird replaces the whole definition of *bird* and therefore indirectly conducts to {that moves in air}. For an all-embracing definition of the intransitive verb *fly* it is not advantageous to mention 'self-propelled aerodynamic motion' as Evans (2010: 40) did because not only birds and aircraft move in the air, but any object or substance thrown high does this, and there is nothing wrong in *The tennis ball was flying back and forth*).

In discourse, the necessity of repeating the same word is dispensed with if the word that follows contains the same seme as the preceding one. Thus, *My neighbour's house burned down last night. The flames (from the burning house) could be seen for several miles. The damage (resulting from the fire) was extreme. The cause (of the fire) was thought to be defective wiring* (Chafe 1972 in Garvey 1974: 460; Cf. Lipka 1992: 172; Ivić 2005: 21-30). The lexemes *burn down* and *flame* share the seme 'fire', while the verb *burn down* and the noun *damage* share the complex seme 'not whole any more'. The noun *cause*, implicitly attached to 'fire', leans on the extralinguistic knowledge that electricity (in *wiring*) has to do with heat.

From the lexicologist's perspective, by tracing cases of redundancy eliminated in this way, one can uncover semes and obtain material for definitions of the words containing these semes, or find out typical semes.

Speakers can take advantage of redundancy and leave out a verb of movement if it is (a) closely preceded by another verb which also denotes movement (*allow, ask₂, beckon, expect, invite...*) or (b) preceded by a "strong influence" verb (see §3.4.5; *bully, charm, coax, coerce, deceive, force, help, intimidate, lull, press, persuade* (§3.4.5), *provoke, shame, steer, tempt*, all containing 'sb_x strongly makes sb_y make') and at the same time followed by an adverb or preposition of movement (*back, in, into, out of, over, through*). A few examples are in order: *Let's ask him (come) over for a drink. He asked her (to go) out. Shall I ask him (to come) in? He beckoned Stan (to come) into the house. She expects/invited John (to come) back tomorrow. We allowed/forced them (to go) out of the house. She coaxed her daughter (to go) into the water. She helped her brother to his feet. They persuaded the monkey (to go) back into the cage. allow sb (to come) in, force linen (to get) into the drawer. Expect₂ is defined as: <#sb_x# experiences thought concerning #sth# that tends to m o v e and be with sb_x>, based on to_{2a}-infinitive, *invite* and *ask₂* as: <#sb_x# uses language wanting to make #sb_y# c o m e and be with sb_x and be strongly influenced by sth good>, based on to₅ and to₁-infinitive. This phenomenon is impossible with other verbs, such as *advise, beg, instruct* or *tell* (§3.1.3): **We advised them out* instead of *We advised them to go out*; **I would strongly advise against out on your own*. (*He advised her against the meeting* contains *meeting* with its strong association with *attend*, which enables omitting *attend*). **He begged her out*. Lee (2001: 84-86) tries to explain the difference by postulating direct causation in the first group as opposed to indirect causation in the second. However, both groups*

are comprised of indirect causatives as they contain 'make sb make' – see §2.2.16 b. The definition of *advise* is: <#sb_x# uses language experiencing mental phenomenon_x concerning sth_x (that sb_x knows well) when sb_x wants to make (#)sb_y(#) (know to) make (#)phenomenon_y(#) expected to be good for sb_y or not make phenomenon_y because phenomenon_y is viewed as bad>. For example, *They strongly advise that you (should) take a passport. The doctor advised a rest/her to rest. a. on/about important issues, a. walking, a. sb what/where/how/when... beg* <#sb_x# strongly uses language wanting to make (#)sb_y(#) make good phenomenon_x for sb_x when sb_y does not want making phenomenon_x {giving sth}>, e.g. *b. for help; b. to be given a chance; b. her to come back. I refuse to b.* (The formal *b. of you* has not been used as a clue for the definition as this use of the preposition *of* seems to be idiomatic.) In short, indirect causatives that contain 'sb_x strongly makes sb_y make - experience phenomenon' optionally elide the following verb of movement – see §3.1.2.I for the same meaning of *into*₁.

If the hearer has enough background knowledge to be able to retrieve the omitted verb, after verbs defined as '#sth# comes - tends to (not) exist' (*begin, cease, continue, complete, finish, keep*) one can omit verbs dealing with creation, i.e. with 'make (exist)' (*build, learn, read, sing, tell, wash, write*) and consumption, with 'make not exist' (*eat* – see §1.1.3c II, *drink* §2.4.7a, *smoke* §2.2.17) (Dixon 2005: 99, 177). For example, *Mary started (learning) French at fifteen. I finished (reading) the book yesterday. Rose began (to cook/eat) the dinner. Ann completed (knitting) the jumper. Learn* is <#living thing_x that can move {sb_x}# wants to make thing_x's true mental phenomenon_x (base being sth) concerning #state_x - habitualness_x# and come to know state_x -

habitualness_x> (*l. (how) to drive; l. about₁ prehistory; l. fromg textbook*). *Read* is defined as: <#sb_x# experiences (strong) mental phenomenon_x (*this* thought) to make sb_x know sth_x (concerning sth_x) when sb_x uses (#) Γspace of₁ (sth_y made by use of) written symbols {language} (#) (and uses sound language to make sb_y come to know sth_x) source being sth_y> (*r. about₁/ofg tragedy; r. fromg/in₁ newspaper; r. to₁ amuse oneself; r. to her daughter*). It is usually the redundancy of semes that are part of the following noun's definition that enable omitting. It would be more precise to say that a verb is deletable after the verbs above if it repeats the seme denoting a phenomenon in the noun. In our examples *dinner* is <event during day that is longest of events when sb_x m a k e s man-made substance - things come to be in sb_x's body through sb_x's mouth h> and *jumper* a 'man-made thing to be put on body, made by making woollen yarns cross one another'. Cooking, eating and knitting all contain the seme 'make'. Dixon (2005: 177) states that "from *Mary began liking her new house after she'd been living in it for six months* is not possible to omit *liking* since this is a verb that can take any sort of object". Or, from our point of view, *house* is not defined by dint of liking (but as <large man-made thing with space_x habitually used when sb_{more than one} exists in space_x>), in contrast with *French* (has to be learned, defined as <form of language that sb_{indef} must come to know if sb_{indef} wants to use - understand native language of a lot of sb_{more than one} in France, part of Canada, Belgium...), *book* (intended to be read, see the definition in §1.1.2), *dinner* (defined by means of eating) and *jumper* (defined through the notion of knitting).

If speakers use a part of a semantic definition as a word of their utterance even when it is redundant and omissible, this word may serve as a clue to semantic

defining. In her study of "semantic compression", the omission of a word which duplicates part of the meaning of another word in the same sentence, N. N. Leont'eva (1967 in Apresjan 1977: 6) adduces the following examples: *pot made of copper* → *pot of copper*; *the process of struggle showed...* → *the struggle showed*; *pills relieving one from headache* → *pills for headache*. From our point of view, these examples support the following definition of *copper* as <hard reddish substance which becomes green, found in environment and used to make things>, of *struggle* as <event when sb struggles>, and of *pill* <small man-made thing that sb_x makes come to exist in sb_x's body through sb_x's mouth, used to make sb_x feel less bad>.

1.1.3 c II Pleonasm

Pleonasm (unnecessary repetition of semes) and tautology (parallel use of synonyms) arise when a part of a phrase repeats another part in the same or adjacent phrase without adding any new information (cf. Leech 1981: 148). According to Cruse (2004: 220-24), pleonasm occurs when a semantic non-head does not bring information that is not already available in the head. For instance, the adjective *female* is the non-head of the noun phrase *female aunt* and it does not contribute to information beyond the head *aunt*). Couched in terms of definitions, pleonasm is produced when the content of a particular word's (directive/analysis in the) semantic definition and that of its collocate/synonym coincide precisely. In *The bouquet consisted of flowers* 'flower' is part of the definition of *bouquet*, which is <form of a lot of long thin {beautiful, smelling, with strong colours} parts of small living thing that cannot move, close together>. In lexico-semantic terms, the lexeme *bouquet* includes the same seme as the lexeme *flower*, defined as <long thin {beautiful, smelling, with strong colours} part of small

living thing that cannot move>. There is nothing in the content of *flower* that is not already contained in *bouquet*.³ Thus, the pleonasm confirms that *bouquet* has to be defined as consisting of flowers.

The quasi-wise saying *Never trust a liar* contains an uninformative repetition of 'not true', as the following definitions of *trust* (in the relevant meaning) and *liar* demonstrate: *trust* <#sb_x# experiences (*this*) thought_x thinking that (#)sb_y(#) experiences - expresses (#)psychological phenomenon {*this* thought_x}(#) that is t r u e > *T. me - have I ever lied to you in the past? t. account/instinct/common sense/judgement/memory/what the newspapers say; t. that...; I t. so. liar* <sb_x who {habitually} uses language to make expression of thought that is not t r u e, in order to make sb_y think that thought_x is true>.

The verb *kick* exemplifies the phenomenon that Lyons (1977: 262) calls "encapsulation" – the relative narrowing of meaning contained in the semantic definition. This has been effected for *kick* by means of 'sb's foot' in the seme that specifies the body part used: <#sb_x# strongly touches #thing# (sb_y's body part) using sb_x's foot> To bring the encapsulated feature to the surface would be pleonastic: **He kicked the ball with his foot*, unless the specification is even more precise: *He kicked the ball with his left foot*.

Pleonasm imposes restrictions on collocability. Thus, the following collocations are infelicitous: ?*serious battle /rebellion/revolution/war* ('bad and s t r o n g event that is s t r o n g') – see §3.3.6.

The sentence **The man badly wished them to leave* (Greenbaum 1970: 1) is stylistically wrong because *badly* means 'strongly', and *wish* repeats this seme. *The man badly wanted them to leave* is informative because *want* lacks 'strongly'. However, there is no pleonasm when 'strongly strong' from the analysis is combined with

'strong' in the directive (like in *wild*₅ 3.3.5). The definitions are:

wish <#sb_x# intentionally experiences mental phenomenon_x / *this* thought concerning phenomenon_y strongly wanting phenomenon_y to exist (in order to make #sb_y# experience / be affected by / come to be with / use #sth {good}# for sb_y), when sb_x is without power to make phenomenon_y>; e.g. *I w. [that] I knew it. She wishes to_{1a} be alone. Do you w. me to go?* (By way of politeness, the speaker invests the hearer with power to make phenomenon.) *I w. for₁₀ him to succeed. w. for₇ an opportunity; w. sb good morning; W. me good luck. w. peace/joy; ??I've been wishing you success for years. *Happiness is wished (by me).* (clues: to 'experiences mental phenomenon_x concerning phenomenon_y' - non-finite clause Type I, to '*this* thought' - (*that*), to 'experience mental phenomenon_x strongly wanting phenomenon_y' - *for₇*, to 'experiences mental phenomenon_x wanting phenomenon_y' - *to_{1a}*-infinitive)

want (semantic prime)<#sb_x# experiences psychological phenomenon_x concerning phenomenon_y wanting phenomenon_y - event made by sb_y, source being sb_y, in order to make {living} thing - sb_x experience / be affected by / use (#)sth {good}(>#) Madge wants to_{1a} be an actress. What do you w. me to_{1a} do? I w. this letter (to be) ready by tomorrow! I w. it for₁ you. What do you w. of₇/from₈ me? He is wanted by police. I've been wanting to meet you for ages. *W. to be alone!

For linguistic stylistic reasons, speakers do not normally say *dark black*, not because experience teaches them that black is not dark, which is simply not true, but because black is dark by definition, and therefore it is

superfluous to mention it. However, if the connection is predicative rather than attributive (cf. §4.10), it would be acceptable to say *Black is the darkest colour*. The predicate, unlike the subject, is expected to add new information to an utterance. Therefore, when enumerating the characteristics of living beings in *Living beings eat food*, the noun *food*, coinciding with the object directive of the predicate verb *eat* is redundant, while *living beings* is not, because 'living beings' is the subject directive of the verb *eat* (cf. Cruse 1986: 106; *eat* <#living thing_x that can move# makes (#)solid substance - thing_y(#) come to not exist any more and come to be changed in thing_x's body after moving through thing_x's mouth, because thing_x wants to | feel good / live}>), *food* (<solid substance_x - thing_x used when substance_x - thing_x comes to exist in living thing_y's body through thing_y's mouth>).

For expressive, emotional purposes, repetition of a seme contained in the definition of the collocating word within the same phrase is not felt as pleonasm, as in *rush quickly, murmur softly, shout loudly, huge giant* (Cruse 2004: 226). To offer a definition of a phenomenon as its cause is another manifestation of pleonasm, a trick to explain causalness away, e.g. *Anaemia is caused by having too few red cells in blood*.

Redundancy produced by the repetition of linking semes is a matter of degree; there may be one, two or more repeated semes. Thus in (a) *My dog had six puppies* (Gardner 1973: 17) there is no redundancy because the seme 'female' from the directive of *have*₂₃ (see §3.4.6 g) is joined to the noun *dog*, which contains no 'female' in its definition. In (b) *My bitch had six puppies* the seme 'female' is shared by the ready-made moneme *bitch* and *have*, which creates redundancy without pleonasm. When the seme 'female' gets its independent, morphological manifestation, the utterance becomes stylistically awkward: (c) *?My female dog/she-dog had six puppies*. The difference between (b) and (c) that is responsible for

the inadequacy of (c) lies in the explicit mention of *female* in the phrase *female dog* instead of the *bitch*. *Female* in (c) is obviously superfluous if *have puppies* is added.

In the long run it is the matter of pragmatics whether an utterance will be considered pleonastic or not. The utterance *The river runs* without modifications such as *fast* or *slow* is pleonastic for normal purposes (*river* <large and long space with a lot of liquid substance {water} moving in one direction>), *run*₁ <#liquid substance# moves in one direction>, but if it is said to a little child, it becomes metalinguistically informative, as an instruction about the use of the word *run*. *He pinched a part of her body* is unfortunate and uninformative because *pinch* can be defined as <#thing_x# makes #body part# be between two hard things_y pressed together>, and the sentence repeats the object directive completely (the second noun slot). But for stylistic reasons, if the speaker thinks of the bottom and wants to be polite, this sentence becomes felicitous.

1.1.3 d Zeugma

Two lexical items connected by a conjunction and a common argument or predicate in a phenomenon called "zeugma: cannot be conjoined in a well formed predication if they belong to different sememes of the same lexeme. Since *zeugma* is the occurrence of one lexical item that serves two clauses, zeugma is applied to test polysemy. For instance, **Tom followed the road and the fox* (cf. Cruse 1986: 13) or **Bill and the stone broke the window* try unsuccessfully to fuse two sememes into one. Complementarily, the unacceptability of these two sentences proves that the verb *follow* has one distinct meaning in *Tom followed the road*, and another in *Tom followed the fox*. Kuno (1974: 469) rightly claims that *break* in **John and a hammer broke the window* has two separate lexical meanings, one where *John* is a human

AGENT and another where *hammer* is an inanimate AGENT transformed from the INSTRUMENT. The meaning of *break*₁ is: <({#sth_x {sb [intentionally]} / sth_y# makes}) # rpart of 1 hard thing# {instantaneously} come to not exist in whole state any more and have different form by strong touch (using sth_y)>. That is to say, the definition covers two distinct meanings, one where sth_x {sb} (*John*) is the subject, and another one with sth_y, which is basically an INSTRUMENT transformed into an AGENT. The acceptable zeugma in *His decision and his departure were hasty* points to a single meaning of *hasty* in this sentence.

In *He experienced hatred*, the noun *hatred* can be either 'his own hatred' (= He felt hatred towards somebody) or 'hatred from others' (= Somebody hated him and so he was the subject of hatred) also exemplifies polysemy because *!He experienced love and hatred* is not acceptable if the meaning of *love* in this sentence is 'love from others' and of *hatred* 'hatred towards others', or vice versa. The example proves that there is a verbal sememe *experience*₁ and another *experience*₂, as dictionaries often distinguish.⁴

The question "Does *ride* have different meanings in such examples as *ride a horse* and *ride a bicycle*? (Lee 2001: 176) gets the answer if *ride* is submitted to the zeugma test. If *First she rode a bicycle and then a horse* is a normal sentence, then 'man-made thing' and 'non-human living thing' are not in contrast here (*The Holt Intermediate Dictionary of American English* has *Do you ride a bicycle or a horse?*). So, *ride* constitutes a single sememe in both collocations above. Therefore the cumulative definition of *ride*₁ in BE (as in *She can r.; The car rides smoothly. The horse rode away; The boy was riding on his father's shoulders; r. bicycle/motorcycle/tricycle/ass/horse; r. prairie; r. on donkey*) should be: <(#sb_x# makes) (#)man-made thing_x with narrow surface_x used to make sth_x move by ground / {{non-

human} living thing_y that can move {used to make sth_x move}}(#) move in some manner when sb_x's body | exists in space of thing_x / touches surface_x of thing_y and thing_{x/y} touches (#)ground(#)>⁵ – or, simplified: '(somebody makes) vehicle/animal move(s) on the ground with somebody in/on the vehicle or on the animal'. (There is also *ride*₄ defined as <#thing# uses (#)air/surface of water(#) to move> *Surfers rode the waves. A ship was riding the waves. Gulls ride (on) the wind*, and see *ride*₅₋₇ in §2.1.5 c.)

Zeugma which connects two different sememes is tolerated in metaphorical and jocular speech. "Zeugma is always a somewhat forced or artificial literary device, akin to punning, and is more often found in comic writing [...] than in serious discourse" (Hanks 2013: 229).

1.1.3 e Entailment

Entailment is "a relation between a pair of sentences such that the truth of the second sentence necessarily follows from the truth of first" (Crystal 1991: 122), i.e. if the first sentence is true, the second sentence must also be true, and if the first sentence is false, the second sentence may be true or false. Since entailment issues from the content of lexemes, it can be employed as a means to approaching definitions. For instance, *The cost of the project has increased* entails *The cost of the project grew higher* because *increase* is defined as 'become stronger in amount - size'. *Jim is tall* entails *Jim is not short* as a consequence of the antonymous relation between *tall* and *short* and the negation of the latter, which is reflected in a common complex seme incorporated in their definitions 'that has degree of extension'. Namely, *tall* is <#{large} thing# that has strong degree of prominent vertical extension in comparison with reference point, which is long-time state> (*tall boy/telegraph pole/pyramid*

/tower/tree; ?a t. glass); *short* is <#human living thing# that has small degree of vertical extension, which is long-time state> (*short boy*). The phenomenon of entailment also provides a test for the elements of definitions related to the hyponymous hierarchy (Cruse 1986: 14; see §4.1); for example: *It's a doll, so it's a toy*. (*It's a doll* unilaterally entails *It's a toy*; consequently, *toy* is the superordinate of *doll*). This has the same effect as *dolls and other toys* (**toys and other dolls*), *There's no toy more entertaining than a doll* or *She likes all toys except dolls*, and serves as a pointer indicating that the definitions of *doll* and *toy* must contain the element 'man-made thing used by children to play' (cf. Leech 1990: 97), *doll* further specified by additional semes.

1.1.3 f Paradox

Paradox (or contradiction) is produced in a connection of two sememes with incompatible content. This phenomenon arises when a sentence or a collocation contains homoreferential lexemes with semes that are contradictory (mutual antonyms included), i.e. semes which, at least in normal situations, cannot both be true at the same time, while the lexemes are not propped up by hedges such as *in some respect*. For instance, *magnanimous* and *egotistic* share 'mental event', but cannot be combined in **This gesture was magnanimous and egotistic* on the grounds of elements 'thinking of others' and 'thinking only of oneself' while both *magnanimous* and *egotistic* refer to *this gesture*. *He walked/*strolled quickly round the park* (Kempson and Quirk 1971: 556) reveals that *stroll* contains 'slowly' in its definition. The authors call this "a technique of forced-choice selection test". A paradox is also instantiated by the collocations **pale black* 'colour that has strongly strong degree of light and has no light' (*pale* <#colour# that has strongly strong degree of light>; *black* <colour

that has no light> and **pale ultramarine* 'that has strong degree of light and is blue colour tending towards red that has weak degree of light' (*ultramarine* <blue colour tending towards red that has weak degree of light>; *blue* <colour characteristic of clear sky>). (Definitions with 'colour characteristic of something' have been inspired by Wierzbicka's approach to definitions of colours.)

1.1.3 g Good-test

If an inanimate noun can be modified by the adjective *good* out of context, it means that the denotated entity is conceptualized as having a particular use. Thus, *a good knife* is all right because a knife is regularly used for cutting, but ?*a good stone* is not because there is no regular function of a stone, although a context-conditioned interpretation of this phrase is possible (cf. Fillmore 1982: 117; Taylor 2002: 451). In Pustejovski's terms (1995), *stone* is without a telic qualia. Accordingly, *knife* should contain 'used for cutting' in its definition, while for *stone* the seme 'used' should not be mentioned, at least not as an invariant feature.

Nouns denoting social roles, functions, positions and professions, like *accountant*, *daughter*, *judge*, *king*, *singer*, contain the seme 'social role'. Such nouns also collocate with *good* and *bad*: *good/bad* + *accountant/father/judge/king/milkman/racehorse/singer*, and they are ambiguous between (i) 'good/bad man' + 'social role' and (ii) 'good/bad in social role' (see §2.2.15). The semes 'used' and 'social role' are similar in meaning: *a good knife* 'a knife that can be used for cutting well'; *a good king* 'a king that makes habitualness of acting his social role of ruling well' – see §3.4.3. 'Social role' nouns enable the equation: *He is a weak king* = *He is weak as a king* = *He is a king that rules weakly* (Vendler 1968: 93). Both things with intended purpose and people with their

social roles and professions concern “functional relations” (Rasulić 2016: 270 - 274).

The same effect as with *good* is achieved by using *enjoy* in a similar test. “The meaning of a verb such as *enjoy* is bigly coerced by the context in which it is used: if you enjoy a film, you watch it; if you enjoy a meal, you eat it; if you enjoy a beer, you drink it; and so on” (Hanks 2013: 379). In our opinion, *enjoy* should be defined as <#sb_x# experiences strongly good emotion when sb_x uses energy of (#)sb_x(#) when affected by (#)phenomenon(#)>. The defining seme ‘phenomenon’ can be replaced not only by any gerund or verbal noun (*She enjoyed skiing/the sunrise*), which is to be expected as they refer to phenomena, but also to any noun that contains ‘phenomenon’ in its definition, even in the distinguisher. *Film* and *meal* are phenomena, while *beer* is a substance and *book* is a thing. And yet, the collocations *enjoy a beer/book* are easily understood even without context because *beer* is defined so as to contain ‘drinking’ and *book* (see §1.1.2) to contain ‘writing’ and ‘reading’ (i.e. ‘seeing’) as phenomena. Apparently, the speaker /hearer picks the ‘phenomenon’ element in his or her mental definition of a noun. However, ??*Enjoy the stone* out of context is meaningless. It has to be supplied with contextual information about particular stone useful for carving, sculpturing, building, or any other specific use, because there is no singular function of stone such as could affect its user. But even then it is just a wayward exploitation. (If ?*Enjoy your knife* sounds strange, it is not because the sentence is not understood (the meaning is ‘Enjoy cutting with your knife’), but because it is unusual to enjoy cutting.) Pustejovsky (1995 in Jackendoff 1996: 61) attributes this phenomenon to qualia, while Jackendoff comments that qualia structure is world knowledge and that world knowledge is encoded within a lexical conceptual structure.

Likewise, out of context the sentence *I like chocolate* makes an elliptical reference to ‘I like eating

chocolate' and not to 'I like filling cracks in walls with chocolate' or something else as fanciful as that (see §1.1.3b). Namely, *chocolate* must be defined as '{sweet brown} solid - soft - liquid substance made to be eaten/drunk'. Another test is the frame *He is addicted to _____*, where the noun in the slot reveals the typical use of the denotated object/substance. *He is addicted to wine* = 'to drinking wine', *to chocolate* = 'to eating chocolate', *to golf* = 'to playing golf', etc.

One more clue for detecting defining semes, at least in an indirect way, will be mentioned in §3.5.1 in connection with *headed*.

1.2 TYPICALITY

1.2.1 There is a type of semes that are very important in creating definitions although they are non-distinctive. For instance, the noun *cot* in British English can be defined as <man-made thing {with high sides} with space for young child>, or in American English as <man-made thing_x that is simple, narrow and used when sb lies on thing_x {in tent}>. In both definitions elements marked by braces are important for identification of the meaning and for explanation of the usage of the noun because these semes occur in speech or text very frequently. And yet, strictly speaking, they can be omitted if a definition featuring only invariant elements is required.

To take another example, sememe *hurl*₂ (other than *hurl*₁ in *hurl stones/spears*) collocates with the following object nouns: *abuse, accusations, allegations, assaults, attack, censure, challenge, charges, contempt, criticism, curses, defiance, epithets, ideas, insults, interjections, knowledge, lyrics, oath 'curse', obscenities, offence, outrage (New Democrats and populists h. moral outrage at one another), pain (I want to h. my pain at her), profanity, pronouncement, prophesies, questions,*

rage, remarks, reproof, slights, slurs, threat, rhetorical weapons, wishes, sharp words. They are almost always in the plural, followed by the preposition *at*. When looking for the common content of these nouns, one can notice that they most often, but not always, denote verbal aggressive messages. Less frequently, the verbal communication is not negative (*epithets, ideas, interjections, lyrics, pronouncement, prophecies, questions, remarks, wishes*). When a noun does not denote a verbal message at all, such as *knowledge, outrage, pain, rage*, such a message is implied. Thus, the most probable interpretation of *hurl one's pain at sb* would be 'use words to describe one's pain and by empathy make the other person share the pain'. The preposition *at* in these collocations is *at_g* (§3.1.2. I).⁶ Therefore we define *hurl₂* as $\langle \#sb_x \# \text{ uses } sb_x\text{'s energy of emotion and language to make } sb_y \text{ experience } \#\{\text{more than one}\} \text{ expression of mental phenomenon / event made by use of language} \# \text{ in order to make } sb_y \text{ weak} \rangle$, and the seme 'more than one' has been marked as typical.

When sememe *lose₁* is concerned (defined in §2.5.1c), the most frequent are collocations with the object 'money' or, as in *Tom lost all his money on betting*. Less typical are those cases that contain 'habitualness of getting money', e.g. *Jim lost business to the competitors*, and even less those that do not denote money, such as *Jim's grandmother lost all her teeth, lose sb's support / sympathy, lose a friend, lose interest*. (On the notion of habitualness see §2.1.5a.)

Typicality in definitions contributes to shaping a view of a collocation as a scaled property when extralinguistic matters of categorization of reality are at stake. *Tree* is by definition $\langle \{\text{large}\} \text{ living thing}_x \text{ that cannot move, with one } \{\text{long}\} \text{ part}_x \text{ touching ground and a lot of thin things}_y \text{ above part}_x \rangle$. The existence of a bonsai, an artificially dwarfed variety of tree or shrub,

justifies treating 'large' as a typical feature. Therefore the sentence ??*He is a lumberjack who cuts bonsai trees* is objectionable.

1.2.2 Typicality is involved in many linguistic phenomena. Let us take a look at a few more instances.

Certain countable nouns lack morphological plural. They are names of living creatures (*bison, cod, deer, fish, gazelle, goldfish, greenfly, grouse, halibut, moose, mullet, offspring, reindeer, salmon, sheep, shellfish, trout, whitebait, zebra*), of weapons and vehicles (*aircraft, hovercraft, spacecraft*) and plants (*cypress, fruit, willow*). Their denotata are typically seen in groups, i.e. defined as '{seen as thing_{more than one}}'. For example, *sheep* is defined as <weak living thing_x that can move, used at farms because of thing_x's thick hairs, easily made to move as sb_{indef} wants {seen as a lot of thing_x more than one}>. These nouns collocate predicatively with the nouns *bag/catch/defence /livestock*, which are indiscriminately used with plural and singular nouns (Hlebec 1996); e.g. *His catch was only one/three fish. His bag was one/two deer. Their defence was one/five gun. Her livestock was only one/ten sheep.*

As Cruse (2004: 268) notices, *cats and other animals* insinuates that *cat* is a hyponym of *animal*, but although *cats and other pets* is fine, it does not mean that *It's a cat* entails *It's a pet*. This is owing to the fact that a cat is a pet only optionally, and in the Anglo-Saxon culture typically, as indicated by the braces and the slant: <non-human living thing_x that can move with four legs {fighting with dogs}, that sb_{x indef} keeps in sb_x's house {because sb_x likes thing_x }/ because thing_x eats mice>.

The solution to the problem of the family resemblance concept seems to be in engaging typicality in the definition of *game* (Hanks 2013: 328). According to Wierzbicka (1990: 357), the meaning of this lexeme, adduced by Wittgenstein to illustrate family resemblance,

should contain the following invariable semes: 'somebody', 'long-time', 'aim: pleasure [of participants /spectators]', 'suspension of reality', 'rules and goals, 'unpredictable course of events', and the variable, i.e. typical ones: 'involving physical activity', 'with winners and losers', 'played for amusement [of participant(s)]' etc. Her view opposes Wittgenstein's concept, and Hlebec (2006) offered further arguments when joining in the criticism. Cruse also voices opinion that "this notion is not very helpful for semantic analysis" (Cruse 2004: 98). We propose the following definition of *game*: <short-time contest_x made by sb_{more than one} who are together experiencing good psychological state and make event_x according to rules, when end_x of contest_x cannot be known before end_y of event_x>.

What is a diagnostic feature of one sememe frequently becomes a typical feature of another sememe of the same lexeme. Thus, *glass*₂ (a synonym for *mirror*) is defined as <man-made smooth thing_x {of glass₁} used to make living thing_y that can move {sb} see space of thing_z{y} by looking at surface of thing_x> (cf. Landau 1989: 138-139). Also, the part of a definition that refers to what is typical often forms a separate sememe. For example, what is typical in *have*₁ ('in sb's hands') comes to the fore and becomes diagnostic in the definition of *have*₄.

1.2.3 Tests for typicality

To provide for a semantic definition's variable parts which refer to something typical, there are several means at disposal, and we are going to present some of them.

1.2.3a *Idiomatic expressions*

Idioms and fixed metaphorical expressions which reflect collective beliefs often offer material for typical senses in the definitions of the corresponding noun sememes (cf. Kövecses 1993: 262). As Goddard (1998: 242) informs, “[t]he importance of collocations, common sayings, endonyms, and so on as evidence for semantic structure was originally argued by the Russian linguist Jurij Apresjan, in various works”. For instance, *make a pig of oneself* is an informal expression meaning ‘eat or drink too much’ and *to pig oneself* ‘overeat greedily’. Therefore the definition of *pig* should include the information on overeating as typical: <non-human living thing_x that can move, with no hair and curly tail {that eats a lot}, kept at farms and used for thing_x’s meat>. Only idioms, phrases, sayings and proverbs that are frequently used in variants speak in favour of introducing their information to a definition. Thus, *to play cat and mouse with sb*; *When the cat is away, the mice will play*. *He who lives with cats will get a taste for mice*. *If you can’t feed the cats, you must feed the rats*. *That that comes of a cat will catch mice*, all converge on the cat’s feature of catching mice. *To lead a cat and dog life* and *fight like cat and dog*, direct to hatred between cats and dogs. These two characteristics should enter the definition of *cat* (§1.2.2), at least as typical features in order to help differentiate this animal species from other similar ones. On the other hand, *be the cat’s whiskers*, *like the cat that got its cream* or *set the cat among the pigeons* lack defining properties.

The following statement can be applied to the make-up of definitions, at least to the building-in of their typical features. “A useful source of information on intricate aspects of semantic attribution in view of cognitive frames can be found in formulaic similes (formulaic expressions of explicit expression) of the form AS ADJ AS N, such as the ones in [...] *as black as coal*, *as solid as rock*, *as proud as peacock*” (Rasulić 2016: 267).

Frequent idioms can help us to cut down the numerous available information about a notion expressed by a lexical item and concentrate on essentials. A definition like 'non-human living thing that can move with four legs, that sb_x indef likes to keep in sb_x's house, with sharp paws and soft and furry hair, that likes to be clean, easily jumping and climbing, whose eyes glow in dark, fighting with dogs and playing with/chasing/eating mice>, based on Wierzbicka's (1985: 167 - 168) explication of *cat* on one and a half pages does not serve our purpose to filter encyclopaedic facts and get purely semantic definitions. Such definitions can be very useful when studying culture in general and interpreting particular language use.

1.2.3b *But not*-test

What is negated in a clause containing *but* in the test frame X IS__, BUT... NOT (Hudson 1995: 22) is the typical feature of the entity described. For instance, *He is an industrialist, but he's not rich.* ??*He is an industrialist, but he is rich* (*Industrialist* contains {rich}). *It's a bird, but it can't fly.* ??*It's a bird, but it can fly.* (*Bird* contains a typical seme 'move in air' (= 'fly'; see §1.1.3c I for the full definition of *bird* and *fly*). Typicality yields oddness in the variant with *but*.

1.2.3c *Obligatory adverbs*

If an adverb is compulsory in front of an adjective, it means that the noun the adjective is attached to typically contains the content of the adjective (COBUILD *Grammar* 1990: 81). People are typically *dressed* (for *man*₁ see §1.1.2), while to denote a contrast with naked people the adjective *clothed* is used. Therefore, *He/She is a well-*

dressed man/woman, but **He/She is a dressed man/woman*. Another example is *The superbly cut clothes were displayed in the window*. **The cut clothes were displayed in the window*. (Clothes are typically cut to be worn.)

1.2.3d *Unmodified nouns*

A typical realization of a noun sememe does not have to be modified by a classifying adjective (§3.3.2a I), which is exemplified in *They left nothing except a few empty jars*, where *jars* refers to food jars. “[I]f one meant cosmetic jars one would have to say something like ‘cosmetic jars’” (Wierzbicka 1985: 62).

1.2.3e *Hedges*

In a sentence of the type STRICTLY SPEAKING X IS Y, the item marked as X lacks the feature that is considered to be typical of Y. Thus, *Strictly speaking, a penguin is a bird* shows that *bird* should be defined with ‘move in air’ as a typical feature. A penguin is a bird that cannot fly, and that is why the pattern with the hedge above applies, as distinct from **Strictly speaking, a sparrow is a bird*. This type of hedge is used when the speaker does not lower the criterion for categorization. The same effect is made by the hedge *loosely speaking*, with the notion of lowering the criterion: *Loosely speaking, a penguin is a bird*. Complementary to this, the intensifier *par excellence* goes with nouns containing a typical characteristic: *A sparrow/*penguin is a bird par excellence*. (See also Taylor 1989.)

We have used ‘characteristic of’ as a special kind of typical feature in §1.1.3 f), in the spirit of Wierzbicka’s (1985: 343) warning that “the different senses of the

notion ‘prototype’ should be clarified and sharpened through attempted definitions”.

1.2.4 Canonical features

Typical features should be distinguished from “canonical features”. A feature emerges as canonical when it is distinctive in system and actualized in text by default, but can be suppressed in text and exchanged for an undistinctive feature. In *It’s quite pleasant sitting here and looking out the window. The trees are rushing past at 90 miles per hour* (Langacker 2006: 71), *tree* collocates with *rush* to convey the speaker’s impression while riding on a train. We cannot say that ‘moving’ is non-typical and ‘static’ is typical for trees since we do not want to say that most trees do not move, or that trees usually do not move. *Tree* is by definition a living thing that cannot move and therefore it is canonically static. Only in fairy-tales trees can change their place by their own will. In Langacker’s example, it is the subjective speaker’s point of view that makes trees seem to move.

Also, having four legs is a canonical feature (Murphy 2003: 98) that has a distinctive function when defining *dog*. The absence of canonical features is regarded as a defect or as a deviation from the “normal” or “expected” state, but within the semantic theory it should not be treated as “untypical”, although the *but not*-test (§1.2.3b) for typical features and the *but*-test (1.1.3a) for invariant features give the same reactances as canonical features: *It’s a dog, but it hasn’t got four legs. *It’s a dog, but it has got four legs*. Semantically, ‘with four legs’ for *dog*, just like ‘absence of movement’ for *tree*, are distinctive because semantics deals with the language system rather than the language process, and exceptions in reality, like abnormal members of a natural kind, such as a green lemon, a three-legged tiger (Putnam 1970 in Hanks 2013: 338) do not count.⁷ Also,

in the definition of *boat* <small - (informal style) large man-made thing with surface and space used for moving on water>, it should be understood that canonically a boat is without a hole, because a boat with a hole cannot be used (Verschueren 1981: 334). For the same reason Wierzbicka (1990: 348) states that *boat* should not be defined as 'able to travel on water'. She proposes 'kind of thing made for travelling on water' as a better solution.

In one of its meanings the adjective *raw* occurs in *raw patches on body* and *raw elbow*. For a start, we define this sememe as <#body part# that is without skin> because patches on the body and elbow are parts of body. The liver and the eyes are also parts of body, and yet **raw eye/fingernail*, *!raw liver* are wrong. But when 'with skin' is added we arrive at the paradoxical <#body part with skin# that is without skin>. We might add the technical term "canonically" to 'with skin', but such terms are to be avoided in defining and canonicity should go without saying. The solution seems to be <#body part with skin# that has come to no more be with skin>, where, 'with skin' is understood canonically, while 'has come to no more be ...' gives an aspectual perspective to the meaning to imply that a *raw elbow*, etc. was previously with skin.⁸

To put it simply, a typical seme is a very frequent non-distinctive feature, whereas a canonical seme is the opposite: a distinctive feature that is very rarely suspended.

2 COLLOCATION

2.1 DEFINING COLLOCATION

2.1.1 The English linguist John Rupert Firth (1890-1960) used the terms “collocation” and “collocability” (Firth 1957a)⁹ and initiated a special interest in collocations, although he was not systematic in his remarks on the subject. For Firth, collocations were “words that co-occur more frequently than it would be expected by chance” and this definition has been taken over by some linguists (cf. Gledhill 2000, Stubbs 2001: 73 in Krimer-Gaborović 2011: 134). “Words must at some level or other be taken at their face value in their common and usual verbal environment” (Firth 1968: 113). According to Firth, who created the famous maxim “You shall know a word by the company it keeps”, “[meaning] by collocation is an abstraction at the syntagmatic level and is not directly concerned with the conceptual or idea approach to the meaning of words. One of the meanings of *night* is its collocability with *dark*” (Firth 1957a: 181). Also, part of the meaning of *cow* can be insinuated by such collocations as found in *They are milking the cows. Cows give milk* (Firth 1957b in Geeraerts 2010: 169). As concerns Firth’s contribution to the theory of collocations beyond stressing the general importance of collocations for semantics, it is best to quote Lyons: “Now Firth does not in fact have very much to say [...] about the question of determining what collocations are synchronically acceptable or unacceptable” (Lyons 1966: 296). “[Firth] does not engage in detailed, logical development of arguments; rather, he offers flashes of insight and thought-provoking phrases and metaphor” (Hanks 2013: 392). “The Firthian school correctly recognizes that one item collocates with a number of other items and that this is an important

aspect of meaning, but offers no explanation of the mechanism that may govern the selection of some items rather than others" (Kövecses 1986: 130). However, Firth's pioneering and inspiring role in this sphere is highly valuable. "From Malinowski Firth borrowed the idea of studying language in a context of situation, but refined the method by distinguishing various levels on which there are strictly linguistic elements. He then distinguished the specifically linguistic levels into sets of relations on the two axes discussed by de Saussure, paradigmatic and syntagmatic, and he insisted that priority could not be given to either. The over-all purpose of this contextual analysis was the statement concerning meaning" (Dineen 1967: 303).

As Roos stated, collocation is not a mere co-occurrence of two lexical items but, as Leisi's term "semantic congruence" suggests (Leisi 1973), also their capacity or tendency to collocate. Collocation is not only a kind of distribution relevant for disambiguation or for the description of style, but also a syntagmatic connection of lexical items according to specific rules (Roos 1976: 66).

The importance of collocation has also been stressed by Igor Mel'čuk, a Canadian Russian-born linguist. "Mel'čuk (1976: 59) has expanded upon the Saussurean bipartite notion of a linguistic sign by claiming that a lexical item is an 'ordered triple' consisting of *significant*, *signifié*, and 'information about combinatorial properties of the sign, which in their totality may be spoken of as syntactics'" (Wilkins 1996: 267).

John Sinclair defined collocation more narrowly as "the occurrence of two or more words within a short space of one another in a text. The usual measure of proximity is four words intervening" (Sinclair 1991: 170). This criterion lends objectivity to defining, but it is mechanical. If *law* is taken as a node (key word) in the sentence *The new safety law naturally led to higher car prices*, according to Sinclair's principle the collocates would be *the, new, safety, naturally, led, to* and *higher*. We give

preference to the easily applicable intuitive criterion of a permissible connection within a grammatical structure and do not take into consideration the span of a collocation, no matter how many words apart are the node and its collocator, as long as they make a semantic and a syntactic whole. Thus, in our view, only *the*, *new* and *lead* are natural collocates of *law* in the sentence above because parsing shows that *law naturally* or *law higher* do not constitute grammatical structures. In another instance, mentioned in Fontenelle (1997: 3), “[f]inding the correct sense, and hence the translation of *laid* [in *These hens have laid dozens of eggs since we bought them*] obviously depends on the system’s ability to recognize a collocational relationship between *lay* and *egg*, and not between *lay* and *dozen*”. We agree with the following statement: “[T]he co-occurrent pairs will not always be adjacent in the text; for example [...] a student of cooking vocabulary would be interested in the collocations of FRY and POTATO, MASH and POTATO, SAUTÉ and POTATO, etc., regardless of the distance between them in the text. Since many concordances only show the immediately adjacent forms they would not, perhaps, be the perfect basis for this inquiry” (Matthews 1991: 35). Neither does *noisy to sleep* make a collocation, as in *It’s (too) noisy to sleep here*. Although superficially *It’s (too) noisy to sleep here* and *He is anxious to sleep here* may seem to belong in the same pattern, the former sentence has ‘the ambient is noisy’ (conveyed by the collocation *it noisy*) + ‘sb would like to sleep here’, where *noisy* is part of one whole and *sleep* part of another, while the latter nests the collocation *anxious to sleep* ‘a person (would strongly like) to sleep’.

Unlike John Sinclair, we place stress on abstract, language-system tendency for a collocation to occur, while a corpus serves to verify such tendencies. We side with Geoffrey Leech, who stated that “[t]he data-driven approach that he [Sinclair] advocated opposed any application of pre-existing theoretical concepts to corpus

data [...]. For him, the corpus data was all-important, whereas for Chomsky it is useless. My position (somewhere between what I would call extreme empiricism and extreme rationalism) is that we need both theory and the data of real language in use (Milojević 2010: 329)". Corpora and concordances are valuable because they offer real-life usage, but only after ambiguity has been eliminated and if (for our purpose) literary and scientific texts and nonce occurrences have been left aside. Sabine and Stefan Evert (2014: 59) show that "larger corpora do not necessarily lead to better results" and "composition and cleanness of a corpus are more important than corpus size".

Chomskyan exclusive reliance on the linguist's own intuition and a mechanical use of corpus are two equally unsatisfactory extremes.

For a collocation there must be a paradigmatic choice to replace both collocates, e.g. *red book: r e d shirt/sky/stain; big/heavy/interesting b o o k.*

2.1.2 A wide range of definitions and differences in the use of the term "collocation" is presented in detail in Nesselhauf (2005: 11-18). In the present book, collocation will be defined as a well-formed syntagmatic relationship between two (or seldom three) closely related lexemes making a grammar unit (a simple clause or phrase) in which both (all) of them may undergo paradigmatic replacement, not changing the lexical meaning of the other. In brief, collocation is a permissible connection of pairs, rarely triple sets, of lexemes within short grammatical structures.

The claim that language is a system implies that there are a number of recurring elements (i.e. units) and a number of "selection (selectional) rules" or "restrictions" to the combinations of the units, not only in grammar (as noticed by generative grammarians), but also in semantics. Therefore, they can be labelled "collocational restrictions" in general. In generative semantics, the

notion "selection(al) restriction"¹⁰ was used to connect the content of a verb with its subject in the text, but the repercussions of selection rules (rules of selection restrictions) were still considered to be of syntactic rather than lexical nature. Lehrer (1974 in Kövecses 1986: 129) treats collocation under the name of selection restriction and Leech (1990: 137 – 142) goes further giving reasons why selection restrictions are to be defined semantically rather than syntactically in terms of arguments and predicates provided with semantic features.

2.1.3 Collocability is a possibility or, in a stricter sense, a pronounced tendency of words to co-occur in texts. It depends on the semantic content of lexemes and grammatical constructions involved, as specified in their definitions.

A collocate is one of two or two out of three elements that make up a collocation. A "node" (Sinclair's term; Firth's "key-word", Hausmann's "base") is the collocate that is regarded as fixed in the analysis, while the other one, "collocator" (Hausmann's term, Mel'čuk's "value"), varies during the investigation. For Mel'čuk, one element in collocations (e.g. *favour*) is chosen on the basis of its meaning, and the choice of the other (e.g. *do*, **make*, **give*) depends on the first chosen. Roles of node and collocator are relative and they depend on the investigator's attitude, but they are indispensable when the collocational method is implemented. To view collocation as a neutral syntagma without either/any collocate being primary (Lipka 1992: 166) is a legitimate but less fruitful approach.

In our view, the clause *The Earth orbits the Sun* consists of two collocations: *Earth orbit* and *orbit Sun*. To treat *Earth + orbit + Sun* as one collocation would cause complications (see §2.1.5 b I). Instead of analysing a verb/adjective + noun or noun + verb /adjective collocation with the noun as a node, because of the procedure of the collocational method, it is much more

fruitful to treat the verb as a node. A noun as a node has no practical value because nouns are independent, containing no slots for combinations with other parts of speech, while adjectives and verbs do contain (see §3.0; cf. Cruse 2004: 223). For example, the collocation *blunt knife* is to be approached with *blunt* as a node and *blade/knife/pencil/razor* as collocators, rather than with *knife* as a node and *blunt/new/sharp* as collocators. The dependency grammar also upholds the opinion that the latter approach is much less effective.

2.1.4 Directive and analysis

The part of an adjective's or verb's definition that establishes a link with collocating noun sememes is called a "directive" (Wiggins 1971: 26), which will be signalled by a pair of hashes like this: # #. The content of the directive corresponds to what Leech calls "collocative meaning". Unfortunately, Leech does not believe that collocations are the main path to discovering meaning and invites researchers to resort to collocational meaning "[o]nly when explanation in terms of other categories of meaning does not apply" (Leech 1990: 17). The rest of the definition, labelled "analysis" (Wiggins 1971: 26), is established by using simple recurring semantic units mainly reached by insight into function words' meanings and sometimes relying on intuition and lexicologists' practice. (In different terminology, for Allerton (1984: 26) directives are "secondary meanings", while analyses are "primary meanings".) Another way to look at the counterpart of the directive and analysis in grammatical constructions is noticing that verbs choose certain nouns as their subjects and objects, while adjectives choose nouns as their heads. Cruse (1986: 108) calls verbs and adjectives "selectors", while the nouns chosen are "selectees".

There is affinity between the sememes of verbs on the one hand and propositions in semantic syntax and semantic logic on the other, i.e. verb directives correspond to propositional arguments in semantic syntax, and analyses to predicates. For instance, in *He clipped the hedge* - *he* and *the hedge* are arguments, while *clipped* is the predicate. The semantic definition of the verb *clip* <#sb_x# makes #thing_x that grows# come to be in good form by making thing_x come to be without end part of thing_x when sb_x uses sharp thing_y> contains #sb# and #thing that grows# as directives, while 'makes ...come to be in good form by making thing_x come to be without end part of thing_x' is the analysis. There are one-place and two-place predicates which correspond to sememes with single and double directives. Single arguments and single directives lead to one-place predicates and intransitive verbs (e.g. *walk* as in *We are walking*), while double arguments and double directives yield two-place predicates and transitive verbs (e.g. *see* as in *I saw a bird*). The correspondence between the directives and analyses of verbal and adjectival definitions on the one hand and the arguments and predicates of propositions on the other hand amounts to the difference between *langue* (system) and *parole* (process), and this is the way the two language spheres are interconnected.

Not only the directive, but also the analysis in a definition provides for the good choice of collocates, just as restrictions in collocating are brought about not only by the directives but also by the content of the analysis. For instance, the adjective *boisterous* should be defined as <#event in nature / sea / long-time air that moves in outside space# that is strongly strong and bad>. The analysis 'that is strongly strong and bad' restricts the meaning 'long-time air that moves in outside space' to the noun *wind* because **b. breeze/zephyr* leads to paradox, and ?*b. blizzard/gale/storm* to pleonasm.

The transitive verb *run*₃ is defined as <#sb# comes to exist in space_x and not in space_y any more by moving feet fast in #contest#> as in *r. a race/rally/relay/marathon/the 100 m*. Although a tournament is a kind of contest, the collocation **r. chess tournament* is not well-formed because the analysis requires the participants to move fast, which is in a chess tournament out of question. To restrict the object directive content to 'contest when sb_x during short time makes sb_x come to exist in space_x and not in space_y any more' would be a redundant repetition of what has to be stated in the analysis. However, sometimes an object directive almost completely replicates the analysis, as in *strum* <#sb# makes sounds with fingers that touch strings of (#) man-made thing with strings used to make harmonious sounds when touched(#)>. (Touching a string to make a harmonious sound requires a special technique, but this does not affect the definition. In order to provide for such information the definition would become an instruction manual.) This situation of immediate context interconnection stirred Dwight Bolinger (1968: 246) to remark that to know the approximate meaning of *He strummed the guitar*, it is sufficient to be familiar with only *strum* or only *guitar*. But if we know neither, "[a]t some point it is necessary to break out of the circle, to get a foothold outside language. A theory of meaning that will do this is obviously easier to ask for than to get[...]".

For practical and perhaps psycholinguistic reasons it is preferable to disburden a directive and shift the definitional content to the analysis whenever possible (cf. *pretty* in §2.4.7c).

2.1.5 Classification of collocations

2.1.5 a We shall accept Firth's distinction between "free" (or "open") and "restricted" collocations. For Firth free collocations are those in which there is rich commutability (e.g. *useless* as a node + *dictionary/book/knife/telephone...* and other numerous collocators), while restricted collocations have a node combined with a narrow range of commutable collocators.¹¹

There is no strict borderline between free and restricted collocations. The number of substitutable collocators depends on the possible range of lexemes in the directive. If the directive is widely inclusive, such as *#thing#* or *#sth#*, there will appear numerous collocates and the result will be a fairly free collocation, like *heavy*₁ <*#thing_x#* that unintentionally makes sb experience bodily phenomenon of strong degree of effort to lift thing_x> + *boat/book/desk/jar/stone/truck/trunk...* For verbs containing in their definitions '*#sth#* (un)intentionally makes', such as *break*₁, *kill*, *open*, *screech* (<*#non-living thing / sth#* makes a high, rough, sharp and strong sound>, e.g. *The brakes screeched*), the list of available nouns is very long because of the broad-scope '*sth*'. But if the directive covers a narrow range of lexemes, there will be few nominal collocates, leading to restricted collocations. A very narrow range is manifested by the node *ribald* + few collocators: *laughter/humour/joke/speaker* or the adjective *rancid* (<*#fatty substance_x#* that tastes - smells bad because substance_x exists during long time>) with only *bacon/butter/fat/lard*. Hence Palmer's suggestion that "it could be argued that *rancid* is to be defined in terms of the very specific, unpleasant, taste associated with butter and bacon that is 'off' (Palmer 1981: 77). A middle-size collocation range is exemplified by *#non-human living thing that can move* used for making sb move# in the verb *curry* with the following definition: <*#sb#* makes *#non-human living*

thing_x that can move {used for making sb move {horse}}# come to be in good state by combing hair of thing_x>: *curry* + *ass/camel/colt/foal/donkey/horse/mare/pony/stallion*. The collocation *curry dog* and possibly *curry* followed by names of other animals in various cultures, warrants proclaiming horse as a typical, not the sole, animal that can be curried. This range is narrower with the verb *neigh*: *colt/foal/horse/mare/pony/stallion* + *neigh*: <#horse# makes high-pitch sound>.

In semi-idiomatic phrases one member cannot be replaced by any other lexeme to preserve the meaning of the other member. For example, *bill* in *foot the bill*, in *curry favour* (*favour* <event when sb_x {with power} makes phenomenon influencing sb_y in good way>), *shoulders* in *shrug one's shoulders*, *lips* in *pout one's lips*, *foot* in *stamp one's foot*, *sudden* in *all of a sudden*, *kin* in *kith and kin*, *span* in *spick and span*, and *lions* in *a pride of lions* cannot be replaced by any other lexeme to preserve the meanings of *foot*, *curry*, *shrug*, *pout*, *stamp*, *all*, *kith*, *spick* and *pride*. Just like idioms, they are not amenable to the collocational method, so they will be labelled "fixed phrases". (They were called "bound collocations" in Cruse (1986: 41), while Cowie (1981) named them "restricted collocations" in contrast to "open collocations".) Thus, *addled egg*, as a fixed phrase cannot serve as material for the collocational method phrase because in the meaning 'not fit for eating' *addled*₁ cannot collocate with any other noun except *egg*.¹² In a special technical meaning, the adjective *noble* occurs only with *metal*, and the fixed phrase *noble metal* can be defined as a whole as <metal substance that air does not change>, while the adjective *noble* should not be defined at all because the other member is not part of a paradigm. However, the definitions for *gold*, *silver* or *platinum* should contain 'metal substance || that air does not make different', with 'metal substance' as a marker and the rest a distinguisher – see §2.4.4.

Firth (1957a: 196, 197) made a distinction between “general (usual) collocations” and “personal collocations” as well. The examples of the latter, which are unpredictable nonce combinations, could be *the pulse of music*, *an edge to a voice*, and the famous Dylan Thomas’ *a grief ago*. *Constipated* by definition refers to persons, and to make sense of the unusual and unpredictable collocation in *constipated river* (McIntosh 1961: 337), it has to be interpreted metaphorically. Poetry thrives on unusual turns of phrases. Personal collocations are not interesting and, moreover, they are harmful, for the collocational method if allowed to enter the corpus. However, they are of high value in the study of metaphors in literature. It may be fruitful to analyse them subsequently, after the collocational method has been applied, to discover in what respect they deviate from the normal usage.

Some linguists have drawn a distinction between “occasional” and “habitual collocations” (like *hate pictures* vs. *take pictures*; cf. Roos 1976: 66). The collocational method treats them indiscriminately. Unlike Firth, we do not attach great importance to the statistical probability of occurrence. For instance, the noun *rain* is most frequently followed by *fall*, less frequently by *stop* and rarely by *end*. And yet these findings from the *BNC* do not affect the definition of *rain* as <environmental phenomenon with a lot of small parts of water that come downwards from above>. If *torrential* has been found to occur attributively in 98% cases, we ignore the exceptional 2% and treat *torrential* as an attributive adjective, which is reflected in the definition of this adjective as <#liquid substance# that is of strong kind and comes downwards in a lot of parts> – see §3.3.2a I. Deviations from linguistic “rules” are always to be expected in speech and sloppy writing.

A view has often been held of collocations as arbitrary and unpredictable combinations. This is simply not true. For instance, *make a decision* or *fully aware*, adduced as examples of “collocations, i.e. arbitrarily restricted lexeme combinations” in Nesselhauf (2005:1),

are not arbitrarily restricted at all. Allerton (1984: 29) thinks that the use of *on*, *put*, *give*, *make* and *to* in *on Fridays*, *dependent on*, *put question*, *give answer*, *make suggestion* and *essential to* are arbitrary in spite of his claim that "the (non-)occurrence of a collocation is a direct result of its regularly predictable meaning". Neither do we agree with Benson (1989: 4) when he stated: "The arbitrary nature of collocations can be easily demonstrated within English itself. One says *make an estimate* – but not **make an estimation*; *make an effort* – but not **make an exertion*[...]". In order to make the matters clear, one should be aware that many speakers (and certainly not Morton Benson) mix *estimation* with *estimate*, and their usage has not been taken into consideration here, as, for instance, *estimation of how much you should pay* or *estimation of how long the repair will take*. Fowler (1965) says: "The sense of a judgement formed by calculation or consideration belongs to *estimate* and not to *estimation*, which means not the judgement itself, but the forming of it. [...] The use of *in my* etc. *estimation* as a mere substitute for *in my* etc. *opinion* where there is no question of calculating amounts or degrees, as in *The thing is absurd in my e.*, is illiterate."

If we define *estimate* as <sb_x's thought_x that is made expression of concerning amount_x of sth when sb_x wants to know amount_x as n e w true thought_y>, *estimation* as <sb's thought that is made expression of concerning degree of how much sth is good>, *effort* (= 'attempt') <strong mental phenomenon_x of sb_x who uses sb_x's energy wanting phenomenon when sb_x strongly uses sb_x's energy>, the justification for *make* to be used with *estimate* and *effort* becomes obvious: *make* is activated because of the seme 'new'. Admittedly, it may seem at first blush that there is a vicious circle here: *make* is defined as 'new' and we define *estimate* and *effort* by means of 'new' because they collocate with *make*. But on

second thoughts, we may understand that when people make an estimate of something, they (want to) come to learn about something they did not know before, as in *I made an estimate of how many people would attend the concert on the basis of the interest they had shown last time*. Contrariwise, the phrase *in my estimation* involves no idea of novelty on the part of the experiencer; I just inform somebody else about my opinion. Likewise, 'effort' is directed to gaining something that has not existed before, whereas the notion of exertion centres on effort itself and its cause. Therefore, *make* incorporates the seme 'new' and combines with those nouns that also contain 'new'. The seme 'know' is compatible with *wh*-words (§3.1.3), as shown in *an estimate of how many...*, and it is not recommended for *estimation*. 'To come to know' also implies the notion 'new', which leads us back to *make*.

Do as a full transitive verb (although "light", §3.4.7) refers to, or implies a task or some other expected, usual and habitual situation (*Ann did the vacuuming. I do a lot of swimming. Why should I do all the donkey work?*). It is in contrast with *make*, which, building on its primary meaning of creation, communicates a new or exceptional activity (exceptionality has a strong flavour of novelty), as in *make apology/the bed/break/date/sb's day/evening/exception/excuses/a go/history/impression/nonsense/offer/a play for sb/representations/room/splash/time/use/world of difference*. The idiomatic use of *make nothing*, with the meaning 'not experience strong and bad bodily phenomenon' (see *of*₆), as in *He makes nothing of lifting 60 kilos* and *make it 'succeed (in spite of difficulties)'* shows that *make* is impregnated with such a strong causative load that even in a collocation with "empty" words like *nothing* or *it* it can convey the meaning of effectiveness (with or without effort). Therefore *do*, with its 'expected' and 'habitual', agrees semantically with nouns that share the same semes, such as *do favour* containing 'expected', *accounts/business*

/catering/fishing/paperwork/research/shopping – all with ‘habitualness’. (With habitualness, reference is made not to individual events but to their set as a whole, which is a notion similar to mass nouns – cf. Declerck 1979: 17 in Laffut 2006: 132. Habitual situations, which manifest the habitual aspect (Kreidler 1998: 204), are neither stative nor dynamic.) The difference between the verbs *make* and *do* matches the difference between the infinitive and the gerund (see §3.2.6). *Make* refers to a single or more than one new event, while *do* is complemented by a verb referring to a habitual, regularly repeated event. If a situation is equivocal, speakers waver in use of *make* and *do*, as in *do/make rounds* ‘talk to a lot of people’, which combines the notion of frequency (a kind of habitualness) with effort to achieve something and create a new situation favourable for the one who “does the talking”. The difference between habitualness and state can be exemplified by the distinction between *custom* and *convention*. The definition of *custom* is <habitualness made by use of symbols concerning sb_x more than one with power who want to make a lot of sb_x more than one make event habitually concerning sth> (*abolish₂/abrogate /contravene/establish/observe/uphold* c.). *Convention* is defined as <long-time state made by use of symbols by a lot of sb_x more than one with power who want to make a lot of sb_x more than one make event_x concerning manner of making event_x>.) A custom is practised on particular occasions, i.e. customarily and occasionally, while convention is a generally accepted way of behaving. One can *break a convention* if it is *strict*, but not **break a strict custom*.

For us, *heavy rain* is not “like the more familiar kind of idioms, [a collocation that has] to be individually learned” (Cruse 2004: 74). There are definite conditions that obtain for *heavy rain* in contrast with **heavy wind*. The deviation of the seemingly similar **heavy wind* is based on a significant cognitive, semantic and lexical

difference: rain is conceived of as a lot of water drops, while *wind* is viewed as energy. The adjective *heavy*₂ collocates with *rain* and not with *wind* as a natural consequence of *heavy*₂ meaning <#environmental phenomenon# that consists of a lot of parts> (as in *h. snow/fog/mist; The air was h. with fragrance*).¹³ *Wind* goes with *high*, as *high* in one of its sememes agrees with nouns that denote degree, as in *high*₂ *expense /fine/loss/speed /temperature*, and this is the reason why *high* is connexive with *wind* rather than with *frost* and *rain* (cf. Cruse 2004: 74). The adjective *strong* in *strong wind* means <#phenomenon# that is strong (i.e. 'intense')>, 'strong' being a semantic prime. Since rain is measured on the scale of density of drops rather than on an intensity scale, it cannot be described as strong either.

2.1.5 b *Lexical and grammatical collocations*

There are two types of collocation according to the class of collocating words: (i) "lexical collocations", when both members are "lexical" words (also called "content", "full" or "open-class" words) and (ii) "grammatical collocations" (or Firthian "colligations") with one "closed-class", "function" or "form" word, i.e. a pronoun, article, auxiliary verb, preposition or conjunction. (On close affinity between a lexical word and a function word or a grammatical category as collocator see Benson et al. 1986.)

Lexical collocations in English can be classified into six subtypes:

- (1) verb + noun, e.g. *buy + book, reach + top, see + land*
- (2) adjective + noun, e.g. *little + finger, happy + face, change (is) + necessary*

- (3) noun + intransitive verb, e.g. *deer + run, woman + breathe*; or noun + transitive verb, as part of N + V + N pattern, e.g. *pupil + buy (notebook), sailor + see (land)*
- (4) verb + adverb, e.g. *speak + softly, walk + stealthily*
- (5) adverb + adjective, e.g. *slightly + rough, greatly + amused*
- (6) verb + adjective, e.g. *fall + ill, keep + quiet, turn + blue*

There are seven subtypes of grammatical collocations and each consists of three members. The last two are followed by a clause:

- (7) verb + preposition + noun, e.g. *account + for + behaviour..., throw (ball) + at + boy...*
- (8) adjective + preposition + noun, e.g. *angry + with + parent, keen + on + mathematics*
- (9) noun + preposition + noun, e.g. *pack + of + wolves, book + on + table, interest + in + poetry*
- (10) adjective + conjunction + adjective, e.g. *poor + but + honest*
- (11) noun + conjunction + noun, e.g. *pen + and + ink*
- (12) verb + conjunction + clause, e.g. *know + that..., understand + why...*
- (13) noun + conjunction + clause, e.g. *idea + that..., reason + why...*

This classification comes as a combination of subtypes classified by Hausmann, Aisenstadt and Benson (found in Nesselhauf 2005: 22) and extended by our item (10).

Links of bound morphemes, including derivational, inflectional and zero morphemes, with free morphemes, can be treated in the same way as free-morpheme collocations, but they will not be treated in this volume.

2.1.5 c *Specialized language*

The lexis of English for specific purposes has some particular features that may be analyzed by means of the collocational method, but care should be taken to label such usage as "specialized" or "technical". Hanks (2013: 324) expresses this opinion in the following words: "[T]here is a great difference between how words are used in science to express meanings stipulatively for purposes of rigorously defining scientific concepts, on the one hand, and how words are used to make meanings in everyday language, on the other". For instance, in a paper by Hüllen (1981: 141) "it is shown that [the lexical composition of verbs used internationally by pilots] is changed in such a way that special features (like + / - own power, + / - contact to the ground) become important. This gives the verbs a special meaning which is related to the general meaning of everyday usage in the same way in which scientifically planned and controlled movements (of a plane) are related to natural movements (of people and things)". To take an example, the verb *sink*₁ in everyday communication is to be defined as <#(Γbody part ofΓ living thing_x that can move# makes) #thing_y# come to exist in space of liquid - soft substance moving downwards {which is bad}>, as in *The ship is sinking. Our feet sank into the mud. They sank the ship*, while in technical parlance *sink*₂ is <#large man-made thing_x that moves in air# unintentionally moves in air downwards {which is bad}>. There is no strict borderline between technical and common language. The marker (§2.4.4) 'large man-made thing that moves in air' is not rare. It occurs as a marker of the nouns *aeroplane, aircraft, airship, balloon, fighter, plane, rocket* and many others, and also as a directive of the verbs *buzz, dive, land, navigate, pilot, propel, soar, and trim*. But in another example, 'molten iron' imposes itself as the object directive of the verb *puddle* (<#sb# makes

#molten iron_x# come to be without charcoal by moving parts of iron_x>) in highly restricted collocations *p. iron/steel*, and the classeme 'molten iron' belongs to technical jargon.

The verb *ride* feeds on its principal sememe (§1.1.3 d) when producing the following specialized meanings: *ride*₅ <#ground_x# is in kind of state for sb to ride₁ touching surface of ground_x> *The course will ride very hard in this weather*; *ride*₆ <#sb# is #some amount# of weight when ready to ride professionally> *John rides 115 pounds*; and *ride*₇ <#sb_x# makes event of #sports contest# when sb_x rides> *Does he ride this race?*

2.1.5 d Importance of collocations

Encountering and processing collocations is an important way to master the use of words in language acquisition, and the familiarity of native speakers with collocations is intrinsically related to gaining the mastery of mental lexicon. This idea has been expressed in the following statement by Eve Clark (2010: 261-262):

[Collocations] are another tool for children in tracking the conventions on words in the lexicon. Children make use of the patterns of co-occurrence in adult speech as they work out the meanings of verbs, for example. They take into account which nouns for objects commonly occur with which verbs, whether these are similar to each other, and which other terms also occur with those verbs. Consider transitive uses of the verbs *to eat* and *to open*. *To eat* is consistently used with nouns for kinds of food – cheese, apple, bread, while *to open* is used with nouns for containers with lids or barriers to access: box, tin, jar, door, window. When presented with an unfamiliar term collocated with *eat*, children can infer that it probably refers to some kind of food even when there is nothing physically present to support this inference.

As Stubbs (2001: 73 in Krimer-Gaborović 2011: 134) states, the unconscious knowledge of collocations plays a crucial role for the competent, idiomatic and fluent use of a language. Semantic definitions throw light on this knowledge and brings it to consciousness.

As distributional semanticists rightly suggest, children master the proper use of words by generalizing about the meanings of collocates of head words. "[...T]he ability of children to generalize to an infinite number of potential sentences depends on their analysing parental speech using a fixed set of mental categories' (Pinker 1995: 417).

The process of mastering the meaning and use of words has also been beautifully expounded by Michael Hoey in "Lexical priming" on page LA12 of *MEDAL*.

The explanation for the native speaker's characteristic fluency and naturalness lies in the fact that we do not construct sentences out of single and separate words. [...] They work together in predictable combinations. So the entry for *crazy* shows that the word is used in combinations like *be crazy to do SOMETHING*, *crazy about SOMEBODY*, *crazy about SOME-THING*, *drive SOMEBODY crazy*, *go crazy*, *like crazy* [...]. [...] The existence of combinations like these is proof that the traditional view of language as separate grammar and vocabulary has to be modified. [...] Whenever a native speaker encounters a word, he or she makes a mental note, quite subconsciously, of: (a) the words it occurs with (b) the grammatical patterns it occurs in (c) the meanings with which it is associated [...] This process of subconsciously noticing is referred to as *lexical priming*.

2.1.6 Compounds

A combination of two (or more) nouns that form a unit (like *safety match*) makes a compound rather than a collocation, although Firth treated elements of compounds as a kind of collocation. According to the criterion adopted

here, the collocations *juvenile crime* and *punishable crime* are not compounds, whereas *sex crime* and *crime rate* are. Nouns denoting material sometimes behave like adjectives (and they are treated as adjectives in most dictionaries) because the substance of which something is made is an inherent property of the thing (*silk thread, marble palace, iron ore, brick wall, concrete bridge*) – see §3.3.3. Therefore such phrases should be considered to be collocations rather than compounds – see also the comment on adjective - noun compounds in §3.3.1e.

Phrase appellatives (phrasal lexemes), by some authors included in partial idioms (cf. Palmer 1981: 81), make up collocations since they fulfil the criterion set in the final paragraph of §2.1, like *white wine*.¹⁴

2.1.7 Related collocations

Unexpanded definitions of some adjectives and definitions of the corresponding derived adverbs can differ only in their affiliation with parts of speech. The adjective *total* in *total stranger* semantically modifies the base morpheme *strange* rather than the noun *stranger*, and the semantic relationship between *total* and *strange* in *stranger* is not different from that between *totally* and *strange*. The definition of *totally* is <state in {strongly} strong degree that | is [strongly strongly] {bad} - good - true / does not exist> – see §3.6.3 b. *Total* is defined as <#(thing that makes) state# that | is strongly strongly {bad} - good - true / does not exist> (t. *ban/confusion/darkness/disregard/ignorance/silence/success*). In *total stranger* the indirect non-inherent connection (see §3.3.1c II) is activated: '(sb_x who makes) state that influences sb_y whose knowledge about sb_x does not exist', i.e. for *stranger* the brackets are withdrawn and *total* gets coupled to *strange* via 'sb who makes', but the unexpanded definition is the same as that of the adverb if the notation is ignored.

The adverb *eventually* (Fries' (1952) Class 4 word) has the same meaning as *eventual* (Fries' Class 3 word), but unlike *eventual*, which modifies nouns (Class 1) and can establish a non-inherent connection, it modifies verbs (a Class 2 word). The adjective *eventual* is defined as: <#(thing making) phenomenon# that exists at end of long-time time>, while the morphologically derived adverb *eventually* is defined as <phenomenon [existing at end of long-time time]> – see §3.3.2a III. Often, differences between lexemes from the same word family are small. To take an example, the noun *haste* is <bad and strong state when sb | moves / makes event | quickly, wanting to make phenomenon>, *hasten* is <#sb# moves / makes event | quickly, wanting to make phenomenon (moving in direction of space specified)>, *hasty* is <#(phenomenon_x made by) sb# who | moves / makes {bad} event | quickly, wanting to make phenomenon>, while *hastily* is <sb moves / makes event [quickly, wanting to make phenomenon]>. Here, not only are the definitions for the adjective and the adverb virtually the same, but even the noun definition shows similarity. The difference is only in evaluation and in the varying class status, which does not belong in meaning proper (see §3.0). A definition of an adjective is expanded by a directive in order to establish connection with nouns, while that of an adverb contains conditions that enable a link with adjectives and verbs.

Nouns are more special than adjectives (Jespersen 1924: 77); in our *haste* example 'bad and strong state' is more specific than 'phenomenon'. We accept that *eventual defeat* and *eventually defeat* are two distinct collocations, as Mel'čuk does, and that only inflectional variants of the same part of speech are instantiations of the same collocation. However, we cannot ignore the fact that there is a close connection, even equality, between the meanings of *eventual* and *eventually* and other similar derivatives. Therefore we choose to treat the cases like *eventual defeat* ~ *eventually defeat* as separate but

related collocations, with *eventually defeat* as basic – see §§3.0 and 3.6.1. Likewise, *pay debt* and *payment of debt* are deemed to be collocationally related because *-ment* changes *pay* from a verb to a noun with no semantic alteration. The collocation *pay debt*, which is basic in the lexical system, has its textual manifestations with inflectional variants in *paid debt*, *paying a debt*, *the paying of a debt*, and in the semi-compound *debt-paying*. (*Debt-paying* is not a true compound and can be treated as a textual variant of a collocation because its meaning is opaque; only the order of elements in *paying* and *debt* has changed.) However, *treating with cruelty*, *cruel treatment* and *cruelty of treatment* make different collocations (cf. Halliday 1966: 156 in Nesselhauf 2005: 13 and Felbabov 1988: 103, who treat the last two as variants of a single collocation. Their and Lipka's (1992: 166) stance is in line with Mitchell's view (1975: 117, 118, 134) that a collocation is an association of roots rather than words). Opting for one of these two approaches is an academic issue and the matter of an arbitrary decision. It seems to be of no consequence to the explanatory power how these cases are treated. On the one hand, different parts of speech with the same root often share a common meaning, which is apparent from the foregoing. On the other hand, their semantic definitions are not exactly the same, which reflects the highly abstract function that parts of speech serve in language.

2.1.8 Formal presentation of collocates

In order to be consistent, in our examples of collocations that accompany definitions, only the citation forms of lexemes appear. However, contextual and inflectional clues will be occasionally provided in order to make the reader aware of the actual meaning of the collocator. Thus, instead of the collocation *disgusted with way*, it is better to present an expanded phrase *disgusted with the*

way he behaves. Collocates are printed in italics, and if they are augmented in order to clarify their meaning, the members of the phrase that do not constitute the collocate will be printed non-italic.

2.1.9 Lexical fields

Different lexemes that share some semes in their definitions make up a lexical field. The verbs *nourish* and *fertilize* are both defined as: <#sth# makes #ground# good to make grow {a lot of} non-human living things that cannot move>, the adjective *fat* is <#ground# that is good to make grow a lot of non-human living thing_{more than one} that cannot move>, *sterile* is <#ground# where a lot of non-human living thing_{more than one} that cannot move cannot grow>, *verdant* is <#ground# that is with a lot of green non-human living thing_{more than one} that cannot move>, while *marginal* is <#ground# where a lot of non-human living thing_{more than one} that cannot move grow with difficulty>. The lexemes *field*, *land* and *soil* share the compound seme 'ground' (§§2.4.3c, 2.4.4., 3.1.1), and they belong in one and the same lexical field as the lexemes *fat*, *fertilize*, *marginal*, *nourish*, *sterile* and *verdant*, because all these verbs and adjectives contain 'ground' in their directives. Porzig's theory of lexical fields was based on this relationship of shared semes, called essential meaning-relationship (Porzig 1934 in Lyons 1977: 261).

2.2 SEMANTIC ROLES

2.2.0 General relations between arguments and predicates have been captured by a number of "semantic" or "thematic roles" ("deep cases", "semantic cases" or

“actants”; e.g. Fillmore 1968). “Roles can be thought of as labels for the variables that stand in relation to predicates” (Langendoen 1970: 62). Dixon (2005) has elaborated on a large number of semantic roles and verb classes and associated them with the corresponding syntactic patterns and functions. He employs syntactic patterns and collocability with function words to classify lexemes into semantic types and his definitions are sometimes in some parts governed by collocation.

These roles are useful as mnemotechnic labels for the relations, but do not have any other function or explanatory power beyond this (Mellema 1974; Palmer 1981: 149; Jackendoff 1985 and 1990 in Kreidler 1998: 83). Thus, a subject directive followed by ‘make’ in the analysis can be termed “AGENT”, e.g. *John* is the AGENT in *John wrote an essay* and in *The essay was written by John*.

We take roles to be abstract relations between lexemes in sentences rather than utterances.¹⁵ In *It wasn't Tom who did it*, on the sentence level *Tom* is AGENT anyway, although the utterance negates that *Tom* was an agent.

Roles can multiply depending on a particular type of semes in definitions. For instance, the noun *company* in the sentence *The company had₁₀ (§3.4.6 d) five casualties* (the noun *casualty* defined as $\langle sb_x \{ \text{more than one} \}$ (in strong relation with $sb_y \text{ more than one}$) who has come to not exist any more or has come to be affected by strongly bad bodily state during bad and strong phenomenon with a lot of $sb_x + y \rangle$), cannot be said to play any of the roles mentioned in the following list with quite a lot of roles (§§2.2.1 – 2.2.15). The military *company* above may seem to be in the role of PATIENT but actually it is not because the implied AGENT that has caused casualties is beyond the scope of the sentential scenario, while the real PATIENT is *casualties* – people and not a state that would be expected of *have₁₀*. Likewise, *have₁₂* presents a

subject directive where sb_x cannot be allotted to any of the roles on the following list.

Doubt as to the definite number of roles in general was expressed by Langendoen (1970: 88) “[W]e have not exhausted the list of possible roles in our discussion, and indeed the question how many roles will have to be distinguished in English grammar – and, more important, in universal grammar – has by no means been answered”.

2.2.1 Agent

2.2.1 a The common feature of verbs with an AGENT is the seme ‘make’ after the subject slot. The typical AGENT is a human (‘sb’) who does something intentionally¹⁶ and is exclusively responsible for an event that has an immediate effect, typically in direct physical contact, as in *break*₁ (see the definition in §1.1.3 d) or *kill* (§1.1.2). An untypical, inanimate AGENT (‘non-living thing’) is usually a piece of equipment or a natural force. “The ability of a noun to occur as an agent depends on its semantic specification as a thing which has the *p o w e r* to do something, a thing which has a force of its own, which is self-motivated [...as in] *The heat melted the butter. The wind opened the door*” (Chafe 1971: 109). Therefore its activity is unintentional and, in the case of equipment, not (completely) independent. With ‘phenomenon’, ‘non-living thing’ or ‘non-human living thing’ as the subject directive of ‘make’, ‘unintentional’ is implied and will not be explicitly marked. Only unintentional phenomena done by ‘sb’ will be explicitly marked as such, while both ‘sb makes’ and ‘made by sb’ imply the seme ‘intentionally’. The role STIMULUS, when corresponding to the subject directive in ‘#sth# unintentionally makes #sb# experience’, can be thought of as a kind of untypical AGENT, actually a quasi-AGENT, like *question* in *Her question surprised me* – see §2.2.5.

There are at least four ranks of inanimate AGENTS: (i) sophisticated devices, like *aircraft-carrier, computer, interceptor, printer, refrigerator, synthesizer*, (ii) gadgets like *blender, excavator, generator, telephone, windscreen-wiper*, (iii) tools and implements, such as *cigarette-lighter, grater, peeler, screw-driver*, and (iv) effective substances, like *contaminant, deodorant, fertilizer, pain-killer, poison* (Prčić 2001: 116). The same author finds another, quite untypical rank of inanimate AGENTS – (v) abstract means perceived only by their results, like *brain-teaser, eye-opener, font-designer, thriller*. We add (vi) ordinary things or substances (like *stick, stone, smell*, as with *pervade* §2.5.1.a I iii, *dust* in *Dust coated the shelves*) which can be used as the least typical AGENT.

The collocational method bolsters the division of instruments above. In the meaning <#sth {sb}# makes) #man-made thing indirectly helping sb# use energy_x as base of event (made expression of as amount of energy_x)> the verbs *operate* and *run*₂ collocate with names of instruments in (i) and in cases when energy is used (ii), but not in (iii - v). Examples are: *operate/run + calculator/car/computer/device/dishwasher/elevator /jet engine/safety equipment/freezer/laptop/lawnmower/lift /machine/machinery/press/record player/train/unit*. (Another collocator of these nouns is the intransitive verb *break down* <#man-made thing indirectly helping sb# comes to not use energy and not help sb any more>.) The verb *control* in one of its meanings collocates with 'man-made thing indirectly helping sb' in the object slot: <#sth {sb}# makes #_Γ part of _Γ complex man-made thing indirectly helping sb# be used> (c. *engine /fan/lighting/machine/machinery/traffic lights*; c. *level /pressure/speed/volume*). But: **operate/*run + deodorant/grater/peeler/stick*.

The ultimate decision whether these nouns will be interpreted as AGENTS in particular sentences depends on their collocations with verbs. With verbs defined as '#sb#

[intentionally] makes', like *beat* and *carve*, an inanimate agent is obviously normally impossible because 'sb' stands in its way. Therefore, the sentence **The stick beat Alec* is rejected (except in imaginary situations because in fairy-tales, fantastic stories and science fiction the AGENT can be anything, as in *The magic words/The blinking of her eyes opened the door*) because *beat* is <#sb_x# strongly touches #sb_y# using | sb_x's hand / hard thing | wanting to [intentionally] make sb_y feel bad>. In other words, *stick* is always conceptualized as a hard-thing instrument: coupled with *beat*, it is in clash with the dominant 'sb' as an expressed or implied agent. *The stick hit Alec* is accepted because *hit* is defined as <(#sb_x# makes) (#)thing_x(#) move and strongly touch (#)thing_y(#) (using thing_x - substance_x)> (for the full definition see §2.3.2b.), and allows the animate AGENT to recede into the background (reflected in the first pair of brackets) and promote a 'non-living thing' to an untypical AGENT. In collocation with *hit*, the conceptual searchlight may focus on a stick as a 'thing_x' and produce a clause with *stick* as the subject. The verb *break*₁ (§1.1.3 d) does not necessarily refer to an intentional event, although such an event is typical, while *carve* (§2.5.1b i) does. This accounts for *The stick/stone/axe/earthquake broke the window*, but **The chisel carved the statue*. For Nishimura (1993: 494) ??*A red-hot icepick killed Jane*, icepick being a tool (iii), is acceptable only under rather abnormal circumstances (e.g. where the icepick fell from a great height. Neither is **The door handle opened the door well-formed*, *door-handle* also being a kind of (iii). However, *The key opened the door* is acceptable because opening a door depends on properties of the key (see *open* in §2.2.4; Taylor 1989: 217), which is an individualized implement, in fact a gadget (ii). While a stick is totally dependent on the hitter, a key has a significant degree of independence.

In an adequate context the action referred to can be essentially the same in sentences with distinct deep cases, as in *She opened the safe with the code* and *The code opened the safe*. "The difference lies in the ways in which the action is related to the various entities which participate in the action. The participants simply stand in different "case" relations to the activity and the differences of meaning are primarily matters of grammatical meaning rather than of referential meaning" (Nida 1975: 136). Another example is *load* <#sb / man-made thing_x helping sb indirectly# makes a lot of (#)thing_y more than one - substance_x(#) move and touch (almost) all surface_x / exist in (almost) all space_x of (#)man-made thing_z {used for making {sb}- thing_y move} (#), using thing_x to make substance_x touch surface_x / exist in space_x>. This verb contains 'man-made thing_x helping sb' in the subject slot, and it is repeated in the analysis to reflect the fact that such things like thing_x above play alternative roles of INSTRUMENT (§2.2.6) and AGENT.

2.2.1 b Two agents of different status (animate and inanimate) usually cannot be coupled in a single situation, and they belong to separate sememes: **John and the key opened the door* (Palmer 1981: 147). **Bill and the stone broke the window* (Fillmore 1968). While *John* and *Bill* are typical, animate AGENTS, *key* and *stone* denote things used as instruments by definition (*key*) or occasionally (*stone*), here promoted to AGENTS. However, when events are separate, it is acceptable to mention different levels of agentivity: *The window was broken once by John and once by a car fender* (Nishimura 1993: 498). In *Mary and a robot cleaned the house*, the man-made thing is perspectivized as a self-activating means because it is a sophisticated device (i), while ??*Mary and a vacuum-*

cleaner cleaned the house is acceptable only in humorous use, when the gadget (ii) vacuum-cleaner is personified. Definitively aberrant is **John and a pencil drew a portrait*, as a pencil is just a tool (iii) – for *draw* see §2.2.16a.

Modern weapons are sophisticated devices and their names can be used as type (i) AGENTS. *Bob and the enemy gun fired almost simultaneously* shows that there is only one meaning of *fire* here. *OALD* cuts the verb *fire* ‘shoot a weapon’ into two allophones, while *MEDAL* treats them as a single sememe. Our definition of the verb *fire*₁ is: <(#sb_x# makes) (#)weapon_x(#) make (#)flying thing_x from weapon_x(#)>¹⁷ come out of weapon_x {using energy of thing_x to strongly touch sth_x in order to make sth_x be in bad state}>. For *She fired at a target*, *The rebels fired their machine guns into the air*, *The squad fired on demonstrator* or *Several shots were fired*, ‘sb’ makes’ is relevant, while for *The gun fired* ‘weapon makes’ is activated.

This type of verbs, containing ‘(#sb# makes) (#)thing - substance#) make - move’ should be distinguished from the unaccusative and middle verbs – see §§2.5.2a and 2.5.2c II. Although the potential object directive ‘weapon’ here may become the subject directive, it does not mean that *fire* can become a middle or unaccusative verb. The barrier is the double object, which prevents ‘weapon’ from being understood on par with *bread* in *Bread is baking*. Namely, although *fire* in *The gun fired* is as intransitive as *bake* in *Bread is baking*, the first sentence has active meaning and implies ‘ammunition’ as object, whereas *bake* in our example does not imply any object and has passive meaning.

Even though not functioning as a subject, a noun after *by* passive sentences is also an AGENT because such sentences are based on the same definition of a verb as their active counterparts.¹⁸ – cf. the definition of *by*₁ in §3.1.2. I.

2.2.2 Patient

When an AGENT does an action that affects a thing, the role of the thing is called "PATIENT". (For the discussion on "affect" see §3.2.8.) In Crystal (1991: 11), a PATIENT is described rather loosely as usually referring to an entity (animate or inanimate) or to an abstract notion which does not cause the happening denoted by the verb, but is directly involved in some other way. It is typically the role of the direct object, e.g. *ball* in *I kicked the ball* and *shovel* in *Tom grabbed a shovel*.

2.2.3 Experiencer

The role of an animate directive of a lexeme containing the seme 'experience' (cf. endnote 4) followed by a kind of psychosomatic, i.e. 'psychological' or 'bodily phenomenon' (such as *enjoy, feel, hear, know, like, see₁, suffer, think*), is said to be an EXPERIENCER (Halliday 1970: 153, originally called "DATIVE" by Fillmore). Thus, *Peter* and *I* are EXPERIENCERS in *Peter felt excitement* and *I understand your problem*. (Dixon uses "COGITATOR" as a label for the doer of thinking.)

In *The book interested₁ him*, the EXPERIENCER is 'he' (surfacing as *him*), in *Peter interested₂ his friend in computers* and *Mary interested₂ herself in computers* the EXPERIENCERS are 'friend' and 'Mary' (represented by *herself*). (The definition of *interest₁* is: <#sth_x# makes #sb_x# want to know - experience sth_y>; of *interest₂* <#sb_x# makes #sb_{x/y}# strongly experience mental state concerning sth_x so that sb_{x/y} wants to know - experience sth_x>.

A being can be an EXPERIENCER and experience a psychosomatic phenomenon unintentionally (as in *see*) or

can be intentionally active (as an AGENT) in order to make oneself experience such a phenomenon and at the same time become an EXPERIENCER (as in *look*). We define *see*₁ as <#living thing that can move# comes to [unintentionally] (know and) experience perception concerning #sth# by sense using light>, and *look* as <#living thing_x that can move# [intentionally] uses energy of thing_x in order to make thing_x experience perception concerning sth and come to know by sense using light>. (Our definitions of *see* and *hear* may refute Wierzbicka's statement (1980: 96) when she said "I fail to see how words like "to see" or "to hear" can be explicated without a reference to words like "eyes" and "ears".) The verb *think* has an intentional and an unintentional sememe: *think*₁ <#sb# experiences [unintentional] mental state of (*this*) thought concerning phenomenon>, e.g. *I thought I heard some noise*; *think*₂ <#sb_x# [intentionally] uses sb_x's mind in order to make sb_x experience {strong} - good - bad mental state concerning sth> *What do you t. about it? I am thinking about leaving the job. Let me t. I often t. of Kate.* With 'experience' the seme 'unintentionally' is present by default and only sporadically can imply an intentional action, as in *John tried to like/dislike Mary* (Dixon 2005: 288). In the sentence *Try to admire her*, the interpretation has to be *admire*₂ because *try* is by definition an intentional verb and has to match the *admire*'s sememe 'intentional'.

The role acted by the object of a verb with EXPERIENCER may be called EXPERIENCED (*excitement* in the example above or *agony* and *wound* in *suffer agony /wound*) if it refers to a psychosomatic phenomenon.

2.2.4 Objective

The subject of an intransitive verb of passive or internal causation (see §2.2.16a) is called "OBJECTIVE" (sometimes "THEME"), e.g. *window* in: *The window opened* (*open*: <#(sth_x {sb_x} / man-made thing_x helping sb# (un) intentionally makes) (#)non-living thing_y(#) move and come to be in state of not any more making sth not be able to move into / out of (#)<# ∩{empty} space_x of ∩ thing_z(#) (when sb_x uses thing_x)>. Our sentence activates the intransitive version <#non-living thing_y#...>, the initial bracketed part of the definition omitted, but even then a backgrounded AGENT from the bracketed subject slot is implicit. *The gate opened* implies that a person or a mechanism did the opening. An OBJECTIVE is quite like a PATIENT in being affected by a phenomenon made by an AGENT, and the difference lies in viewing the affected entity as more independent when occurring as the subject of a clause than as the object. Intransitive inchoative verbs like *begin*, *break*₁, *change*, *close*, *crack*, *develop* (§2.2.13), *drown* (<(#living thing_x that can move# makes) #living thing_y that can move / non-living thing_z# come to exist with all (body) parts in space of liquid substance {so that thing_y dies}>), *grow* (§2.5.2a), *split*, *start*, *stop*, *tear* (Lyons 1968: 359), all defined as `#sth# comes to (not) exist', turn into transitive and causative when an AGENT is activated and the objective becomes PATIENT, as the definition of *open* illustrates. Verbs with this kind of alternation are called "unaccusative" and "middle" verbs – see §§2.5.2a and 2.5.2c I).

The presence of an OBJECTIVE does not sanction the expression of AGENT: **The vase broke by the clumsy child*. **These vases break easily by clumsy children* (Yoshimura and Taylor 2004: 297) because the process of `coming to

be' is highlighted and the AGENT must be removed (Halliday in Lyons 1968: 366).

2.2.5 Stimulus

The role of an animate or inanimate entity in the argument representing an that unintentionally makes an EXPERIENCER experience a psychological phenomenon is called "STIMULUS" (or "AFFECTING"; cf. Kreidler 1998: 70). This role is exemplified by *opera* in *Opera delights Betty* and *Betty likes opera*. We define the verb *delight* as <#sth# unintentionally makes #sb# experience strongly good emotion> and *like* as <#living thing_x that can move {sb_x}# {habitually} experiences strongly good emotion_x and (this) thought_x concerning #sth_x# that unintentionally makes thing_x experience psychological phenomenon of wanting sth_x>. (Due to the seme 'strongly', *like* does not tie in with *much* in affirmative sentences, where it needs an intensifying adverb *very*, *too* or *so*; cf. Greenbaum 1970: 11- 2). The common element that unites *delight* and *like* is '#sth# unintentionally makes sb experience psychological phenomenon'. The former is straightforward in allotting the subject directive to a STIMULUS as causer, while the latter cloaks the same role with the object directive in a roundabout way, leaving the subject position to the experiencer, thus creating a false impression that the EXPERIENCER is an AGENT that affects a PATIENT, while it is just the opposite. Alternatively, a STIMULUS in the subject position can be thought of as an untypical AGENT – see §2.2.1 a.

Further examples of STIMULI are the objects in *Peter felt the velvety surface* and *I understand your problem*. A STIMULUS also appears as a subject of transitive or intransitive verbs, e.g. in *The speech thrilled the audience*; *The problem worries me*; *The surface feels velvety*; *Your looks appeal to me* (*appeal*₁ <#sth_x#

influences sb_x who experiences emotion that sth_x is good for sb_x), and *The rabbit vanished*. (*vanish*: <#thing_x - substance_x# {instantaneously} unintentionally and unexpectedly makes sb come to not any more experience perception concerning thing_x - substance_x by sense using light>; Langendoen 1970: 71 regarded *the rabbit* as PATIENT.)

2.2.6 *Instrument*

The noun *key* in *He opened the door with a key* is said to have the role of an INSTRUMENT, which is used here as a prepositional object. The definition of *open* (see §2.2.4) accommodates both the INSTRUMENT (by 'sb uses thing') and the AGENT role (by 'man-made thing directly helping sb') of *key*. Lyons (1968: 298) accounts for the syncretism of INSTRUMENT and AGENT by a possible "neutralization of the distinction at a more superficial level of the grammar or upon 're categorization' in terms of animacy or some other syntactically-relevant notion".

The 'sth' in 'use sth' may appear as a subject slot to surface as AGENT types (i) and (ii), and sometimes other types (iii - v) in §2.2.1 a, only if the 'sth' is conceived of as an independent INSTRUMENT. This is also the way the noun *knife* behaves, which is basically an INSTRUMENT (cf. *This is the man/knife that killed Bill*; Lyons 1968: 298): *The sharp blade of the knife cut₄ his finger*, the definition of *cut₄* being: <#sth_x {sb_x}# makes #thing_x - sb_{x/y}# (instantaneously) come to be with narrow space when sb_x uses sth_x sharp, making new state>. (According to some authors, *key* is an INSTRUMENT even in *The key opened the door*, because they concentrate on the logical rather than psycholinguistic aspect of language.) The promotion of an INSTRUMENT (MANIP in Dixon's terms) to an AGENT (transitive subject slot) "may disclaim the Agent's responsibility for the result

of the activity", as in *That stick [unintentionally] hit the vase (when John swung it)* (Dixon 2005: 111). When *key* is the subject, the promotion has the effect of lessening the influence of the underlying human AGENT. The phenomenon of viewing an instrumental entity as AGENT comes as a result of interlacing the syntactic meaning of the word order (the subject position) and the purely semantic role of being a device ('sth' in 'sb uses sth').

As Levin (1993 in Somers 1994: 496) demonstrated, *crane* is an intermediary instrument (= gadget (ii) in §2.2.1 a), proven by *The crane loaded the truck*, unlike *spoon* and *pickfork* (**The spoon ate the ice cream* and **The pickfork loaded the truck*), which are facilitating instruments (= tools [iii]). In definitions, the differences can be presented as 'complex man-made thing helping indirectly' for sophisticated devices (i), 'man-made thing helping indirectly' for gadgets (ii), and 'man-made thing helping directly' for tools and implements (iii) and effective substances (iv).

So we come with three degrees of "instrumentality" and its relation to AGENT: (1) A thing is logically an instrument, but linguistically can or must be used as AGENT, viewed as an almost independent entity (a sophisticated device or a gadget, e.g. *weapon* (e.g. *The gun fired/kills*), when the definition enables both 'sb' and 'weapon' to be potential subjects by the formula '(#sb# makes) #weapon# ...') (2) The INSTRUMENT promoted to the role of AGENT is perspectivized as a rather independent entity, defined as a 'man-made thing indirectly helping sb' and called "intermediary" (e.g. *vacuum cleaner*). (3) The INSTRUMENT is an entirely dependent entity (e.g. *pencil*, *pen* and *straw*), i.e. 'man-made thing directly helping sb'. This is a "facilitating" instrument, apt to be used as an AGENT only occasionally, as in the case mentioned in §2.2.1a. (Cf. 'helping directly' vs. 'indirectly' and *help sb* vs. *help to sb*. §3.2.7a (2).) These three degrees generally correspond to the first three ranks of inanimate AGENTS in §2.2.1a.

Both *to fire a gun* and *to write with a pencil* are logically 'to use a gun/pencil', but there is also a significant difference. In the former case the weapon is viewed as a PATIENT and an independent entity liable to manipulation rather than an INSTRUMENT. (Cf. *He fired a gun* vs. **He fired with a gun*, though *He killed Jim with a gun* presents *gun* as an INSTRUMENT.) When the preposition *with* is employed, there is an INSTRUMENT, a dependent entity (*She wrote with a red pencil* vs. **She wrote a red pencil*. (We define *write* as #sb_x# makes #sth_x made by use of symbols {language}# exist and be seen {when sb_x touches surface of thing_y} using man-made thing_x {directly} helping sb to make sth_x seen and using form of substance, when sb_x wants to influence sb_y and to make sb_y know sb_x's mental phenomenon concerning sth_y>). Usually, the preposition *with* is used with the names of helping things (iii) and (iv) in §2.2.1 a, while *by means of* is the normal way to mention the use of sophisticated devices (i) and gadgets (ii). The latter accept *by* when the following noun is without an article; e.g. *The potatoes are planted by machine* (OCD) or *by telephone*.

Any 'thing' can be used as INSTRUMENT by adding *with*₂ 'using sth', which liberates us from the need to mention 'used' every time.

2.2.7 Recipient and donor

A RECIPIENT (BENEFICIARY, BENEFACTIVE or POSSESSOR) is the 'living thing' in '#living thing# comes to be / is | with (power to experience – use) #sth - time#', like *she* in *She owns land* (see §3.4.6a) or *her* in *He gave her money* (cf. Nida 1975: 27). (*Give* is defined in 2.5.1b iii.) Other examples: *I'll reserve some thickets for us both* (RECIPIENT *us both*). *Let me make you a cup of tea* (*you*). *John sent the news to the Congressmen by telegram* and

The Congressmen received the news from John (the Congressmen; Langendon 1970: 62).

A DONOR is 'sb_x who makes sb_y come to be with power to use sth_x', as *grocer* in *The grocer sells tinned peas to Mary. Mary buys tinned peas from the grocer* (see the ending paragraphs of §2.5.2c II), as well as the personal pronoun (*I*) and the noun *John* in the examples above. (Verbs *sell* and *buy* stand in the relationship of reciprocal antonymy.)

2.2.8 Actor

An ACTOR is "[t]he role of an argument that performs some action without affecting any other entity. *S y l v i a left*" (Kreidler 1998: 70). (For the definition of *leave* see §2.5.1a iii.) In semantic definitions this role can be recognized as 'sth' in '#sth_x# makes sth_x come to be'.

2.2.9 Comitative

COMITATIVE is the role of somebody or something that is accompanied by somebody or something else, and it corresponds to 'sth_x existing during same time and being in same space as sth_y' in the definition of *with*₁, e.g. in *Mark walked with Jane* (cf. Nida 1975: 27).

2.2.10 Locative

The seme 'exist in (or: occupy) space' without 'come to' or 'not any more' performs the role of a LOCATIVE (or LOCATION), e.g. *country, steppes* and *windowsill* in: *They prefer to live in the country. They inhabit steppes. The burgler clung to the windowsill.* The addition of 'not any

more' to 'occupy space' leads to the role of SOURCE (see next).

2.2.11 Source

The seme that corresponds in definitions to the role called "SOURCE" is 'space' in '(partly) not any more exist in (or: occupy) space'. It is the label for the location or entity from which a motion starts, e.g. *London* in *John left London and headed towards the north* (Langendoen 1970: 62) or *attic* in *Tim fetched the suitcase from₅ the attic* (Aitchison 1994: 118). *The glass* in *She drank water from the glass* is in any case a source, no matter whether we interpret the sentence as implying that the glass was emptied of water ('not be any more') or that some water remained in it 'partly not be any more'.

2.2.12 Goal and Locatum

A GOAL refers to the space to which something moves or to an arrival point (Aitchison 1994: 118), e.g. *the north* in *John headed towards the north*, *summit* in *They reached the summit*, or *saucepan* in *Leonora put the carrots into the saucepan* (cf. Crystal 1991; 155). The corresponding seme for the GOAL is 'space' in 'come to exist in (or: occupy) space'. A LOCATUM is the entity moved in relation to a GOAL ('sth' in 'make sth come to exist in (or: occupy) space'). In our examples it is *John*, *they* and *carrots*.

2.2.13 Origin

The subject of a verb containing 'sth_x' in '(make) sth_x come to exist as sth_y' or 'sth_y' in '(make) sth_x come to not have form of sth_y any more', is an ORIGIN (Fillmore's

SOURCE), e.g. *alligator* in: *The alligator developed from₁ an egg* (*develop*: <#sth# comes to not have form_x any more and comes to have {larger} form_y of sth_y>), *acorn* in *The acorn developed into an oak*, and *blackberries* in *The juice is made from₁ blackberries*.

2.2.14 Result

The term "RESULT" (or "EFFECT") can be used for something created by an action of a causative verb. The noun *essay* is a RESULT in *John wrote an essay*, or the noun *attack* in *Jim began a ferocious attack on the snowdrift*. (For the definition of *write* see §2.2.6.) The definitional signal of this role is #...# in 'make #...# exist' – see also §2.2.16a and endnote 22.

2.2.15 Essive

The role of nouns functioning as subjects of the linking verb *be* is called "ESSIVE" (cf. Langendoen 1970: 102, 103). Langendoen adduced exemplar sentences *Ruby is a beautiful soprano* and *Leopold was a good king*. On one interpretation, 'Ruby is a beautiful person who is a soprano' and 'Leopold was a good person who was a king'. In these cases *Ruby* and *Leopold* play the ESSIVE role. According to this author, in the alternative interpretation 'Ruby sings soprano beautifully' and 'Leopold ruled well as king', the same nouns simultaneously serve the ESSIVE and AGENT role. If we take an approach more sensitive to the formulation of sentences, in the first interpretation *Ruby* and *Leopold* are solely AGENTS and his claim becomes convincing only if the paraphrases of the second interpretations read: *Ruby is a soprano that sings beautifully* or, in the manner of reading non-inherent connections (§3.3.1c II), *Ruby is sb who makes habitualness of singing in a soprano beautifully* and *Leopold was a*

king who ruled well or *Leopold was sb who made habitualness of ruling as king well*. In these cases the link formed by the relative pronoun *who* repeats the names initially mentioned in the role of AGENT and changes them into ESSIVE.

2.2.16 Causation

2.2.16a Causation assumes different roles: the AGENT (see §2.2.1 a) is the primary causer, while the INSTRUMENT (§2.2.6) is the source of a lower degree of causation (Nilsen 1973: 95). We can add STIMULUS (§2.2.5), as a subtype of AGENT producing affective causation, as well as ACTOR (§2.2.8), with even less force. EXPERIENCER (§2.2.3) can also be a low-degree internal causer as expounded in this section.

There are four kinds of causation depending on the animateness of the AGENT and the PATIENT. In (i) physical causation, an inanimate entity produces a change in another inanimate entity ('#sth_x non-living# makes #sth_y non-living#...'), as in *The wind made the window shudder* (Wolff and Song 2003: 322 in Ružin 2009: 36); *Hot Sun rays warmed the water*. The AGENT of (ii) affective causation is an inanimate entity, the affected entity being animate (*The wind made him shiver*). There are also (iii) volitional ('#sb# makes #sth non-living#...' *He broke the stick*), and (iv) inductive causation ('#sb_x# makes #sb_y#...', e.g. *sit₂ vt* in §2.2.16 b). The verb *seem* can be (ii) or (iv): <#sth_x# is in state (affected by sb_x) that makes sb_{sp/x} experience (*this*) thought (influencing sb_{sp/x} and) concerning sth_x, as tending to be true>.

Stative perception verbs, verbs of emission and verbs of involuntary change of state manifest internal causation (Pylkkänen 1999; see also §2.2.4 and *have* 8-9 in §3.4.6c). These are verbs that contain '#sb_x# uses sb_x's energy' (e.g. *hurl₂* and *fire₂* as in *f. ideas*

/insults/questions/smile at sb, see §1.2.1), ‘#living thing_x that can move# [unintentionally] comes to know and experience perception’ (*see, hear, smell*), #living thing that can move# [unintentionally] comes to experience bodily state...’ (*blush*), #event# comes to be experienced by sense’ (*flash*). They are all phenomena happening when a living thing uses resources of one’s own organism. Since ‘experience’ is a special untypical kind of internal causation, with a living thing affecting itself, verbs with ‘experience’ can be considered to be even more direct than those with ‘make’. Thus ‘experience’ in the sense mentioned in §1.1.3 d and endnote 4 seems to be part of the common underlying meaning ‘#living thing_x# {unintentionally} makes living thing_x come to experience...’ because it is implied even by verbs of emission (*hurl₂, fire₂...*), which have ‘sb_x uses sb_x’s energy of emotion’, and ‘sb_x’s energy of emotion’ has to be ‘unintentionally experienced by sb_x’.

2.2.16b In semantic terms, causation can be direct or indirect. “[T]he primitive requirement for direct causation is that there be no intervening event [...] between the causing subevent and the result subevent” (Rappaport Hovav and Levin 1999: 33 in Ružin 2009: 34). Various degrees of directness have their correlates in the definitional analyses: ‘make # # (not) exist - be’, ‘make # # come to (not) | be in state / exist’ or ‘make # # (not) move’. The most direct causation is brought about by ‘#sth_x {sb_{x/y}}# makes #sth_{y/x}# (not) exist - be’ (e.g. *cause: c. embarrassment/problem/trouble; draw <#sb# makes (#)line(s)(#) exist that look like(#)sth(#) using thing that touches surface> I d. very well. d. a circle; d. a house; make₁ <#sb# makes #sth_x# exist {by touching sth_y}> She makes delicious cakes*, which expresses the strongest degree of causation and is typically associated with touching (Wierzbicka 1975: 495).

Verbs with '#sth_x# makes #sth_y# come to (not) | be in state / exist' (the transitive *bend, boil, break₁, burn, cook, melt, open, tear...*) are verbs of direct causation with less force. They can be identified as verbs capable of detransitivization (§2.5.2c I). Transitive verbs with '#sth# makes #thing - substance# (not) move' (*bounce, float, flutter, jump, move, spin, stop, turn*) also reflect direct causation, with an even less significant result (see on unaccusatives in §2.5.2a). The same 'move' can be reduced to 'come to not exist in space any more', but in lengthy definitions the former version is preferable.

In morphological terms, causation can be simple (realized by means of a single lexeme, like *kill*) or periphrastic (or analytic, by means of two lexemes, like *make die*). Usually, direct causation is conveyed by simple causatives and indirect causation by periphrastic causatives, but this is not a rule. Thus in *The wind made | the window shudder/him shiver* the periphrastic *made the window shudder and made him shiver* express direct causation. The action of the wind and the events of the window shuddering or his shivering are simultaneous, without any mediator. The analytic construction has to be used because *shudder* cannot be a vt: **The wind shuddered the window* or **The wind shivered him*.

2.2.16c Indirect causatives convey mediated causation, and this is reflected in '#sth_x {sb_x}# makes sth_y {sb_y} (not) make - experience phenomenon', exemplified by *cause* <#sb# makes #phenomenon# exist, which tends to be bad> (*The bright light caused him to blink. Sunlight causes these insects gather*); *allow* <#sb_x# uses symbols {language} to express that sb_x experiences mental phenomenon_x concerning phenomenon_y when sb_x does not want to make (#)sb_y(#) not make #phenomenon# that sb_y wants>; *drive₂* (see §3.3.5); *force* 'compel' <#sb_x# makes sb_{y/x} make phenomenon_x when sb_{y/x}

does not want to make phenomenon_x>, *keep* (see the example in 3.2.3b), *make* (not always), *permit* <#sb_x {indef/with power}# uses symbols in order to express that sb_x experiences mental phenomenon_x concerning phenomenon_y when sb_x does not want to make sb_{y/x} not make (#)phenomenon_y(#)> (*He permitted himself ten cigarettes a week and Doctor allowed Mike two cigarettes a day* make elliptical references to *He permitted himself smoking ten cigarettes a week and Doctor allowed Mike smoking two cigarettes a day*); *persuade* <#(sth made by use of language by) sb_x# uses language and expresses (this) thought that strongly makes #sb_y# want to make phenomenon that sb_y did not want to make> *I persuaded John to give a lecture. I persuaded John that he should give a lecture*; *prevent*₁ <#sb_x# makes phenomenon_x in order to make sb_y not make (#)phenomenon_y(#) that sb_y wants/tends to make>; (Sememe *prevent*₂ as in *prevent a fire (from) spreading* (Hanks 2013: 201), is defined as <#sth_x {sb}# makes #sth_y# not make event>, and the causation is also indirect, and *start* (vt). All indirect causatives are complemented by non-finite clauses (see §3.2.3a II). A common definitional content ‘#sth_x# makes #sth_y# not | make / be affected by | phenomenon’ occurs in *save/spare /stop sb from*₂ *sth*. Certain indirect causatives (*get*, *have*₂₅ (§3.4.6 g), *help*, *let*, and *make*₂)¹⁹ are complemented by a bare infinitive, as expounded in §3.2.7a.

Dixon (2005: 60) comments on the phenomenon of directness in causation: “The (c) sentences – basically intransitive verb used transitively [– see §2.5.2a] – imply careful and direct manipulation, whereas the periphrastic *make* constructions imply some more indirect means”. Examples that Dixon adduces to illustrate this claim are: (1a) *The child sat on the mat*. (1b) *Mary made the child sit on the mat*. (1c) *Mary sat the child on the*

mat. (2a) *The piece of metal bent.* (2b) *Mary made the piece of metal bend.* (2c) *Mary bent the piece of metal.* (3a) *The pauper bled.* (3b) *John made the pauper bleed.* (3c) *John bled the pauper.* We define the perfective intransitive *sit*₁ as <#living thing_x that can move {sb_x}# (comes to) be in bodily posture touching surface of thing_y with thing_x's {sb_x's} back (middle) body part>; and transitive *sit*₂ as: <#sb_x# by using sb_x's hands makes #living thing_x that can move {sb_y}# come to be in bodily posture touching surface of thing_y with thing_x's {sb_y's} back (middle) body part>. The phrase *make sb sit* indicates strong but indirect causation, probably by using persuasion or threat, while the moneme *sit* vt denotes physical intervention on the part of the AGENT (see also §§1.1.9 and 2.2.16a), which is direct causation.

Semantic definitions reveal an almost interminable series of different shades of "compactness", to use Dixon's (2005) term for various relations within causation¹⁹.

Linguists do not define the above mentioned roles always in the same way. There is disagreement especially about the use of the terms "goal", "source", "patient" and "actor".

2.2.17 Equivocation of roles

A single constituent *some* can sometimes play two equivocal semantic roles. Thus, the roles of GOAL and RECIPIENT may coincide, as in *The news reached the Congressmen by telegram.* The congressmen have come to be with power to use the news, i.e. they are the RECIPIENT, but at the same time they are the arrival point of the news, and, since any thing occupies some space, they also represent the GOAL. We prefer to call this phenomenon "equivocality" rather than "ambiguity" because the alternative interpretations do not exclude

each other and do not affect the sentence meaning. In some utterances *it* may at the same time belong in *it*₁ and *it*₂ or to *it*₂ and *it*₅. Lindstromberg (1997: 68) allows of the possibility for *on* meaning continuation of movement and *on* meaning 'touch' to be realized simultaneously. We consider such cases not as being ambiguous but rather as equivocal.

The noun *chimney* in *The chimney* (as well as *fireplace/pipe/volcano*) *smoke* is an AGENT, the verb *smoke*₁ defined as <#sth# makes gas substance by burning [exist]>. In reality, a chimney, fireplace or pipe are conductors rather than the cause of smoke, and *the chimney* in the sentence above has been considered to be both AGENT and SOURCE in Aitchison (1994: 119). So, the alternative view is that smoke comes from any of the objects above (<#non-living thing_x# makes gas substance made by burning move in space_x of thing_x and partly not exist in space_y of thing_x any more>). No alternative seems to be present in *fire/engine emit smoke*, to which only the first definition applies.

The subject of *look* (see the definition in §2.2.3) has a double role of AGENT and EXPERIENCER because its definition contains 'intentionally uses energy' and 'experience perception'.

In *The hammer struck the nail*, *the nail* brings forth only a PATIENT and does not play a multiple PATIENT/LOCATIVE role. LOCATIVE has the source in 'touch surface' (leading to the preposition *on*) of the definition of *strike*: <#sth# strongly touches_x #{hard} thing_x# touching_x upper surface of thing_x (using hard thing_y) and makes #strong event by touching_x#>. So, if the sentences read *The carpenter struck the nail on the head* or *The ship struck on rocks*, the LOCATIVE would be *head* and *rocks*. With its dual object directive, the definition predicts *The tree was struck by a lightning* or *He was ready to strike the first blow*, as well as *He struck the table a heavy blow with his fist* (double object).

As a case of regular role-switching, any noun defined as 'man-made thing helping sb to make phenomenon' can serve both as INSTRUMENT and AGENT if the predicate verb contains 'be in state that makes sb make phenomenon for which thing_x is used'. Examples are: *This pen won't write*, *The straw sucks well* (Dixon 2005: 453), and *The refrigerator cools badly*.

2.2.18 *Speaker*

The notion 'speaker' appears in three manifestations: as (i) explicit, in the so-called "egophoricity", when the speaker is morphologically verbalized in a text; e.g. *I* in *I think you wrote a sloppy letter*, or in complex sentences with a speech verb in the main clause, also the subject of the main clause, e.g. *Dick* in *Dick claims that Jane will surely marry him* (cf. Brecht 1974: 511-512) '[Dick said:] "Jane will surely marry me"'. (ii) indirect or implicit, when the speaker is part of the corresponding definition, without any special morpheme, as in *You wrote a sloppy letter* (i.e. 'I = sb_{sp} find the letter that you wrote sloppy'; see the definition of *sloppy* in §2.4.3b). (iii) as basic, due to the omnipresence of the speaker by way of the very act of speech in any utterance, e.g. *John has recovered from illness*. 'The speaker says: John has recovered from illness.' The underlying presence of the basic speaker is responsible for the grammaticalness (at least in colloquial English) of the reflexive pronoun *myself* in *Solar energy was invented by God and myself*, unlike **Solar energy was invented by God and herself* (Levinson 1983: 248) because *myself* agrees with an underlying 'speaker'. It is always implicitly understood that the speaker thinks of himself as 'I', that every sentence is introduced by the verbs 'say', 'think' and 'know', otherwise he or she would say nothing. (Some transformationalists derive all sentences from such an underlying verb, which is deleted on the surface.) To mention these inherently locutionary

words (locutionary aspect of a speech act is the very fact that it is being spoken) would be not only redundant but would add a shade of doubt in one's own words: *I say/think/know that you are very kind*. This is the reason why "[t]here is no epistemically stronger statement than a categorical assertion'" (Lyons 1977: 809). *It is raining* implies 'I know that it is raining', and therefore such plain statements, in opposition to wishes, promises, predictions, etc. are factive (§3.4.4).

In interrogative sentences with *you*, the seme 'sb_{sp}' (the implicit speaker) becomes sb_h (the hearer, the interlocutor) if it is the word containing 'sb_{sp}' that is questioned. In *Did you write that sloppy* latter? sb_{sp} of the adjective *sloppy* remains the same as in the statement because *sloppy* is not questioned, but in *Do you find the letter sloppy?* and *Are you sure to pass the exam?*, *sloppy* and *sure*₂ (§3.3.7a) are questioned and sb_{sp} of these adjectives changes into sb_h. *Mutatis mutandis*, the same holds good for other persons (*he, she, it, we, they*): *Is he/she//Are we/they | sure to pass the exam?* If there is no mention of a pronoun, *you* is understood: *Does Mark seem to be happy?* 'Does Mark make y o u think that he is happy?' The verb *seem* is defined in (§2.2.16a).

2.3 ASPECTUALITIES

2.3.0 Just as there are names of different roles to encapsulate various relations between verb directives and analyses, so are there suitable labels for diverse types of verb analyses alone. This task is done by aspectualities ("lexical aspects" or "Aktionsarts"). "Theoretically, we could distinguish as many elements within this category as there are different kinds of events. That is why it has been impossible to set up a coherent system of 'Aktionsart'-oppositions up to now" (Nehls 1988:177). Various

aspectualities correspond to various initial parts of definitional analyses.

The principal generally accepted semantic division of verbs is into “stative” and “dynamic”. There are further minor categories that ramify within, or cut across, these two.

2.3.1 *Stative verbs*

A state “is conceived of as existing, rather than happening, and as being homogeneous, continuous and unchanging throughout its duration” (Lyons 1977: 483). Stative verbs denote a state rather than an event and evoke “viewing a phenomenon as an indivisible whole without parts” (Hlebec 1990; see §3.2.5) just like the perfective aspect. “[Stative] verbs allow the speaker to view a situation as a steady state, with no internal phases or changes” (Saeed 1997: 109). A stative verb is repulsive to the imperative and the progressive form, or, to be more precise, does not agree with the imperfective aspect (cf. Dixon 2005: 216). It cannot be used in an answer to *What did he/she/it do?* or *What happened?*. Among others, stative verbs are: *be* ‘exist’, *consist*, *envy*, *exist*, *lack*, *like*, *remain*, *see*, *stay* ‘continue to be in state’, *survive*, *suspect*, *want*, as in: *Jane saw/!was seeing her brother at the station. The notebook consisted/*was consisting of fifty pages. Cannes is/*is being in France. Frank likes/*is liking his garden.* With the gerund to precede, *of* is disallowed for stative verbs: **staying (stay₂) sane of the soldier, *leaning of the wall, *turning of the road, *knowing of good literature, *seeing of grapes.* In contrast with states, events allow the preposition *of* 8 and 10 (§3.1.2. I) after the gerund, as in: *trampling of elephants, gushing of water, falling of the wall, turning of the wheel* (cf. Bolinger 1977: 141); *gathering/selling of grapes, reading of good literature.* The aspectual character of stative verbs is unbounded

(see §2.4.7 b I) and atelic, i.e. with no inherent beginning or end (Comrie 1976a; Cruse 2004: 286; § 2.3.2b).

Within the class of stative verbs, one can make further division into "privative" and "relational" verbs.

2.3.1a *Privative verbs*

Privative verbs relate to phenomena occurring within a person's mind. In semantic definitions, privative verbs contain 'experience psychosomatic phenomenon', which includes (i) 'emotion' (ii) 'thought', (iii) 'bodily phenomenon', and (iv) 'perception'. (i) Verbs of emotion are: *admire*₁ <#sb_x# experiences strongly good emotion concerning #sth_x {sb_{y/x}}# as worthy / strongly good (in social role of sb) and not expected because of sth_y> (with *about*₁, *as*₃, *for*₃ and the *wh*-word *how* as clues), *adore*, *astonish*, *desire*, *detest*, *dislike*, *feel*₁ <#living thing that can move# experiences #emotion#>, *hate*, *like* (see §2.2.15), *long*, *love*, *prefer*, *surprise*. (*Admire* has another sememe: <#sb_x# makes strong expression of strongly good emotion concerning #{sb_{x/y}} - sth# that is worthy / strongly good and not expected>.) (ii) Verbs of inert cognition (Leech 1987: 25) contain 'thought': *believe* (see §3.2.10), *desire* <#sb_x# experiences strongly strong emotion - (*this*) thought wanting ((sb_y) to do) sth good>, *forget*, *hope*, *imagine*₁, *impress*, *know* (§3.2.8), *mean*, *realize*, *recognize* (see §2.3.2b I), *remember* <#sb_x# (instantaneously comes to) experience *this* {good - bad} thought concerning sth_x that is past so that sb_x knows #sth_x (sb_{x/y})# (sb_{x/y} being in social role of sb)>;²⁰ *see*₂ 'have opinion' (as in *Tom's act was seen as an insult by the teacher and the class alike*), *seem* (§2.2.16a), *suppose*, *think* (§2.2.3), *understand*, *want*, (iii) Verbs of bodily sensation (Leech 1987: 26) comprise *ache*, *feel*₃, *hurt*, *itch*, *tingle*. (iv) 'Perception', i.e. 'phenomenon

experienced by one of senses' occurs in the verbs of inert perception (Leech 1987: 24), like *behold*, *feel*₂, *hear*, *notice*, *observe*, *recognize*, *see*₁ (§2.2.3), *smell*, and *taste*.

Some of these verbs have another, dynamic meaning; e.g. *differ* 'quarrel', *feel* 'touch', *see to* 'take care of' or *taste* 'try the taste'.

Sometimes one comes across a privative verb used in imperfective aspect, which shows that the delimitation between stative and dynamic verbs is not always strict: *And you are hating being there, Gerda!* (Agatha Christie *The Hollow*, Chapter 7). *I'm understanding more about quantum mechanics as each day goes by* (Comrie 1976a: 36). *He is constantly doubting my words* (Pârlog 2011: 35). This happens when the speaker wants to emphasize an idea of a gradually evolving action, of a temporary action or of unpleasant repetition. The phenomenon of "stative" progressives is "an instance of contextually/pragmatically licensed rule-breaking for specific rhetorical or expressive effect" (Mair 2006: 92 in Pârlog 2011: 44).

A subspecies of privative verbs, called "relating" verbs (Dixon 2005) are characterized, according to our analysis, by having the same 'phenomenon' both in the subject and object slots, connected by 'makes sb experience mental phenomenon concerning': *demonstrate* <#sth# makes sb experience (*this*) thought and know way concerning #phenomenon#, *imply* <#phenomenon_x# makes sb experience (*this*) thought concerning #phenomenon_y# to be true>, *suggest*₃ <#phenomenon_x# makes sb come to be influenced by (#)phenomenon_y(#) and to experience (*this*) thought concerning (#)phenomenon(#)> (e.g. *The evidence suggests (that) he is the thief. A solution suggested itself to me. The results s. improvement.*), in addition to *depend (on)*, *result (from)*, *relate (to)*, *show* and *be due*. Of course, this applies only to the relevant sememes of these

verbs. The verb *indicate* has #sth# instead of <#phenomenon_x#, but 'phenomenon' as a hyponym of 'sth' is implied.

2.3.1b *Relational verbs*

Relational verbs comprise (i) linking verbs (see §3.4.8) like *appear* (= 'seem'), *form*, *remain* (§3.4.8), *represent* and *seem*, (ii) verbs of possession '#sb#' is with power to use sth', like *belong*, *deserve*, *have* (§3.4.6 c), *lack*, *own* and *possess*, (iii) verbs of relative position '#sth_x# is in space of sth_y' (*attach*, *tie*), (iv) Dixon's "contain" subtype (2005: 108) *comprise*, *consist (of)*, *constitute*, *contain*, *include*, (v) Dixon's "comparing" verbs (Dixon 2005: 283 - 284) '#sth_x# is in comparison to sth_y' *balance*, *compare*, *count*, *differ*, *equal*, *fit*, *resemble*, *suit* (as in *That dress suits you*) <#man-made thing to be put on sb_x's body# is good in comparison to what is seen of #sb_x#>, and (vi) "relate" verbs, like *concern*, *depend* (COBUILD *Grammar Verbs 1*). They usually have 'be' (i.e. 'is' or 'are') immediately following the subject directive and they are never used either in the progressive (imperfective) aspect or in the imperative mood. Only few of them passivize. The "relate" group of verbs includes *apply (to)* (intransitive), *pertain (to)*, and *relate (to)*. *Pertain* is defined as: <#mental phenomenon_x# is experienced as phenomenon concerning phenomenon_y>.

Here are definitions of three more relational verbs, *belong* (a verb of possession), *contain* (the "contain" subtype) and *resemble* (a linking verb): *belong* <#sth_x# is strongly influenced by sb who is with power to use sth_x during long-time legal state of relation> *The house belongs to her father.* *contain* <#sth_x# is with space in which #sth_y# is, so that sth_x connects sth_y> *The box contains marbles;* *resemble* <#sth_x# is like #sth_y#,

which connects sth_x and sth_y in psychological state> *She resembles her sister*. Among relational verbs which belong to more than one subtype are: *cost, measure, weigh* (i) and (v), *encircle, enclose, surround* (e.g. *wall s.*) (iii) and (iv), and *fit* (iii) and (v).

2.3.2 Dynamic verbs

Dynamic verbs are those verbs that are defined as 'event', including 'environmental event'. They branch into durative and punctual verbs.

2.3.2 a Durative verbs

Durative verbs comprise verbs of action (with '#sth# makes ...' or '#sth# uses...', such as *cook, cut, read, stab, try*), verbs of transitional event²¹ ('#sth# comes to be...'), verbs of movement ('#sth# moves...' or '#sth# makes sth move') and "rest" verbs ('#sth# exists in space').

Verbs of transitional event are *become* <come to be>, *change, deteriorate, die* (§4.1), *drown* (§2.1.4), *fall, grow* (§2.5.2a), *mature, widen* among others. Examples of movement verbs include: *bounce, crawl, crouch, dance, drive, float, fly* (§1.1.3cI), *flutter, gallop* (§2.5.2 a), *glow* <#thing# makes light move>, *hang, jump, kneel, look after, march, move, play* 'take part in a game', *race, radiate* <(#sth_x makes) #energy# move and partly not exist in space of sth_x any more>, *rain* <#environmental event# moves down from sky having form of a lot of small parts of water>, *ride*₁ (§1.1.3d), *run*₁ (§1.1.8 cII), *sit down* (see *sit* in §2.2.16c with 'comes to be' activated), *slide, snow, travel, trot, walk* (§2.5.2a.), *work, wriggle*.

Here is a selection of "rest" verbs: *lean, lie, live* <#living thing# exists in time and space>, *rest, sleep, squat, stand* <#sth {living thing that can move{sb_x}}#

(makes thing_x's {sb_x's} body) exist in vertical {bodily} posture in space {when thing_x's {sb_x's} feet touch surface}>, *stay*₁ <#sth# exists in space_x not changing space_x>, *wait* <#sb# exists in space_x not changing space_x, wanting sth>, *watch*.

Neither stative nor rest verbs can be used as an answer to *What did he do?* or a similar question, and both imply lack of movement.

Movement and "rest" verbs are basically intransitive (Dixon 2005: 103-104). They are imperfective verbs collocating with *for*, which often do not change their textual meaning when the present perfect simple is substituted for the present perfect progressive accompanied by a temporal adverbial with *for* referring to a period (cf. Leech 1987: 50). For instance, *Indians have lived/have been living in Mauritius for generations. Their ancestors must have travelled/have been travelling for weeks* (Broughton 1990: 246). *Jake has been running/has run a small business for five years. Helen has been playing /has played the piano for two years* (Swan and Walter 1997: 161). If the subject is a non-living thing in the role of a LOCATIVE, substitution is not possible, e.g. *The castle has stood/*has been standing on that hill for 900 years*. (Cf. the opposite when the subject is a living thing in §3.6.2) Neither is it possible if the period is not mentioned, e.g. *How long have you been waiting/*have you waited? I have been waiting/*have waited long enough* (Swan and Walter 1997: 161). Such verbs denote continuous events by definition and include phenomena which are unbounded, atelic.²²

2.3.2 b Punctual verbs

"Punctual" (or "momentary") verbs have 'instantaneous' in their definitions. Such verbs are collocable with the adverb *suddenly*; e.g. *flash* <(#sb# makes) #sth {with

light}# instantaneously come to be strongly experienced by sense using light>; *hit* <(#sb_x# makes) (#)thing_x - substance(#) move and instantaneously strongly touch (#)Γspace - surface of_Γ thing_y(#) (using thing_x - substance_x) (and makes bad and strong event when thing_x - substance_x touches living thing_y that can move {sb_y}> *He (sb) hit his knee (thing_x) on/against the wall (thing_y). She (sb) hit the wall (thing_y) with paint (substance). The ball (thing_x) hit the fence (thing_y). The falling coconut (thing_x) hit Mary (living thing_y; Dixon 2005: 111); kick <#sb_x# uses sb_x's energy of bodily event to strongly make sb_x's foot touch #thing# instantaneously>. Among other punctuals one can find *burst, explode, knock, and switch*.*

The meaning of grammatical aspect combines with the lexical aspect of punctuality to produce iterativity, as in *The light was flashing*, because "iterativity involves the repetition of a discrete action, with or without perceivable intervals. [...] There seem to be hardly any English verbs which are intrinsically iterative" because verbs like *babble, beat, frizzle, oscillate, shiver, sizzle, titter* denote an event with "repetitive phases of an otherwise uninterrupted event" (Canavan 1983: 82).

2.3.2 b I Achievements

To quote (Smith 1991: 28 in Saeed 1997: 113), achievements are "instantaneous changes of states, with an outcome of a new state". In another formulation, "[a]chievements are events in which there is a transition from one state to another which is construed as being instantaneous. *John forgot everything he had learned. She arrived yesterday. They graduate next week. [...] My driving licence expired a month ago*" (Cruse 2004: 287,

288). *Tom cut (§2.2.6) the rope with a knife* (Chafe 1971: 152, 154).

In terms of semantic definitions, achievements contain 'instantaneously (make sth) come to ...'. The seme 'instantaneously' places achievements among punctuals. Other examples are: *forget* <#sb# instantaneously comes to not experience (*this*) thought concerning sth_x and comes to not know #sth_x# any more>; *expire* **1** <#sth made by use of language {in writing} by sb_{with legal power}# instantaneously comes to not be in strong legal state any more> *license/offer/option/patent/sentence/title/tax* e. **2** <#state when sb is with power# instantaneously comes to not be in strong state any more> *authority /eligibility/hold/presidency* e. Other achievements include *enter*, *find*₂ <#sb# instantaneously comes to experience (*this*) thought concerning, and know #phenomenon# that | tends to be/is | true> (*He found a solution to the problem; I found (that) I'd left my key at home*); *recognize* <#sb_x# instantaneously comes to be with (*this*) thought concerning, and comes to know #sth_x# that sb_x did not know any more, using sth_y as source>; *reach* <#sb_x# (makes sb_x) instantaneously come to exist in space_x of #thing# when sb_x wants to exist in space_x>; *spot* <#living thing that can move {sb}# instantaneously comes to experience perception concerning #sth_x# by sense using light>; *start* vi <#sth# instantaneously comes to| be in state_x/exist in space_x - time_x|and not any more | be in state_y/exist in space_y - time_y | and tends to be in state_x / exist in space_x - time_x>, *step* <#living thing_x {sb}# instantaneously comes to exist in space_x (touching surface) and not any more in space_y by moving thing_x's foot>; *stop* <(#sth_x# makes) #sth# instantaneously come to not | move / make phenomenon | any more> (*She stopped at the corner of the street. He was stopped by the police. She couldn't stop him from running*

away. *The rain stopped the match from continuing*) and *win* **1** <(#sth_x {sb_x}# makes) #(infml: sth_y alive / sth_z belonging to) sb_x# {intentionally} instantaneously come to be with power to use (#)sth_y worthy (#) after sb_x used strong energy in (#)contest(#), which is good event> *This won him fame. w. (oneself) the victory; win bet/medal/prize; w. control/favour/support (1st object), He won the match for us. w. appeal/championship /game/war (2nd object) **2** (formal, literary) <#sb_x# instantaneously makes sb_x come to be in #space# when sb_x does not use sb_x's strong energy any more> *win* the top of the mountain*

All performatives are achievement verbs (Vendler 1970: 91).²³

At the level of grammar, the stative and habitual aspectualities ('state' and 'habitualness') appear as a non-progressive aspect, expressed by simple verb forms, while the dynamic aspectuality ('event') corresponds to the progressive aspect of *-ing* tense forms.

2.3.3 Ambient verbs

"Ambient" (Chafe 1971) is a label used for verbs containing 'environmental phenomenon' (see §§3.3.5 c and 3.3.5 d). They are Dixon's (2005: 127) "weather" verbs, as in *It is raining/snowing/hailing*. This includes *chill, cold, dawn* (§2.4.7b II), *fog* (§2.4.4), *it₃* (§3.1. 4a iii), *mist* (§2.4.4), *rain* (§2.1.5a), *smog* (§2.4.4), *storm* (§§2.4.7b ii and 3.3.5), *sunrise* (§2.4.7b II), *winter, wind*.

2.3.4 Benefactive verbs

Verbs connecting a RECIPIENT and a PATIENT, i.e. verbs with '#sb#' (come to) be with - without (power to use) #...#' in their definitions, are "benefactives", e.g. *acquire, buy,*

*find*₂, *get*, *give*, *have*₁₋₄ (§3.4.6a), *lose* (§2.5.1c), *own* (3.4.6 i), *sell* (2.5.2c II), *send*, in *Tom has (Tom's got)/found/lost the tickets. Tom owns/acquired a convertible. Mary gave/sent Tom the tickets. Mary bought/sold Tom a convertible* (Chafe 1971: 147).

2.3.5 Evaluative verbs

The following verbs, among others, contain evaluative semes 'good' or 'bad' in their analyses: *admire* (§2.3.1b), *blame*, *congratulate*, *criticize*, *fear*, *praise*, *punish*, *scold*, *snigger*. These semes occur in nouns and adjectives as well: *usury*, *utter* (adj), *torture*, *touchy* 'sensitive', *valour*, *vapid*. The annotation for Thomson and Alba-Juez (2014) in John Benjamins Book Gazetter Spring 2014: 5) comments on evaluation: "It is now an acknowledged fact in the world of linguistics that the concept of evaluation is crucial, and that there is very little – if any – discourse that cannot be analyzed through the prism of its evaluative content"

2.4 THE COLLOCATIONAL METHOD

2.4.1 Background of the collocational approach

The collocational approach to meaning was put forward by the London school led by J. R. Firth, and elaborated on by British 'Firthian' school linguists Halliday, Greenbaum, Sinclair, McIntosh, and Mitchell, among others. Its basic principles have been adopted and further developed by the author of the present book (groundbreaking in Hlebec 1998). In Hlebec (1998) we launched a method of discovering semes by listing collocations and thus arranging semes in a meaningful chain as a way to formulate definitions. This method was applied later in

Hlebec (2002, 2003, 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2012, 2015). Our collocational method is closest to Sinclair's "semantic preference" (Sinclair 1996 in Geeraerts 2010: 172), although "Sinclair did not fully integrate notions of lexical semantics into the investigation of collocations" (Hanks 2013: 6). Its aim is to find out verifiable and non-arbitrary definitions of sememes derived from their behaviour in collocations. One of the aims of a collocational analysis has been expressed by the following remark: "Syntagmatic relations between lexical items are interesting because in every language there are items which co-occur with high frequency, others which co-occur as the need arises, and still others whose co-occurrence seems impossible. If one could predict these facts from knowledge of the meanings of the words in isolation they would present no difficulty, but prediction is frequently difficult and often impossible" (Wilkins 1972: 126).

The Firthian spirit has also been pursued by D. Cruse (1986: 16), who says:

We can picture the meaning of a word as a pattern of affinities and disaffinities with all the other words in the language with which it is capable of contrasting semantic relations in grammatical contexts. Affinities are of two kinds, syntagmatic and paradigmatic. A syntagmatic affinity is established by a capacity for normal association in an utterance: there is a syntagmatic affinity, for instance, between *dog* and *barked*, since *The dog barked* is normal (a syntagmatic affinity always presupposes a particular grammatical relationship). A syntagmatic disaffinity is revealed by a syntagmatic abnormality that does not infringe grammatical constraints, as in *?The lions are chirruping*. Paradigmatically, a semantic affinity between two grammatically identical words is the greater the more congruent their patterns of syntagmatic normality.

Wierzbicka (1987: 21-22) is aware that "[t]he meaning of a word can often be illuminated by the other

words which it tends to co-occur with”, but thinks that “evidence of this kind is only ‘circumstantial’, and rarely, if ever, compelling. Differences in well-formed collocations do suggest differences in meaning, but there is usually more than one way of interpreting the clues which they offer”.

2.4.2 The relationship between paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes has been succinctly stated by Mednikova: “[P]aradigmatic connections, occurring in language, and syntagmatic connections, realized in speech, together reveal the meaning of words in the best way. They cannot be observed isolated one from another” (Mednikova 1974: 47; translated by B. H.). Or, compare in the same spirit: “[T]he lexical item balances syntagmatic and paradigmatic patterns, using the same descriptive categories to describe both dimensions” (Sinclair 2004: 148). G. G. Pocheptsov (1976) has written a book adopting the approach in which the word is viewed in the framework of syntagmatics. To quote this author, “It has been aptly said that the image of a *dramatis persona* such as a king is created primarily not by the patterns of his own behaviour but by the attitudes of other *dramatis personae* towards him. Something similar can be observed in the syntagmatic nature of words, which manifests itself not in the word itself but in its environment. The structural and semantic indispensability of the environment, its belonging to a particular class and subclass – all these together form the syntagmatic “image” of the word” (1976: 108). The neuropsychologist A. R. Luria (1976) argued for two distinct principles: (1) the paradigmatic principle involving processes of the selection of phonemic and semantic systems, which is disturbed when lesions of the posterior parts of speech areas occur, and (2) the syntagmatic principle of combinatory processes of words into propositions or phrases, which becomes disarranged due to lesions of the anterior parts of these areas.

The general idea of this tenet of lexical semantics that words with similar meanings tend to occur in similar contexts and that both syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations between words are important for semantics, is on line with the collocational method. This idea is shared by the distributionalist school, but there are also numerous differences between the present method and their search for the patterns of word usage. Distributionalists make use of larger context segments, such as sentences, rather than two neighbouring words. They rely on frequency and statistical data and ignore the systematic meaning to the advantage of particular contextual meanings. Information obtained by their statistical techniques, which neither interpret nor explain linguistic facts, is overburdened with data from the particular text and even with non-linguistic features. As Hanks (2009: 9) put it, statistical methods of treating collocations bypass meaning entirely. Thus, according to the distributionalist method, the syntagmatic neighbourhood of *knife* found in a processed text, are the words *cut, blade, spoon, cutterhead, noni* and *nimuk* (the names of a boy and his dog in a story where a knife plays the key role), and the paradigmatic neighbourhood is represented by *hammer, shovel, hat, pencil, spoon* and *blanket* (Sahlgren 2013: 9, 12).

Louis Hjelmslev's glossematics laid stress on commutation (mutation of items in paradigmatic relations) as the fundamental relation for the understanding of language. Unlike distributionalists, Louis Hjelmslev analyzed the combinatory possibilities of language not as one of linear nature. He did deal with meaning and the co-existence of units of a higher order, but concentrated on the relations between phonetic and semantic substance not going into semantic detail as did Firth.

The aim of collocation analysis (developed by S. Th. Gries and Anatol Stefanowitsch) is to measure the degree of association (attraction or repulsion) that lexical elements exhibit in relation to constructions, which is an

important aspect of investigating collocations. It is a quantitative method heavily relying on mathematically oriented statistics of frequencies. However, since typical features occur in speech most frequently, and they should be introduced in definitions, frequency does enter into our definitional parameters.

Explanatory Combinatorial Dictionaries for French (Mel'čuk et al.1984) and Russian (Mel'čuk and Zholkovsky 1984) describe syntactic and lexical collocations in the greatest detail, providing definitions by means of 62 lexical functions, which are "not [...] genuine semantic unit[s] [...] L[exical] F[unction]s are introduced to describe restricted lexical cooccurrence and derivation, but by no means semantic" (Mel'čuk 1987: 96).

Information on the combinatorial properties of lexical items provided from corpora has been discussed by Church and Hanks 1990, Church et al.1994, Fontenelle 1992, Grefenstette et al. 1996, Heid 1994 (in Fontenelle 1997: 2), among others.

Another approach to collocations, most developed and promising so far, is the theory of norms and exploitations (TNE). "TNE [...] had its genesis in a marriage between lexicography and corpus linguistics" (Hanks 2009: 4). "TNE is an essential foundation for a new kind of dictionary which, on the basis of corpus analysis, will report the patterns of usage most associated with each word (strictly speaking, each content word) in a language. [... TNE is a new] lexically driven theory that concentrates on identifying such patterns before any attempt is made to state the meaning and do anything with it" (Hanks 2009: 14). This theory is closest to our collocational method in revealing roles and arguments, but it does not go any further in providing clear semantic definitions.

In order to provide insight into valid semantic definitions, the collocational method follows three steps. The first step is to find as many collocators as possible for the particular node, the second is to delimit sememes,

and the third one to find common senses for the collocators of a particular sememe and to engage the senses in a definition.

There are other schools of linguistic thought that in their procedures show similarities with the collocational method. Such approaches have been pursued in Bar-Hillel's category grammar, McCawley's and Lakoff's generative semantics, Chomsky's government and binding theory, and Bresnan's lexical-functional grammar, and it would take too much space to analyze them all. The point is that none of them has resulted in semantic definitions of our type. Moreover, being the only elaborate inductive approach to lexical collocations, the collocational method provides additional and original insight into semantic system and aims at a systematic theoretical approach to the semantic analysis of English, applicable to other languages as well. It respects Firth, who insisted "on the primacy of meaning, on the need for a basically inductive approach to language study [...] and in particular on the syntagmatic aspects of language structure" (Mitchell 1975: vi).

We find the collocational method preferable to the structured vector space model, although they share some important characteristics. Both take syntactic structure and typicality into account and keep trace of the selectional preferences for words' argument positions. On the other hand, semantic spaces "provide a model of word meaning that is independent of dictionary senses" (Erk/Padó 2008: 897). Although this approach is basically correct, it is not sufficiently transparent and explicit, making too much use of formulaic language and mathematical parlance. When Schütze (1998) computed "first-order" vector representations for word meaning by collecting co-occurrence counts from the entire corpus (in Erk/Padó 2008: 898), he did something that corresponds to the first step in the collocational method, and when he summed up all first-order vectors of the words in the context after determining "second-order" vectors for

individual word instances in their context, this procedure also bears a likeness to the succeeding steps in the collocational method.

2.4.3 The procedure

2.4.3a As a first step, investigators should provide for a list of collocators of a verb, adjective, adverb or preposition, which are mainly nouns. If they are interested in the meaning of an adverb, collocators are usually verbs and adjectives. To take an example, in order to find out the meaning of the verb *conclude*, investigators should have at their disposal instances of *conclude* collocating with numerous collocators like: *article/author/committee/concert/court/enquire/investigation/judge/letter/meeting/panel/paper/concert program/report/researcher/review/scientist/study/survey/tribunal + conclude; conclude + affairs/agreement/alliance/business/chapter with quotation/historic compromise/contract/conversation/business deal/discussion/essay/lecture/meeting/negotiation/pact/remark/speech/talk with story/treaty/truce/war*. They should also take notice of verb + preposition + noun, verb + conjunction + clause, and verb + infinitive collocations: *He concluded by saying that... She concluded with a remark... The matter concluded without too much fuss. The story concludes with the hero's death. The jury concluded, from the evidence, that...; conclude from fact. We concluded to go out/that we would go out*. This accords with Sinclair's statement that "the word is not the best starting-point for a description of meaning because meaning arises from words in particular combinations" (Sinclair 2004: 148). Information on non-existent collocations is also helpful to this purpose.

2.4.3 b As a second step, polysemy is determined.

When treating polysemy, Uriel Weinreich mentioned collocability as a means of demarcating meanings and stated: "Thus, we might want to say that *fair* implies *fair*₂ if it occurs in the context of *judge*, *game*, *decision*, *warning*, etc., but a complete analysis must find that [element] *c*₁, which is shared by the designata of *judge*, *game*, etc." (Weinreich 1966b: 180). Unfortunately, he has not pursued this course of ascertaining a common meaningful component, which is the pith of our collocational method.

Present-day monolingual dictionaries of the English language offer a fairly reliable division into separate senses. This does not mean that the researcher should stick indiscriminately and blindly to lexicographers' treatment of polysemy. If one is in doubt, the test of zeugma (§1.1.3.d) is available for this purpose.

Sometimes a single definition can cover a number of separate lexicographer's meanings or, the other way round, one meaning in a dictionary is to be divided into two or, exceptionally, more meanings. For instance, the verb *indicate* has six senses in MEDAL: **1** express indirectly, **2** show that sth exists, **3** show to be necessary, **4** point to sth, **5** be a sign of sth, **6** signal in a vehicle. All of them can be covered by an umbrella definition <#sth_x# (by use of symbols) (influences sb_x and) makes sb_x know and experience (*this*) true thought concerning #sth_y#>. The example sentences from the same dictionary can illustrate the effectiveness of our definition: **1** *Both sides indicated a willingness to solve the problem* = '*Both sides* (#sth_x, i.e. sb_x#) by use of symbols, i.e. language, made both sides (sb_x) know and experience thought concerning their *willingness to solve the problem* (#sth_y#)'. **2** *A survey indicated that 89 per cent of people recycle paper* = '*A survey* (#sth_x, i.e. phenomenon#) by use of symbols made sb_x indef know and experience *this* thought: *89 per cent of people recycle*

paper ('sth_y'). **3** *Test results will i. whether the treatment was successful* = 'Test results (#sth_x, i.e. phenomenon#) by use of symbols will make sb_x indef experience thought concerning the treatment as true and know *whether the treatment was successful* (#sth_y#)'. **4** *We'll monitor closely in case early delivery of the baby is indicated* = 'We'll monitor closely in case something (#sth_x, i.e. phenomenon#) by use of symbols makes sb_{sp+x} know and experience thought concerning *early delivery of the baby* (sth_y).' **5** *He indicated the boss's office with a nod* = 'He (#sth_x, i.e. sb_y#) using move of sb_y's head as symbol, made sb_x know and experience thought concerning *the space of boss's office* (#sth_y#)'. **6** *Each pin on the map indicates a district office* = 'Each pin on the map (#sth_x, i.e. non-living thing#) used as a symbol makes sb_x indef know and experience thought concerning space of *district offices* (#sth_y#)'. The 'symbols used' from the definition is equivalent to 'language' in 1, 'language and numbers' in 2 and 3, and 'nod' in 5, while *pin* ('sth_x') plays the role of an untypical AGENT (cf. §§2.2.1a and 2.2.6). The agentive role of *pin* can be explained as an instance of symbolic representation (see §5). 'Sb_x' is backgrounded and is probably recoverable by the wider context of 5, while in 2, 3 and 6 'sb_x's are the unmentioned 'people in general'. The seme 'influences sb_x' is optional, added to cover the possible use of *to* (which has not been included in the dictionary).

This is not to say that there is only one meaning covered by this simple definition. The directive 'sth_x' hides 'sb_x', 'non-living thing' and 'phenomenon', which yields three sememes. The semes 'sb' and 'non-living thing' seem to be able to coexist (cf. *The umpire and the scoreboard indicated 2: 0 for the home team*, and see §2.2.1 b), but not 'non-living thing' and 'phenomenon' (?*The clouds and the weather forecast indicate storm*) or

'sb' and 'phenomenon' (**The doctor and the symptoms indicated palliative care*).

The type of metonymic conceptualization 'sth made by sb' for 'sb', met in sememes 2, 3, 6, and probably 4, just like other types of metonymy, has been treated by cognitive linguists, but should not be sidestepped in definitional semantics either. Thus, *abort*₁ is <(mental event_x made by) sb_x# makes #{strong mental} event_y when sb_{x/y} wants sth# not exist> *The president aborted the mission. The committee's decision aborted the plan.* Such cases of metonymy are presented by a single definition that covers two sememes using bracketed expansion. Note awkwardness in the zeugmatic *?Both the president and the committee's decision aborted the mission.*

Frequently employed cases of metonymy are regular (semantic) alternations (Hanks 2013: 176 - 180). According to McCawley in cases of regular polysemy meanings are predictable and need not be stated in the lexicon (McCawley 1968: 130-1 in: Lehrer 1990: 215). Cases of indirect connection (§4.4.) can be treated as regular polysemy since there are rules that produce a secondary meaning of certain adjectival lexemes.

Whenever there is a sememe '#sb_x# makes (#) sb_y(#) move', there is also a sememe '#sb# makes #one's path#' *He edged his opponent into the corner. The policeman slowly edged his way forward. He elbowed me aside. He elbowed his way through the crowd (OALD s.v. **edge**).*

For instance, meaning (2) in the regular polysemy noticed by Apresjan when adjectives that mean (1) 'having a certain property/being in a certain state' such as *intelligent/stupid man* are accompanied by meaning (2) 'expressing this property/state', 'manifesting this property/state' *intelligent/stupid look/answer* (2000: 15), is revealed by our definitions to be in indirect connection with (1). Both meanings are covered by '#(expression of

mental event of) $sb_x\#'$. For instance, *hesitant* is $\langle\#(\text{expression of mental event of }) sb_x\# \text{ who during short time has bad and weak thought concerning phenomenon}_x \text{ because } sb_x \text{ does not know if phenomenon}_x \text{ that } sb_x \text{ wants to do is good or bad}\rangle$ (1) *h. about signing the contract; h. with tablets; h. to comment on the new treatment;* (2) *h. smile/reply* (indirect).

In some cases of metonymy, especially those that belong in regular polysemy, there is allosemantic variation within a single sememe. Thus, for example, the referential meaning of *paper* in *The paper discusses some mathematical problems* is 'the author of the paper' rather than 'scientific article', as a paper is not alive, but it would be wrong to say **The paper had a sandwich for breakfast* meaning 'the author of the paper had a sandwich for breakfast' (*discuss* $\langle\#(\text{sth made by use of language by } sb_x\# \text{ uses language wanting to make } sb_{\text{indef}} \text{ know a lot about } \#sth\#\rangle$). The contextual meaning 'the author of a scientific article' of the lexeme *paper* is only one alloseme of its sememe 'scientific article', used in figurative speech, and it straddles two notions, that of the scientific article and that of its author. That the lexeme *paper* in the sentence above still belongs to the sememe 'scientific article' can be proved by zeugma: *The paper, which was published in Italy, discusses some mathematical problems*, where *which* obviously shows that it is not the author who was published. In other words, for metonymy to be productive in this way, it is necessary that the meanings of the expansion within the subject directive of a verb should repeat a seme from the analysis ('use language' in our example, while *paper* and *have* (sandwich) do not share such a seme). Since the expansion of the directive in the verb *discuss* does not lead to a separate sememe, we conclude that it integrates more closely with the head than the extension of an adjectival directive – see §3.3.1c.

It is desirable, though not always feasible, that a definition should also provide a link with other sememes of the same lexeme. In the definition of *hedge*₁, which reads <group of a lot of living thing_x that cannot move, that occupy space close together, mid-sized, with hard parts, {that sb_x indef wants to make in good form and to make sb_{x/y} behind thing_x not experience sth bad}>, this is accomplished by the segment marked as typical, while *hedge*₂, the secondary sememe leaning on *hedge*₁, is: <sth_x that sb_x indef wants to use in order to make sb_{x/y} not experience sth_y bad>, as in *Buy gold as a hedge against inflation*.

Sometimes a word can be used ambiguously or equivocally. For instance, the adverb *straight* in *go straight to London* exemplifies two meanings at the same time: <moving in direction of sth [using strongly strongly small degree of amount of s p a c e]> + <moving in direction of sth [using strongly strongly small degree of amount of t i m e]>. According to Read (1955: 41 in Nida 1964: 89) "in the compilation of the Oxford English Dictionary the intermediate or transitional quotations were discarded as being 'ambiguous' or 'not clear', and the resulting neat patterns are false to actual usage".

2.4.3 c In order to establish a semantic definition, the investigator should proceed to search for the c o m m o n c o n t e n t o f c o l l o c a t o r s of each sememe. This content is essentially the condition for felicitous co-occurrence with the node, and at the same time it furnishes us with a lexical category. This, third step employs Hjelmelev's commutation test on the collocational level of language. One lexical item is substituted for another checking whether the other one remains semantically constant. This stage in the procedure uses the paradigmatic axis of language and follows the distributional semantics thesis about linguistic items with similar distribution having similar meanings

(Rubenstein and Goodenough 1965). According to Zellig Harris (1954), a pioneer of distributional method, if two words tend to have a similar distribution (e.g. if they both co-occur with a third word), they belong in the same language class (Harris 1968). Hanks (2013: 412) gives a hint of this procedural stage when stating: "That the direct object of *hazard* is usually *guess* is a very coarse discovery [...]. A finer-grained discovery, at a more abstract level, is that other words and phrases found as the direct object of *hazard* can be grouped together in a paradigm set according to some shared semantic property, for they turn out to have something semantically in common with *guess*, namely, that they denote a thought or a speech act. The meaning is then something like 'to assert or believe something, but only tentatively'". However, Hanks stops at this important observation, does not elaborate on it and does not proceed to the next step.²⁴

Since a lexeme contracts more than one syntagmatic relationship, a repeated procedure with phrases and clauses leads to new semes. Eventually a number of semes is gathered that are the building material for the definition of the lexeme. Then the semes are to be distributed over the definition to make a meaningful and well-formed definition such as can enable the prediction of collocations as well. For instance, the collocations *amazed* + *at* + n, *amazed* + *how* and *amazed that sb should* + v produce the definition of *amazed* as: <#sb_x# who during short time experiences good - bad and strong mental phenomenon (*this* thought) concerning not expected event when sb_x comes to know sth>. This definition predicts the use of *about* after *amazed*, because *about* means <sb experiences thought - emotion concerning #sth#>, while 'mental phenomenon' comprises 'thought' and 'emotion'. This is confirmed by examples such as: *a. about the theft; Martin Luther King would be a. about civil rights progress.* (President Obama in a speech held on August 27, 2013); *the importance of*

being a. about absolutely everything (Sir Terry Prachett in a lecture held at Trinity College, Dublin).

Steps b) and c) cannot be strictly separated because when lexicologists wish to distinguish sememes, they always have to take care of semantic coherency that unites certain collocators paradigmatically. And yet, step b) may be treated as a distinct one when the investigator makes only a preliminary and provisional arrangement of various senses, while in step c), applying a more rigorous methodology, this is verified, corrected if necessary, and firmly established.

In order to exemplify the the procedure, we shall go through all phases for defining the verb *conclude*₁. This meaning can be dissected by taking the following steps: (i) make a list of words with which this verb usually collocate, as in §2.4.3a, (ii) sort out a particular sememe that you are interested in, and (iii) look up for the common meaning of this sememe's collocators. The verb *conclude*₁ can be followed by a *that*-clause, so it must be the seme 'this thought concerning phenomenon' that is part of its meaning (see §3.1.3). Based on a previous research into the meanings of other *conclude*₁'s collocators, the prepositions *from*_g and *by*₂ (see §3.1.2. I), we know that *conclude*₁ is used to denote a mental phenomenon basis. It is opposed to the progressive aspect, which means that *conclude*₁ is a stative verb. The zeugma test confirms that there are three separate senses of *conclude*: **By emphasizing the importance of profit, John concluded an agreement with his partner that he must quit the job.* (*Conclude*₂ is 'end by saying/doing', *conclude*₃ is 'make an agreement', and both are used in formal style.) So we come up with the following definition of this verb sememe: <#sb# comes to experience *this* thought concerning phenomenon_x (AE: as tending to be true) using mental phenomenon_y as basis>.

The investigation may include other paradigmatically substitutable verbs, such as *infer*, *deduce* and *gather*. Since in current English *conclude*₁ and *gather* as verbs of thinking are not followed by object nouns, there will be no object directive in their definitions. Contrary to *conclude*, *infer* and *deduce* are followed by an object noun. Only *infer* can be followed by a noun which denotes an event (*presence*, *existence*, *displeasure*, *fire*). Since deductions and inferences are *made*, while *make* (unlike *do*) indicates a new situation (see §2.1.5a), this fact also has to be incorporated in the definitions of *deduce* and *infer*. The common seme for *wh*- words is 'know' (asking with *why*, *what*, *when*, *how* etc. presupposes wanting to know; see §3.1.3). (The presence of 'know' does not entail the application of any *wh*-word. There are restrictions; e.g. the verbs *advise*, *forget*, *investigate*, *learn*, *recognize*, *remember*, and *see* allow all of them, while the adjective *sensible* collocates only with *why*, the verb *estimate* with *how many*, *demonstrate* with *how* and *why*. These restrictions can be indicated by mentioning the corresponding seme; e.g. 'know way/cause of phenomenon' for *demonstrate how/why*.) There are examples with *deduce* and *gather* followed by *why* and *how*, so 'know' must be one of their semes. Only *gather* among them is normally followed by *so/not* (*COBUILD Grammar*; see §3.4.4). All verbs that collocate with *so* or *not* insinuate belief that a thought may be (not) true, i.e. 'sth just said by sb_h and experienced by sb_{sp} as (*this*) possibly (not) true thought' without 'know' (*It appears so*; *She claims so*; *I am afraid not*; *I assume/believe/expect/fancy/fear/gather/guess₁/hear/hope/imagine/maintain/notice/presume/promise/reckon/say/suggest/suppose/suspect/think/understand so*; *I *doubt/*wish so*). (The verb *doubt* is defined as: <#sb# experiences (*this*) thought_x when sb_x does not know | if (#)state_x(#) exists / if (#)((thought expressed by) sth made by use of language by) sb_y(#) is true>. *I seriously*

d. (the truth of) her statement. They never doubted him. I very much d. whether they've found it. Tim began to seriously d. that it would be possible to elude the police. Some people d. my ability/honesty /loyalty.) The brackets within the second object slot have been used to furnish the data on various facets of the object that can be highlighted by concentrating on 'thought', on 'sth made by use of language' or 'sb', in addition to 'state_x' of the first object. But this is not a (doubly) indirect connection; either time the whole object is employed, only with varying focus. The focus also varies depending on the activation of other semes. Thus, using the conjunction *that*, 'thought' is stressed to express disbelief, while with *whether* 'not knowing if state_x exists' gives impression of uncertainty (cf. Benson et al.1986 s.v. *doubt* v). Another aspect 'existence of state' is provided by the first object.

Therefore, in the final stage, in addition to *conclude*₁, we can define the three other semes in the following way:

infer <#sb# comes to experience (*this*) new thought concerning #state# using mental phenomenon as basis>;
i. conclusion/his displeasure/existence/meaning/presence;
i. about/that...

deduce <#sb_x# comes to experience (*this*) #thought# concerning sth_x particular when sb_x knows sth_x using mental phenomenon as source>;
d. fact/knowledge /theory/probable time; d.about/ that...

gather <#sb_x# comes to experience *this* thought_x concerning phenomenon when sb_y's language is source of thought_x>;
g. about/that...

To take one more example, in order to determine the meaning of the adjective *sloppy* as in *sloppy kiss* (i) a corpus of collocations with *sloppy* is necessary (*sloppy + attitude/clothes/plaster/thought/expression/eye/film /kiss /love letter/love song/look/novel /romance/sentimentalist*

/Valentine's card). (ii) Semantically similar collocations of the same lexeme are grouped together. The nouns *expression, eye, kiss* and *look (in one's eyes)* denote an expression of a mental event (one sememe), while *love letter/novel /romance/love song* refer to something made by use of symbols (another sememe). Therefore, the slot for collocating nouns (the directive) is formulated as *#(sth made by use of symbols to make) expression of sb's mental event#*, and the adjective proper (the analysis) is *'that is made in order to make sb_y experience sad emotion connected with love, in manner that is viewed by sb_{sp} as bad'*. The collocation *sloppy sentimentalist* exemplifies an expansion of the directive in a doubly indirect connection between the directive and the analysis is explained in §3.3.1c II. So, the full definition of this *sloppy's* sememe is: *<#(sb_x who makes (sth made by use of symbols to make)) expression of sb_x's mental event# that is made in order to make sb_y experience sad emotion connected with love, in manner that is viewed by sb_{sp} as bad>*. The element *'sad'* is supported by another *sloppy's* sememe, meaning *'watery'* via its near-synonym *tearful*. The seme *'love'* is derived from a defining element of *romance* and *Valentine's card*, as well as from the typical feature of *kiss* (*kiss* is *<event when sb_x touches sth {sb_y} with sb_x's lips {as expression of sb_x's mental event of love}>*), and from the noun *love* occurring as a frequent attribute of *song* and *letter*. (The noun *love* is defined as *<mental state and strong emotion that sb_x experiences {as good} associated with warmth, concerning sth (as relation of (more than) two sb's)>*, e.g. *blind/extreme /desperate /destructive /intense*.) The oddness of *?I like sloppy writings* suggests *'viewed by the speaker as bad'*.

In yet another example, if the verb *irrigate* collocates with such nouns as *area, common, countryside, desert, field, garden, ground, land, lawn, meadow, pasture, range, savannah* or *soil*, these nouns must have

something in common. This is apparently the same 'ground'. Therefore, 'ground' is supposed to be the marker for the noun collocates (§2.4.4), as well as the directive, of *irrigate*, defined as <#sth# makes #ground# be with liquid substance {water} in order to make [exist] non-human living things that cannot move>.

By observing collocations *cultivate* + *area/country /common/countryside/field/ground/land/lawn /meadow /pasture/range/savannah/soil* and **?cultivate* + *bank /beach/desert /floor* (the bottom of the sea/cave) */frontier*, it can be concluded that the object directive should read: #ground for growing non-human living thing that cannot move# because the nouns in the latter group denote ground on which plants are not grown. But since the tendency is to make directives as simple as possible, leaving detailed definitional material to analyses, instead of defining *cultivate*₁ as <#sb# makes #ground_x for growing non-human living thing that cannot move# such as to make {a lot of} non-human living things that cannot move exist and grow on ground_x and be good for use>, a better solution, which avoids the repetition of 'non-human living thing that cannot move', would be: <#sb# makes #ground_x # come to be in state that makes {a lot of} non-human living things that cannot move exist on ground_x and be good for use>.²⁵

In another example, collocations such as *acute /chronic* + *pharyngitis/rheumatism* indicate that in definitions for *pharyngitis* and *rheumatism* there should be no mention of the length of the diseases, since they collocate with both *acute* and *chronic*, unlike *epilepsy*, which is chronic by definition, so that the phrase *chronic epilepsy* is pleonastic.

The verb *hiss* has a wide collocational range: In *The _____ is hissing* the slot can be filled by *audience, cat, crowd, kettle, pressure cooker, snake*, which brings us to a vague 'sth' in <#sth# makes high breathed sound>. This analysis is backed by the onomatopoeic motivation of

this word: /i/ is a high sound, /h/ is a breathed sound, and /s/ is a voiceless sibilant with a high-frequency hiss characteristic. Occasionally, sound symbolism of onomatopoeic words can be employed in defining them, as in *boom* <#sound# comes to be heard as EXPLOSIVE, DEEP and VIBRATING, where 'EXPLOSIVE, DEEP and VIBRATING' are evoked by /b/, /u:/ and /m/ respectively (as in Hlebec 2002: 99-101).

To determine the lexical meaning of an adjective, adverbial collocates can also be used following the same procedure, e.g. *charming, exciting, popular, powerful, safe, successful* all contain 'good' because they collocate with *wonderfully*, which contains the same seme.

John Sinclair said of *set in*: "The most striking feature of this phrasal verb is the nature of the subjects. In general they refer to unpleasant states of affairs. Only three refer to the weather; a few are neutral, such as *reaction* and *trend*. The main vocabulary is *rot* (3), *decay, malaise, despair, ill-will, decadence, impoverishment, infection, prejudice, vicious (circle), rigor mortis* [...] The subjects of *set in* are also highly abstractions; several are nominalisations of another part of speech" (Sinclair 1987: 155-156). This kind of reasoning coincides with the third stage of the collocational method, and in our notation, the information on *set in* above would include 'bad' as a typical seme: <#{bad} state# comes to be long time state>.

At this stage of the development of the theory certain repetitions in the material for definitions, such as the redundant information that phenomenon is contextually good (typically) or bad, are inevitable because the complete definitions of the relevant function words have been copied to make the procedure transparent. There is occasional internal repetition of semes. This is conspicuous with *surprising*, whose definition contains 'phenomenon_x' mentioned four times: <#(sb_x who makes - experiences) phenomenon_x# that unintentionally makes sb_{y/z} experience (strong) thought

concerning phenomenon_x that is not expected, because of sth_x, when sb_{y/z} comes to know phenomenon_x that influences and makes sb_z think that phenomenon_x is {good} - bad>. This is a safe way to control the elements of definitions until “redundancy rules” could be established such as would dispense with repetitions. Certain semes in definitions are redundant, as, e.g. ‘unintentionally’ with ‘sth’. As mentioned in § 3.2.7 and 3.2.9, clauses with *should* redundantly and with emphasis repeat the information about (lack of) expectation, as in *It’s strange that he should be invited by Kate* vs. *It’s strange that he is invited by Kate*.

2.4.4 Markers and distinguishers

There is usually one main seme that is a headword in the definition of a noun sememe, called a “marker” (or Russian semanticists’ “archiseme” [Radić-Dugonjić 1999: 47 ff]) or with some authors “classifier”, which repeats itself in several or many lexemes, and which is often followed by the relative pronoun seme ‘that’. “A good definition includes a classifier, the name of a more general category, and at least enough facts to distinguish this word’s sense from the senses of any other words that share the same classifier” (Hudson 1995: 24). It roughly corresponds to Katz and Fodor’s semantic marker in generative semantics. The term “marker” has been used in other senses in sociolinguistics and conversational analysis, as well as in lexical semantics for what we call a ‘(distinctive) seme’. In transcription in the present book, a marker is followed by a double bar and separated from the rest of the sememe labelled a “distinguisher”,

To take an example, in the noun *hedge*, defined in §2.4.3b as <group of a lot of living thing_x more than one that cannot move || that occupy space close together,

mid-sized, with hard parts>, the marker is the complex seme 'group of a lot of living thing_x more than one that cannot move', which reccurs in the nouns *bouquet*, *vegetation*, *grass*, *forest* and *wood*, and appears as the object directive of the verbs *mow*, *scythe* and *disafforest*. Another, more general marker is 'living thing that cannot move', which can be established as a subject or object directive of the verbs *bloom*, *plant*, *ramble*, *set*, *shoot*, *sow*, *sprout*, *transplant*, *twine* itself, *uproot* and *wither*, as well as the directive of the adjective *shady*. In the definition of the noun *yeast* as <soft (viscous) substance_x || which makes a lot of small balls of air when substance_x is made warm {used in making bread}>, the marker is the element 'soft viscous substance'. The same marker occurs at the beginning of the definitions of other nouns, for instance, *mud* <soft (viscous) substance || that is {bad} part of ground, which can be used to make form of thing>. The marker 'soft viscous substance' reappears as a directive of the verbs *smear*, *spread* and *stir*. The seme 'viscous' is as changeable as the state it denotes; yeast becomes thick and sticky when mixed with a little water or merely mashed, and mud becomes hard in hot weather. The existence of the directive #slightly bad bodily state# for the phrasal verb *pick up*: <#sb# comes to experience #slightly bad bodily state#>, justifies assigning not only 'bad bodily state', but also 'slightly bad bodily state' to the group of markers. (Semantically opaque phrasal verbs, like *pick up*, are treated as a single lexical unit, while in transparent ones, such as *come down* 'fall', the verbal part is separated from the particle and both are treated separately.)

Markers often coincide with the notion of presupposition. A presupposition is that part of a sentence's meaning which is assumed to be true or to refer to something as existing, and which holds good even when the sentence is negated or questioned. In a like manner, when the existence of a noun notion is negated, markers remain true. Presuppositions hinge on the

semantic and grammatical properties of the words involved. *This is not a hedge* does not cancel the marker 'living thing_x that cannot move' and *This is not yeast* keeps 'soft substance_x' intact. Complementarily, distinguishers often correspond to the part of meaning that is changed in negatives. "[I]f someone says, *it wasn't a blonde that I saw*, the likeliest interpretation is that both [HUMAN BEING] and [FEMALE] are outside the scope of the negative, and only [FAIR-HAIRED] is being negated" (Cruse 2004: 56). "[T]he default reading of *that's not a stallion* is that the animal indicated is a mare, that is to say, the negative applies only to the [MALE] component, leaving the 'horse' component untouched" (Cruse 2004: 238). The test of negation is not infallible because it also depends on context. If *boy* is defined as 'human living thing || who is young and male', in *Jackie is not a boy*, it is 'male' that is usually negated and 'young' remains, while in *John is not a boy* it is 'young' that is negated and 'male' is still valid.

Every marker can be preceded by a general seme 'kind of'. This is in the spirit of Wierzbicka's claim that "although [...] different features have to be enumerated in an empirically adequate definition, in the semantic formula they have to be subordinated to a general taxonomic statement referring to KIND" (1988: 472).

Sometimes the delimitation of a marker is not so straightforward. The definitions of the nouns *duty* <strong (legal -) mental state experienced by sb_x concerning {worthy} phenomenon_x {habitualness} strongly influenced and expected by sb_y with social power / more than one who want(s) to make sb_x make phenomenon_x because of law - {morals}> and *obligation* <strong mental {legal} state experienced by sb_x concerning phenomenon_x {habitualness} strongly influenced and expected by sb_y {with social power} who wants to make sb_x make phenomenon_x because of {law} - morals> differ only

slightly and it may seem that their markers are virtually the whole definitions. The marker is 'legal state experienced by sb_x concerning phenomenon $_x$ expected by sb_y with legal power who wants to make sb_x make phenomenon $_x$ ' because the same bundle of semes occurs as part of the definitions in a number of nouns – *ensorship, conscription, constitution, legislation, penalty and regulation*, as well as part of the definition of the verb *lift* (§ 3.4.5), to mention only lexemes in this book. (In order to marshall the semantic definitions both of *obligation* and *duty*₁, we have used the definitions of *have, impose, violate, under, of, to*₅, and *to*-infinitive, for *duty*₁ – *abandon*₁, *do* and *exercise*, and for *obligation* – *meet*.)

The occurrence of a directive, which is easier to determine, may be used as the most appropriate criterion in establishing markers. A list of markers in the appendix may equally well serve this purpose, but this list is not final and therefore, by the time it becomes final, markers have to be tentative. All markers are probably used as (parts of) directives, and perhaps vice versa, all directives can be markers. As a cover term for 'directive' and 'marker' we shall use the label "classeme", which may be superfluous if the directive and the marker turn out to be the same.

Although the notion of markers and distinguishers has been abandoned in semantics (cf. Shields 1977), it might turn out to be useful. Perhaps our argumentation will restore and salvage the notion and term (cf. Hudson 1995: 26).²⁶

Markers and the complementing distinguishers also emerge within a small lexical field made up of nouns denoting dense air in the nature. These can be delineated as: *fog* <bad environmental phenomenon with gas substance || that is in large space $_x$ of air and makes sb see things in space $_x$ with strong difficulty>, *haze* <gas

substance || that is in large space_x of air and makes sb see things in space_x with difficulty>, *mist* <bad environmental phenomenon with gas substance || that is in large space_x of air and makes sb see things in space_x with difficulty>, *smog* <strongly bad environmental phenomenon with gas substance made by burning || that is in large space_x of air and makes sb see things in space_x with strong difficulty>. For *smog*, Goddard (1998: 32) advances the following definition: <something in the air, because of things that people do in that place; people can see it; it is bad for people to breathe>.

These markers are corroborated by the definitions of the following collocates of these nouns:

dispel + *darkness/fog/mist/smog/?haze/*rain* (*dispel* <#sth# makes #bad environmental phenomenon# not exist any more>); *in*₁ (§3.1.2. I) + *fog/haze/mist; dense/thick* + *fog/haze/mist/smog* (*dense* <#liquid - gas substance_x# that makes sb see things that are in substance_x with difficulty>; *thick*₁ <#liquid - gas substance_x# that makes sb see things in substance_x with difficulty>); *thin* + *haze/mist/*fog/*smog* (*thin* <#liquid - gas substance_x# that makes sb see things in substance_x easily>); *belch* (*out*) *fire/smog/smoke /steam* (*belch* (*out*) <#thing# makes #{gas}substance made by burning# come to exist in space of air in strong amount>).

Morphologically derived adjectives *foggy/hazy/misty* enter the construction *it*₃ 'environmental phenomenon' + *be* + *foggy/hazy/misty/smoggy*. The seme 'gas substance' occurs as an object directive in *breathe* (*out*) /*discharge/emit/exhale/expire/liquefy/sniff*, and as the directive of the adjectives *brisk/dense/fresh/heavy/rarefied*.

As the definitions of *fog*, *mist* and *smog* show, a marker can be made up of two directives joined.

2.4.5 The collocational method requires painstaking finetuning of definitions after a lot of experimenting before a satisfactory result is achieved. The investigator has to analyse a large number of collocations in order to make this method applicable. Definitions reached through collocational method have sometimes to be augmented by data obtained by means of tests (§1.3). The advantage of such definitions is that they are (almost) totally regulated, even more than the partially controlled ones by Apresjan. A single "polysemous" definition may cover two or more separate sememes for the sake of succinctness, and relations between the meanings can be presented more vividly. For instance, **He and the storm began felling trees* proves that *begin* has two separate meanings here, one with a living agent 'sb' and the other with a non-living 'environmental phenomenon' (see §2.2.1 b). And yet, a joint, polysemous definition of *begin* can be constructed: <(#sth# makes) {(#)phenomenon(#) come to exist - make and tend to exist - make}>.

The collocational method opens a safe road to defining without skewing meaning because the means used are purely linguistic. It uses words of common parlance. The material for definitions is provided by all information on the collocational potential of a word, including its syntactic behaviour and valences.

So far, linguistic literature has treated grammatical and lexical collocations deductively (Mel'čuk) and grammatical collocations inductively (Dixon). Our approach brings the novelty of treating inductively not only grammatical but also lexical collocations.

There is a similarity between the notion of lexical function and the simple seme in our approach, but there are also important differences. For Mel'čuk (1987: 96) a lexical function is not a genuine semantic unit because lexical functions are not language-specific. They can have wide application in translation. For this author, there is equivalence between *strong* in *strong wind* and *heavy* in *heavy rain*. On the contrary, our simple semes, as well as

other semantic units based on simple semes, are meant to be natural language-specific units established by inductive reasoning. Katz and Fodor's (1963) and Bolinger's (1965) "markers", like (Human), (Animal), (Male), (Young), as well as Dixon's (2005: 7) "semantic types", also bear similarity with our markers, as they are units in the process of atomization of meaning.

Disharmonious collocations also provide an important means in the collocational method and instrumentation for meaning. Thus, Cruse's example (2004: 212) **She's on the back of my hand* 'Her phone number is written on the back of my hand' in contrast with *She's in the phone book*, can be explained as hinging on the definition of *phone book* <solid flat man-made thing_x in which exist {a lot of} pieces_x of paper with space in which exists sth_x made by use of language in writing that is not strongly short, in order to express names of a lot of sb_y more than one who use telephone>. Namely, (*the back of*) *hand* does not contain 'names of a lot of sb_y more than one'. Reliance solely on corpus is insufficient as "[n]o amount of data can show that a sentence or other linguistic phenomenon cannot occur" (Hanks 2013: 22). For instance, the *BNC* concordance lines for *inadequate* accessed in 2015 do not witness *entirely inadequate* although *OCD* contains this collocation.

By means of collocations subtle distinctions between two sememes can be worked out, as in the case of *cottage* and *hut*: *cottage* <man-made thing with space_x for living || that is small {out of town}>; *hut* <man-made thing with space_x for living || that is small and simple, out of town>. The marker '{man-made} thing with space for living' appears as the directive of the adjectives *palatial* and *spacious* and also as a prepositional object of the verb + preposition + noun collocation *dwell in + noun*. The seme 'small' comes out as a distinctive feature the moment we detect **imposing cottage/hut*, because

imposing is defined as <#{man-made} thing# that is large and makes sb feel admiration>. The same 'typically out of town' is proven by means of **urban hut* vs. ?*urban cottage*.

Following his own intuition, Cruse (1986: 281) adduces examples of "idiosyncratic collocational restrictions", for which there is apparently no semantic motivation:

flawless +
*argument/complexion/performance/?taste/?order/*behaviour/*credentials /*kitchen/*record/*reputation*. (The collocation *flawless record* has been attested in CDAA s.v. *record*. *Flawless reputation* is a normal collocation in CDAA and LTP.)

immaculate +
*performance /kitchen /order /?record /?reputation /?taste /*argument /*behaviour/*complexion/*credentials*

impeccable +
*performance/behaviour/credentials/order/record/taste/?argument /?reputation /*complexion/*kitchen*

spotless +

*kitchen/record/reputation /?complexion /*argument /*behaviour/*credentials /*order/*performance/*taste*

unblemished +
*record /?complexion /?reputation /*argument /*behaviour /*credentials /*kitchen /*performance/*order/*taste* (CDAA and LTP mention *unblemished reputation* as a usual collocation. The collocations *flawless/spotless /unblemished credentials* are acceptable by some speakers.)

The same allegedly hopeless situation is claimed in *LLCE* s.v. N 214 *adjectives: p u r e*, where *flawless* is glossed as 'perfect; with no flaw', *spotless* as 'pure; very clean; having no spots or marks of dirt', and *immaculate* as 'pure; flawless; faultless; spotless'. However, the collocational method leads us to a fairly neat pattern as soon as we have learned that *argument* is 'sth made by use of language', *behaviour* is 'habitualness', *complexion* is 'colour of face', *order*, *performance* and *taste* are 'sb's state / state that sb makes', *kitchen* is 'thing with space_x used when sb exists in space_x', and *record*, *credentials* and *reputation* are 'moral state'.

The adjective *flawless* is defined as <#habitualness (?) - state/phenomenon made by use of language/worthy man-made thing/colour of face/outer body part# that is strongly strongly good> on the basis of the collocations: *f.* + *beauty/performance/record* 'state', + *argument* /*English* 'phenomenon made by use of language'+ ? *behaviour* ('habitualness', acceptable to some speakers), + *diamond* 'worthy man-made thing', + *complexion* 'colour of face', + *skin* 'outer body part'.

immaculate <#state of sb / state that sb makes / thing with space_x used when sb exists in space_x / (sb wearing) man-made thing to be put on body# that is strongly strongly good>: *i.* + *order/performance/technique/timing* 'state that sb makes'; + *conception* 'sb's state'; + *garden/house/kitchen* <large thing_x with space_x used when sb exists in space_x and makes thing_y - substance good for eating>; + white *shoes/uniform* 'man-made thing to be put on body'; *He was i. in his uniform* 'sb with man-made thing to be put on body'; + *credentials* 'worthy long-time state of sb'.

impeccable <#state that sb makes/is in / phenomenon made by use of language / event made by sb / man-made thing to be put on body# that is strongly strongly

good>: *i.* + *argument/record/reputation* ('state made by sb', acceptable to some speakers; cf. *Language Activator*); + *behaviour/credentials/English/logic/manners* 'habitualness made by sb'; + white *shirt* 'man-made thing to be put on body'

spotless <#moral state/(state of) thing with space_x used when sb exists in space_x / man-made thing to be put on body# that is in strongly strongly good order>: *s.* + *accommodation* <state of thing with large space_x used when sb exists in space_x>; + *character/credentials/record* 'moral state'; + *kitchen* (see *immaculate* for the definition); + white *shirt* 'man-made thing to be put on body'. *He keeps his house s.*

unblemished **1** <#moral state/colour of face# that is strongly strongly good>: *u.* + *character/credentials/record/reputation*; *complexion* **2** <# outer body part# that is strongly clean> *u.* + *skin*.

Of course, directives with 'thing' constitute sememes different from those with 'state', 'event made by sb' and 'phenomenon made by use of language'. The seme 'sb' stands apart to form still other sememes. 'Colour of face' and 'outer body part' pass the zeugma test, as well as '(state of) thing with space_x used when sb exists in space_x'. Some other combinations are not acceptable; e.g. ??*Her beauty and the diamond were flawless. *John was enthusing about her immaculate kitchen and playing technique.*

It is possible to discern a logic underlying the distribution of these adjectives. *Flawless* is anthropocentric – with the stress on workmanship (*performance*, production of diamonds), human outward look (*beauty, skin, complexion*) and the results of human activities (language). *Immaculate* centres on states (including the outward look of things worn) and spaces. (The preposition

in with its sememes *in*₁, *in*₂ and *in*₃ unites 'state' and 'space'.) The meaning of *impeccable* is similar to that of *flawless* and it is used in formal style. *Spotless* highlights the state of physical cleanliness. Physical cleanliness of *spotless* and *unblemished* serves as a basis for the metaphor of moral purity.

Cowie's (1997) claim that collocations with *conduct/carry out/perform* are formed by making choices from sets that are arbitrarily limited, has to be challenged because he disallows the collocations of these verbs with the nouns *inspection, review* and *survey*, whereas according to *the OCD* the collocation *perform inspection/review/survey* are quite normal. It seems that there is a general tendency for idiolects to impose individual constraints upon collocations. Such "idiosyncretic" restrictions are neutralized by corpora as they record only the production of "tolerant" speakers.

The nouns that go with *perform*₁ can be defined as 'event made by sb_{with power}', as in *p. abortion/juggling act/autopsy/calculation/piano concert/dance/experiment/feat /inspection/magic/miracle/music/opera/surgical operation/theatrical play/somersault /test/trick /undertaking* or *p. skilfully on the flute* and *p. live on TV*. Therefore the definition of *perform*₁ should be <#sb_x# makes #event made by sb_x with power# {for a lot of sb_y more than one}>. *Perform*₂ has <#sb_x# makes (come true) #(mental state concerning) phenomenon_x expected by sb_y with social power who wants to make sb_x make phenomenon_x#>: *p. + ceremony/duty₁/job/mission /promise/rite/ritual/service /task/wedding*. The following collocations are not apposite: **perform + condition /criterion /demand /instruction /requirement /schedule* because they denote phenomena that are expected by an exterior authority rather than by the agent himself (cf. *impose* in §3.4.). There is also *perform*₃ <#sb# makes

#role of social power#, but unlike *appoint* (see §3.4.3), *perform*₃ limits its range of noun collocates, prohibiting all those 'roles of social power' that are metaphorically derived from 'space' – *office, order, position, and post*. For them, the proper choice are *hold* and *occupy* (*hold office, occupy post, etc.*), whereas *perform*₃ collocates with *function* and *role*.

The definitions of the other two verbs and the accompanying collocations follow: *carry out* <#sb# makes #event wanted to be made# end>: *carry out* + *autopsy/experiment /inspection/operation/review /survey /test*; *conduct* <#sb_{with power}# makes #phenomenon for sb_{more than one}#>: *conduct* + *autops /experiment /inspection/review/survey/test*. In this way, the object directives appear to be 'event wanted to be made' (for *carry out*), 'phenomenon for sb more than one' (*conduct*) and 'event made by sb_{with power}' (*perform*₁). These elements, in turn, with the help of *on*₁, *on*₆ and *with*₂, lead to the definitions of the nouns involved; e.g. *experiment* <event made by sb_x {with power of knowledge} for sb_y more than one concerning sth_x that sb_x knows well, using sth_y when sb_x wants to come to know sth_x better>; *autopsy* <event wanted to be made by sb_x with power of knowledge for sb_y more than one, using sharp thing to cut sb_y's dead body in order to come to know what made sb_y die>.

Semantic definitions resemble sentences, which is along the line of some semanticists (notably Weinreich). "The only adequate way to study the meaning of a word is to put it in a sentence frame, in a predicative position" (Hofmann 1993: 224). In definitions the verb is almost always in the present, the unmarked tense. Wierzbicka's reductive paraphrases (1987: 12), called explications,²⁷ consist of a number of short sentences, while our definitions consist of single sentences or phrases, which

makes them more succinct than reductive paraphrases and usually less “clumsy” and “artificial”, as Wierzbicka (1987: 13) admitted of her own definitions. Wierzbicka has “looked for generalizations which, within certain well-defined categories, would apply to any member of a given category, and which would therefore have full predictive power. Moreover [she has] sought to state the proposed generalizations in a standardized semantic metalanguage, derived from natural language – a metalanguage which would make them both rigorous and intuitively verifiable” (Wierzbicka 1988: 162). Ours is the same aim but with a different method, and our explanations sometimes differ.

The metalanguage of definitions, like that of explications, includes a minimal number of basic words, often equivalent to semantic units that have only one, unambiguous meaning.

2.4.6 Even when all the steps of the collocational method have been taken, after other techniques for establishing definitions have been used, two particular lexemes that belong to terminal taxa may still not be fully differentiated. When it comes to defining terminal taxa (see §3.7.2), it is often necessary to resort to extralinguistic data or to linguistic data not provided by the collocational method. Wierzbicka (1985) suggests the following feature categories for lexical fields with terminal taxa: (a) why it is used, (b) how it is used, (c) its look, (d) collocations if any. According to the same author (Wierzbicka 1985: 52), names of human artefacts require the following schema: category (a kind of thing made by people), purpose (relative to situation), material, shape, size.

For example, to distinguish between *parsley* and *celery* in the lexical field of vegetables, it would be necessary to introduce such extralinguistic data as ‘used for seasoning, with smaller leaves than cellery’ for *parsley*, and for *celery* ‘used as a vegetable, with larger leaves than parsley’.

In order to determine the distinguishers of *cup* and *mug* it is necessary to mention drinking at the table in opposition to drinking away from the table as the main characteristic that governs other features of cups and mugs (Wierzbicka 1985: 19 ff). Of course, if someone uses a mug while sitting at the table, it does not influence the definition of *mug*, because this noun contains the seme 'used at table' as a canonical feature (see §1.2.4).²⁸ One could as well use a book to smash a mosquito, but it does not affect the definition of *book* (in §1.1.2). While a few collocations could help decide the shape of these vessels (e.g. *tall mug* should be preferable to *?tall cup*, the reference point being horizontal extension, which should be strongly smaller than the vertical one; see §1.1 3 e), we cannot find any collocate with *cup* and *mug* to bring out the distinction of drinking at, vs. away from, the table and we do not want to treat the difference as distinctive.

cup <hard thing with empty space || that is man-made, small and round {not much higher than wide, with handle, used in vertical position, with small plate, one of set} used to hold {hot} liquid_x when sb drinks liquid_x for pleasure {at table}> (The marker 'hard thing' has been attested as a directive of the verbs *break*₁, *dent*, *grate*, and *grind*.)

mug <hard thing with empty space || that is man-made, small and round {higher than wide} with a handle used to hold liquid_x when sb drinks liquid_x for pleasure not at table>.

2.4.7 Agreement of defining semes

Sememes are combined (i) according to pragmatic circumstances, i.e. the speakers' experience with

referents around them, and (ii) according to purely linguistic (semantic, grammatical or stylistic) regularities.

2.4.7a *Pragmatic factors*

Some collocators are felt as peculiar owing to familiarity with real facts. However, there is no clear-cut borderline between the encyclopedic knowledge of facts and the knowledge of a language (cf. Leech 1990: 69, 85, 141; Cruse 2004: 94), though arguments have been made for the distinction between linguistic and extralinguistic knowledge. Thus, *My uncle always sleeps standing on one toe* is unbelievable because of what speakers of English know about the world, while *My uncle always sleeps awake* is unimaginable because this is not only impossible, but also based on the contradiction between *sleep* and *awake* (Leech 1981: 6). This is a linguistic fact since distinctive features of the two lexemes ('not active' and 'active') are in contradiction. (For different views and discussion see Bolinger 1965, Sanders 1973 and Hudson 1995: 31-3.) It seems that both opinions are reasonable: On the one hand, the content of semantic definitions constitutes linguistic knowledge shared by speakers of a language. On the other hand, there is knowledge of particular aspects of the vast world specific for particular speakers, which does not manifest itself in semantic definitions. This speaks in favour of a division. But there is also an area of typical senses, canonical expectations, idioms and proverbs, which enter definitions as important variable elements, and they are a transition from linguistic to encyclopaedic competence. Thus, the definition of *drink* as <#living thing_x that can move# makes (#)liquid substance_x {water / alcoholic substance} (#) move through thing_x's mouth directly and comes to exist in thing_x's body {source of substance_x being thing_y with empty space}>²⁹ produces collocations such as *drink*

water/wine/lemonade, and even such as *drink petrol/blood*, which are unusual, but linguistically acceptable. *He flew the sparrow across the English Channel*, marked in Evans (2010: 41) with a double question mark, is linguistically as correct as the same sentence with *homing pigeon* instead of *sparrow*. The difference is in the much lower probability for the former to be true, but this is a matter of knowledge of reality, not of language. Moreover, most material from semantic definitions simultaneously functions as information about reality, with the exception of much “folk biology” and other popular classification where such information is superficial or even misleading.

When a certain collocation is unacceptable on pragmatic grounds, its referents never occur in the given relationship or connection in reality. In such a collocation it is the connection of its referents that is questionable (impossible or improbable, as in the world of fables), e.g. *The giant devoured the house. The fisherman caught a talking goldfish*. For pragmato-linguistic reasons too, one would not say **yellowish blue* (Kay and McDaniel 1978), because there is another (for the speakers of English basic) colour between yellow and blue, which is felt as such by the sense of sight, and this fact is reflected in language by having a distinct term *green* in general usage.

2.4.7 b *Linguistic factors*

2.4.7 b I A phenomenon called “feature synthesis” embraces whole clauses, as *Jane is a cow* or *John is talking to us tomorrow* (Canavan 1983: 60). In the first sentence, either *Jane* is a name for a cow or *cow* is used metaphorically for a woman, but not vice versa. In the second sentence, the adverb *tomorrow* dominates the imperfective aspect and imposes the meaning ‘in the future’ instead of the primary meaning ‘in the present’.

The speaker and the hearer opt for this interpretation rather than for 'John is talking to us now' because the present progressive is polysemous, whilst *tomorrow* has its fixed meaning of the future. Even the preposition *in* with its primary meaning <existing in = occupying «space»> (see §3.1.2. I) can impose the same 'space' on a noun that primarily denotes a surface, as in *He could see the little image of the consecrated candle reflect in the soft surface of the pearl*. Hawkins (1986 : 28) explains this phenomenon away in a rather abstruse way as an association of the active zone of two-dimensional solid chunk represented by *surface* to MEDIUM by "some dependent principle".

There is semantic affinity between plural and uncountable nouns in that both categories are unbounded (not individuated; Huddleston 1984). Two nouns that are semantically closely connected are expected to have the same type of boundedness. *The Inka women wove lama wool into blouses* (both *wool* and *blouses* are unbounded). **She wove wool into a blouse* (*wool* is unbounded, *a blouse* bounded). *She wove some old wool into a blouse* (both bounded).

The transitive verbs *work* <#sb# makes #good - bad - {strong} phenomenon# exist> and *portend* <#sth# makes sb_{indef} believe that #{bad} - good phenomenon# will exist> have the evaluatively ambivalent 'good - bad' in the object directives. So, when collocating with nouns that connote a good or bad event by definition, the nouns help decide what kind of phenomenon is meant, good or bad, as in *work cure/miracle/wonder* (good), *work/havoc/mischief* (bad) or *portend victory / mild winter* (good), *portend trouble/danger/severe winter* (bad).

For other rules of connection see §§3.3.0 and 3.3.1.

2.4.7 b II The content of a directive and the content of the collocating noun marker should always coincide, either exactly or partly overlapping (more precisely, be identical or in a hyponymous relation). (When the marker content

of a noun is broader than that of a collocating directive, we speak of “transference”.) Thus the adjective *pregnant* with its directive #female living thing that can move# agrees with nouns whose markers are superordinates (*animal*, *neighbour* ‘living thing that can move’) or hyponyms (*nun*, *poetess* ‘human female living thing that can move’). However there is no transference of ‘female’ in *pregnant* to *chair* in **The chair is pregnant* because *chair* contains ‘non-living thing’, which is incompatible with the directive ‘female living thing_x that can move’ (cf. Cruse 2004: 248). The adjective *cruel* is <#(bad phenomenon made by) sb_x# who makes sb_y experience strongly bad state> and the nouns *crime/torture* contain the identical ‘bad phenomenon made by sb’. Therefore the collocations *c. crime/torture* are admissible, as well as *c. person*, due to the repetition of ‘sb’.

To take another example that illustrates semantic compatibility, the adjective *severe*₃ (§3.3.6 c), which contains #bad phenomenon#, is collocable with the nouns *cramp* and *epidemic* because their markers contain a narrower ‘b a d and strong bodily p h e n o m e n o n’. The same adjective avoids the company of nouns with a hierarchically incompatible marker ‘environmental phenomenon’ that does not contain ‘bad’ (e. g. *dawn*, *sunrise*), but permits *cold/severe storm* (*storm* with ‘b a d environmental p h e n o m e n o n’, which is a hyponym of ‘bad phenomenon’). The semes ‘b a d and strong mental e v e n t’ and ‘b a d and strong e v e n t when sb_x strong touches sb_y’ contain ‘bad and strong event’ (a broader notion). Therefore, noun markers that contain the two narrower semes above collocate with verb directives that have ‘bad and strong event’ (or even broader ‘bad and strong phenomenon’ = ‘bad and strong event - state - habitualness’), like *suffer*₁ (see §3.5.3) <#living thing that can move {sb_x}# experiences #bad and strong phenomenon#> + *depression/grief/misery* ‘bad and strong mental event’, and *suffer*₂ <#living thing

that can move {sb_x}# is affected by #bad and strong event when sb_y strongly touches sb_x and makes sb_x feel strongly bad> + *attack /beating /kick /pinch /shock /thrashing/torture/whipping*.

Besides the classemes (i.e. markers and directives) that are more complex than 'living thing that can move' ('female living thing that can move' and 'human female living thing that can move'), there are simpler ones: 'thing' and 'sth'. In another series of nesting classemes we have found seven degrees: 'sth', 'thing', 'thing_{more than one}', 'living thing_{more than one}', 'group of living thing more than one', 'group of living thing that cannot move more than one', 'group of small and thin living thing that cannot move more than one'. The classeme 'group of living thing more than one that can move' is a co-hyponym of 'group of living thing more than one that cannot move', 'group of large living thing_{more than one} that cannot move' is a co-hyponym of 'group of small living thing_{more than one} that cannot move', and they do not belong to this progressive series.

2.4.7 c *transference*

When a directive is attached to a noun with broader marker content, the content of the directive is "transferred" to the noun so that textually the marker equals the directive in respect of extension. Weinreich called the modified feature of such a noun NEUTRAL, and his example was *pretty teacher*, where *pretty* carries the feature 'female' over to the otherwise neutral *teacher* (Canavan 1983; 60). This process was labelled "feature transfer" (Weinreich 1966a: 430), "transference" (Cruse 1986: 35), "contextual determination" (Cruse 2004: 119), or "characterization" (Allerton 1984: 26). In transference a particular verb or adjective directive feature

contextually imposes an interpretation on a noun such as would be absent out of context. The function of transference is to create two identical semes (features) in *parole* and in that way enable the meaningful chaining of words. "Transference" is just a metaphor since the 'transferred' seme does not move from one place to another. Rather, it is "copied" or "duplicated". Canavan (1983) calls this phenomenon "domination", which is apt to be used provided there is dominance of a hyponym (the directive 'human female living thing that can move' of *pretty* in our example) over a superordinate (the marker 'human living thing that can move' of *teacher*). Thus, adding *cruel* <#(bad phenomenon made by) sb_x# who makes sb_y experience strongly bad state> to the noun *behaviour* <phenomenon made by sb_x {in relation to sb_y}>, which is evaluatively unmarked (neutral) and more extensive in meaning than 'bad phenomenon made by sb', changes 'phenomenon made by sb' of the noun *behaviour* into 'bad phenomenon made by sb'. At the same time the noun's unmarked feature contextually changed into marked.

In *My neighbour is pregnant* the adjective *pregnant* projects the feature 'female' onto the noun *neighbour*. Looked from another point of view, because *neighbour* and *woman* are in hyponymous relationship ("Hyponymy involves entailment." Palmer 1981: 87), *My neighbour is pregnant* entails *My neighbour is a woman*. The adjective *pregnant* can be defined as <#female living thing_x that can move# in whose body exists new living thing_y that can move, which state sb_y male made> (See the definitions of *by*₁ and *with*₅ in § 3.1.2 I, which collocate with *pregnant*.) (Mackenzie and Mel'čuk (1988: 72) provide the following definition: X is pregnant with Y (by Z) = As a result of functioning of X's reproductive system, X has inside X's body a Y <Ys> which is developing until Y is able to live outside X's body and then will come out of X's body (Y being the offspring of Z).)

The extension of a noun can be contextually limited under the influence of the collocating verb. Thus, for example: *winner* <thing that wins> in *ride a winner* is interpreted as 'horse' owing to the definition of the primary *ride*, which contains 'horse' as a typical object, and in the application of *ride* the same 'thing' is dominated by the directive #non-human living thing that can move {horse}#. Another example of transference from a verb directive is *He drinks the stuff for breakfast*, where *stuff* is neutral by definition as to the kind of substance, and is more extensive in meaning than 'liquid substance', but is specified here as 'liquid' owing to the influence of the object directive of the preceding verb *drink*. The definition of the verb *drink* is given in § 2.4.7a.

The impact of the directive in transference must not be overemphasized because the content of the analysis makes an equal contribution. In our examples, *pretty* is 'good-looking in a womanish way', *cruel* contains 'bad' in the analysis as well, the content of *pregnant's* analysis can be attributed only to a female, 'direct movement through the mouth' is normal only with liquids and *gulp*, etc. It would be wrong to introduce 'bad' as a transferrable feature in the directive of the adjective *bitter* for *b.* morning *light/sun/winter*; see §3.3.5d 5) because 'bad' in the definitional analysis automatically requires that the collocating noun should contain 'bad' if not by definition then contextually, as in the noun collocates *treatment*, (morning) *light* and (afternoon) *sun*, which do not contain 'bad' in their definitions. The principle holds good for all parts of speech.

2.4.7d The chain that links content words and prepositions can be represented by the following scheme: ANALYSIS → **PRE-DIRECTRIX** + DIRECTRIX ← NOUN DEFINITION (see §3.1.2). The scheme is to be interpreted as tying together an ANALYSIS with a PRE-DIRECTRIX, and of "filling" the content of a DIRECTRIX with (a part of) a NOUN DEFINITION.

The meaning of an adjective analysis must be the same as the corresponding seme in the pre-directrix. For instance, the analysis of the adjective *happy* (see §3.3.7a) contains 'experience mental phenomenon (= 'emotion - thought'), while the pre-directrices of *about* and *with*₃ (§3.1.2. I) contain 'experience mental phenomenon (= 'emotion - thought') concerning / because of sth'. Therefore all collocations with *happy about/with* are well formed. The adjective *scared* collocates with the prepositions *about*₁, *at*₃ and *of*₄, which all contain 'emotion'. The adjective *certain* (§3.3.7a) contains 'experience (*this*) thought_x concerning sb_{x/y} - phenomenon_y' as the analysis. Thus, *certain about* is well formed combining the 'thought' of the *certain's* analysis with the 'thought' of the preposition. In *pleased at* both the adjective and the preposition contain 'mental state'. 'Thought' of *that* is a little narrower in meaning than 'mental state'. Therefore *He was pleased that he was going out with her* is passable, but *He was pleased to be going out with her* is preferable. The adjective *sincere* is defined as <#(mental phenomenon_x experienced /phenomenon_y made by use of language | by) sb# who experiences and makes expression of good and strongly true mental phenomenon_x concerning sth>. Therefore it can co-occur with *about* (which contains the same 'mental phenomenon'), but not with *that*, which contains 'this thought', a seme absent from the meaning 'mental phenomenon'.

For verbs too, the analysis has to be the same as the pre-directrix's content. The occurrence of *believe that*, but not of **believe about* is explained by the definitions of *believe* <#sb_x# experiences (*this*) strong thought_x that tends to be true concerning {good state} / event made expression of by (#)sb_y(#) who makes (#)sth made by use of symbols {language}(#)>,³⁰ *that*, which contains 'this thought' (coinciding with 'this thought' of *believe*),

and *about*, with 'emotion - thought' but without '*this* thought'. The verb *remember* (§2.3.1 a) collocates with *that* ('*this* thought') because '*this* thought' is part of *remember*'s meaning. The collocation *remember about*, where *about* repeats 'thought', is also well-formed on condition that an object (e.g. *something* or *anything*) intervenes, as *remember* is a transitive verb.

As regards chaining directrices with directives, we add one example; the collocation *in house* is well-formed because *in* has 'space', into which *house*'s 'space' dovetails – see the definition of *house* in §1.1.3c I.

2.4.8 Semantic tailoring

When two or more sememes of a lexeme have identical analyses, differing only in directives, we shall call such a phenomenon by Allerton's (1982) term "semantic tailoring", which has a similar meaning – see examples in §§3.3.5 and 3.4.6.

2.5 TRANSITIVITY

2.5.1 Object

2.5.1a

(i) Transitivity, i.e. the presence or absence of a direct object to follow a verb, which is accordingly called transitive or intransitive, has various manifestations. For one thing, it can be viewed as syntactic (grammatical, formal) or as semantic (notional) transitivity. Grammatically intransitive verbs can be pseudo-intransitive due to the suppression of an object (see below) or (also termed

“detransitivized”) due to the middle voice (§2.5.2c; cf. Lyons 1968: 350 - 351).

(ii) Syntactic transitivity is an easily observed grammatical phenomenon when a verb is followed or not followed by an object. In terms of definitions, any directive other than the initial one corresponds to an object. Most verbs can be treated as both transitive and intransitive within a single semantic definition. They “need not be given separate semantic description” (Fillmore 1968: 24 in Bilbija 1976: 12). As Wierzbicka (1996: 410 in Toyota 2013: 44) states, “we should constantly remind ourselves that the number of syntactic core arguments depends not on the number of entities in the situation referred to, but on the manner in which the situation is conceptualized by the speaker, and [...] the same action may be viewed as ‘transitive’ or ‘intransitive’ depending on the point of view”. When one and the same verb is used transitively on some occasions and intransitively on others, its semantic definition does not change, but the presence or absence of an object modifies the verb’s sentential meaning.

The object of a basically transitive verb can be omitted and thus generate an intransitive (“pseudo-intransitive”; Lyons 1968: 360 - 364) verb under the following circumstances:

(1a) When the object has a rather narrow meaning, like ‘horse’ or ‘sth made by use of language in writing’, it is often automatically activated so that there is no need for its identification. This is also the case with ‘money’ as the typical object of the verbs *borrow*, *counterfeit*, *invest*, *save* or *spend*, with ‘water’ or ‘alcoholic drink’ after *drink*, with ‘food’ after *eat*, ‘cigarette’ after *smoke*. Such basically transitive verbs can be freely used intransitively without any support of context, the use being traditionally called “absolute”. Verbs that form part of restricted collocations (see §2.1.5a) belong here. Another example is *knit* <#sb# makes threads cross in order to make

(#)(substance of) man-made thing {to be put on body}(#) [exist]>. This definition covers both the transitive *knit* in *My grandmather is knitting a jumper* and the intransitive *knit* (“absolute” use in traditional terminology) of *My grandmother is knitting*. The following verbs can also be used pseudointransitively: *attend, broadcast, carve* (see §2.5.1b I ii), *drill, hunt, paint, pay, play, publish, scrub, sew, sing* <#sb_x# makes long vibrating (#)music sounds(#) [exist] and come through sb_x’s mouth>, *tailgate* ‘drive a car too closely’, *type, write* (§2.2.6). Also, as Hanks (2013: 200) observes, “[i]t should be noted that normally only basic arguments of literal clauses can be elided. So, for example, ‘He fired’ must mean ‘He discharged a bullet from a gun’; it cannot normally mean ‘He discharged someone from employment’ or ‘He put the pots in the kiln and baked them’.

(1b) The semantic role ACTOR as a subject (see §2.2.8) also enables frequent omission of the object in the same clause. The verb *leave* (see the final paragraphs of this section) illustrates this category.

Parentheses around the object directive’s hashes of a verb indicate that the object can be left out even without the support of context (for Types 1a and 1b).

In case (2), when the object is ‘sth’ or ‘thing’, i.e. a vague notion of broader extension than those in (1), it is not easy to dispense with the object, but sometimes the immediate context helps provide the information about the missing object. Such verbs establish free collocations (see §2.1.5a) and delete the object only when heavily supported by context, which is case (2a). Definitions of 2a Type verbs do not place their object hashes within brackets, and thus mark the difference from Type 1. Yang (1996) also pleads for the pragmatic principle of deleting an object if it is contextually understood; e.g. *When prices are low, he buys* (see §2.5.2c II), *I’d like to buy your house if you’re willing to sell (it)*, *Are you buying or selling? Roger is cutting* (Chafe 1971: 132). Such absolute

use of verbs is obvious in sports where the restricted world of sports rules and actions enables much of information to be silently understood, and even requires omitting, as *block, hit, centre, pass* (the ball) or *score* (the goal). When backed up by context even the verb *hit*, with a very broad meaning of 'thing_y' in its object slot (see §2.3.2b), which may seem to stipulate an obligatory object,³¹ can be used intransitively: *We are going to try to change our psychology on him, try to wait on his slow pitches and try to hit to the opposite field on his outside pitches* (*Houston Chronicle* in Bilbija 1976: 49). In *MEDAL*, but not in *OALD*, *hit* 'touch sb with force' is marked as intransitive besides transitive, but no example of intransitive *hit* has been provided. However, the verb *put* is obligatorily followed by an object (**Stella put*; Aitchison 1994: 111) because the object can be anything and usually context cannot retrieve it.

(2b) Absolute use is also possible when #sb# of the object directive is textually realized as 'sb_{indef}', as in *It's better to give than to receive* or with the verbs *shock* and *offend*. They both contain '#sth# makes (#)sb(#) experience bad and strong mental phenomenon', and can be used without an object when #sb# is applied to 'sb_{indef}', as in *These movies deliberately set out to shock* (*OALD*), *The advertisements were designed to shock* (*CIDE*), *A TV interviewer must be careful not to offend*. The following verbs can also imply an object as a general notion 'all kinds of thing', i.e. as 'sth indefinite': *attack, hear, learn* (§1.1.3c I), *steal, teach, telephone*.

(iii) Semantic transitivity has to do with how much an entity is affected by another entity expressed as a clause subject. Toyota (2013: 30-33) remarks that the semantic and syntactic criteria of transitivity do not always coincide. The verb *like* is syntactically transitive since it involves two arguments. "However, in the semantic definition, it is not so transitive, since the clause does not imply much transfer of action or event, but is more likely to denote the mental state of the subject" (2013: 31).

Semantic transitivity appears to be a matter of degree. According to the parameters of transitivity provided by Hopper and Thompson (1980), clauses such as *She left₁* are more transitive than *I like cakes*. Movement is more 'transitive', i.e. it affects space more than the mental state of liking affects the object of liking. But neither *like* nor *leave* in the meaning 'go away from a place' passivize, which means that even *leave₁* does not imply that the object is sufficiently affected to promote the subject to the role of AGENT. We define *leave₁* as $\langle \# \text{thing } \{sb\} \# \text{ comes to not exist in } (\#) \text{space}_x(\#) \text{ any more, with intention to exist in } \text{space}_y \rangle$,³² while for *like* see §2.2.5. That *leave₁* is untypically transitive is shown by 'exist in' (or 'occupy') immediately preceding $\# \text{space} \#$, and the fact that *like* is not semantically transitive is shown by 'experience mental phenomenon concerning' immediately preceding $\# \text{sth}_x \#$. In both *leave₁* and *like* the object directives are introduced by phenomena whose actants (ACTOR and EXPERIENCER respectively) are viewed as devoid of power to affect anything. Therefore, they can be regarded as pseudo-transitive. The mismatch between the grammatical and the semantic object was noticed long ago: "[W]ith such verbs as *see*, *hear*, it is clearly a mere metaphor to talk of an 'object'" (Sweet 1913: 25 in Jespersen 1924: 157). By contrast, a verb such as *pervade* is both syntactically and semantically transitive, and it passivizes because its definition $\langle \# \text{smell}_x - \text{sound}_x \# \text{ makes } \# \text{big space}_x \# \text{ (come to) be with } \text{smell}_x - \text{sound}_x \text{ in all parts of } \text{space}_x \rangle$ implies that a smell or sound, although inanimate, affect a space significantly and change it. "[I]t might be maintained that the grammatical form of an English sentence like *I hear you* or *I see you* (its parallelism with *I hit you*, etc.) influences speakers of English to think of hearing and seeing as activities initiated by the person 'doing' the hearing or seeing (Lyons 1968: 351).

A difference similar to that between Type (1) and Type (2) verbs was also noticed in Wierzbicka (1988: 375): “[E]at, drink or smoke are easier to use intransitively than break or cut; and cook is easier to use intransitively than kill” because “the action [of breaking or cutting] has a very drastic effect on the patient, so that the patient undergoes a radical change as a result” (for kill see §4.1). But the explanation mixes up formal and notional transitivity. Namely, “the effect on the patient” is a semantic phenomenon that we shall expound immediately, whereas the probability for a transitive verb to suppress its object is a syntactic phenomenon hingeing on the semantic scope of the object. It is highly doubtful whether the object called *cake* in *eat a cake* is changed less than in *break a cake*.

2.5.1 b *Double object*

Some definitions house two objects. There are three main kinds of double objects in the definitions of verbs. Leaving Type (ii) for §2.5.1b II and Type (iii) for §2.5.1b III, we shall first deal with Type (i), when both object directives are with bracketed hashes, which means that only one can surface at a time.

2.5.1 b I Lexical-syntactic alternation

In lexical-syntactic alternation the activation of the first object slot inhibits the activation of the second one, and vice versa. The definitions of double object Type (i) correspond to constructions with alternation (Levin 1993). What is expressed as a nominal group in one alternant may become a prepositional phrase in another, i.e. the alternation is effected by making the directrix (§3.1.2) become the other object. Laffut (2006) discusses three

important types of alternation: the locative alternation (e.g. *Mary rubbed the glass with the handkerchief. Mary rubbed the handkerchief over/on the glass*), the material/product alternation (*Jim sawed wood* or *Jim sawed opening in wood*), and the image impression alternation (*She inscribed their names on the ring. She inscribed the ring with their names*; see §5). In Apresjan's terms, they are "forms denoting something which is being acted upon in some way or other, and forms denoting something which is being created or destroyed by action" (Apresjan 1977: 21).

(i) Some verbs collocate with an object noun followed by the preposition *from*₅ to effect the locative alternation. Instances of these verbs are: *beat* (*dust from carpet* or *carpet*), *pick* (*remains of food from teeth* or *teeth*) <#living thing_x that can move# makes (#)small thing_y - substance(#) come to not any more be in (#)_Γspace of_Γ thing_z(#) using thin thing_α to make thing_z be in different state>, *clean* (*grease from hands* or *hands of grease*) <#(thing_x {living thing_x that can move} / substance_x# makes) (#)thing_{y/x}(#) come to not be covered with bad (#)thing_y(#) by making thing_y come to not any more be in | space / surface | of thing_x (by using thing_z - substance_x)>, *clear* (*leaves from path* or *path of leaves*) <(#sb# makes) (#)thing_x - substance(#) come to not be covered with bad (#)thing_y more than one - substance_x(#) by making thing_y - substance_x come to not any more | exist in space / surface | of thing_x>, *shake out* (*crumbs from pocket* or *pocket*) <#sb# makes #small inanimate thing more than one # come to not be in #space_x# by making space_x move strongly and repeatedly>, *squeeze* (*juice from lemon* or *lemon*), *weed* (*goose-foot from flowerbed* or *flowerbed*) <#sb# makes (#)ground with living thing_{x+y} that cannot move(#) come

to be without (#)bad living thing_y that cannot move(#)>, *wipe (sweat from forehead or forehead)* <#sth_x# makes (#)sth_y(#) come to not be in surface_x of (#)sth_z(#) by using - touching Γ surface_y of \neg thing_x or by making thing_x move touching surface_x>. The co-occurrence of *wipe* with the preposition *with* is backed by the same 'use' and this preposition is also available for other verbs of this type. The common content of *from*₅-type verbs is: '#sb_x# makes (#)thing_x(#) come to not | exist in space / be on surface of (#)thing_y(#)' as a common denominator. The locative alternation also includes *ride (horse and border on horse* – see §1.1.3 d). The common content of locative alternation verbs is '#sth_x# makes (#)sth_y(#) move in relation to space - surface - line of (#)thing(#)'.

In yet another group of locative alternation verbs can use the preposition *on* for 'touch surface - line' with a general definition '#sb# makes (#)substance_x(#) touch (almost) all surface_x of (#)thing(#) connecting substance_x and surface_x', e.g. *load (cart with apples or apples on/onto cart)*³³ (The verb *load* is defined in §2.2.1 a.), *powder (neck with talc or talc on neck, toast with cinnamon or cinnamon on toast)* <#sb# makes (#)solid substance_x(#) touch (almost) all surface_x of (#)thing {body}(#) and connect substance_x in a lot of strongly small parts and surface_x>, *smear (wall with mud or mud on the wall)* <#sth_x {sb}# makes #soft substance_x# move touching (almost) all surface of #thing# connecting substance_x and surface_x> (The same 'soft substance' corresponds to '+ viscous' in Ljung 1973: 708.), *spray (wall with paint or paint on wall), sprinkle (linen with water or water on linen), spread (bread with butter or butter on bread)* (*Spread*₁, which is of interest here, has the sense <#sth {sb}# makes (#)substance(#) touch (almost) all surface_x of (#)thing(#) connecting

substance_x and surface_x>), *squeeze* (*fish fillets with lemon juice* or *lemon juice on fish fillets*), and *string* (*necklace* or *beads on a necklace*). When these verbs are used in non-progressive aspect, a holistic reading is much more likely than in progressive (Laffut 2006: 83); cf. *They sprayed the wall with paint* vs. *They were spraying walls with paint*. Similarly, *I remember the facts*, where *remember* expresses a state, paraphrased by Ota (1965: 61) as 'I am in the state of having the memory of...' vs. *I am remembering the facts*, with *remember* as a process ("event" in our terminology; = 'I am in the process of achieving memory of...'; Canavan 1983: 31). It is only natural that the imperfective aspect with its partitioned view of events is not associated with the holistic view – see §§2.3.1 and 2.3.2.

The following two sentences show that there is a problem with the deep case analysis: *John smeared paint on the wall*. *John smeared the wall with paint*. As Mellema (1974: 49) states, the two sentences receive the same case structure according to Fillmore (1968: 48), although there is a semantic difference between them. The first sentence is logically consistent with *Most of the wall didn't get any paint on it*, but the second is not.

Unlike the verbs with 'all' as a seme, the definition of the verb *put* contains only one object: <#living thing_x that can move {sb}# makes #thing_y# move and come to be in touch with surface of thing_z by using part of thing_x's body {hand}> – cf. §2.5.1a I ii (2a). Here there is no change of state of the prepositional object, i.e. thing_z (Laffut 2006: 35) and the surface is small, whereas *load* implies the use of a thing that carries the load. Thus, *put apples on(to) a cart*, but **put cart (with apples)*, where *apples* is a LOCATUM and *cart* a GOAL (§2.2.12).

The verbs *empty* (*tub of water* or *water into bowl*) go with the preposition *of*₃. (The fact that *Mary wiped the blackboard clear of offending words* is well formed, unlike **Mary wiped the blackboard of offending words*, can be

explained by defining the adjective *clear*₁ as <#thing - space# that is no (more) with bad parts>, while *of* is matched by 'part', but no sense of *wipe* supports any of the *of*'s meanings.)

(ii) The material/product alternation is illustrated by the following examples from the object-of-result verbs (Jespersen 1924: 159) or the "make" verbs (COBUILD *Grammar*): *bake* (*potatoes* or *pie*) <(#sth {sb_x}# makes) (#)thing_x - substance_x(#) come to be in dry state by dry heat {in order to make (#)thing_y - substance_y(#) made of thing_x - substance_x come to exist in body through sb_{y/x}'s mouth}>, *bore* (*plank* or *hole in plank*), *cook* (*potatoes for lunch* or *lunch with potatoes*) <(#sb_x# makes) (#)thing_x - substance_x(#) come to be in state that makes (#)meal(#) when thing_x - substance_x exists in space of hot liquid {water}>, *cut*₂ (*the paper by making a slit* or *a slit in the paper*) <(#sth_x{sb_x}# makes) (#)thing_x(#) come to be with (#)empty space(#), when sb_x uses sth_x sharp>, *dig* (*ground* or *grave/hole in the ground*) <#thing {sb}# makes (#)ground_x(#) come to be in different state by making (#)empty space(#) be in ground_x>, *eat* (*apple* or *hole in apple*; see §1.1.3c II), *light* (*lamp* or *fire*), *mend* (*socks* or *hole in socks*) <#sb# makes (#)man-made thing to be put on body(#) come to be in good state without (#)empty space(#), by using threads>, *open* (*the box* or *lid of the box*; see the definition in §2.2.4), *shave* (*beard* or *client/face*) <#sb# makes (#)surface body part {face}(#) come to not be in state with (#)hairs(#)>, *smoke*₂ (*tobacco in a pipe* or *a pipe*) <#sb_x# makes (#)substance_x(#) come to be in state of smoke that sb_x breathes in, when substance_x is in (#)thing to be put in sb_x's mouth(#)>.³³ The universal definitional formula for this alternation is '#sth_x# makes

#sth_y# come to be in state...’, so that adjectives meaning ‘state’ can be used as complements, as in *bake bread hard, dig well deep, shave skin clean*. The element ‘#sth_x# makes’ is placed within brackets for those verbs that have a middle-voice version (see §2.5.2c). This formula predicts that *curry* <#sb# makes #non-human living thing_x that can move {used for making sb move {horse}}# come to look in good state by combing hair of thing_x> should also allow alteration, following the near-synonyms *groom* and *dress* (see endnote 5), and thus requiring that ‘hair of thing_x’ should be flanked by the hashes. We haven’t done so because collocations such as *curry hair/mane* have not been testified in our corpus, but we believe that they are possible if the need for them should arise.

This type of alternation also occurs in *carve*, defined as <#sb# uses sharp thing_x to make (#)wood_x(#) exist as (#)thing_y(#), using wood_x as origin and changing only form of wood_x>. The definition sanctions *carve a toy from/out of the piece of wood* and *carve the piece of wood into a toy* (Laffut 2006: 2). Such verbs of the image impression alternation, like *imprint, inscribe, embroider, etch, paint*, are systematically polysemous between expressing the creation of a sign and distortion of the surface (Laffut 2006: 147). Thus, *His name was inscribed on the stone* highlights the message, while *The stone was inscribed with his name* gives prominence to the surface. (The verb *inscribe* is defined as: <#sb# touches surface of (#)thing_x - substance_x(#)> and makes thing_x - substance_x contain (#)sth made by symbols(#)>. One of the two possible objects of such verbs is always ‘sth made by use of drawing symbols’, which includes a drawing (visual representation) and written language (‘sth made by use of language in writing’). In the long run, to *inscribe/embroider/etch/paint*, etc. one’s name is to represent one’s personality by visible means and it is on

par with drawing and painting which also stand for objects and events.

(iii) There are still other, minor categories of alternation represented by the following verbs: *present* (*something to person* or *person with something*), *cure* (*patient of disease* or *disease*), *treat* 'try to cure': <#sb_x# uses sth wanting to make (#)living thing_x {sb_y}(#) experience good bodily state when thing_x experiences (#)bad bodily phenomenon(#)>, which go both with nouns denoting persons and with nouns denoting disease, *abet* <#sb_x# makes (#)sb_y(#) make more easily (#)sth_x bad that is not to be made(#)>, as in: *She abetted the thief in the crime* ('sb_y' in the 1st object activated); *He was accused of abetting the crime* (2nd object activated).

All these examples constitute two distinct meanings (Apresjan 1977: 22)³⁴ and yet, due to metonymic contiguity between the two, a single definition is possible. The zeugma test applied in **She played a fast ball and a tennis match* shows that there are two distinct sememes of *play* here, and speakers must opt for one of the two candidates for the direct object in its polysemous definition <#sb_x# (habitually) makes (#)short-time contest_x made by sb_x + y (more than one) who are together experiencing good psychological state and make event_x according to rules, when end_x of contest_x cannot be known before end_y of event_x(#) using (#)small round thing(#)>. (The first object directive is rather lengthy, but it is supported by the noun *game* as the object of the verbs *draw*, *level* and *tie*.) The contiguity between denotata of the two objects in the extralinguistic world is usually of high degree. Sometimes the contiguity is effected through a kind of transformation (*cook*) or through the connection of a part of a system and the system (*play*). The direct object that has been excluded

(cf. Cruse 2004: 294) is backgrounded and still implied as part of the meaning.

The verb *dribble* can be used with a LOCATUM as an object: *Dribble a little olive oil over the salad* (OALD). Laffut (2006: 152) records an example with a LOCATION as an object as well: *Dribble peppers with oil*. The semantic definition of *dribble* is: <(#sb# makes) (#)liquid substance(#) move downwards and partly not exist in space of thing any more, existing at same time and space as, and touching, broad surface of (#)thing(#)>. (The definition also allows *Oil dribbled over₁ the salad*. *Water was dribbling out (from₆ the tap)*, but not **Oil dribbled the salad*. This prohibition is imposed by the rule stated at the end of §2.5.2c I. However, in *drip* with a similar meaning, the idea of the surface on which drops fall (the LOCATION) cannot be a direct object. Of course, it can be mentioned, but only within a prepositional phrase: **She dripped the floor with detergent*. *She dripped detergent on the floor*. *Drip* is defined as <(#sb/thing with liquid substance# makes) (#)liquid substance(#) come to move downwards in small parts touching small surface>, as in *He 'sb' dripped wax 'liquid substance' onto the cloth*. *The tap 'thing with liquid substance' was dripping beer 'liquid substance'*. *The tap was dripping ('liquid substance' implied)*. *Blood dripped on the floor*. Both *drip* and *dribble* contain 'surface' but in *dribble* the surface is broad and may become a surface object, while in *drip* it is small and not apt to become one, which accounts for the phenomenon observed. (Cf. the comment on *put* in §2.5.1a ii.)

Only if both objects denote a narrow-range notion (see §2.5.1a ii [1a]), can they both be deleted. Examples are: *carve, cook, dig, eat, saw, shave, smoke, weed*. If one of two objects is of broad extension, the objects cannot be omitted unless greatly helped by context (*clean, clear, load*; cf. §2.5.1a ii [2a]). Notice that middle verbs with a double object, like *open* (§2.2.4), *shower* (§2.5.2c I) or *suckle* (*milk from breast* or *breast*)

<(#living thing_x that can move# makes) #young living thing_y that can move# drink (#)milk(#) from thing_x's body part with milk>, can activate the second object only when used in active voice. This is only natural because the middle voice is always intransitive.

2.5.1 b II Ditransitive verbs

In double-object Type (ii), two object directives are present in a single definition without brackets, and both or either of them can surface. This is the pattern N + V + N + N, with a ditransitive verb, as in *forgive*: <#sb_x# {uses language to} make #sb_y# come to be instantaneously viewed as not bad any more although sb_y did #sth bad# that sb_x experienced>, e.g. *She forgave him his lies, She forgave him. She forgave his lies*. Here the segment 'sb_y did sth bad' manifests a close connection between the secondary AGENT sb_y and sb_y's activity 'did sth bad'. By metonymy, mentioning one implies the existence of the other. The zeugma test does not support a single sememe: ?? *She forgave him and his lies*.

The definition of *envy*, another double-object Type (ii) verb, is: <#sb_x# experiences {bad and} strong mental phenomenon because sb_x | does not experience / is not with (power to use) / does not make / is not affected by #sth_x# that #sb_y# experiences / is with (power to use) / makes / is affected by>. A simpler version could read: <#sb_x# experiences {bad and} strong mental phenomenon because sb_x does not have #sth_x# that #sb_y# has>. *I e. you. I e. you your luck. I don't e. him his money problems. I envied her for₃ her good looks. I e. you having such a car. She has always envied his success*. (CIDE says in the same spirit: *envy* v 'to wish that you had (a quality or possession) that another person has'.

2.5.1 b III Verbs of transfer

In double-object Type (iii) pattern `#sb_x# makes (#)sb_y(#) come to (not) | be with / use - experience #sth_x# good for sb_y', there is a possibility for both object directives to surface simultaneously or only for the second, direct object, but not for the first, indirect object ("internal dative") alone, e.g. *give* <#sb_x# makes (#)sb_y(#) instantaneously come to be with #thing_x# by moving thing_x in direction of sb_y making contact with sb_y's hand (so that sb_y is with power to use thing_x)> *John gave her the money. John gave the money. *John gave her; bring*₁ <#sb_x# makes (#)sb_y(#) come to be with #sth_x# making sth_x not any more exist in space of thing and making sth_x move in direction of sb_y>. *Jim brought Jane a bunch of flowers. Jim brought a bunch of flowers to Jane and her mother. Jim brought a bunch of flowers. !Jim brought Jane.* In this variant of the double object mentioning the first object is mandatory. The indirect object is omissible because "the speaker's attention is focused primarily on the effect of the action on the target person" (Wierzbicka 1988: 362). That the second object is weaker is proven by its possibility to appear as a prepositional object after the preposition *to*, and in case of the sole appearance of the second object it would be construed as if it were the first one. The passive is usually made with the indirect object as a subject. *She was knitted a jumper* is more frequent than *A jumper was knitted her*. The skeleton of the pattern is `to bring/give sth', where `sth' plays the semantic role of "gift" (Dixon 2005: 93), while mentioning the RECIPIENT is facultative (*He threw (me) the ball*).

Those transfer verbs that contain `#sb_x# makes (#)sb_y(#) come to | be with / use - experience #sth_x#

good for sb_y ', i.e. those without 'not', collocate with the preposition *for*_{1a}.

Other verbs of transfer include: *ask, award, bequeath, build, buy, change* (money), *charge* (money), *cook, cost, cut* (food), *deny, earn, feed, fetch, find, gain, hand over, hire, keep, lend, mail, offer, owe, pay, post, pour drink, read, rent, reserve, save, sell, send, serve, show, sing, spare, supply, take, teach, tell, throw, win*₁, *wish*. The 'sth_x' may be 'bad' only if 'not' is activated in 'come to (not)', and 'not + bad' = 'good', as in *spare* (*Spare me the cost/embarrassment/trouble*). It is implied that a thing_x is not transformed: *?Break me a stick. ?Kill me a spider ?He fixed her a car. ?He rebuilt her a house*. (Wierzbicka 1988: 363, 369). *Lose* is another verb in this class, defined in §2.5.1c. *The business* 'sth_x that is made habitually to make sb_x come to be with money' *is losing* 'is coming to be without' *money* 'sth_y'. *They* 'sb_x' *lost* 'comes to be without' *business* 'sth_x that is made to make sb_x come to be with money' *to the competitors* 'that influences sb_x who comes to be with sth_x' (one object). *His foolish behaviour* 'sth bad' *lost her* 'made sb_x come to not any more be with' *the job*, 'sth_y' (two objects).

A similar result as with verbs of transfer is effected by some speech act verbs (*allow, bet, deny, elect, name, offer, promise, recommend, refuse*; – see §3.4.3), which add '# sb_x # uses language to make (#) sb_y (#)' to the pattern. With performatives it is more important to know the social position a person is going to occupy than the identity of that person or to know what is promised than the person given the promise. Indirect causative verbs with '# sb_x # makes # sb_y #' or '# sb # makes #mental phenomenon#', as in *appoint* (see §3.4.3a) and *force* 'compel' cannot omit the (main) object. From the grammatical point of view sb_y cannot be used alone because it is a dependent object of the verb *make* which

requires another noun phrase as a complement, e.g. *They appointed John (as/to be) director. They appointed director. ?They appointed John.* (Although Dixon 2005: 145 gives an example, *I appointed John (to be sales manager)*), presumably this sentence could be acceptable only in a context in which the social position has already been established, as, say, an answer to *Who did you appoint to be sales manager?*)

In actual texts, the universal meaning of the pattern is added to the lexical meaning of a transfer or speech act verb employed. For example, the N + V + N + N pattern in *Jill knitted Jim a jumper* (Wierzbicka 1988: 367) with its meaning `#sb_x# makes (#)sb_y(#) come to (not) be with / use #...#' is fused with the meaning of *knit* <#sb# makes threads cross in order to make (#)man-made thing {to be put on body}(#) exist> to produce `Jill made threads cross in order to make a jumper exist in order to make Jim come to be with / use the jumper'.

Another variant of this pattern meaning is `#sb_x# makes (#)sb_y(#) come to | be with / experience #sth made by use of symbols / phenomenon experienced by senses#', where the obligatory object slot is filled with nouns like *game, joke, music, picture, song, story, trick, write*, as in *She sang him the same song twice. I'll draw you a picture* (Wierzbicka 1988: 360, 367).

2.5.1c Triple object

We have noticed several instances of a triple object, among others in the verbs *abort*₂, *excavate*, *ride* (§1.1.3 d), *risk*, and *tell* (§3.1.3).

The definition of *abort*₂ is: <((#sb_x# makes) (#)female living thing_x that can move {sb_y}(#) that made) (#)child_x(#) come to not be with child_x in thing_x's body earlier than wanted, and end (#)event when thing_x

is with child in thing_x's body(#), so that child_x exists not any more> *The doctor aborted pregnancy/the expectant mother; She/The pregnant animal aborted. The foetus aborted; a. baby/child/foetus*

excavate: <#sb/man-made thing_x indirectly helping sb# makes (#)empty space(#) in (#)ground_x(#) exist and makes (#)thing_y - substance(#) come not be in ground_x any more > e. + *hole/canal/tunnel* ('empty space'). e. + *area/site/soil* ('ground'), e.+ *burial chamber/city/pottery/remains/rock/settlement/weapons* ('thing - substance'). This polysemous definition connects three closely interwoven metonymic notions: (i) of an empty space, (ii) of the ground where the empty space appears by digging and (3) of the thing/substance hidden in the ground, which comes out by digging.

When 'sth good', 'sth bad' and 'event' are triple object directives, as in *risk* (which has <#sb# is with possibility to come to not be with (#)sth_x good(#) and experience (#)sth bad(#) when doing (#)event(#) wishing to come to be with sth_y good>), it depends on context which interpretation will be operative. For instance, in *risk the flight*, the noun *flight* will be understood as 'sth good' if the person who undertakes the risk wants to fly, and as 'sth bad' if the person is afraid of flying. (See also *hazard* in endonote 24).

Further instances of the triple-object verbs are *agitate* and *lose*. *Agitate* <#sth# makes (#)part of₁sb(#) experience (#)mental phenomenon(#) and not any more experience (#)state without excitement(#)>. Examples: *She was agitated by his appearance. Astronomy agitates thinkers.* ('sb'); *The excitement agitated his voice. Sorrow agitates the heart. Poetry agitates the soul with affection.* ('part of sb'); *The landscape agitated his feelings/thoughts/mind.* ('mental phenomenon'); *Nothing agitated the calm of the night/of her soul* ('state without excitement'). *Lose*₁ <(#sth_x {bad}# makes) #sb_x# come to not any more | {be with

power to use} / be in strong relation with / have (#)sth_y {worthy {money_x}}(#) {base being possibility of coming to be with power to use money_x}, (which influences sb_y who comes to be with (power to use) sth_y) in (#)contest(#), which is bad for sb_x)> *He 'sb_x' lost his job 'sth_y'. His foolish behaviour 'sth_x bad' lost him 'sb_x' the job 'sth_y'. The mistake 'sth_x bad' lost her 'sb_x' the election 'contest'. I. the bet/prize 'sth_y worthy'; lose the war 'contest'; They lost to a better team 'sb_y'.* The definition above may seem to be too long to cover a single sememe. And yet, the zeugma in *When he was broke, Tom lost both money and friends* shows that, similar to *have₁ and ₁₀*, which provide the base for this meaning of *lose*, *lose₁* houses several senses that are mutually similar to such an extent that they may combine. Even *lose₂*, defined in §3.5.4, is not a strictly separate seme, which is proven by *He lost both the game and the money*. *Lose* in *lose one's headache*, where losing is neither of money nor bad, is undoubtedly a distinct sememe, based on *have_g*, verging on lexical exploitation.

There are no instances to be found of a clause that would contain all three objects at the same time.

How many object slots for patientive participants a definition should contain depends on the complexity of the situation depicted by the verbal lexeme. In *abort* the participants are 'woman', 'unborn child' and 'pregnancy' (obligatory) as well as 'person helping woman' (optional).

Expanded objects with partonomic connections do not increase the number of sememes. Thus the definition of *clap* <#sb_x# touches (#) rbody part of r sb_y(#) with (#)hand(#)> actually incorporates two objects: 'body part of' and 'sb' as variants of one object (zeugma in *She clapped Tom's ears shut and her grandson on the back* is acceptable), and 'hand' as the second one (*He clapped his hand down on my shoulders*).

2.5.2 Transitivity conversion

2.5.2 a Unaccusatives

In one type of verbs (cf. Dixon 2005: 309) labelled “unaccusatives” (Yoshimura and Taylor 2004), it is the intransitive version that is basic, while the transitive one is derived by interpolating ‘make’, thus causativizing the intransitive (Dixon 2000).³⁵ They include durative verbs involving movement or rest (§2.3.2a; Dixon 2005: 103 – 105; cf. Lyons 1968: 365), as well as verbs referring to the change of physical state of object (Pinker 1995: 276). The examples are: *The horse galloped.* → *He galloped the horse.* *The baby rode on his knee.* → *He rode the baby on his knee.* *I am fussing* ‘I am nervous while I am busy’. → *Don’t fuss me* ‘Don’t make me nervous while I am busy’. The definition of *gallop* is <(#sb_x# makes) #non-human living thing_x that can move used to make sth move {horse}# move fast when thing_x touches upper surface of thing_x - space> (The object slots of *curry* and *gallop* can serve as marker for *horse*.) Goddard (1998: 241) mentions also *jockey* and *groom* (see endnote 5) as “horse-words” “which provide lexical cues to aspects of conceptualisation of [...] *horse* in English”.); *walk* <(#sb# makes) #living thing_x that can move# move touching (#) _Γsurface of _Γ thing_y(#) when thing_x uses thing_x’s feet slowly>; *The butter melted.* → *Sally melted the butter.* *The ball bounced.* → *Hiram bounced the ball.* *The horse raced past the barn.* → *The jockey raced the horse past the barn* (Pinker 1995: 275). *The baby burped.* → *He burped a baby.* *The bell rang.* → *She rang the bell.* But, when there is no movement or change of physical state, conversion is blocked: *Jewells glitter.* → **She glittered jewels* (Levin and Rappaport 1995 in Ružin 2009: 153).

The first pair of round brackets in the definition of *grow* <(#sb# makes) #living thing that cannot move/_Γpart of _Γ body# come to have larger form>

indicate that there is a transitive sememe <#sb# makes #living thing that cannot move/Γpart ofΓ body# come to have larger form> besides an intransitive one <#living thing that cannot move/Γpart ofΓ body# comes to have larger form> *His beard is growing. Grass grows well.* The same happens in *Her eyelids fluttered* (*flutter* <(#sb# makes) #thing# move repeatedly to and fro and quickly>) and in *The stone/bird flew through the air*, where there is real intransitivity, because beard is imagined to be growing by itself, birds to be flying by themselves, etc. with no other entity as a cause. However, the same verbs can be used transitively, as in: *He is growing beard. He flew the kit. She fluttered her eyelids at him.* (The verb *flutter* is normally not used with the preposition *at*. However, when *flutter* is followed by the noun *eyelash* or *eyelid* in the plural, *at* becomes natural, because the morpheme *eye* (in *eyelid/eyelash*) 'part of body used for looking' and *at* share the seme 'use one's energy to' (in this case 'to see sb'), which is more obvious with the verb *look* §2.2.3.) Definitions of unaccusatives show that when used intransitively, such verbs denote an event that is viewed as possible without instigator, the subject being in the role of an OBJECTIVE. Of course, the typically human AGENT within the transitive transformation has to be stronger than the OBJECTIVE of the basic sentence.

Even inanimate nouns may become agents of unaccusative verbs in transitive versions if they are contextually strong enough in comparison with the PATIENT, as in: *The branch broke/snapped.* → *The weight of the snow broke/snapped the branch* ('weight' is not animate, but is relatively 'strong' in comparison with 'branch' owing to the seme 'strongly' in the meanings of *break*₁ (§1.1.3 d) and *snap*). *I am constantly fretting*₂. → *The noise is constantly fretting*₂ *me. We sheltered* (*in the cave*). → *The cave* (contextually strong because it gave shelter) *sheltered us* (*shelter* <({#sth - space# makes}) #sb# come to not be in bad state any more>). Other

definitions are: *fret*₂ < ({#sth_x# makes}) #sb# come to experience bad emotion wishing that sth_x does not exist any more>; *snap* < ({# thing_x - substance# makes}) #thing_y# instantaneously and with sound come to not be whole any more>. The common pattern underlying these sentences is 'come to not be - exist any more'.

If a causative version is infelicitous because 'sth' as AGENT would not be strong enough, it can be formulated periphrastically, as in *Mike wriggled* → **Her criticism wriggled Mike*. *Her criticism made Mike wriggle*.

2.5.2 b There are rare examples where the RECIPIENT as the subject of a transitive verb in constructions not unlike unaccusative becomes an indirect object, and a causative phenomenon appears as an untypical AGENT in subject, e.g. *gain* < (#sth# makes) #sb# come to be with #sth#, which is good> *She gained an international reputation* → *Her exhibitions gained her an international reputation* (*she* → *her*). The AGENT (*her exhibitions*) is 'strong' compared to the RECIPIENT (*she*). Such cases are infrequent because there are few verbs that have RECIPIENT in the subject slot of the basic sense while at the same time the expanded sense contains 'sth good - bad'. Another example is *lose*, defined in §2.5.1c.

2.5.2 c *Detransitivization (Middle voice)*

2.5.2 c I In another type of transitivity conversion a phenomenon occurs that is contrary to unaccusatives: the object of a transitive verb becomes the subject of an intransitive verb in the process called "detransitivization" (cf. Palmer 1981: 139; Dixon 2005: 446 - 458), and such constructions are called "pseudo-intransitive" (cf. Lyons 1968: 366 ff.), "medio-passive" (Grady 1969), or, simply, "middle" (Yoshimura and Taylor 2004: 297). The

difference between an active and a middle sentence is that in the latter no external person or object is viewed as the cause of an action (Wierzbicka 1975: 513). The event is presented as if it was going on due to a certain quality of its own. In this way the verb process is emphasized, as if it were done spontaneously by itself (Halliday in Lyons 1968: 366). "The effect of the middle voice is to abolish the logical subject altogether, and construe the event as being causeless" (Cruse 2004: 292). For instance, *bake* in *He is baking some loaves in the oven* or *open* in *Mary opened the window* have their intransitive counterparts, with subjects which are referentially the same as the objects of transitive versions as presented in their definitions in §§2.5.1b I ii and 2.2.4 – *Some loaves are baking in the oven. The window opened*. Some linguists say that in these sentences the verbs are used "ergatively", i.e. their subjects can play the OBJECTIVE role (see §2.2.4), but Dixon (2005: 447) makes out a strong case for avoiding the term "ergative" in this sense. Other examples are: *Sports cars sell quickly* (*sell* defined in 2.5.2c II), *The unit must test for adequate wiring*, and *The veal cuts₁ easily* (*cut₁* <(#sth_x{sb_x}# makes) (#)thing_x(#) come to not be whole any more and come to have (#)form of thing_y more than one(#), when sb_x uses sth_x sharp>).

As Yoshimura and Taylor (2004: 303) put it, "[a] middle expression presents a non-Agent participant as possessing certain inherent properties which significantly facilitate, enable (or, as the case may be, impede) the unfolding of the kind of process designated by the verb phrase; at the same time, the contribution of the Agent to the process, though not erased, is backgrounded." The subject of the middle voice sentence should "have the right features to be conceived of as a self-instigating participant" (Laffut 2006: 243). "[T]here must be some special semantic marking to enable an object to be fronted, as in *Shakespeare translates into Greek but not*

into Chinese or *The reason I prefer heavy cream is that it whips; the lighter stuff has to be doctored up with emulsifiers*" (Dixon 1977: 76 ; cf. COBUILD *Grammar*: 3.67). We claim that in a seeming paradox, detransitivization is possible only if actually the process cannot be done by itself and requires a strong and/or intentional AGENT. As a corollary of this, the object of the transitive verb must not be too strong if it is to be construed as the AGENT of the corresponding intransitive sentence. The AGENT of a transitive verb that can produce a middle version is usually animate, while the entity that can be employed as an OBJECTIVE (the subject of the medio-passive) is usually inanimate. This creates clear disambiguation: if a verb with an animate AGENT as a subject has obligatorily or typically an inanimate entity as the object (PATIENT), then an inanimate noun in the position of the subject of the same verb can only be interpreted as an OBJECTIVE co-referential with the object. Dixon (2005: 457) states that "[t]here will be no danger of ambiguity if the various roles have different referential possibilities. Only a human can pour, only a liquid can be poured, and only a container can be poured out of. We know that *John pours well* is a transitive clause with object omitted, but that *Custard pours well* and *The jug pours well* involve promotion to subject". In this way the whole complex AGENT-and-PATIENT situation is viewed as a metonymical connection, in which any of the two roles may be highlighted by putting them into the subject position on condition that the subject of the transitive verb is unambiguously stronger than the subject of the same verb used intransitively. For instance, *disconcert*, being defined as <#sth# makes #sb# come to be in bad and strong mental state because of not expected event>, where there is no clear indication that 'sth' is stronger than 'sb', cannot be used as a middle verb. The verbs such as the following are without their middle counterparts because they contain 'sth' or 'thing' of indistinctive strength and dependence both in subject and

object: *divert* <#sth_x# makes #sth_y# come to not exist in space_x any more and come to exist in space_x in direction of space_z>, *invert* <#sth_x# makes #sth_y# come to not exist in same state in space any more and turn sth_y upside down or back to front>, *fret*₁ <#thing_x# slowly makes #thing_y# come to not be whole any more {by moving thing_x roughly in touch with thing_y}>, *generate* <#sth_x# makes #sth_y# [exist]> (*They generated loud laughter. Loud laughter generated tension. *Loud laughter generated.*).

There is one more condition to be met for a verb to function in the middle voice. Not only has the AGENT to be strong enough so that it can be understood as such even when it is not mentioned; also the OBJECTIVE has to be an entity independent enough in order to be able to appear as the subject of a sentence, but not too strong lest it should be mixed up with the AGENT (cf. Hlebec 2007: 115-120). This is why *These people discourage easily* is well-formed unlike **Mary encourages easily*. (Yoshimura and Taylor 2004: 297). Easily encouraged Mary becomes an active person herself and to mention her as a subject of a middle construction is not felicitous. *The door opened* is grammatical unlike **The bank account opened*. The door is a physical thing with its numerous visible characteristics which cause events like hit somebody, open automatically or get stuck. Contrary to this, a bank account is just an abstraction with a numerical manifestation. In the same way as *computer* or *key* may become AGENTS (see §2.2.1.a), so may *door* become an OBJECTIVE. They are all intermediary and facilitating instruments viewed as independent entities ('man-made things helping indirectly') and they can function both as untypical AGENTS and as OBJECTIVES, in contrast to *spoon* and *pickfork* ('man-made things helping directly'; §2.2.1 a). For the same reason **promise/*record/*rule + break* is rejected because *promise*, *rule* and *record* are dependent on 'sb',

the “breaker”. On the other hand, *The text/sentence reads...* is well-formed because *text* and *sentence* have their independent existence. It happens quite regularly that the reader concentrates on the message, not knowing and/or not feeling the need to know the identity of the sender. The verb *assume*, defined as <#sb_x# experiences (*this*) thought_x concerning #phenomenon# as true before sb_x knows that thought_x is true> (e.g. *The house was assumed to be haunted. It was assumed that the house was haunted. We must assume him to be innocent. Don't always assume the worst. In this example we have assumed a unit price of \$10*), does not produce the intransitive counterpart (**The worst assumed readily*), although ‘sb’ in the subject slot is certainly ‘strong’ or at least ‘stronger’ in comparison to ‘phenomenon’. Again, ‘phenomenon’ lacks sufficient independence. The phenomenon of *friendship* is subject to the same restriction: *They forged/established their friendship at school. Their friendship forged / established cooperation at school. *Their friendship forged / established at school*. Further examples are: *The three main bearings can clog with sand and general muck. Snow heaped on the sidewalk. *Carrots heaped on his plate. *The statue veiled with a blanket* (Laffut 2006: 240-241). In *snow* “the designatum of the Locatum has a certain ‘mobility’ of its own” (Laffut 2006: 243). *They released a film. → *The film released. They relayed a broadcast. → *A broadcast relayed. *These books put easily on the top shelf* (Yoshimura and Taylor 2004: 297). In the asterisked sentences the object noun does not manifest sufficient referential independence to be transformed into subject.

The common definition of detransitivized verbs is the following one: <{(#sth {sb_x}# makes)} #thing / sb_y / substance / sth made by use of symbols# that is viewed as independent entity come to be...>. When the material within the brackets is ignored, the definition refers to the intransitive variant of the verb while the

complete unbracketed definition refers to the corresponding transitive sense. Thus, for instance, *flush*₁ and *flush*₂ are jointly defined, as reported in §2.5.6c. An exception to this tendency is the verb *photograph* <(#sb# makes) #sth# come to be instantaneously seen in a photograph>. *I don't photograph well/badly* is construed as 'I am (not) photogenic' (Yoshimura and Taylor 2004: 297) and gets the status of an idiom. *I am (not) good at taking photographs/photos/pictures* would be used for the other possible interpretation.

We define the verb *improve* as follows: **1** <{(#sth_x# makes)} (#)sth_{x/y} {long-time state – habitualness} (#) be better than before> *legislation/measures + i. + quality of life /efficiency; sb + i. + working conditions / fertility / one's French /math grade / health /knowledge /land /performance /position / property / road /service / educational standards / taste / one's tennis /transport / washing-powder / weapon; Peter improved himself. His work is improving. The doctor says she should continue to i. The weather / Economic conditions improved. My French has improved. artwork/décor/team i.* **2** <#sb# has power and makes good phenomenon concerning habitualness that is more good (= better) than before> *Jim improved at basketball/chess/tactics. He has improved a lot. i. on/upon achievement /standard; She improved on the book. Jane improved on her previous best performance. John improved in his reading.* *Improve*₁ can be used as transitive or intransitive although there is a 'sth' both in the subject and object slot. This seems to be due to the fact that in *improve*₁ only 'sth_x' (unlike 'sth_y') can be 'sb', while in *improve*₂ the subject is always 'sb'. Therefore, *improve* in *This legislation improved*₁ cannot be understood as a shortened version of the transitive sememe *improve*₁ in *This legislation improved*₁ *efficiency*, but has to be intransitive. If both the subject and the object is 'sb', as

in *She improved₁ herself*, the precise meaning can be left to context.

The sentence **The tomato peeled* is not well-formed because of general knowledge that tomatoes cannot peel themselves, while *Tomatoes peel easily* or *Light snow clears easily* are well-formed owing to the adverb *easily*, which indirectly indicates 'sb' as AGENT: *easily* defined as <event made by sb_x [with little energy of sb_x]>. **Steel forges* is bad, but the adverb makes it grammatical: *The steel forges well*. For example: *Wash the trousers in lukewarm water* → *These trousers wash easily in lukewarm water* (*wash* <{(#sth {sb}- substance_x# makes)} #thing_x {to be put on body}# come to not be with bad substance_y by using liquid substance_x {water} and thing_y>). *Will not (won't)* used for things has the same impact as *with difficulty* and other adverbials of efficaciousness; for instance, *Try flushing the toilet*. → *The lavatory won't flush*, where *flush* means <{(#sb# makes)} (#)non-living thing with space_x(#) come to be in clean state by moving (#)liquid substance {water}(#) to space_x>. The same effect is realized by the adverbs such as *quickly, tightly, safe, clean (paint washes clean) or well*.

Another middle verb is *shower₁*, which manifests locative alternation (§2.5.1b I i): <{(#sb_x# makes)} (#)non-living thing_x more than one/substance_x(#) come to touch (#)thing_y(#) and make a lot of thing_x - substance_x and surface of thing_y be together>. (It is evident from the definition that only the first object slot can become the subject of middle construction because the second slot may contain 'sb' ('sb' is a kind of 'thing'). **People/*The room showered with confetti. They showered confetti on people. Confetti showered on people. They showered people with confetti*. The same happens with the metaphorical *shower₂*: *They showered praises on him. Praises showered on him.*)

In the pattern <(# #...) (#) (#)... (#) (#)> the first object cannot be used as a subject of a transitive sentence with the second object as a grammatical object. Therefore, **Confetti showered people*. (See also *dribble* in §2.5.1b I.)

The interpretation of actants that play role in middle voice sentences may change during time. “[T]he English verb “to air” has been exclusively used as transitive. But recently it develops a new usage as an intransitive verb: *The new programme will air Tuesday at 8 p.m.*” (Morris and Morris 1975: 23 in Yang 1996: 102).

The element ‘that is viewed as independent entity’ in the general definition above does not seem to be a seme of any particular lexeme, while one and the same verb can sometimes allow and sometimes disallow a middle construction, as in the examples above with *easily*. Even this adverb does not warrant the construction, as in **Beat curd eats easily*. Therefore Yoshimura and Taylor (1970: 293) rightly reject a lexicalistic approach to middle constructions and instead “propose a global characterization of the construction, with specific focus on properties of the subject referent in association with the semantics of the predicate”. And yet, since semantic invariant content is partially involved in this matter, we have included this chapter in the book.

2.5.2c II The middle voice echoes the meaning of -ee nouns, as in *absentee, appointee, deportee, devotee, divorcee, employee, escapee, evacuee, examinee, experimentee, licensee, nominee, payee, persecutee, refugee, returnee, testee, trainee, trustee*. They all denote PATIENTS, that is to say persons affected by sth strong, but at the same time they are independent AGENTS since they do some activity (Cf. the definitions of *appoint* and *nominate* in §3.4.3a, in which the first object slot is filled with ‘sb_x’ who is at the same time influenced by sb_y with power and himself/herself becomes an influential agent. Bauer (1983: 250) informs that Bernard Comrie

has suggested that this morphological device shows a trace of ergative-absolutive patterning in English.)

For an argument to act as a semantically strong AGENT, the definitional analysis of the transitive counterpart of middle verbs has to contain 'make', so that '#sth# makes' can be deleted in the middle voice. The verb *hear* <#living thing_x that can move# [unintentionally] comes to (know and) experience perception concerning #phenomenon# by sense using sound'> does not contain 'make' although the subject is 'living thing' and the object is 'sth', and therefore, **The music heard weak at the back of the hall* (Lyons 1968: 366-7 without an explanation). Neither do we say **The poem memorizes easily* although the object of *memorize* when used transitively is never a living thing, while its subject is always 'sb'. Namely, the definition of *memorize* is <#sb_x# comes to know #sth_x made by use of language# very well and keep sth_x in sb_x's mind>. So, again, there is no 'make' that could be suspended.

For verbs containing 'space' or 'surface' as a subject directive or 'come to exist - be (not any more)' in the analysis, detransitivization is not possible even if 'make' is present. Space and surface are visualized as mere containers, while something that exists or does not exist has the inactive role similar to ESSIVE (§2.2.15). Thus, *They hung the room with posters* → **The room hung with posters*. (*hang* <#sb# makes #space_x# come to exist with | things / solid substance | high in space_x>). The verb *swamp* <#sth# makes #ground# come to be covered with bad water> does not produce **The field swamps every year*. The same phenomenon occurs with *irrigate* (see §2.4.3c). Also with *exhaust*: **The first edition exhausted in three days* (*exhaust* <#sb# makes #sth# come to not exist any more>). For **Caviare never eats at five o'clock* Lyons (1968: 367) has no explanation, which we find in the fact that there is 'coming to not exist any more' in the analyses of both verbs (*Eat*

is defined in §1.1.3c II.). This makes object directives of *exhaust* and *eat* not independent enough to become OBJECTIVES, and thus unfit for the middle voice. Neither can the ideas of 'space' and 'surface' in *hang* and *swamp* form the image of an independent entity that could be envisaged as a virtual AGENT. (Without comment on the oddity for the modern hearer, Dixon quotes the words of an English explorer: "They [i.e. turtles] are extraordinarily big and fat; and so sweet that no pullet eats more pleasantly". This was said in 1697, but the example is valuable for indicating the change in language behaviour over time, especially when borderline phenomena are involved. (For the definition of *eat* see §1.1.3c II.)

It is only natural that the middle voice, which is couched in terms of an intransitive verb, cannot remain and be made transitive at the same time. Therefore, **HP sauce sloshes our chips*. (*slosh* <(#sth# makes) #liquid substance# move suddenly>) **The inflated goods pack this normal cardboard box* (Laffut 2006: 240-241).

There are also cases where the OBJECTIVE is a living thing, but then the AGENT has to be a typically strong living thing to be distinguished from that of the PATIENT. An OBJECTIVE can be an animal ('non-human living thing that can move'), a child ('sb young') or 'sb taught' on condition that the AGENT is human or adult ('sb_{with power}'), which proves that relative strength is indispensable for the understanding of the middle voice, as in: *She feeds her baby with a spoon*. → *The baby feeds with a spoon*. *She fed my cat for me*. → *My cat fed*. (Strength is only relative, so that sb_{with power} is not obligatory, although in 'drill and teach professionally' it is present.)

There are verbs which require that both the subject and object should be human, and which do allow the object to be promoted to subject. If such a verb occurs only with a subject and no object stated, we know that the subject must be a promoted object; e.g. *bribe* (as in

Kingsland police bribe easily), *persuade* and verbs from the annoying type (*scare, annoy, excite, anger, shock, tire, embarrass, offend*; Dixon 2005: 457, 453 and 456). This happens because speakers of English treat persons who *persuade, annoy, bribe, insult, shock, offend* etc. as relatively strong ('sb strongly makes...'), while those who get persuaded, annoyed, bribed, offended etc. are treated as PATIENTS and therefore relatively weak, although, of course, they act as independent entities.

A human PATIENT in the function of an object can appear as a subject in the role of an OBJECTIVE if it is contextually understood not to be an AGENT (not 'strong') even though the AGENT is 'sth': *She doesn't frighten easily*. The definition of *frighten* is <(#sth# strongly makes) #sb# come to be instantaneously afraid>, where *afraid* implies weakness.

Even 'sb' if weak can become the subject of a detransitivized verb, e.g. *The scandal broke him. She broke under interrogation* (*break*₃ <(#sth# makes) #sb# come to experience strongly weak mental state instantaneously>).

A number of middle verbs denote human activities of treating things or substances (*clean, freeze, handle, mark, polish, sell, stain, wash* with 'make #...# come to be in state' – see §2.5.2c I) including cooking (*bake, boil, cook, fry, roast, simmer*). They are usually combined with adverbs denoting the way in which the things or substances are treated. Often they occur with a manner adverb, a modal or a negative.

Unlike selling, buying is not thought of as requiring a rather strong AGENT, reflected in ??*energetic /enterprising /high-powered /persistent /pushy buyer* vs. *energetic/pushy, etc. salesperson*. (A buyer can be *avid, enthusiastic* or *eager*.) Though in *Mary bought some rare stamps from* *Jane* and *Jane sold some rare stamps to* *Mary* the object of one particular act of buying/selling is always one and the same article (i.e. *some rare stamps*), it is the AGENT that is different, being weaker in the

former, and stronger in the latter verb. Therefore, *The book sells/*buys well. This book sells/*buys at \$ 9.* The verb *sell* is $\langle \{(\#sth_x \{sb_x\} \# \text{ makes})\} sb_x's \#sth_y \{thing - substance\} \# \text{ come to be in relation with } (\#)sb_y(\#)$ when sb_x makes sb_y come to be with power to use sth_y when sb_y makes sb_x come to be with power to use $\{amount\ of \ } sb_y's \text{ money}\} \rangle$; *buy* $\langle \#sb_x \#$ comes to be with power to use $\#sth_x \#$ (in order to make living thing $\{sb_z\}$ use sth_x) when sb_y is source and makes sb_y come to be with power to use $sb_x's \text{ } sth_y \{worthy \{amount\ of \ } money\} \} \rangle$. *He bought a jumper* implies 'He bought a jumper for himself' if not indicated otherwise, usually with *for* + ' sb_z ' (*He bought a jumper for his daughter*). *Buy* and *sell* are relational (converse, reciprocal) antonyms, and buyer and seller are mutual DONATORS, i.e. exchangers. The definitions show that *sell* contains three occurrences of the causative *make*, while *buy* contains only one invariant 'make'. Even if *from* in collocation with *buy* verges on *from*₃ 'when sb_x makes sb_y not be with sth_x any more', there is an untypical possibility for the seller sb_y to keep the thing sold, as, for instance, information.

The difference between unaccusatives and middles is reflected in our definitions as: $\langle (\{ \# \ # \ \dots \}) \# \ # \rangle$, where the intransitive section is basic, vs. $\langle (\# \ # \ \dots) \{ \# \ # \ \dots \} \rangle$, where the transitive version is basic. This is illustrated by the definition for *burst*₄: $\langle (\#sth_x \# \text{ strongly makes}) \{ \#sth_y \{sb_x\} \text{ come to not be whole by touch any more (and instantaneously forms a different shape), because of energy that } sth_y \text{ has inside space of } sth_y \} \rangle$ and *explode* versus *break*₁ (defined in §1.1.3 d), *crush* and *smash*, which follow the basically intransitive pattern $\langle (\# \ # \ \dots) \{ \# \ # \ \dots \} \rangle$. The braces here mark basicness as, loosely speaking, a kind of typicality. Some verbs do not clearly belong in one or the other category as they

seem to be on an equal footing, like *drill*: *Soldiers* (sb_y) *drill*. *The officers* (sb_x with *power*) *drill their soldiers* (sb_y), *tear* and *chip*. Their definition pattern is $\langle (\# \#) \dots \# \# \rangle$ as one cannot tell which is basic here, the transitive or the intransitive meaning (Dixon 2005: 119, 310).

2.5.2d The definition of the verb *surprise* $\langle \#sth\#$ makes $\#sb\#$ experience mental state_x concerning not expected phenomenon \rangle predicts that there should be no intransitive version because 'sth' is not stronger than 'sb'. The intended meaning of EXPERIENCER is conveyed by the corresponding adjective *surprised*, which has become independent from 'sth makes'. The definition of the adjective *surprised* reads: $\langle \#sb\#$ who experiences strong mental state concerning not expected phenomenon \rangle . This adjective corresponds to the intransitive section of the verb, ' $\#sth\#$ makes' eliminated and discarded. (*Surprised* followed by *at* is an adjective, while followed by *by* is the past participle; Dixon 2005: 167.) This echoes Toyota's opinion (2013: 45) that adjectives that are superficially identical to past participles take part in "adjectival passive" and can be regarded as "a case of split ergative based on the lexical meaning (i.e. mental state)".

2.5.2e Not only a direct object, but also an indirect object of a preposition, represented by a directrix, can become a middle voice subject. *This stick jumps easily* is derived from *jump easily with this stick* (Dixon 2005: 448).

2.5.3 Reciprocal and reflexive verbs

For reciprocal verbs (Jespersen 1924: 161), such as *argue*, *collide*, *combine*, *contradict*, *converge*, *cross*, *differ*, *draw* (game), *embrace*, *fight*, *kiss*, *meet*, *mix*, *part*, *resemble*, *separate*, and *touch*, the plural subject of their intransitive versions implies mutual action. *They*

embraced equals *They embraced each other*. *Oil and water don't mix* entails *Oil doesn't mix with water*; *Tom and his wife divorced* entails *Tom's wife divorced (Tom)*. To convey this meaning they must contain the same 'together' in their definitions. Their common content is 'sth {sb}_{y+x} be together {during same time - space}'. *Divorce*₁ is defined as: <(#sb_x# makes) #sb_{y(+x)}# be not together legally any more>' (*Divorce*₂ is a performative verb <#sb_{with religious - legal power}# makes #sb_{x+y}# be not together legally any more>'.) *She and her husband argue about trifles*. We define *argue* as <#sb_{x(+y)}# uses language to make expression of strong (and viewed by sb_{y/x} as bad) mental phenomenon_x concerning sth, when sb_x and sb_y make same phenomenon_x at same time and think in different manner, which makes bad and strong state that prevents sb_{x/y} from knowing who is right, so that they are two sb_{more than one}/two groups of sb_{more than one}>. *The gang and the police fought yesterday*. *Fight*₁ is defined as <#sb_{x(+y)}# strongly uses sb_x's energy together, sb_x connecting sb_y, in order to make sb_y in weak bodily state because sb_y is viewed as bad >. *Fight*₂ in *She and her brother always fight over the choice of music* is <#sb_{x(+y)}# uses language to make expression of, when experiencing, strong (and viewed by sb_{y/x} as bad) mental phenomenon because of/concerning sth, when sb_x and sb_y think together but in different manner, which makes bad and strong state that prevents sb_{x/y} from knowing who is right>. *They kissed and said good-bye*; *kiss*₂ is <#sb_{x(+y)}# uses sb_{x/y}'s lips to touch #sb_{y/x}# {as expression of sb_x's mental event of love} so that sb_{x+y} are together during short time>; *kiss*₁ is <#sb_x# touches #thing {sb_y}# with sb_x's lips>.

Reciprocity is also manifested in collocations with *be* + certain adjectives (*akin, equivalent, identical, opposite, parallel, similar*); e.g. *These two lines are parallel* (to each other) (Gleitman 1965: 283).

Apresjan (1973) calls the function of such verbs in clauses "symmetrical predicate". *They parted near the pond. He/She parted from her/him near the pond. (part <#sb_{x(+y)}# come(s) to not be together any more>.)*

Verbs with $\langle \#sb_x\# \dots (\#)sb_{y\{x\}}(\#) \rangle$ use the corresponding reflexive pronoun optionally when 'sb_x' is activated in the object directive. Among others, they include "grooming" verbs *bathe, change, dress robe, shave, shower, undress, wash* (Aitchison 1994: 112), as well as *adjust, curl, enjoy, hide, insulate, prepare, press, recover, reform, register, submit, surrender*. Thus, *She bathed = She bathed herself. They submitted to the enemy = They submitted themselves to the enemy. They must defend. = They must defend themselves.*

2.5.4 There can be morphologically unrelated (suppletive) pairs of verbs such as *die - kill, eat - feed, have₁ - 4 - give, know - tell, learn - teach, see - show*, where the second member adds an AGENT to the first member.

Verbs that are defined with 'make' and an AGENT in its subject stronger than the entity in the object fulfil the condition to produce an additional intransitive use and their transitivity can be redundantly indicated for the sake of greater clarity by means of brackets. For example, the definition of *coil* $\langle (\# \text{living thing}_y\# \text{ makes}) \# \text{thing}_y\# \text{ come to have spiral form} \rangle$ could do with $\langle \# \text{living thing}_x\# \text{ makes } \# \text{thing}_y\# \text{ come to have round form} \rangle$ leaving the intransitive version to the general rule.

3 DEFINING PARTS OF SPEECH AND GRAMMATICAL CATEGORIES

3.0 Words must be classed into parts of speech in order to enable their morphological and syntactic functioning. Each formal word class (or traditional "part of speech") has at its disposal a unique combination of grammatical devices, including inflection, derivational affixes, word order, phonetic signals of contrast and structure words that distinguish it from other parts of speech. This kind of distribution provides a formal criterion and gives clues to the identification of parts of speech, which in turn, helps generating syntactic units. Division into parts of speech serves the purpose of syntactic chaining of words, as a quasi-meaning overlaying the genuine meaning conveyed by semantic word classes. "All the instances of one part of speech are the "same" only in the sense that in the structural patterns of English each has the same functional significance" (Fries 1952: 73). "English is a bipolar language, a noun-verb language, with the noun-verb structure the basis of communication. Modifiers are built about the noun and the verb to make communication more e x p l i c i t. The structural devices of subordination are used to make communication more e x t e n s i v e, structure words to make communication more c o h e r e n t" (Conlin 1961: 92). According to the same author (139), structure words are: conjunctive adverbs, prepositions, conjunctions, pronouns, determiners, auxiliary verbs and particles.

Different parts of speech have their corresponding types of definitions: those of nouns are compact and homogeneous, verbs and adjectives contain directives and analyses as separate elements, while in definitions of adverbs and prepositions one can isolate their core parts

representationally square-bracketed and underlined respectively.

Nouns are independent (Šahmatov 1927: 8 - 11, Sandmann 1939 in Belić 1958: 13; cf. the term for 'noun' in Slovenian, which reads *samostalnik* 'an independent one'), containing no slots for combinations with other parts of speech, while adjectives and verbs do have such slots. In cognitivists' terms, "[in *The man found the cat*] [FIND] is conceptually dependent. For, it presupposes, as an inherent part of its own internal structure, the two things participating in the correspondences; [MAN] and [CAT] are conceptually autonomous because they do not similarly presuppose a salient external relationship. One cannot conceptualize the [FIND] relationship without conceptualizing the two things functioning as trajector and landmark of that relation [...], but it is perfectly possible to conceptualize a man or a cat without mentally setting it in a relation with some external object" (Langacker 1986: 16).

Wierzbicka (1988: 487) highlights the typical characteristics of the main parts of speech across languages by saying in a nutshell: "On the whole, then, nouns tend to have an inherent gender, related to the notion of 'kind' encoded in them; adjectives tend to have a category of degree, related to their static and 'uni-dimensional' character; and verbs tend to have the categories of tense and mood, related to their temporal orientation and predicative function".

By deciding on a particular part of speech, the speaker chooses to highlight one of two or more elements in the metonymic chain of events. An unmarked sentence *I love horses much* can be paraphrased as *My love of horses is great* (highlighting the state of love) or *I am a great horse lover* (with *horse lover* as a classifying noun category). This does not effect a change in meaning unless one understands highlighting as a special kind of meaning.

Because words of different parts of speech collocate with one another on the principle of common elements of meaning, it is proper to say that they agree with each other, i.e. adjectives, verbs and nouns agree with prepositions, prepositions agree with adjectives, verbs and nouns, nouns agree with verbs and verbs with nouns, etc.

Further discussion on particular parts of speech can be found in the introductions to the corresponding chapters dealing with articles (§3.1.1), prepositions (§3.1.2), conjunctions (§3.1.3), adjectives (§3.3), verbs (§3.4), nouns (§3.5), and adverbs (§3.6).

Semantic word categories cut across parts-of-speech division. We can classify words semantically into (a) words denoting things (designated by nouns, but nouns also cover phenomena and relations), (b) events (typically designated by verbs containing 'event'),³⁶ (c) states (typically designated by adjectives, past participles and stative verbs, but also by prepositions and nouns) and (d) relations, mainly by prepositions, marked by such relational semes as 'concerning', 'because of', 'touching', 'in order to make', 'in function of', 'connecting', 'using', etc. All these classes of meaning are explicitly marked in definitions by the corresponding semes.

The relationship between semantic types and grammatical word classes has been exhaustively treated in Dixon 2005.

3.1 FUNCTION WORDS

3.1.0 Function words ("grammatical" or "form words") are not depleted of meaning, as sometimes believed. The difference between grammatical and lexical words replicates itself in their respective semantic definitions. The former predominantly refer to subjective phenomena and relations. The definitions of certain function words,

especially of most determiners, contain semes related to the utterance, the speaker, the hearer and similar pragmatic factors, which are much less pronounced in the lexical section.

Function words take part in grammatical collocations. An important aim of defining function words is to capture the invariant meanings of particular lexical items with which function words collocate. Adjectives, especially stance adjectives (see §3.3.7), and verbs readily combine with a number of function words: prepositions, the conjunction *that*, *wh*-words, and the *to*-infinitive. These may be used to diagnose the part of the meaning of an adjective called "analysis". The definitions of prepositions are contrived by looking for the common content of adjacent nouns, verbs and adjectives and then by experimenting to see whether all data mesh together.

We have followed the traditional separation of prepositions from conjunctions, although "[there is no] reason for making conjunctions a separate word-class. Compare such sentences as "after his arrival" and "*after* he had arrived" [...]. The only difference is that the complement in one case is a substantive, and in the other a sentence (or a clause)" (Jespersen 1924: 89). "*And* and *with* mean nearly the same thing, the chief difference between them being that the former coordinates and the latter subordinates" (Jespersen 1924: 90).

Semantic definitions of a selection of function words follow.

3.1.1 Articles

The definite and the indefinite articles have the function of translating the content of noun lexemes and noun phrases from the language system (from the sphere of potential) to speech or text, as Gustave Guillaume (1919) found out. The articles bring nouns into particular use, actualize them, and, just like adjectives, determine the

range of referents. They convey the meanings 'universal' ('all'), 'singular' ('only') or 'existential' ('one of...'), with the ramifying corollaries of these principal meanings. Therefore, to analyze the use of articles, as we are going to do next, is to make an excursion into pragmatics.

The use of articles in semantic definitions is superfluous because semantic definitions deal with the language system, while the identifying role of the definite article is in definitions played by indexes.

3.1.1a *The definite article*

We find that the major function of the definite article is to refer to 'all of (potential) referents of sth' (universal), like in *the previous chapters* (= 'all chapters in this book preceding this chapter') or 'only one isolated referent of sth among all potential denotata' (singular, unique, as in *the previous chapter* = 'the only previous chapter'), which both boil down to "no-otherness". The universal perspective allows of no extra referents, whereas the unique perspective logically implies other referents in addition, but they are cognitively ignored. In Bertrand Russell's (1905) view, "to use a definite description [...] meant to claim that there is only one such object as is described by the definite description (Dimitrijević 2010: 491)" (the Uniqueness Hypothesis). "[...T]he speaker indicates that he presupposes that there exists, in the world, just one entity such that his addressee, aided by his knowledge of the context, the situation, and the world in general, is able to identify that entity as the entity to which the speaker intends his definite description to apply" (Dik 1973: 311). Therefore, we define the primary use of *the* semantico-pragmatically as: <#sth_x# that is viewed by sb_{sp} as | all sth_x / one part of all sth_x, sb_{sp} not thinking about other parts of sth_x> (cf. Hlebec 2007: 151-152).

Familiarity with the nominal notion, which has often been mentioned as an important characteristic of the definite article (the Familiarity Hypothesis) *is* important, but it is only a corollary implied by the notion of uniqueness (singularity). Uniqueness readily associates with familiarity and vice versa – familiarity brings into focus a particular entity or phenomenon leaving others out.

According to Schwartz-Norman (1976: 284), for a LOCATUM (see §2.2.12) to be interpreted holistically, it must be definite, while the partitive effect is connected to the absence of the article (Dowty 1991: 98). Thus, both in *spread the prepared fruit on trays* and *spread trays with the prepared fruit*, the LOCATUM is interpreted as ‘all of the prepared fruit’, while in *spread prepared fruit on trays* and *spread trays with prepared fruit*, it is not (Laffut 2006: 75; cf. 2.5.1b I i). Sometimes the indefinite adjective *any* has the same effect as the definite article, as in the following sentence: *Scratch-No-More is a natural herbal formulation you spray directly onto any vulnerable surfaces where your cat scratches.* (However, Laffut (2006: 76), who adduces this illustrative sentence, believes that here there is no marker pointing to a holistic interpretation and fails to see the holistic influence of *any*.) We define *any* (either adjective or pronoun) as $\langle (\#)sth_x(\#) \text{ that is not important which one among all other } sth_x \text{ more than one} \rangle$, e.g. *Any child would know that. We don't accept just any guests.*

The with proper nouns denoting families, dynasties and peoples (*the Smiths, the Habsburgs, the French*) and very large or long geographic spaces (like seas, oceans, rivers, canals, groups of islands, mountain ranges, deserts, high streets, large buildings and monuments), represented in mental lexicon as ‘strongly large space’ is associated with the meaning ‘all’: *the Danube, the Sahara, the Suez Canal, the Arctic, the Atlantic Ocean, the Persian Gulf*, (but: *Davao Gulf, Lingayen Gulf, Moro Gulf, Baffin Bay, Hudson Bay*, which are small), *the Middle*

East, the Rockies, the Hebrides, the Balkans, the Commonwealth, the Strand, the Louvre, the air, the environment (Hlebec 2011: 106). With the names of lakes *the* is not used (*Lake Erie, Lake Bohinj*), unless its large size is emphasized, as in *the Great Lakes*. (There are classemes 'large space' and 'large ground', proved by the collocations: *torrid /treacherous /wild + area/bank /beach /country /desert /island /land /moorland /mountain /plain /region/?field/*plot/*patch/*spot.*)

The need to mark an entity as the only one arises when there is more than one entity of the same kind. If there is no plurality in this respect and the identity of the entity is obvious to the hearer, no article is necessary, as usually happens with proper names and their substitutes (*Peter, Spain, mother, God, Jim became Managing Director, Let me help you, boy*). Theoretically, this can be presented as a collocation of the zero article and a noun.

The function of the definite article to convey the speaker's universal viewpoint often combines with its strictly pragmatic aspect, i.e. with what has been or will be mentioned in speech or to something implied by the situation. In this respect, *the* is similar to *it* and shares with it the same 'which sb_{sp} | is going to mention/has mentioned | just now' (see §3.4.1a, b). Therefore, *John was looking for a gold watch and Bill was looking for the gold watch, too* is synonymous with *John was looking for a gold watch and Bill was looking for it, too* (Partee 1972: 423).

3.1.1b *The indefinite article*

3.1.1b I Definition of the main sense of the indefinite article *a (an)* is: **1** <#sth_x countable# that is viewed by sb_{sp} as one part of all sth_x, sb_{sp} thinking about other parts of sth_x>. (The contrast between countables and uncountables is relegated to the difference between

different semantic classes – see §3.2.2.) *I'm reading a book* 'I am reading something that is part of all things (= instances of class) denoted by *book*'; *in a previous chapter* 'in one of previous chapters').

So, the primary function of the indefinite article, found in collocations with countable nouns, is to mentally isolate in speech one out of all entities which the noun denotes in the language, still keeping all others in view. In other words, "an indefinite noun phrase presupposes the existence of more than its referent, a class of referents to which this one belongs" (Kreidler 1998: 144).

3.1.1b II From the principal meaning of a_1 other senses spread. The most important are a_2 and a_3 , collocating with uncountables. **2** $\#substance_x\#$ that is viewed as one kind of all substance that can be expressed by noun denoting $substance_x$ > *Would you like to taste a good wine?* 'Would you like to taste substance that is viewed as good kind of all substance denoted by *wine*?' The indefinite article with the superlative is a mixture of a_1 and a_2 because the *task* in *a most important task* (= 'a strongly important task') is viewed as a kind of all tasks, as distinct from *the most important task* where only one among a number of tasks is isolated.

The indefinite article a_3 is used with uncountable nouns to attach the seme 'kind of' (possibly expanded by 'good' or 'bad') to the meaning of the noun collocator: $\#sth_x$ uncountable $\#$ that is viewed as (good – bad) kind of all that can be expressed by noun denoting sth_x >. Jespersen (1965 VII: 432 - 437) also considered this use as a typical classifying function. If the modifier of a noun specifies a kind of the nominal notion, which is done by means of a classifying or evaluative adjective or a restrictive clause, speakers may use the indefinite article, but usually omit it because it is redundant. Thus, *I should say that there is not only increasing public awareness of the problems of smoking and its long-term consequences*

*to the health of smokers, but an increasing awareness of the dangers of passive smoking, particularly to children (BNC). She plays the oboe with (a) charming sensitivity (Quirk et al.1985: 287). The leader has (a) proud bearing. (a/an) + absolute/academic /actual /basic /better /certain /common /deep /direct /encyclopaedic /first-hand /full /general /good /great/greater/new/perfect/personal /poor /practical /special /specialist /specific /sufficient/ tacit /technical/thorough/wide/working + knowledge; (a) passing anger; (a) + passionate/sudden /violent + hatred. In other words, the evaluative or classificatory a/an is redundant if the noun is accompanied by an adjective with evaluative or classificatory function, so that when the speaker does not want to emphasize '(good - bad) kind of', uncountables are not modified by a/an: *Most people have knowledge of the Wild West through Hollywood movies. It is beyond human understanding. a man of immense personal charm; new understanding of literature; actual /common /factual /local /previous /prior /public /scientific + knowledge. The indefinite article is precluded when 'kind of' is unwarranted, as in *She played the oboe with a sensitivity (Quirk al.1985: 287).**

The use of *a/an* with *u n m o d i f i e d* evaluative uncountables is allowed when the uncountable noun refers to somebody or something that causes a good or bad feeling and at the same time forms an equative relationship with the subject of the clause, as in the following sentences: *They gained a consciousness of the fact that nothing could be done. These slums are a disgrace. She is a credit to her school. Pearls are a nuisance. Try to achieve/strike a balance between work and play. That plane crash was a terrible business. You are picking up my remarks and trying to make a nonsense of them.*

Cf. *a credit* in sentence above, where 'she' = *credit*, i.e. 'somebody who 'makes' people in her school be proud' with *do sb credit* without an article because the clause is not equative.

A close connection between evaluation and classification, both covered by the indefinite article, also manifests itself in *have*_{1g} (see § 3.4.6 e), where ‘good’ is one of defining semes. Since adjectives that contain ‘good - bad’ are often used as classifying adjectives to denote a kind of phenomenon (see §3.3.2a I), the relation between *a*₂ ‘kind of’ and *a*₃ cannot be coincidental. Commenting on the behaviour of the semes ‘good’ and ‘bad’, which is the same as that of classifying adjectives, Hlebec (1995: 160) says: “It is no wonder if such a ubiquitous dichotomy, which leads to two basic categories [‘good’ and ‘bad’], i.e. two most important ‘kinds of sth’, should find expression on the formal side of a language by being associated with the indefinite article, encroaching on the field of countables”.

3.1.1c The generic use of the indefinite article can be accounted for as a metaphoric use of *a*₁, which combines speakers’ existential vision with the universal viewpoint. This use of *a* is roughly equivalent to the pronoun *everyone* (every + one) or *anyone* (any + one; *A dog is a domestic animal* → □‘Any dog is a domestic animal’), and its synonymous expression *one and all* also unites the existential and the universal.

Quite opposite to the use of the definite article to pick out one person among two or more persons bearing the same name (as in *the John Smith my school-friend*), the indefinite article serves as a “multiplier” of one person (*What a Hercules!*). In that case the proper noun is treated as countable and comes under the use of *a*₁.

3.1.1d In addition to (in)definiteness, both articles can carry the meanings ‘specific’ and ‘non-specific’. According to Christopher Lyons (1999 in Dimitirijević 2010: 495), “if a referent is known to both the speaker and the hearer, then what we are dealing with is a case of definiteness. But if the referent is known only to the speaker, then it is

a case of specificity". If both the speaker and hearer are familiar with the referent, it leads to 'non-specific'. In *Have you got a camera or a radio? – I have a camera, but I have no radio*, the indefinite article in the interrogative sentence is non-specific, and in the response it is specific. Non-specific use is also manifested in generic sentences like *The/A bear likes honey*.

3.1.2 Prepositions

Prepositions manifest great diversity of meanings and "the polysemy of prepositions verges on the chaotic" (Taylor 1989: 109). Cognitive linguists have done much to demonstrate that the prepositional usage is highly structured (110). The collocational method might also contribute to achieving this task.

As Patrick Hanks (2013: 288) observes,

[m]ost prepositions are maximally complex. It is something of a mystery that native speakers manage to acquire and use everyday words of such complexity naturally and conventionally, while foreign learners have such difficulty with them. Two possible lines of inquiry suggest themselves; either there is some underlying generalization (a set of subcategorization rules, perhaps?) governing their idiomatic usage, or more probably these words are not learned independently at all, but only as components of phraseology associated with other, less frequent words.

A preposition and its complement (object) together modify the preceding word: a verb, an adjective or a noun. Collocations consisting only of a preposition and a prepositional complement (*of danger, in mine, on shelf*) as well as of a word followed by its preposition (*aware of, dig in, book on*) sound incomplete (see §2.1.5 b). Instead, a complex collocation is called for (*aware of danger, dig in mine, book on shelf*).

We shall search for the meanings of prepositions by looking for the common meanings both of their complements (i.e. directrices) and of the preceding full words. The preposition's meaning proper is determined by finding the seme that can directly replace the preposition and connect the preceding word with the directrix, and it will be conventionally underlined. If definitions of particular prepositional sememes differ even slightly, they cannot be considered to be synonymous, like *from*, *of* and *through* in *die from wound*, *die of hunger*, and *die through neglect*.

Hanks draws attention to Halliday's "slot-and-filler grammar", so that, for example, the preposition *at* is used with numbers of hours as "fillers" in the slot of *at _____ o'clock*. The view is not much altered if *at* is treated as a node, like we do, and *1...12 o'clock* are treated as collocators. However, in that case the number of collocators has to be increased to include a much broader category of 'time phenomenon viewed as having no parts' and the definition would read: <sth being - doing during «time viewed as having no parts»> *I get up at 8 o'clock*. *The rocks were exposed at low tide*. *At his death, he was a general*. *We sleep at night*. *I met him at dinner*. *He is poor at present*. *Ann walked five hours at a stretch*. *at the beginning*; *meet at midday*. The noun *o'clock* is one of nouns such as *noon*, *midnight*, *tide*, *death*, *night*, *lunch*, *present*, *beginning*, *end*, which present time as points. Even *night*, a lasting time, is equated with *noon*, a time point, because *night* is typically a period without activity, usually spent in sleeping.

To preserve symmetry with the term 'directive', we have decided to give the name "directrix" to the semantic representations of prepositional objects. The preposition's content outside the directrix will be dubbed "pre-directrix" or "post-directrix", depending on its position in relation to the directrix. A pre-directrix includes all semes from the beginning of a preposition's definition to the directrix.

Post-directrices occur rarely, usually as a mere product of the wish to form more elegant definitions.

In verb definitions, graphical marks for the (pre-, post-) directrix are superfluous because semes are sufficient to enable the correct use of prepositions. For instance, *decide* <#sb_x# instantaneously comes to experience (*this*) thought concerning (#)mental state when sb_{more than one} do not know sth_x(#), when sb_x comes to know well what sb_x wants to do (in order to make sth_x not | exist / affect sb / be used | because sth_x is viewed as bad)(when there are two - more possibilities)>. The following clues have been employed to marshal the definition: *d. affair /argument /controversy /dispute /issue /matter /problem /question*, all containing 'mental state when sb_{more than one} do not know',³⁷ *wh*-word (*d. where to go/what to buy*) 'know', *against* (*d. against*) 'in order to make sth_x not | exist / affect sb / be used | because sth_x is viewed as bad', *for*₇ (*d. for course of action*) 'sb_x wants', *between*₄ 'when there are two possibilities', *among*₂ 'when there are more than two possibilities', *to*_{1a} infinitive (*d. to go*) 'want', *that* '(*this*) thought', *should* 'expect' (*She decided that she should go.*), *about*₁ (*d. about it*) 'mental phenomenon_x concerning phenomenon_y' (rare), *on*₆ (*d. on the candidate*) 'sb_x's mental phenomenon concerning sth that sb_{x/y} knows well'. The definition activates the non-finite clause construction: *They decided me to leave my job*. As stated above, for the prepositions *about*, *against*, *for*, *on*, *between* and *among* to be activated, the existence of the defining semes above is sufficient.

For a preposition to be realized in a prepositional phrase when the collocating noun is provided by a verb directive, the hashes have to be within brackets in order to signal that the object of the verb can be omitted and thus give way to a preposition. For instance, 'sb not

affected by *sth'*, which has potential to surface as the preposition *from*_{2b}, can appear after *escape* <#sb_x# is not affected by (#)state_x(#) that sb_x views as bad> (e. *from monotony*, as distinct from e. *injury*) only when the object slot is blocked. This possibility is indicated by the vanishing hashes, but not after *elude* <#sb_x# does not experience #phenomenon_x# because sb_x would experience phenomenon_x as bad> (e. *capture*, *e. *from capture*). In other words, an obligatory direct object precludes its use as a prepositional complement, which is a truism.

Underlined semes within pre-directrices stand for elements that can directly replace the preposition in the given collocation. The semes preceding the underlined seme match the words in front of the preposition. Thus, in the collocation *adamant about staying* (the preposition *about*₁ defined below, 'sb who intentionally experiences mental phenomenon' corresponds to *adamant*, 'concerning' replaces *about*, while '«sth»' is filled by *staying*).

In the formation of full lexemes definitions the entire definitions of prepositions, including directrices, pre- and post-directrices, are employed.

Some adjectives bear no special trace in the definitions of collocating prepositions. They are free to surface as the speaker finds it necessary, observing only the most general rules, such as **tall in New York*. In definitions of verbs, information on available prepositions (*hit in the stomach*, *hit on the head*, *write on paper*) is provided unless the connection between the verb and the preposition is loose (*read in a library*, *sing with a friend*; see the definitions of *hit* (§2.2.2b), *read* (§1.1.3c I), *sing* (§2.5.1a II) and *write* (§2.2.6).

The following overview of the most frequent prepositions is intended to cover all the sememes that appear in this book, and some have been added although they do not occur elsewhere in the volume.

3.1.2 I

about **1** <[sb] (intentionally) experiencing mental phenomenon concerning «sth»> *Aren't you curious a. the results? Don't worry a. your brother. What (do you think) a. inviting your mother?* 'What mental phenomenon does sb_h experience concerning the invitation of sb_h's mother?'; *He was angry/mad a. the way he has been treated; She felt₄ uneasy a. lending him money. dispute/say sth/talk/tell/think a. their rights* **2** <making sb_{x/sp} experience mental phenomenon concerning «sth»> *She is stupid a. money. There is something a. her face that I don't like. There is nothing positive a. walking for five hours. All that is strange a. this is that she never appeared again. Is there anything a. John that makes you uneasy? Nothing is special a. this movie. There is something sweet a. the place* 'There is something that makes speaker experience strongly good mental phenomenon concerning the place'; *speculation a. her resignation.*

Peter interested his friend in computers sounds better than ?*Peter interested his friend about computers* because the transitive *interest* contains 'make sb strongly experience mental state concerning sth' and requires *ing* with its 's t r o n g l y' experience mental state concerning sth' as a collocator.

against **1** <touching «non-living thing» strongly> *He brushed a. the fence. a ladder propped a. the wall; *I hit the stick a. Harry.* **2** <making bad phenomenon different from «sth good»> *She offended a. the common sense/good taste/rules.* **3** < [sb] wanting to make «sth_x» weak / not exist | when sth_x is viewed as bad> *appeal a. maltreatment (appeal₂: #sb_x# strongly uses language to influence sb_y with {social} power/sb_z more than one when sb_x wants to make | good {worthy} event_x / bad event_y not*

exist> *The government is appealing to everyone to save water.*); *fight a. the Persians*; *case a. death penalty*; *action a. criminal* `action of sb who wants to make criminal weak when criminal is viewed as bad'; *guard a. bad habits* **4** <when sb wants to make sb not make «phenomenon_x» when phenomenon_x is viewed as bad> *advise/speak a. voting*

among **1** <made - experienced by «more than two sth» in the same manner> *They discussed the matter a. themselves. The land was divided equally a. the heirs.* **2** *among* <when there are «more than two»> *choose a. several options*

as **1** <in order to make sb_{indef} experience thought that sth_x is «sth_y»> *The bomb was disguised as a package. He painted her portrait as a child; They were all dressed as clowns.* **2** <used with purpose of «sth»> *It can be used as a protection against water.* **3** <sb_x being in social role of «sb»> *I wanted to use him as an agent* `...to use him, he being in the role of agent'. *As managing director, I am expected to provide effective leadership. Tom refused to recognize him as his son.* (See §3.4.3.)

at **1** <being in «space» used for {a lot of}sb_{more than one}> *They met at the bus stop. Our airplane stopped at London. She is at home. at (the) bank/church/cinema /office/school /theatre/university; sit at the desk/table; at the Savoy; live at No 12 Dalling Road; close at hand; ?He was sitting at the fridge.* (Because a space is here used with a function, it is viewed as having no dimensions. Sitting by a refrigerator is not using its function.) **2** <phenomenon when it is «amount»> *The water stopped rising at (a level of) 90 feet. May left at a run. He bought ten pencils at ten cents each. The cost is put at one thousand pounds. We got the estate at a low price. I estimate her age at thirty. at a rough estimate/guess; at*

full/slow speed; describe at great length; operate at peak capacity; at regular intervals; at + altitude/angle/depth /distance/range + of... **3** <during short time experiencing good - bad {and strong} concentrated emotion because of «phenomenon - sb»> *He felt deep sorrow at John's death/at having to quit his job. She rejoiced at his success. They laughed at his jokes. He was delighted /elated/happy/pleased/thrilled at the thought of being with her. I felt exultant at looking at him. Annoyed /enraged/indignant at being disturbed; angry/furious /mad at sb; relieved at news; flattered at being complimented; amazed/amused/angry/appalled/astonished /concerned/disappointed/embarrassed/furious /humiliated /infuriated /nervous /shocked /surprised /uneasy + at her behaviour; mortified at being caught in a lie; her joy at the news; envy at the success; *love (not 'short time') at her child; *pleased (not concentrated emotion) at me, *happy at his son (child, me and son not 'phenomena'); *sorry (not 'strong') at having to quit his job/at the mistake; *curious at (not 'strong')* **4** <sth being - making during #time viewed as having no parts#> *I get up at 8 o'clock. The rocks were exposed at low tide. At his death, he was a general. We sleep at night. I met him at dinner. He is poor at present. Ann walked five hours at a stretch. at the beginning; meet at midday; at dawn/dusk* **5** <sth_x {sb} (not) using energy of sth_x in order (not) to make «sth»> *He is at work/play /breakfast. attempt at solution; be at pains to succeed; demur at working; guess₁ at the answer; be at war; work at getting better; play at robbers* **6** <sth_x {sb} using energy of sth_x in order (not) to make event concerning «sth»> *Jim drew at his pipe. Look at your hands. She tore at the wrapping but it wouldn't come off. frown/gape/gaze/glare/peer /stare at sb; pick at food* **7** <sth_x {sb} using energy of sth_x in order (not) to strongly touch «sth_y»> *He threw the ball at me. The dog came at him. beat/knock at the door; chop at the tree; fire at demonstrators; shoot at police* **8** <living

thing_x that can move {sb_x} during short time uses | {strong language} sound / body expression | to express bad mental phenomenon concerning «living thing_x {sb_y}»> (= "forceful speech" COBUILD Grammar 334). *Elizabeth cursed at Jack. They laughed at him/his jokes. The cat hissed at the dog. frown at sb; shout at her son*
9 <sb being with(out) power concerning «habitualness»> *She is an expert at tennis. John shines at soccer. ability at chess; beat sb/loose at basketball; adept/bad/clever /clumsy/good/quick/slow /stupid/useless at conversation with women; earnings at cards* (CLEVER subtype in Dixon 2005: 85)

between **1** <having to do with two «sth_{more than one}»> *Divide the cake b. the children. the match b. Italy and Spain; a link b. diet and diabetes* **2** <expressed as the same amount of space - time from two «sth_{more than one}»> *The village is situated b. the river and the highway. b. 5 and 6 o'clock* **3** <connecting two «sth_{more than one}»> *a railway b. two cities* **4** <when there are «two»> *choose b. alternatives*

by **1** <, which phenomenon «sth {sb}» makes> *books sold by vendors; pregnant by her husband* **2** <using «thought / {language} / space»> *taught by method; return by route* **3** <sb_x making strong contact with sb_y's «body part»> *She took him by the hand; catch/grasp/hold/seize/snatch by...*

for **1a** <phenomenon made / space used in order to make «{living} thing» experience / use / be affected by | sth {good}> *There's a letter f. you `a letter written and sent in order to make you use (i.e. read) it'. Jane bought a box of chocolates f. her friend. She is preparing lunch f. her husband. They found jewels f. him. Blow a glass animal f. me. The hotel caters f. foreign tourists. This is the place f. him. What can I do f.1/2 you?* A similar

meaning is expressed by the construction S + V + IO + DO: *He chose her a bag. They caused us trouble. Blow me a glass animal. They changed me \$ 5. He bought them a book. They found him the jewels. He built me a ship.* **1b** <phenomenon_x in order to make «phenomenon_y»> *They voted for independence.* **2** <thing - substance - phenomenon_x - space affecting «(state of) {living} thing {sb}» as {good}- bad (when wanting to make phenomenon_x)> *Swimming is beneficial f. children/health. The only thing that matters f. me is freedom of action. They caused trouble f. us. They improved living conditions f. citizens. This exercise is difficult f. them. It is difficult f. him to speak loud. (Him to speak loud is not a non-finite clause because the meaning is 'He finds it difficult to speak loud' rather than 'It is difficult that he speaks loud.) To_{1b} beat the champion is difficult f. Jim. He died f. his country. It₂'s not good f. the table to kick it that way.³⁸ *That John was a thief is probable f. us (Probability that John was a thief does not affect as good or bad.) Since there are innumerable situations in which anything can affect a person, most verb + adjective collocations can be followed by *for*. This fact liberates us from the necessity to take *for* into consideration every time when defining verbs. "The original division of a sentence like "It is good for a man not to touch a woman" was "It is good for a man | not to touch a woman," but it came to be apprehended as "It is good | for a man not to touch a woman," where *for a man* was taken to belong more closely to the infinitive" (Jespersen 1924: 118). "If the object of *he believes* in "he believes me to be guilty" is the whole nexus consisting of the four last words, it is necessary to say that in the passive construction "I am believed to be guilty" the subject is not "I" alone, but the nexus *I to be guilty*, although these words do not stand together, and though the person of the verb is determined by the first word alone" (Jespersen 1924: 119 -120). **3** <[sb_x] exper-*

iencing - making {good - bad} psychological phenomenon
because of «sth»> *John was known f. lying. They teased
 him f. being silly. She could not speak f. laughing. The
 room will look more cheerful f. a spot of paint. famous f.
 beauty/cathedral; give award f. bravery; best
 remembered f. his work; apologize f. insult; ashamed f.
 telling lies; disliked f. his arrogance; penalty f. littering;
 sick f. lack of food* **4** <[sb] experiencing emotion con-
cerning «living thing that can move {sb}»> *I'm so happy f.
 you. I feel₁ sorry f. her. She felt₁ great affection f. her
 children. I was ashamed/pleased f. you. I've still got the
 blues f. you. He is anxious f. her safety* **5** <with intention
to exist in «space - time»> *the bus f. Chicago; He was
 destined f. a great future.* **6.** <with purpose of «state -
 habitualness»> *a device f. baking; learn f. pleasure* **7** <[sb]
 making phenomenon_x / experiencing mental phenom-
 enon_y | {strongly} wanting «phenomenon_z»> *She is
 anxious f. her success. We all hope f. peace. He came to
 me f. advice. ask/long/search/wait/wish f. a reward;
 applicant f. the job* 'sb_x who uses language in writing
 wanting sb_y with social power to make sb_x come to be with
 job'. *Little Jane spent all her money f. chocolate. She is
 preparing her husband f. bad news = 'for imparting bad
 news'. The men were digging f. gold. He works f. money.
 They fight f. freedom He was concerned f. the boy's
 happiness; I want very much f.7/10 you to₁ come*
 ('strongly wanting'). ?*I want f.7/10 you to₁ come* (Wierz-
 bicka 1988: 120; without 'strongly wanting' and in
 competition with the usual *I want you to come*. This is the
 "volition' sense of *for to* in Wierzbicka (1988: 126- 127).
 **He likes for Kate to come in time* is wrong because *like*
 conveys weak wanting.) **8** <[sb] experiencing «true
 thought»> *He took it f. certain /granted /real /true /a fact
 that John will win.* **9** <sb_x | making / being affected by |
 phenomenon when sb_x comes to be with power to use /
 by making sb_y come to be with power to use «sth/amount

of money»> *I'll swap these three post stamps f. that one. How much do you want f. this car? buy/sell f. 100 pounds; fix the bike f. fifty pounds* **10** Sentences that would without *for* be with an indefinite or unspecified subject (usually with *it*), receive a specified subject when *for* is introduced: *To beat the champion is difficult.* → *F. Jim to beat the champion is difficult. What is difficult is f. Jim to beat the champion. This temperature is normal.* → *This temperature is normal f. winter. There is enough money to buy a car.* → *There is enough money f. him to buy a car. It is easy to shock Jane.* → *It is easy f. anybody to shock Jane.* We shall mark *for* with this function as *for*₁₀. The semantic role of *for*₁₀'s directrix (usually AGENT or PATIENT) depends on the meaning of the following verb. *He longed f. her to_{1a} stay. I am impatient/determined /keen f. her to_{1a} arrive. I demand*³⁹ *f. her to_{1a} see the manager. All I want is f. you to_{1a} be happy. He chose f. John to_{1a} go. It is necessary f. Max to_{1a} be present. The weather was too severe f. them to_{1b} set out. It's time f. Fred to_{1b} go. It was crazy f. Mary to_{1b} do that* (Wierzbicka 1988: 129). *The train is too slow f. us to_{1b} get there on time. The museum was too far f. the villagers to_{1b} visit it. They had been standing near enough f. her to_{2a} overhear their conversation. I am sure that f. John to_{2a} be promoted to full professor would infuriate everybody* (Grosu 1975: 58). *F. Peter to₃ leave would be highly probable. It was odd/wrong f. him to₃ do that. I was pleased f. you to₃ do it. I was delighted f. John to₃ win.*⁴⁰

The following sentences are not felicitous: **It₂ was rude f. John to curse. ?It₂ was kind/selfish f. Mary to₃ do that.* None of *for*'s sememes can be applied here. To correct the sentences, *of*₃ should be used instead of *for*. Since *of*₃ is <phenomenon_x intentionally__made -

experienced by «sb» experienced by sb_{sp} as good - bad>
It was rude of John to curse 'Cursing intentionally made by John was bad behaviour' and *It₂ was kind/selfish of Mary to do that* are satisfactory. It is the speaker's personal attitude embedded in the definition that distinguishes *of*₃ from any *for*'s sememe. Bolinger (1977: chap. 7) and Wierzbicka (1988: 29) explain differently that it is Mary or John who is kind/selfish or rude rather than Mary's/John's action. They believe that *kind*, *rude* and *selfish* centre on the person who behaves in a particular way, while *for*₂ has the whole event (= phenomenon_y) as the scope of its subject.⁴¹ *For*₂ would lead to 'Phenomenon of cursing affecting John was bad', but it is not John who is affected. He is the AGENT. *For*₁₀ would yield 'Phenomenon of cursing made by John was not expected' when *rude* (as well as *kind*, and *selfish*) is 'bad' rather than 'not expected'. If there is a well-formed alternative, *for*₁₀ is avoided. Thus, *It would not have surprised me if everyone had walked out* is better than *?For everyone to have walked would not have surprised me*. Quirk's comment to the latter sentence was "I am aware of the difficulty of prescribing a rule which would forbid it" (Quirk 1968: 187).

from **1** <(making) sth_x come to not any more have form of «sth_y»> *develop/emerge* + *f.* + *egg/seed*; *made f. wood* **2** <(sth making) sb not make «phenomenon» *John stopped Mary f. diving*; *Something held me back f. speaking. absolve f. sin*; *abstain f. drinking*; *exempt f. paying*; *switch f. gambling*; *ban f. demonstrating* **3** <sb_x making «sb_y» not any more be with power to use sth> *The duke took all livestock f. the peasants* 'The duke made the peasants not any more be with power to use all livestock' **4** <sth making thing_x come to not any more be with «thing_y» {by moving thing_x away}> *excommunicate sb f. community*; *clip/detach /divorce/separate f.* **5** <not

(any more) existing in space / touching surface - line | of «thing - line»> *Start running f. that sign post. disappear f. horizon; alight f. the roof; the train f. Paris; separate f. the rest* **6** <(making) sth partly not any more be in «(#)_Γspace of_Γ thing»> *drink beer f. bottle; scoop water f. well; heat from Sun* **7** different in relation to «sth»> *different f. others; far f. center* **8** <source being «sth»> *F. what she tells me, they are rather poor. I learned about it f. a newspaper (= by reading a newspaper); choose a dancer f. six candidates; read f. a book; protection f. authorities; import f. Japan; borrow f. friend*

With *from* in the sentence *The duke deprived/robbed the peasants of/*from all their livestock* Subject and Landmark are in the wrong order (Lindstromberg 1997: 205). The collocations **abolish/*annul/*disobey/*neglect/*neutralize + from* indicate that 'no' in '#sth_x# make #sth_y# not any more' or '#sb# does not do according to #sth#' do not generate *from*. There is an obvious connection between senses 1 ('origin') and 3, 4, 5 and 7 ('separation'); the origin implies separation from the original state/form, and separation implies change to sth different that is not the same as the origin. (The definition of *cut*₃ is: <#sth_x{sb_x}# makes #thing_x# come to not be part of thing_y any more, when sb_x uses sth_x sharp>.)

in **1** <using - occupying «_Γspace - area of_Γ thing - substance - (lack of) light»>⁴² *They were out in the field. She was trained in France. A bird was above in the air. They kept the pearls in a safe place. muscles in my left calf; in the rain/darkness/sun; soluble in liquid; peg in hole; circle in square* ('Area' is defined as 'limited surface'.) **2** <affected by «strong and good {bad} state»> *His financial affairs are in complete disorder. Anarchy /chaos /commotion /conflict /confusion /crisis /danger /debate /difficulty /disagreement /disturbance /epidemic /fight/mess/problem /protest /quarrel /question /rebellion*

/riot/row/scandal/sorrow/trouble/unrest/uprising/war/wrangle; done in affect; shrouded in suspicion; be in love; in agreement; in bad/good health, in good repair; put affairs in order, in full bloom, go in peace **3** <experiencing «{strong} mental state {emotion}»> *in + his/her + agony /alarm /amazement /anger /anguish /annoyance /astonishment/concern/despair/dismay/doubt/envy/fear/hope/joy/rejoicing/sorrow /surprise/unease/wonder/worry;* The seme 'event' is incompatible with *in*₂ and 3. Also, nouns without 'strong state' or '{strong} state' do not collocate with *in*₂ and 3: **in + ambition /aspiration /dogma /heresy /issue* ('strong events') */misunderstanding* (not 'strong'). **4** <state concerning «part of body»> *Some women develop a pelvic infection — more likely in younger women. strong in hands, long in the tooth* **5** <making «form»> *He started to crawl in a circle. They fly in a line. Her lip curled in a sneer. hair in a bun; speak in a pleading note; danger signs in French and Italian; embodied in poetry; work in cooperation* **6** <state_x concerning «phenomenon» that is made> (The hearer is "ushered" into the specification of the subject matter in the directrix.) *He is lacking in tact; She was certain in the knowledge that children's minds are not regarded seriously. Financial performance is becoming more important in separating sheep from goats. weak in grammar; large in size, great in his accomplishments, rash in making decisions; weak in grammar; deficient in vitamin A; fish adept in hiding itself; experienced in diving; versed in Latin, hesitant in accepting it* (The person accepted it) vs. *hesitant about accepting it* (The person hesitated whether to accept it), *abnormality in behaviour, justified in lying; lucky in having a lot of money; mistaken in thinking; selfish in her attitudes, differ in tastes, poor in resources, successful in attracting attention; naive in listening to his excuses; *anxious in being afraid* (There is no specification, as *anxious* and *afraid* are near-synonyms.⁴³ **7** <strongly touching «part

of body» by motion> *kick in the chest, shoot him in the neck, jab in the mouth* **8** <experienced as «strong thought concerning sth viewed as good - bad - true»> *in my + belief/estimate /estimation/opinion/view* **9** <[sb] strongly experiencing mental state concerning «sth»> *absorbed /engaged /engrossed /immersed /interested /involved /occupied in painting; disappointed in government; belief in God* **10** <using «{mental} phenomenon when sb_x uses sb_x's energy to make event» *in his attempt/effort/endeavour*

Nouns that have 'strong state' or '{strong} state' collocate with *in*₂ and ₃, unlike those without any 'strong'.

into **1** <sb_x strongly making sb_y make - experience «phenomenon»> *He eased me i. accepting the situation. talk sb i. buying, press sb i. service, whip sb i. obedience, work oneself i. a frenzy, frighten sb i. agreeing* **2** <(making) sth_x come to exist as «sth_y»> *The puppy grew i. a large dog. They smacked a child i. a timid, vulnerable teenager. They built BU i. a national institution.* **3** <making sth_x form «sth_y» (consisting of parts)> *They built the corn sheaves i. a stack.* (Sheaves are not a stack. A stack consists of sheaves. Sheaves are part of a stack, Laffut 2006: 218); *cut/divide cake i. parts; translate text into French*

of **1** <state - space - surface viewed as part constituting «sth»> *size/weight of animal; surface of triangle; edge of chair, bar of chocolate, mote of dust, the face of the young girl, roof of church* (The seme 'part' is a semantic prime, which disables a simpler definition – see §6.) **belonging of estate* (Belonging is a state but not viewed as a part constituting sth.) **2** <using «sth_x {substance}» to make sth_y> *They built a national institution of BU. John sculpted this statuette of clay. box made of plastic* ('a box made by using plastic substance') **3** <phenomenon_x

intentionally made - experienced by «sb_x» *that sb_{sp} anticipates further in this sentence makes sb_{sp} experience good - bad thought concerning phenomenon_x* > *It's sweet of you to kiss her.* □ 'The event made by the hearer, known to the hearer, which the speaker is going to mention (i.e. the hearer's intentional kissing her), is viewed by the speaker as good (i.e. sweet)'. *It was crazy of Jack to believe that.* 'The phenomenon intentionally experienced by Jack, known to the hearer, that the speaker is going to mention (i.e. Jack's belief in the past), is experienced by the speaker as Jack's bad thinking'. *How nice of her to invite you. It was stupid of him to interfere. It was splendid of them to be so attentive. It was confusing of John/*the text to mix up the explanations* (Bolinger 1977: 142). The construction is always *IT IS ADJ OF SB TO-INF*.⁴⁴ The definition brings out four important elements, represented as semes: (1) there has to be a human EXPERIENCER or, typically, the AGENT; (2) there has to be an intentional phenomenon this person makes or experiences, and this phenomenon has to be (3) evaluated ('thought concerning phenomenon_x as good - bad') experienced by (4) the speaker. (Bolinger (1977: 139) calls this duality "the in-between status of the of construction".) The reason why *It was handsome /generous of John to share the prize*, just like *John was generous to share the prize*, is well-formed, unlike **John was handsome to share the prize*, is in the speaker's simultaneous attention to both the AGENT (i) and his action (ii) in the construction with *of*, while in the last sentence *handsome* is attracted to the AGENT. This would be all right in *John was handsome₁* (= '#sb# who is good-looking'), but *handsome₂* meaning 'generous' has 'phenomenon' rather than 'sb' in the directive (*a h. compliment/contribution/donation/gift*; cf. Bolinger 1977: 138 with a similar explanation). Bolinger finds this construction to be euphemistic in comparison to *SB IS ADJ TO -INF* (e.g. *It was unkind of you to do that* vs. *You were*

unkind to do that. Bolinger 1977: 137). The latter sentence speaks of “you” as unkind in a direct way, while the former has ‘event made by sb is bad’. “In English only a subset of the list of attitudinal adjectives can form constructions like [*It was rude of John to insult me in front of all those people*] and admit adverb formation [*John rudely insulted me in front of all those people*]: *courteous, kind, polite, rude, generous, (un)wise, optimistic, sensible, selfish, naive, right, ridiculous, bold, ambitious, clever*” (Wołoszyk 1974: 348). (The seme ‘event made by sb’ in this definition is backed up by the fact that most adjectives that occur in the pattern *IT IS ADJ OF SB TO-INF* also occur in the pattern *SB IS BEING ADJ*, as in *Am I being crazy about this situation? You are being sweet. She was really being nice to you. He was being stupid all the time*, but not **She is being right*, as *right* has ‘sb_x’s thought’ rather than ‘event made by sb_x’.) **4** <[sb] experiencing {strong and} bad emotion concerning «sth»> *I’m afraid of falling down. ?I’m afraid of crossing the road* (‘crossing the road’ is not bad). *I suspect him of stealing the pen. She repented of her wrongdoing. accuse sb of theft, aware/beware of danger; apprehensive of the future; complain of the head; guilty of crime; sick of nagging; jealous of his brother; suspicious of strangers; fear of dark* **5** <[sb] experiencing {strong and} good - true thought concerning «sth»> *She is hopeful of graduating soon. The same is true of driving. approve of action* (*approve* <#sb_x with social power# experiencing strong and good mental phenomenon_x concerning phenomenon_y made by sb_y uses language to make (#)phenomenon_y(#) come to be viewed as good> *The minister approved the plans.*), *glad/proud of success; be careful of health; words expressive of love* **6** <phenomenon made by «sth»> *singing of bird* (see §2.3.1 and endnote 52); *evaporation of steam; smell of pine-tree; arrival of bus; expectation of elections; flashing of the light* < *the light flashes, flashing the light* < *sb is*

*flashing the light; but writing letters : *writing of letters; *belonging of estate (Belonging is not made by sth.)* **7** <phenomenon affecting «sth»> *reading of books; selling of food* **8** (formal) <sb_x expressing - experiencing - making thought {by using language} to make sb_{y/x} know «sth»> *speak/talk /tell of her success; learn/read of universe; inform of flood; indicative of bribe; knowledge of literature; explanation of how to drive; certain of success; dream of angel* ("Deriving from its implication of completeness and directness is *of's* potential to imply a greater intensity of concern. Thus [I dreamed *of* you] says that you were the star of my dream. Because *about* basically signifies 'near but not at', [I dreamed *about* you] implies that the focus of my dreaming was perhaps somewhat diffuse (Lindstromberg 1997: 202; – cf. also *story of : story about.*) **9** <making sth_x {sb} not be with power to use / experience / contain «sth_y» (any more)>. *The duke deprived/robbed the peasants of all their livestock. absolve sb of responsibility; cured of illness* **10** <[sb] experiencing {strong and} good - bad bodily phenomenon / sensation because of «sth»> *die of wounds; tired of running/talking* **11** <sth taking some amount of space from «sth»> *east of Glasgow*

on **1** <touching {upper} surface - line of «sth»> *A tree fell on the road. tap on the table; rub him on the head; kiss her on the face; on the tree/hat stand; He was on the road. ?kissed the soldier on the helmet/?hat* (E. Studies 53/4 307). **The policeman caught on the thief* is wrong although *catch's* definition contains 'touch' because it does not contain 'surface' or 'line'. The verb *clean* (see §2.5.1b i) has 'on surface' but does not collocate with *on* because it lacks 'touching'. **2** <using sb's mental energy strongly wanting to affect «sth»> *The emphasis is on economy. I am working on the problem. determined /bent/keen/decided /intent/set on sth; seize on sth; advance on sb; insistence on sth* **3** <good phenomenon

concerning «state - habitualness» that is better than before> *increase /improvement on sales; advance on dependence; drilled on mathematics* **4** <{bad} - good phenomenon affecting «part of sb»> *Alcohol acts on the brain. put the blame on her; not fair on him; wage war on France; bring shame/hatred on sb; burden on sb; severe on workers; lavish attention on children* **5** <using «sth» as base> *On your advice I applied for the job. You have it on my word. put a patient on a regimen; on condition that...; on one's own initiative; on the average; on the tea; live on \$ 20; do on purpose; buy on credit; give an advance on salaries; depend on sth; draw on one's pipe; We drew on her experience/our savings. She did it on her own authority.* **6** <[sb_x] expressing mental phenomenon by using language concerning «sth» that sb_x knows well> *They questioned him closely on the subject of rents. He commented on it at length. books on philosophy; ideas on how films should be made; blow the whistle on the manager about embezzlement.* The difference between *decide to do something* and *decide on doing something* can be attributed not to the difference in meaning between the infinitive and the gerund, but to the use of the preposition *on* in the latter case, which conveys the idea of deciding after considering a number of possibilities (Wierzbicka 1988: 32) or, in other words, after getting knowledge about the matter. The gerund in this case comes as a compulsory form because prepositions must be followed by nouns (gerund is a verbal noun).**7** <expected of «sb»> *This round's on me, It is incumbent on you. levy tax on citizens* **8** <sth {sb} affecting «sth» {in bad way}> *They imposed controls on trade. influence on behaviour* **9** <amount of money to be given for «sth»> *What's the postage on this parcel? commission on products*

over **1** <touching broad surface of «thing»> *spill tea o. trousers* **2** <stronger than «sth»> *authority o. sb; Passion o. prerogative pales next to political apathy*

(headline); *choose passion o. money, prioritize passion o. security* **3** <[sb_x] experiencing {bad and strong} mental phenomenon because of «sth» {which sb_{sp} views as bad}> *worry o. trifle; row o. money; haggle o. price; laugh o. mistake; rejoice o. defeat*. Even when the experienced phenomenon is good by definition, as in *rejoice* or *delight*, *over* adds a note of disapproval.

to **1** <moving in direction of «sth»> *He wants to go to town.* **2** <sb_x making «sth_x {sb_y}>> *come to | be with power to use / experience / be affected by | sth_y*> *She gave the book to her brother. John lent it to Sandy. I promised a treat to all my friends. We are forwarding a list to you and all other members. give compliments to sb; pay attention to details* 'making details come to be affected by attention'; *afford opportunity to sb.* With RECIPIENTS this preposition is called "external dative". Wierzbicka (1988: 365 –366) contrasts it with "internal dative", which implies reaching the RECIPIENT with more probability than with the external dative. Cf. *She gave him the book*. To regulate this alternative pattern, information of stylistic nature would have to be added, such as the following. "The construction without preposition is preferred when the direct object is a phrase or a clause. [...] The construction with preposition is preferred: (a) When the indirect object is a phrase or a clause [...]. (b) When the direct object is *it* or *them* (Thomson and Martinet 1986: 92). In "to-dative" the focus of information shifts from the object of "double-object dative" to the recipient (Snyder 2001: 326 in Ivić 2002:15). **3** <[sb_x] using language / making event | to make «sb_y» come to know> *She confided her worries to Mark. I showed the map to Jim. speak to him; announce wedding to people; confess sin to priest; answer to you; denounce brother to police; introduce sb_z to sb_y; the answer to you; reveal secret to her*. Sememe *to*₃ contains 'sb_y' as an "external dative", the person that is less

important than the message made known (Wierzbicka 1988: 377 - 380), and like *to*₂, it can often be replaced by an "internal dative". It depends on the verb definition whether this alternation is possible; cf. *He explained the scheme to her. *He explained her the scheme. Reveal* is defined as <#sb_x# uses language to express (*this*) true thought concerning #state_x# to make sb_y come to know what sb_y did not know concerning state_x>. 'Making sb_y come to know what sb_y did not know', loosely speaking, does affect sb_y, but it is sb's familiarity with states that is really affected rather than sb as a person. In her further discussion, Wierzbicka also states the opinion that 'sb_y' in *reveal* is relatively not important in comparison with the message. In the case of *confess*, *reveal* and *announce* there is no internal dative alternative (**announce / *confess / *reveal sb sth*), which means that the addressee is not only less important than the message; he or she is not affected, i.e. he/she has not changed like the message has.⁴⁵

4 <influencing «sth» {as strongly good - bad}> *She was an inspiration to her students. He'll be an asset to the team. damaging/fatal/harmful to health; essential/pivotal to economic interests; dear to him; cruelty to animals; records to his name*⁴⁶

5 <being {strongly} influenced by «sth {good - bad}»> *He accommodated his plans to hers. devoted/dedicated to her memory; attached to his mother; pledge one's life to the king; addicted to TV; close/committed to her in-laws, indifferent to money; exposed/prone to illness, liable to flooding; allergic to nuts; accustomed/used to living; averse to whisky; agreeable/receptive to ideas; doomed to disaster, resigned to the fact; an answer to accusations*

6 <sb_x coming to be in «social role of sb_{with} social power»> *He was recently promoted to the rank of colonel. The government was returned to office by a large majority. She rose to the level of manager. They appointed her to the position of director*

7 <[sb_x] coming

to be «sb_{with social power}»> *He was recently appointed to colonel /promoted to senior group manager. 8* <[sb] coming to be / being part of «group of sb_{with social power}»> *She was elected to Parliament. She was appointed to a theatre company. He is actor to a theatre company. 9* <[sb_x] being / coming to be | in social role working for «sb_y with social power»> *For ten years he was butler to Mike Johnson. She is personal assistant to the Managing Director. Peter had acted as interpreter to the president. She is personal assistant to the Managing Director. slave to the master 10* <in comparison with «sth»> *She prefers walking to climbing. position of the Sun relative to the Earth; organisms similar to amoebae 11* <[sb] experiencing mental phenomenon concerning «sth_x» in close relation with sth_x> *He referred to them by name. She came around to my way of thinking. sympathetic to idea; the answer to question 12* <as experienced by «sb»> *It is essential to him to drive carefully. It sounded like barking to her. It seems to me that...; to his knowledge; to my mind 13* <[sb_x] experiencing «strong mental state concerning not expected phenomenon»> *To her astonishment/delight /horror/relief /surprise,...*

Sememes *to*₁₁ and *about*₁ differ only slightly. The cognitivist's approach highlights the difference: "[In *to*₁₁] a 'way of thinking' is spoken of as if it was reachable in the way that a physical destination is reachable" (Lindstromberg 1997: 49). In the collocational approach the same effect is achieved by referring to the influence of the primary meaning of *to*.

under **1** <sb_x being affected by «(sb_y making) phenomenon_x when sb_y wants to make sth {sb_x} (not) make phenomenon_y»> *u. attack/authority/obligation/rule 'reign'; u. ruler* (indirect connection). **2** <according to «sth made by use of language by sb_x with {legal} power who

wants to make sb_{y/x} (not) make phenomenon»> *u. act*
 (legal)/*agreement* (legal)/*arrangement*
 (legal)/*guarantee/law/rule* (legal)/*terms*

Bugarski (1996: 205-209) is a source of quite many nouns (or noun phrases and pronouns) that follow the preposition *under* in the meanings we are interested in. This monograph provides us with a sufficient number of collocations such that can lead to a definition by means of the collocational method.: *Edward the Third, king, the Antonines, a totalitarian régime, the stern dictatorship of Ada, the injustice of government tyranny, (serve under) him, instructions, (you will be under) Mr Weedin, that man, the doctor, her domination, orders, any management, Peter's direction, Isabella's guidance, the lax tuition of Mr Ellis, your care, (keep us there under) his eye, the sergeant-majorly supervision, observation, their patronizing and hostile stares, the gaze, his laboriously constructed microscope of detachment, control (4 times), a reasonable degree of restraint, judgement, examination, treatment, notice to leave, penalty, arrest, lock and key, suspicion.* When discussing the meanings of *under* in sentences, trying to capture its essence in language, Bugarski states: "*Under* here signifies submission or exposure to a form of authority: rule, orders, observation, control, leadership and the like, where the holder of authority is denoted by the noun in the position of object" (translated by B. H.). Thus, the author finely shows that he is aware of the common meaning of the noun collocates as well as of the semantic link between the preposition *under* (as well as other prepositions) and its nominal object. It is symptomatic that it is the noun *control* that occurred most frequently as the object of *under* in Bugarski's corpus. In other words, *under* means submission to a kind of control ('phenomenon_x when sb_y wants to make sb_x (not) make phenomenon_y' and 'sb_x with legal power wants to make sb_y (not) make phenomenon' in our definition), while the object noun

denotes the source of control (cf. the analysis of *wild* in §3.3.5 with the notion 'lack of control' coming to the fore).

with **1** <sth_x | existing / making same phenomenon | at same time (and space) as «sth_y»> *John fights/argues w. Jack* (These sentences are ambiguous between 'John and Jack on the same side' or 'on opposite sides', allowing both a "unilateral" and a "bilateral" interpretation; cf. Hanks 2013: 197.) *The rain coincided w. the meeting* 'The rain existed during the same time and in the same space as the meeting'. *Jim faced w. obstacles*. *Spray greens with weedkiller* ("spatial contiguity between the weedkiller and the greens", Laffut 2006: 118); *soup w. garlic* **2** <sb activating -using «sth»> *He kept on w. (building) the wall*. *play w. toy*; *Responsibility lies w. you*. *There's nothing wrong w. expressing one's opinion*. *What are we going to do w. all this money?* *Be careful w. the mirror*. *Spray weeds w. a spray can*. *account w. the bank*. *door swollen w. heat*; *bread made w. flour*; *hurt w. knife*; *good/hopeless w. money*; *endow the ruler w. power*; *voice imbued/laden w. contempt* **3** <[sb_x] experiencing good - bad {strong} mental state because of / concerning «sth_x», who does not make phenomenon as sb_x would like / which is (not) as sb_x likes> *They were dumbfounded w. case of illness*. *Mother was annoyed w. Mary for₃ smoking* 'Mother was annoyed because of Mary, experiencing bad psychological phenomenon because of Mary's smoking, which mother does not like'; *happy w. their work* 'happy because of their work, which is as they like'; *furious w. himself* for being late; *hesitant w. the tablets*; *indignant w. the book*; *indignant w. him* for his behaviour; *pleased w. result/you*; *disgusted w. husband*; *bored/fed up w. nagging*; *angry w. Jane/injustice*; *disappointed/discontented/impatient/patient/surprised/up set + w. + John/sightseeing*; *disenchanted w. idol/treatment*; *satisfied w. a new dress*, *content w. the*

way things are **4** <state concerning «sth {sb}»> *How are things w. you? Have you any influence w. him? It is customary w. the Greeks. What do you want w. me? There's some trouble w. the car. The government's policies have not been popular w. the voters. What is impossible for people is possible w. God. lucky w. the weather* **5** <sth_x {space} occupied by «sth_y»> *The garden swarmed w. bees. place crowded/swollen w. huge influx of students; fill room w. smoke; trucks packed with food; pregnant w. child* **6** <because experiencing «psychosomatic state»> *fingers numb w. cold; blush w. embarrassment* **7** <having «thing_x - amount - form - state» as part of thing_y - unit> *man w. strong hands; child w. brown eyes; number with three zeros; vase w. beautiful shape; flag with three colours* (cf. *have*₅ §3.4.6.b) **8** <living thing_x with power to use «thing_y» when thing_x and thing_y are together {thing_y touching / near thing_x}> *woman w. stick* (cf. *have*₂ §3.4.6. a)

A single preposition can be used in three separate meanings within a single definition. An example is *on*₅, *7*, and *17* when following the verb *levy* – see §3.4.0.

If an adjective manifests a capacity for both *with*₃ and *with*₄, *with*₃ seems to be dominant – cf. *sure* in §3.3.7a.

3.1.3 Conjunctions

The collocational method is difficult to apply to conjunctions, especially to subordinators. The link between a conjunction as a node and its collocators is rather loose since they are relatively independent of the lexical environment. The best that can be done is to apply the knowledge of *classemes* and make up definitions that can be substituted for particular conjunctions. The underlined *semes* in definitions refer to conjunctions proper.

after <not before and in different time than when sth happens> (a definition in terms of semantic primes; see §6) *A. he had left school, he could not find a job.*

although <which is not expected when one knows that> *A. it is difficult, we shall do it. 'We shall do it, which is not expected when one knows that it is difficult.'*

and **1** <*sb_{sp}* adding one more not different grammatical - semantic category that applies to what *sb_{sp}* has just said> This definition offers data on discourse rather than semantic information. *Use both the knife a. the fork.* ('Use the knife, the fork also being one of the same grammatical and semantic category to which *use* applies', one more noun) *I saw a. visited the opera* (one more verb). *I gave the boy a nickel a. the girl a dime* (one more double object). *What is common for music and painting* (one more prepositional object)? *John a. Mary met (each other; one more subject).* *He is talking and laughing* (one more present participle as part of the Present Progressive Tense). *Scientists have studied the matter, and I believe they are sincere* (one more clause). The definite and indefinite article, an interrogative sentence and a statement, the gerund and the infinitive, etc. are not the same grammatical categories. (See also the examples with *and* in §1.1.3.d.) **What are you doing a. shut the door* (Gleitman 1965: 263). **I saw a a. the man.* **Running and to overeat may be unhealthy.* **2** <connecting it with> *Five and six is eleven.* **3** <which is event_x existing {immediately} before event_y> *We must wait and see. I've tried and tried.*

as **1** <in degree in which is> *John is not as tall as his brother. Her dress is almost the same as mine.* **2** <in manner in which> *Tom worked carefully, as an expert works.* **3** <during time when> *As people get older, they lose some hair.*

because <phenomenon_x would not be if phenomenon_y was not> *I believe her because she's honest* (□□'My believing her would not be if she were not honest')

before **1** <at/during time earlier than> *Let me talk to you b. you go.* **2** <wanting phenomenon_x mentioned more than phenomenon_y> *He will die of hunger b. he will steal.*

but **1** <and, different from just mentioned> *I'd love to sing, but I can't.* 'I would love to sing, and, different from my wish, I can't'. **2** <and only> *She does nothing but grumble all day long.*

if **1** <phenomenon_x that is possible to exist makes phenomenon_y> *If she asks me, I'll tell her.* 'Event_x of her asking me, that is possible to exist, will make event_y of my telling her'. *If I seem angry sometimes, it's usually because I'm very tired.* **2** <want to know sth concerning event being true> *He asked me if I was fond of painting.* **3** <phenomenon_x is possible to exist and phenomenon_x exists during time when phenomenon_y exists> *There are plenty of taxis if you're in a hurry.* **4** <and which is not expected> *The stories are basically true, if a little exaggerated.* Notice the seemingly vicious circle made by the definitions of *because* and *if*. *Because* is based on *if* and *if* on the causative *make*. But in §6 it is argued that *if* is reducible to the semantic atom 'make', which is a way out.

or **1** <and possibly> (= 'maybe' Dixon 1992: 361- 364); In more elaborate terms, <sb_{sp} does not know which possibility is true, and knows that it is one of two possibilities (in questions: <...and wants to know which one of two possibilities is true> (the definition based on Goddard 1998: 180). For instance, *She's (either) a model or an airhostess.* 'The speaker knows that her profession

is one of two possibilities: a possibility to be a model and a possibility to be an airhostess'. *Are you going or staying?* 'I want to know which of two possibilities (your going and your staying) is true.' **2** <event_x is wanted to be if sb does not want event_y to be> *They told everyone to show their passes or they will not be permitted to enter the hall.* 'They_x told everyone to show their passes, which is an event wanted to be if they_y did not want not to be permitted to enter the hall.' **3** <to be more precise> *There are five books, or five dictionaries, on the table.* **4** <and if it was not true> *He is afraid, or he wouldn't lie.* 'He is afraid, and if it was not true that he is afraid, he wouldn't lie.'

since <all time_x after time_y when> *I've liked her s. I met her.*

so <and that makes the phenomenon> *It was late, so we had to hurry.*

than <which is different from sth> *I would rather stay here t. go out.*

that <[sb] experiencing this thought:> Verbs that collocate with *that* belong to the THINKING type of Dixon's categorization (Dixon 2005), which corresponds to our 'thought'. 'This' is a pragmatic seme. Although 'thought' is a hyponym of 'mental phenomenon', here it is much narrower and not of the same order, exactly specifying the content of the mental phenomenon in an utterance. For this reason, definitions of the verbs of saying *say* and *tell* differ from *speak* and *talk* in mentioning 'this thought' as a special seme not included in 'mental phenomenon'.

say <#sb_x# expresses mental phenomenon by using language to make sb_y experience this thought concerning sth>. The complete definition is in §3.2.8.

speak <#sb_x# uses language (base being sth_x) to make sb_y experience mental phenomenon_x concerning sth_z (that sb_x knows well) using sth_y as source, affecting sb_y (in order to make sb_y (not) make phenomenon_y when | phenomenon_y is viewed as bad / sb_x strongly wants phenomenon_z)> *s. fromg memory/notes; s. about₁/against₄/for₇/of₈/on₆/to₃/with₁ (esp. AE); ?s. constantly/endlessly; *s. that...*

talk <#sb_x# uses {a lot of} sth_x made by use of language_x (#good - bad language#) to make sb_y experience mental phenomenon_x concerning (#)phenomenon_x(#) and come to know sth_y (that sb_x knows well) (and make sb_y make phenomenon_{x/y}) when sb_x makes same phenomenon at same time as sb_y> *Can we t.? (i.e. privately); t. dirt/gibberish /gossip/moonshine /nonsense/ rubbish/ sense/ treason; t. business /cricket /money /music /politics (t. shop is idiomatic); t. sb into; t. about₁/of₈/on₆/to₃/with₁; *t. equipment/meat; *talk that...*

“Speak to me” implies simply ‘say something to me’, whereas “talk to me” implies something like ‘open yourself to me’, ‘say things to me that would cause me to know what’s on your mind’, ‘interact with me by saying things that are on your mind’ (Wierzbicka 1987 : 381).

tell <#sb_x# uses (#)sth_x made by use of language(#) to make (#)sb_y(#) come to experience (#)mental phenomenon_x(#) (and experience *this* thought) concerning sth_y (when sb_x wants sb_y to make phenomenon_y)> *t. joke/lie/news/story/tale/truth (sth_x made by use of language); I told you so. (sb_y); t. fortune/love*

/problem/the way to the station (mental phenomenon); It is hard to t. (no object); t. about₁/how/of₈/to₃/that/what

Further examples: *It is nice t. George did it.* 'The phenomenon that the speaker is going to mention experiencing this thought is true: "George's doing did it in the past is good".' *John is confident t. Mary will like him.* 'John experiences this strong thought: "Mary will like John".' *I believe t. she's happy.* 'I experience this thought as true: "She is happy".' *Did you know t. Jim had graduated? He was annoyed/indignant t. he was not noticed. It is good for his team that he is tall.* 'The state that the speaker is going to mention experiencing this thought is: "His being tall is good for his team".' *There is little hope that rescuers will find him.* 'There is little probability experiencing this good thought to be true: "Rescuers will find him".' *He lied that he was not married.* 'He used language to make sb experience this thought: "I am not married", which was not true'.

The *IT IS ADJ THAT SB (DOES - IS STH)* construction is possible with adjectives whenever 'phenomenon' is the head of a directive. If the head is 'sb', the construction is out of question. Thus, **It is happy that he won.* 'Sb_{sp} experiences this thought concerning his winning: *his winning is happy'. It is not the phenomenon of his winning that is happy but he.

In the case of *foolish, sure* and *sensible* (see 3.3.7a; *?It is foolish that they don't have it. ?It is sure that John will win. ?It is sensible that they move in*) speakers vacillate because the content of the directives contains mixed elements, both 'phenomenon' and 'sb'.

?That Mike is ill is sad are not accepted by all speakers as bad style.

THAT SB (DOES - IS STH) IS ADJ is a rather infrequent construction justified when its content is strongly tied in with the previous conversational matter. *Kate is wonderful. - That (Kate is wonderful) is known to everybody.* 'This thought concerning Kate's being

wonderful is strongly true'. When *Kate is wonderful* is omitted, *that* becomes a demonstrative pronoun. Bolinger's observation also was "that the word *that* is still – in very subtle ways – the same word it was when it first began to be used to head subordinate clauses, namely a demonstrative" (1977 : 11). In the following sentences the speaker does not follow the rule of placing an old (given) piece of information before the new one (unless backed by the immediately preceding introduction of the complement clause's theme): **That you continue is essential*. **That he should know that is important/interesting*. **That a solution will be found is hoped*. **That no one saw you was lucky*. The adjectives *essential*, *important*, *interesting*, *lucky*, *remarkable* in discourse carry less information than words that convey what is essential, important, interesting, lucky or remarkable. The violation is avoided by introducing anticipatory *it*₅ (see §3.1.4 a V): *It is essential that you continue*. *It is important/interesting that he should know that*. *It was lucky that no one saw you*. *It is hoped that a solution will be found*. But *That a better solution would be found was earnestly hoped for* is acceptable because it insinuates that a solution had been discussed before hope for finding a better one was expressed.

That is often omissible, which is indicated by brackets (see examples in §3.3.7a). As argued by Bolinger (1977: 11), *that* clauses are particularly prone to express old information, whereas clauses without *that* tend to assert new information. Kaltenböck (2006: 390) posits an underlying abstract feature 'distant' for the *that*-complementizer, which gives rise to a different pragmatic interpretation, including formality (*that* is omitted in informal texts). When the manner or kind of talking is part of definition, *that* is better not to be omitted (*She said/ ??muttered she was lonely*). *That* must be used after an inserted adverb: *It was believed, however, that she was innocent*. Bolinger's (1977: 12) telling example is: *I didn't know that*. – *Know what?* – *That Jack's held down*

six jobs at the same time versus: *You want to know something? – What? – Jack’s held down six jobs at the same time.*

Presumably, in order to copy the pattern of *Who will John invite?*, *that* is not used in *Who do you think (* that) John will invite?* ‘The speaker wants to know what true thought sb_h experiences concerning sb_x not known to sb_{sp} that John will invite.’ Another reason might be the syntactic break between *who do you think* and *John will invite*.

Relative clauses with *that* do not contain ‘thought’ and will not be regarded as *that*-clauses here. Although *that*-clauses have been considered to function as objects when following a verb, it is not necessary for a definition to contain an object directive to produce *that* (cf. *indicate* defined in §2.4.3b) The same ‘thought’ in the analysis of a definition is sufficient.

In order to avoid confusion with ‘thought’ as a noun seme, the complex seme ‘is thought as’ with the past participle *thought* in definitions has to be presented as ‘is viewed as’ – see also *that*-clause in §3.2.10.

till <during all time before> *Wait t. I call you.*

unless <,which event will not exist only if> *You’ll be late u. you hurry.*

when <at time at/during | which> *I’ll call you w. I am ready. You were out w. we were discussing it.*

whether <(not) knowing truth of thought concerning phenomenon> *I’m not sure w. she was joking. She decided w. to leave*

while **1** <and, added as sth_x new to sth_y just mentioned> *You look at the children as a parent, w. I see them as a teacher.* **2** <phenomenon $_x$ during time of phenomenon $_y$ > *We looked at magazines w. we were waiting.*

wh-word (*which, when, where, why, how*; see also *whether* above and the pronouns *what* and *who*) <so that sb knows phenomenon>, e.g. *I want to tell you why she left* ('The speaker wants to say sth so that the hearer knows the reason for her leaving.' *What happened?* 'The speaker wants the hearer to say so that the speaker knows event that happened'. *Did he suggest how/when/why we should meet?* 'Did he suggest so that sb_{sp} knows manner/time/cause of our expected meeting?' (As its coordinates, existence has time (*when*), space (*where*), cause (*why*) including the AGENT (*who, what*), effect (*what*), and manner (*why*).); *guidelines on₆ where to go* 'sb_x's mental phenomenon concerning space_x to go, so that sb_{x/y} knows space_x well.'

The choice of a particular *wh*-word depends on other semes in a definition. Thus *hear*₁ allows *where* (*I heard where the plane crashed*), while *hear*₂ enables *what* (*I heard what you think of me. *I heard what the plane crushed*). Adjectives with 'phenomenon made by sb' and 'phenomenon experienced by sb', such as *foolish* and *happy*, permit only *how*. *How* is the only *wh*-word that refers to a phenomenon (the state of affairs or the way of activity) and is linked to 'concerning phenomenon'.

3.1.4 Pronouns

Pronouns are tokens used instead of nouns and clauses on the given speech occasion. They preserve only the basic grammatical information that nouns and clauses carry. Their function is textual reference and avoiding repetition of the same part of speech. Stated in terms of definitions, pronouns are parts of speech that are defined partly semantically and partly pragmatically, with sb_{sp} and sb_h as conspicuous elements.⁴⁷ Definitions of pronouns are a mixture of a highly restricted number of semes, pragmatic

information and links. For example, the function of the relative pronoun *that* is to provide a link with the preceding noun without any meaning, while that of *who* and *which* is the same with the addition of the general meanings 'sb' and 'sth other than sb' respectively.

Adjectives that collocate with pronouns cannot occur in the attributive position because they require a full word to be attached to (see §3.3.0), while pronouns serve as provisional substitutes of content words feeding on the latter, and without a full word as a source of sufficient semantic features a pronoun is inefficient. (Cf. *She was meddlesome* or *she, meddlesome as usual ...* vs. **meddlesome she*.) This is possible only when a pronoun is repeated in a specified variant, as in *You need someone, a □clever someone*.

By way of illustration, we are going to present a portrait of only one personal pronoun, and that is *it*, a most elusive one when defining is required. ("A lexicographic portrait is an exhaustive account of all the linguistically relevant properties of a lexeme, with particular emphasis on the semantic motivation of its formal properties" (Apresjan 2000: xvi).)

3.1.4 a *A portrait of IT*

There has been at least one attempt to "define" personal pronouns in terms of componential features. For example, *it* was presented as [$\langle +N \rangle \langle +\text{pronoun} \rangle \langle +\text{III} \rangle \langle +\text{singular} \rangle \langle -\text{acc} \rangle \langle -\text{human} \rangle$] (Jacobs and Rosenbaum 1967: 56).

Like most lexemes, the pronoun *it* manifests polysemy. The definitions of *it's* five sememes revealed in our research have been teased out by looking for their common behaviour in various sentences. In order to capture what is constant in the pragmatic use of the function word *it*, we have allowed the information on this

use to enter definitions which may be called "semantic" only if by this term we understand statements on any invariable content.

3.1.4a I Personal pronoun *it*₁

Definition of *it*₁: <thing of no - indefinite sex that | sb_{sp/h} has just mentioned / sb_{sp} will immediately mention / is known to sb_h from the extralinguistic situation> The first part of the definition (before the vertical bar) has a constant, semantic meaning, with exophoric reference, while the rest of the definition is pragmatic and depends on participants in communication. Traditionally, *it* in this meaning has been called "personal" even when it refers to objects. In our definition 'thing' here, like elsewhere, denotes both living beings and non-animate things.

To avoid terminological confusion between two meanings of "reference", the term "exophoric reference" will be employed when the particular language user's thoughts are directly oriented towards an extralinguistic referent, while the function of some pronouns and the articles to refer to words used in the speech/writing, will be called "endophoric reference" (Lyons 1977: Ch. 15). The pronoun *it*₁ can have exophoric reference, when indicating a verbally unexpressed and situationally determined thing, as in *Isn't it rather nice?* said to somebody looking at a photograph (Kaltenböck 1999: 49), as well as the indirect, intralinguistic reference, referring to a word or a phrase mentioned. The latter, labelled "endophoric" *it*, is illustrated by *The flat is very nice, but unfortunately it's too expensive.* In *What is this? - It is a book;* or *Who was that? - It was her mother,* the first dialogist does not know what or who that is or was, but does know that there is/was something or somebody. The *it* of the second dialogist provides a link with this unspecific 'something' or 'somebody' by referring

back to the demonstrative pronouns *this* and *that*, thus functioning as an indirect referent. In *Who is it? – It's only me*, the first *it* has exophoric reference, and the second indirect.

Usually, *it*₁ is anaphoric (referring back to what has been mentioned), as in the sentences immediately above, but it can also be cataphoric, forward oriented, as in *It's quite interesting, that book*.

Testing the definition by substituting *it*₁ for *it*: *Who was that? – It (= the human living thing of indefinite sex that you have just mentioned and that sb_h could not recognize) was her mother. The child was lost, but it (= the human living thing of indefinite sex that sb_{sp} has just mentioned) was found soon.*

3.1.4a II Phenomenon *it*₂

Definition of *it*₂: <phenomenon that | sb_{sp/h} has just mentioned / sb_{sp} will immediately mention / is known to sb_{h/sp} from extralinguistic situation>

The first part of the definition, with 'phenomenon', shows that *it*₂ has partly a semantic meaning and an extralinguistic function, but they are realized only vicariously, through the intralinguistic mediation of a nearby noun. The rest is contextually and situationally conditioned and has a pragmatic meaning.

The only difference between *it*₁ and *it*₂ is in 'phenomenon' instead of 'thing of no - indefinite sex' in the semantic segment of the definition. Their common term is "referential" or "referring *it*". In *Swimming is healthy. It tones up the muscles, it* refers to *swimming*, which is the 'phenomenon' just mentioned. This type of *it* also covers Leech's example (1989: 226) where *it* replaces an adjective: *She was rich – and she looked it* 'She was rich – and she looked like she was in the state

the speaker has just mentioned'. In *If a present was given at yesterday's meeting, it must have been to the chairman, it* stands for the phenomenon 'giving the present' rather than for the thing 'present'. Reference is also indirect in *She has left him for another. – I knew it* (= the phenomenon that she would leave him). The same 'know' implies 'true'. Only 'thought' can be 'true', while situations' are 'true' indirectly, i.e. '(situation viewed in) thought that is true'. The same 'immediately' is necessary, as proven by **It, which is obvious, does not bother John that he is unpopular*, which becomes acceptable when the interpolated non-defining relative clause is omitted (cf. Mukattash 1979: 88). In *John will, it₂ is certain, be promoted in January*, it is in the middle of the clause to which it refers. Chafe (1971: 103) noticed that *did it* in *She did it* refers not only to the verb *broke*, but also to the object *the dish* in the stimulus sentence *Harriet broke the dish*.

The meaning of *it*₂ often combines with the meaning of a *that*-clause (see §3.2.10). Like *it*₁, *it*₂ can be the "exophoric" or "situation" *it*, so called by Curme (1931: 41, 187), referring to a phenomenon directly, e.g. *Stop it* (= phenomenon known to sb_h from the situation, i.e. your doing)! or *I call it good luck. I just love it* (= the known fact) *that you are moving in with us. I resent* (pragmatically factive) *it* (= the known fact) *that she did that* (what she did, known to the hearer). *I was the one who guessed₂* (factive) *(it) that you would win. *I don't believe it that Mary stole the money* (pragmatically non-factive). **I assume/suppose/presume/think* (non-factive) *it that...*

*It*₂ occurs in *Would you believe it that Jane's married!*, which is in contrast with *Do you believe that Jane's married?* Only in the first sentence Jane's marriage is taken as a fact. *He won't believe it that I am better than he is* in contrast with *?I won't believe it that he is better than I am* proves that *it* here refers to a state

viewed by the speaker as a fact (Bolinger 1977: 67). In *I find₃ it easy to type*, *it* is obligatory for the same reason.

The pronoun *it*₂ is obligatory when a connection with what has just been mentioned is to be established or when what follows in a complement clause is a true thought (factive) surfacing as the conjunction *that*. *What do you think of running him as a candidate?* – **To do that would be a good idea* (A link with the question is missing.) – *To run him as a candidate would be a good idea* (The speaker treats the question as his own idea.) – *It would be a good idea to do that* (the obligatory *it* referring back to the question; argumentation and examples from Bolinger 1977: 72 - 73); *I would have no trouble at all; it would be easy to convince him* or *to convince him would be easy* (*it* being optional because the reference to the just mentioned lack of trouble (= 'not difficult' = 'easy') is relaxed in the unreal frame of the conditional clause). In *I had no trouble at all; *to convince him was easy* the reference to the preceding sentence makes the use of *it* obligatory: *I had no trouble at all; it was easy to convince him*. Bolinger (1977: 74) explained the ungrammaticalness of the asterisked clause as a result of the information being a fact.

*It*₂ is obligatory when the hearer is familiar with the topic of the utterance and at the same time the preceding verb is semantically or pragmatically factive, i.e. contains the semes 'know' together with 'true' – see §3.4.4. *It*₂ cannot be used even when the verb is factive unless the hearer is familiar with the topic.

It in *I wouldn't have believed it of you* is also *it*₂. In *I am glad that I am out of it*, *it* is "a convenient complement of transitive and intransitive verbs without definite reference, leaving it to the situation to make the thought clear" (Curme 1931: 99). "[T]o express cessation of an activity, *it* is often used as an object, referring to something being done by another or others,

usually in a tone of disapproval: 'Cut it out!' 'Quit it!' 'Drop it!' (Curme 1931: 383).

Some cases are equivocal, as *It must be the postman*, which can be both *it*₁ and *it*₂ with an omitted and situationally recoverable relative clause (Kaltenböck 1999: 49). The distinction between *it*₁ and *it*₂ is not always clear-cut, as in *It's the boys, isn't it?*, used by the speaker on hearing approaching steps. The first *it* directly (extralinguistically) refers to noise made by indefinite persons, probably the boys, (*it*₂), or to suspected boys as the "AGENT" (*it*₁), while the second *it* has textual, endophoric reference.

The reference of *it* is usually anaphoric, but can be also cataphoric when *it* refers to a group of words that is the equivalent of a clause, as in *It's amazing the way she's so quick at picking up the music. It's amazing, his determination* (afterthought called "right-dislocation"). This usage verges on *it*₅.

The pronoun *it* in *I'm going to rough it, Beat it!* ('Run away!') and *He tries to lord it over* has a zero reference (cf. Klajn 1984-1985: 353). This type of *it* belongs to idiomatic usage.

Metaphorical factives (*He can't swallow it that you dislike him* (Bolinger 1977). *She hid it that she was involved. He let it out of the bag that I was the one they were looking for. He spilled it out that you were the thief*) also require *it*. "Emotional factives" (*admire, hate, love, resent, welcome*) take *it* when followed by *that*-clauses, but do not accept it if the topic is new (Bolinger 1977: 69). Even factive verbs, like *know*₁ and *divulge* (see §3.4.4), which contain 'true thought' in their definitions, do not sanction *it*₂ when introducing a new topic. (*He knows (*it) that I can best him.*) This shows that topic ('known to sb_h') is as important as 'true thought', just as our definition reveals.

The string SB THINKS IT ADJ is possible for adjectives with '#sth - phenomenon#' that makes sb experience

thought', while those with '#sb#' who experiences thought' prohibit it. *It* here refers to the 'phenomenon'; e.g. *I find it difficult to memorize poetry. She thought it strange that he hadn't appeared. I like it in the autumn when leaves grow yellow.* This is also exemplified by stance adjectives (§3.3.7): *I believed/thought + it + foolish/essential /important/interesting/sensible to jog in such weather. I would have thought it obvious to anyone with eyes. She thought it probable the police were right. He thought it remarkable that a child could be so unlike his parents. They thought it likely that they could bring that about. Whoever would have thought it possible. *I thought it certain/definite/happy/lucky /sad/sure [...].* (Cf. *I thought it luck, luck = 'state' included in 'phenomenon'*).

The following collocations are wrong: **I thought it ADJ, which was certain /definite /happy /lucky /sure* (cf. Quirk et al. 1972: 519). These are all the same adjectives that object to SB THINKS IT ADJ, except *sad₂*, which tolerates the construction – see §3.3.7a.

Testing the definition by applying the invariant meanings of *it₂* and *of₃*: *It's sweet of you to kiss me.* 'The phenomenon I am going to mention makes me experience a good thought concerning the phenomenon intentionally made by you and known to you, which is your kissing me'.

3.1.4a III Ambient *it₃*

This is an "ambient *it*". The alternative names are: "prop /expletive/pleonastic/impersonal/introductory /non-referring *it*" (Kaltenböck 1999: 49). Jespersen (1924: 241) called it "'unspecified" or "conceptional" neuter, but he found "the same unspecified or conceptional *it* (thought not the great neuter of Nature) as an object in idiomatic combinations like *to lord it | you are going it! | we can walk it perfectly well | let us make a day of it, etc.*" (242). Quite a lot of grammarians think of this *it* as meaningless

and call it “empty” or “dummy”. According to Leech (1991: 225), *it*₃ refers to “background conditions”. In Bolinger’s view, *it*₃ has a referent of an extremely general nature (Bolinger 1977: 78 - 83). His examples are: *It’s nearly ten o’clock. It was cold yesterday. It grew slowly dark indoors. It’s getting late. It’s too noisy to sleep here. It’s dawn. It’s low tide. It₃ is a long way to₁ go. How far is it to New York? It (the force of gravity) took three men to lift him. It’s her graduation (day). How’s it down there? – It’s fairly calm. How’s it up there? – It’s practically ripping the trees out. What’s it like? – It’s raining.* (In the dialogues, the second *it* at the same time belongs to *it*₂ because it refers to the first *it* in questions.) *It*₃ typically goes with verbs of environmental phenomena (*blow, dawn, hail, rain, sleet, snow, thunder*), but it can agree with any other verb if the situation requires, e.g. with *ooze oil* in *I can’t walk. It’s oozing oil all over here!* (Bolinger 1977: 78). *How is it going?* ‘life in general’ (Leech 1991: 226). *It*₃ is all right when referring to sb_{indef} as in *It says in the Bible/guidebook that...*, while *John* in **In John’s letter it says that...* provides information about a specific agent (Bolinger 1977: 81).

*It*₃ is obligatory: **Is raining. *Is late. *Dawn is. *Yesterday was cold. *To rain is certain. *To be noon is sure. *To go is a long way. *To sleep is too noisy here. It won’t take long.* The infinitive here is *to*₁ and it refers to general events; – see §3.3.7a s.v. *certain*. It seems that each item separated by a slant in the definition of *it* makes for a distinct sememe (cf. **It is difficult to continue and raining. *It’s late and five kilometers to the village.* Interpolation of at least a small word or a pause (comma) can eliminate the unacceptable zeugma created by *it*₂ and *it*₃: *How was it₃ this afternoon? – It_{2/3} was hot, and impossible to get anything done. *It_{2/3} was hot and impossible to get anything done. It was hot and just*

about impossible to get anything done (Bolinger 1977: 83, 88).

Definition of *it*₃ <{environmental phenomenon} / phenomenon made by sth_{indef} / time / amount of space>. The phenomena denoted by the semes in this definition have no specific AGENT and they all refer to phenomena of unknown causation.

Testing the definition: *It* (time)'s *getting late*. *It* (= 'the environmental event made by something indefinite)'s *too noisy here*.

3.1.4a IV Emphatic *it*₄

This is the emphatic *it* of "cleft" or "introductory *it*" for a divided clause pattern (Leech 1991: 227). Examples are: *It is Ann that owns the cottage. Who is it that needs me?* (instead of *Who needs me?*) *It was reluctantly that he did it. It was no fool who wrote this. It is love that makes the world go round. It is a happy mother that has such children.*

"[L]inguists do not agree about the grammatical status of the *it* that introduces an *it*-cleft. Most people assume that *it* is a dummy pronoun" (Declerck and Seki 1990: 29). Broughton (1990: 150) calls it "empty" *it*. "Many consider *it*-clefts to be derived from right dislocated structures" (1990: 35). For Curme, emphatic *it* is a subtype of the introductory *it*₂. Declerck and Seki (1990: 30) claim that "[extraposition and *it*-cleft] constructions are formally very similar. The only differences are (a) that the *that*-clause of an extraposition construction is a noun clause [*it*₅], whereas the WH-clause of an *it*-cleft [*it*₄] is not, and (b) that, unlike *it*-clefts, extraposition constructions are never specificational".

The function of *it*₄ is for the speaker to select one of several possibilities as true, and that is a specificational,

new piece of information (cf. Declerck and Seki 1990: 17). In paraphrases, the definite article or demonstrative *that* warranted by an established topic can always be used in company with a noun that has a general and broad meaning in order to narrow its meaning down: *The/That person that owns the cottage is Ann. The way he did it was reluctantly. The/That feeling that makes the world go round is love.* But first and foremost, as Bolinger (1977: 90) argued, a topic has to be established as a base for activating *it*₄ and therefore he called it “anaphoric”. There has to be a common ground, a topic, old information. However, this knowledge is not sufficient for the interlocutor, and the speaker provides additional information about the notion that the interlocutor has been unfamiliar with. When a speaker asks *Who is the bank robber?*, the hearer knows that there has been a bank robbery (and therefore uses the definite article), but he/she does not know the robber’s identity and expects the specification in the answer (e.g. *It is John.* Declerck and Seki 1990: 32). “The interchange [...] *When will we know? – It’s tomorrow that we’ll know* is normal because we are able to understand that the time of knowing has been previously established” (Bolinger 1977: 71), while what the questioner obviously does not know is the exact time.

Declerck and Seki (1990) speak of “reduced *it*-cleft” sentences that occur when a WH-clause following an *it*-clause is deleted, as in *Who said that? – It was Bill [who said that]*. These authors also speak of “*if*-clefts” (i.e. reduced *it*-clefts with an *if*-clause as a subordinate clause). In *If anyone can help us, it’s John* (variable: ‘the *x* that can help us), *anyone* is the pre-form⁴⁸ (Declerck and Seki 1990: 19). In *If she was twenty-six and still unmarried, it (= ‘that state’) was not from lack of suitors*, there is no pre-form, and *it* refers to the premodifying clause *she was still unmarried*.

The close affinity between *it*-clefts and *if*-clefts can be shown by a parallel structure of *It was a book that*

they gave him (it-cleft) and It was a book that they gave him, if they gave him anything or, with a usual word order and elimination of redundancy: *If they gave him anything, it was a book (if-cleft; cf. Declerck and Seki 1990: 22).* This observation has also led Meier (1988) to claim that *it*-clefts are similar to *if*-clefts, but form a separate class, while Declerck and Seki think that *if*-clefts are a subtype of *it*-clefts. Declerck and Seki also consider the possibility of analysing *it* in reduced *it*-clefts simply as an anaphoric pronoun referring back to the contents of the preceding clause, like Halliday (1968) and Huddleston (1971: 325) did, but find this alternative approach unsatisfactory. One of Declerck and Seki's arguments is that since *he*, *she* and *they* cannot be used instead of *it* in reduced *it*-clefts, this *it* is not referring and not anaphoric (1990: 32). For these authors, *it* or *that person* in *if*-clefts are non-referring because the noun phrase pro-form is by definition non-referring (33). However, a definite *it* cannot be used in the following sentence, either: *This murderer, it/*he is Tom!* (34), although *this murderer* is referring. Accordingly, it is more realistic to allow *it*₄ to always refer indirectly.

What is conspicuous in all examples with reduced *it*-clefts with a pre-form because of the established topic, is that the pre-form is always indefinite, usually in the form of an indefinite pronoun: *If there is one thing that he is not, it is intelligent. When we went somewhere, it was always to some small village or other. If they believe anybody, it/*that/* this is Tom.* (Declerck and Seki 1990: 18, 21). *As long as this faculty has had a dean, it has been a man. Since the murder was committed at five, it can't have been John* ('by an unknown murderer' is implied). *Supposing they send someone to help us, will it be John? If some customer complained, it must have been Mrs. Burns. If there is one object that he never uses, it is his bike.* Cf. **If your father will help you, it will be John. *If some boy will help you, he will be Tim. Cf. If some boy will help you, that person will be Tim.* "Other European

languages [...] also have to use (the equivalent of) it [...] and the same is even true of such a totally unrelated language as Japanese" (Declerck and Seki 1990: 34). When there is no pre-form, the verb is made sufficiently indefinite by appearing in a conditional clause, as in *If I eat fish, it's only for reasons of health [that I do so]*. Even non-reduced *it*-cleft can be paraphrased with 'indefinite': *Something/The thing that makes the world go round is love. Somebody/The person who owns that cottage is Ann*. The indefinite notion corresponds to the hearer's lack of information, which is supplied by the speaker.

Definition of *it*₄ <sth that is partly known and partly unknown (indefinite) to sb_h, with new information for sb_h added to what is unknown>.

The same definition applies to *it* in *it*-clefts and *if*-clefts. *It*₄ has, has pragmatic meaning (thematic meaning or to be even more precise, the function of emphasis or of narrowing the subject; cf. Leech 1990: 19-20), rather than denotational meaning and has the function of textual reference in all its manifestations

Testing the definition: *If they gave him anything it was a book* 'Something about them and him who you know is that perhaps they gave him something that the hearer does not know, which is a book (a new piece of information for the hearer)'. *Supposing they send someone to help us, will it be John?* 'I know that we need help and supposing they send a person (unknown to the speaker), will that person be John (which is a new piece of information for the speaker)?'

3.1.4a V Anticipatory *it*₅

This type of *it* has been called the "introductory", "preparatory", "provisional" or "proform" *it* (Kaltenböck 1999, Kaltenböck 2003), or "extrapositive" (Crystal

1991). Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1970) call it “expletive” *it* and Leech a “delayed subject” *it* because “[a] clause as a subject is rather awkward” (Leech 1991: 226). It was termed “expletive” *it* by Bolinger (1977: 67) and “indefinite reference” *it* by Klajn (1984-1985: 350). It is always cataphoric. This *it* is often considered to be a “dummy” meaningless element. In Kaltenböck’s opinion (1999: 49) the overall syntactic and semantic status of this type of *it* is far from clear. Some examples: *It is useless for you to say anything. It is easy to be wise after the event. It was fun looking after the children. It is no use crying over spilt milk. It’s clever of him to lock the door. It is certain that she will win. It makes no difference what he said. It doesn’t matter what they say. It would be a shame if they forgot their passports. It is immaterial what names are assigned to them. It is compulsory to wear a safety-belt. It’s good you gave me a helping hand. It would be inexcusable that they should do such a thing. It would cost millions to build that bridge. It is clear /a pity /annoying /astonishing /probable /strange /unjust that she left.*

Restriction that is in force in **That John had arrived pleased me. *Did that John showed up please you?*, is removed in *It pleased me that John had arrived. Did it please you that John showed up?* (Zaenen and Pinkham 1976: 655; See also *that* in § 3.1.3.) *It*₅ helps to avoid clumsy repetition for stylistic reasons, but also to avoid new information being wrongly placed at the beginning of a sentence, before the given information. Thus, for instance, **That the house was haunted was found* ‘This thought: the house was haunted (information that is new for sb_H) came to be known by sb_{indef} as true’. With *it*, the sentence becomes grammatical: *It was found that the house was haunted*. ‘Phenomenon_x that sb_{sp} will immediately mention made sb_{indef} come to know and experience this true thought: the house was haunted

(new information)' – for *find*₂ see §2.3.2b I. The same holds good for *think* instead of *find*.

It in **It indicates that there is justice that Peter was found innocent* refers to the first *that*-clause *that there is justice* instead of the intended second. Therefore *That Peter was found innocent indicates that there is justice*, without *it* is only acceptable – see *that* in §3.1.3.

"[T]he delayed subject may be (i) a *that*-clause, (ii) a *wh*-clause (= indirect question), (iii) a *to*-infinitive clause, (iv) an *ing*-clause, (v) an *if*-clause". The common delayed-subject patterns are (a) *IT IS ADJ (PHRASE) + CLAUSE*, (b) *IT IS N PHRASE + CLAUSE*, (c) *IT VERB + CLAUSE*, (d) *IT + PASSIVE VERB + CLAUSE*⁴⁹ (Leech 1991: 226). We add: *TO + BE + OF + SB + TO-INF*. Stating it in different terms, *it*₅ can be followed by *be* or some other linking verb, while at the same time its textual referent (a "sentential subject") is a finite (*that*-clause, *if*-clause or *wh*-clause) or non-finite clause (e.g. in *It is useless for you to say anything*).

The use of *it*₅ often merges with the meaning of *it*₂. Actually, *it*₅ is a kind of *it*₂, claiming its identity only on the basis of its specific use to postpone the new information.

The introductory *it* together with the linking verb can be omitted whenever it is in anaphoric link and is clearly retrievable from the preceding context (Quirk et al 1985: 898 in Kaltenböck 1999: 68, 69). Examples in Quirk et al. and Kaltenböck include: *He read three books in one day.* – \emptyset *Easy to do that* or – \emptyset *Strange to do something like that* or – \emptyset *Strange that he did something like that.* \emptyset *Good to see you.* \emptyset *No wonder she's late.* \emptyset *Odd he won't help us.* The demonstrative *that* is also anaphoric here. These sentences, if developed into the full form with *it is*, would contain the cataphoric *it*₅ as well as the anaphoric *it*₂. Kaltenböck (1999: 68) explains the oddity of $\text{??}\emptyset$ *Easy to play tennis* and $\text{??}\emptyset$ *Strange John has to go to London* by the fact that *it*, when restored in

these sentences, is cataphoric, we add: o n l y cataphoric.

A special subtype of *it*₅ occurs with linking verbs used impersonally: *it* + *appear/happen/look/matter/occur/seem/turn out/is* worth; e.g. *It seems that she will pass the exam.* **That she will pass the exam seems* – see the definition in §2.2.16a and the comment on linking verbs in §3.4.8. “These are special in that they represent highly grammaticalized matrix clauses with parenthetical function which always introduce a ‘new’ (irretrievable) complement clause and are therefore near the prop-*it* end of the scale” (Kaltenböck 1999: 64). This subtype agrees with *that* for ‘thought’ and with *to*-infinitive (*It occurred to me to...*). *It turned out that his ‘country cottage’ was an enormous bungalow*, but, without *it*, *His ‘country cottage’ turned out to be an enormous bungalow* (Thomson and Martinet 1986: 215).

*It*₅ occurs with “difficulty-type” adjectives (so characterized in Dixon 2005: 84), like *difficult, easy, hard, heavy, simple, tough, useless*, which do not accept *that*-clauses (**It is easy that...*), but agree with *to*_{1b}-infinitive. *It*₅ also agrees with “attitudinal” adjectives, such as *amazing, atrocious, certain, clear, good, lovely, lucky, odd, perfect*. They belong in value and qualification type adjectives of Dixon (2005: 84). They collocate with both *that*-clauses and *to*-infinitive clauses, and often serve as pertainyms for derived sentence adverbs called “disjuncts”.

In questions *it* is obligatory because of the pronominal nature of its primary meaning (*it*₁). Namely, the standard interrogatory pattern *V + N*, which requires surfacing *N* after *V* as soon as possible (as in *Is swimming good?*, where the gerund *swimming* is more of a noun than of a verb) forces the use of an anticipatory *it*: *Would it be good to take a swim?* **Would to take a swim be good?*).

The pronoun *it*₅ can always be used in patterns with *that*-clauses as they jointly make a construction based on the pragmatic 'sb_{sp} experience *this* thought'.

Definition of *it*₅: <phenomenon_x (*that is known to sb_h* and) that sb_{sp} *is going to mention in form of clause* makes sb_{sp} experience *this* thought concerning phenomenon_x'. The definition contains intralinguistic reference, metalinguistic information and partly consists of endophoric semes.

3.2 SYNTACTIC PATTERNS AND GRAMMATICAL CATEGORIES

In the opinion of some semanticists (Bolinger, Wierzbicka, Langacker, according to Noël 2003: 348 in González-Díaz 2004 :363) every grammatical choice has a meaning behind it. Grammatical categories, such as comparative, tenses, the gerund, and the infinitive, have their own meanings apart from the lexemes with which they are combined. Verbs of transfer (like *give*, *lend*, *send*) with '#sb_x# makes #sb_y# come to be with #...#' occur in the pattern S + VT + IO + DO. Even verbs that do not denote transfer by definition get this meaning in the pattern (e.g. *She cooked him cakes*).⁵⁰ To the extent that syntactic patterns have general meanings of their own, syntax overlaps with semantics and "the semantics of syntactic structure (compositional semantics) sheds light on the word meaning, and [...] compositional semantics, lexical semantics, and the context of the utterance all interact" (Partee 2009: 12).

In this section we are going to treat exemplary only a handful of grammatical categories: the infinitive, countables and uncountables, non-finite and *that*-clauses,

the subjunctive, the comparative and the position in the sentence. Tenses will not be attended to.

3.2.1 *Syntactic patterns*

“Idiomatic patterns” (Everaert 1953) or “constructional idioms” (Langacker 1987) have meanings of their own, which are interwoven with lexical meanings.

By way of illustration, we shall present the pattern S + V + *ONE'S WAY* + ADV P (Adverbial Phrase), where the subject S is ‘living thing_x that can move’, the verb V + *ONE'S WAY* ‘moves by means of making event’ and ADV P is ‘direction in space’. “Goldberg (2006) shows that this construction has syntagmatic and semantic properties that are independent of the properties of the accompanying verb in other constructions” (Hanks 2013: 390), as in *She groped her way out of the labyrinth* ‘She made her way out of the labyrinth by groping’. The whole pattern can be defined as <#living thing_x that can move# makes thing_x move in relation to space_x by making event>. The verbs equally used are: *battle, batter, cheat, chip* (as in *The young hatch chipped their way out of their shells*), *claw, fight, find, force* ‘use strength’, *pay, pick, weave, work*, and many others. This pattern follows the general principle formulated as ‘#sb# makes sth...’, which implies that ‘living thing that can move’ is a kind of strong AGENT. Iconically, the notion of movement made by an AGENT brings about heightened dynamics in the speaker’s mind and enables switching from the verb’s role of the instrumental complement to that of the main verb. As the verb conveys information on an instrumental event highlighting ‘use’, even intransitive verbs can be used in this role, as in *Ann slept her way to the top* with metaphorically used *sleep, way, top* (Hanks 2013: 389).

Looking from the opposite direction, sentence structure is often predictable from word meanings.

The lexicalist approach in the realm of syntax has been notably undertaken by Mel'čuk, Apresjan and Wierzbicka, and the need to anticipate syntactic behaviour on the basis of semantic description has been expressed by Otto Jespersen, Wallace Chafe, Dwight Bolinger, Geoffrey Leech, and Rene Dirven among others. "[...M]uch that was ignored or placed elsewhere in a grammar is now being shifted back into the lexicon" (Aitchison 1994: 27). Berry-Rogghe (1971: 10) points at a possible psychological priority of semantic rules over syntactic rules in the determination of the intelligibility of an utterance. Levin (1993) produced a study of syntactic alternations of verbs in English, which shows that a semantic classification of verbs can be achieved through applying syntactic diagnostics and that a verb's meaning determines its syntactic behaviour. Dependency grammarians starting from Tesnier have occasionally noticed that particular lexico-semantic groups of verbs have the same government or valency. (According to Apresjan (1967), "valency refers to the capacity of a verb (or a word belonging to another part of speech) to take a specific number and type of syntactically dependent language units".) They search after "those grammatical collocations that are centered on verbs and adjectives" (Herbst 1987 in Benson 1989:1).⁵¹ Similar to the notion of valency is subcategorization, originating with phrase structure grammars, which denotes the ability and necessity for lexical items (usually verbs) to require or allow the co-occurrence of syntactic arguments.

3.2.2 Countability

Countable nouns are those whose sememes contain a referent that can be counted. Referents of uncountable nouns are not counted.

The noun sememes that contain the markers 'event', 'thing', 'part' or 'kind of' tend to be countable,

while 'habitualness' (gerunds included)⁵², 'state', 'substance', 'sensation', and 'emotion' are usually uncountable. Quite a lot of nouns denote both states and events, which is indicated by 'phenomenon' in the definition (like *conflict* in *serious*₁ – see §3.3.6 b). These tendencies liberate us from the need to specify countability for each noun in the lexicon, especially because all nouns can be perspectivized differently as countable or uncountable depending on the way the speaker uses it in the particular text or context. The noun *beer*₁ is uncountable in the meaning with 'liquid' as marker, but it is countable as *beer*₂, when referring to a container holding beer, usually consumed by one person on a single occasion. (*Three wines* means 'three types of wine' rather than 'three bottles of wine' because people usually do not drink a whole bottle of wine at once.) Likewise, there is a countable *table*₁, as opposed to the metonymically interpreted uncountable *table*₂, referring to working space, as in *I haven't got much table* (Cruse 2004: 280). The noun *war* is <bad and strong long-time phenomenon which is contest concerning a lot of sb_x more than one existing in same time and space as a lot of sb_y more than one_r, who both want to make sb_{y/x} experience bad and strong state, because sb_{y/x} are viewed as bad>. Since 'phenomenon' covers both 'event' and 'state', this gives: *War 'state' is destructive* or *It was a long war 'event'*. When the speaker thinks of the characteristic quality of things, the noun that regularly denotes that thing is treated as uncountable. One might instance *Your Tiny Tim seems more cat than dog* and *Grandfather's chair was more couch than chair* (Greene 1971: 14). Anomalous absence of the plural marker also occurs when "the individuality of referents does not matter, only their species". *She owns three hectares of oak* (Cruse 2004: 281). The countable nouns *man* and *woman* become uncountable in generic use: *Man is mortal. Woman is the*

pillar of a household. Nouns that are defined by the marker 'thing' rather than by 'phenomenon' and 'substance' can collocate with *the* to make the noun notion generic (*the telephone*, **the love*, **the brandy*).

Proper nouns are typically uncountable because they are specialized for the use with a particular reference. For the same reason they also avoid articles as collocators, with the exceptions mentioned in §3.1.1 a.

When a countable noun is used without article in common phrases such as *go to church/college/prison/school/town*, in other words, when the speaker primarily thinks of the function of a place/institution, the function revealed by such usage should enter the definition of the designating noun. Thus, *school* <(big thing with) space_x used for {a lot of} sb_{x more than one} || where sb_x habitually learn together>. (The marker to the left of || is justified by verbs such as *burgle* <#sb_x# sb_x during short time comes to exist in space_x of #(sb_y who is with legal power to use {and habitually be in}) large thing with space_x used for sb_y# wanting to come to be with power to use sth that belongs to sb_y, which event is bad and illegal>.) The same seme 'space_x used for a lot of sb_x more than one' occurs in the preposition *at*₁. The phrases *cast/weigh anchor*, or *go by bus*, where the countable noun *anchor* is used without article call for 'used' in the following definition: *anchor* <man-made thing || used to make means of transport by water not move>. For *bus* see endnote 5.

Nouns that denote persons bearing characteristics are often used as uncountables, without article. They are, in Curme's terms, "predicate nouns with the force of an adjective". Examples: *He was fool enough to marry her. He was more hero than scoundrel. The child is father of the man. He turned traitor. They stood sentry*. (Curme 1931: 38-39). In our definitions, such nouns contain 'sb' in the marker and a restrictive relative clause in the

distinguisher (see, for instance, *dancer, pianist, publisher, president, skier, worker* in §3.3.1c II).

The status of a noun regarding countability is determined by general rules of the kind mentioned above, and it depends on the particular utterance. See also comment on boundedness in §2.4.7b I, which is a category similar to countability.

3.2.3 Non-finite clause

3.2.3a A subject-containing non-finite clause is an embedded clause with its own subject⁵³ but without finite verb. The so-called “hanging participle” with its own grammatical subject, as in *Dinner finished, the guest retired*, or *Her brother having left the room, they resumed quarrelling*, has been often subsumed under the notion of the non-finite clause, but it functions as a separate subordinate clause rather than an integral sentence element and will not be treated here. Nor shall we analyze non-finite clauses without their own subjects, like *To expect help is unreasonable. Laughing, he shook his head*. We are going to take into consideration such sentences as: *They dislike the house being left empty. Do you mind him borrowing his bicycle? She didn't notice him pinch her wallet. The substance was found to contain 30% silver. I won't have the dog sleeping in the house. Jack was anxious about his son going to the nightclub. The news started me thinking. I can't understand him taking the money. I dislike Peter driving my car. She saw her mother buying food. I want the first engineer off my ship. Mary was angry at Jim lying about her.*

We recognize the following categories of non-finite clauses: Type I (§3.2.3a I i), with verbs of perception (§3.2.3a I ii), with indirect causatives (§3.2.3a II), and with performative verbs (§3.4.3b). A special type of non-finite clause is formed by means of *for*₁₀ – see §3.1.2. I. In subject-containing non-finite clauses with *to be, to be*

can sometimes be omitted – see § 3.2.4. We shall call them “truncated” non-finite clauses.

3.2.3a I i When talking about sentences with non-finite clauses, Borkin (1973: 46 in Wierzbicka 1988: 50) focuses on the personal and experiential, while Dixon insists that they express a judgement rather than a statement of fact (Dixon 1984: 590 in Wierzbicka 1988: 50). According to our analysis, the common content of sentences with Type I non-finite clauses is: ‘sb_x experiences psychological state_x concerning state_y - habitualness’. Instead of ‘psychological state’ there can be one of its hyponyms – ‘mental state’, ‘thought’, ‘emotion’ or ‘perception’. For example: *Kate to be late*, as in *He hates Kate to be late* or *Kate is sure to be late*, contains *Kate* as the subject of the embedded clauses, which are ‘Kate is late’ in both examples. (For **Kate is definite to be late* see the definition of *definite* in §3.3.6). The embedded clause cannot contain ‘event’ and *-ing* form that occasionally occurs as its part is the habitualness indicating gerund rather than the present participle. (Modern grammarians avoid the division into gerund and present participle and prefer the neutral label “-ing form”.) Examples such as *I hope you don’t mind me calling in like this, without an appointment* (COBUILD Grammar 1996: 286) may seem to refute this claim, because the speaker made the event of calling in. But on second thought one should realize that calling in has been lowered from the level of generality (i.e. habitualness) to the particular instantiation by adding *like this*. In *I think she really would have liked to stop us seeing each other* (COBUILD Grammar 1996: 287) and in *His journal shows him constantly going there for information, seeing and going* are obviously used for habitualness, not for an event on one particular occasion. The *-ing* form of *running* in *I shall have₂₆ the machine running by the time you get back* (Curme 1931: 121) is not so evidently used as a gerund, but the normal interpretation is that the machine

will be rendered usable for a habitual activity, not just for one event.

The whole non-finite clause functions as object or complement. In *Jane prefers her coffee (to be) black*, the meaning is 'Jane likes her coffee more when it is black' (the non-finite clause underlined). In *I like boys to be quiet* "it is not *boys* that is the object, but the whole nexus consisting of the primary *boys* and the infinitive, exactly as it is the whole clause and not only the subject of it that would be the object, if we were to translate it into "I like that boys are quiet" (Jespersen 1924: 117). The subject of the non-finite clause can become a semi-object as in *She likes her coffee to be sweet*. The semi-object may become the subject of a passive sentence (*People know John to be stingy → *John to be stingy is known → John is known to be stingy* – see passive in §3.2.8.), unless some of the factors that anyway ban the passive voice intervene (**Coffee is liked to be sweet*).

3.2.3a I ii Non-finite clauses that follow verbs of perception are interpreted with 'phenomenon' as the object of the sentence, i.e. 'sb_x experiences psychological state_x concerning event - state_y', and at the same time there is 'thing unintentionally making phenomenon' also functioning as the object. For instance, *Mike saw Jane cross the street* (see defined in §2.2.3) can be construed as 'Mike by sense that uses light unintentionally came to experience perception concerning the phenomenon of Jane's crossing the street', which entails 'Mike by sense using light came to experience perception concerning Jane'. Namely, they contain two simultaneous objects: the whole clause (*Jane cross the street*) and the AGENT of the clause (*Jane* in the example above), because the perception of an event metonymically entails the perception of the AGENT of the event. In *I heard the train whistling* the definition permits of two interpretations, which again make no difference in the perception of the reality: 'I heard the train (which was whistling)' and 'I

heard the phenomenon of the train whistling'.⁵⁴ However, in sentences such as *I heard the ball breaking the window*, the object is the whole clause (*the ball breaking the window*) rather than the noun *ball* alone. (The verb *hear*₁ is defined in §2.5.2c II.)

When using language, the external world is always internalized and made subjective in the speaker's mind. Privative verbs such as *seem*, *think*, *believe* speak of this internalization explicitly. At the same time, extralinguistic phenomena are analyzed as metonymic connections with an AGENT/ORIGIN/RECIPIENT/OBJECTIVE/EXPERIENCER. This configuration, i.e. the association of a subjective verb or adjective and a metonymically structured phenomenon reported by the verb/adjective, favours the use of non-finite clauses.

Wierzbicka (1988: 48) explains that unlike **I say Mary to be dishonest*, *Mary is said to be dishonest* is felicitous because it contains a hedge 'it is people who say this, not me'. We claim that the reason for this behaviour of *say* is the fact that *say* is 'event', whereas non-finite clauses require states to precede them. The passive *is said* (also *is alleged*) turns *say* (and *allege*) into a state and thus lifts the prohibition. There is another important reason. Even with verbs other than those of perception the first noun in the non-finite clause plays the role of object, be it direct or indirect, although a semi-object (see §3.2.3a I i), so that not only **I say Mary to be dishonest*, but also **I say Mary* is banned.

Wierzbicka (1988: 48) explains the difference between *I believe/judge Mary to be dishonest* and **I say Mary to be dishonest* by stressing that, unlike the acceptable sentences, the latter one "does not allow the speaker to diminish his responsibility for what is being said, because it would be self-contradictory to say in one breath: *I say this; I don't (want to) say: I think this*". *I believe/judge Mary to be dishonest* is with the explication 'I believe/think this; I don't say; people say this' i.e. with

the hedge 'I tend to have opinion'. The same restriction applies to *demand*. The definition of the verb *demand* is <#sb_x{with power}# strongly uses language to make expression of this thought: sb_x expects - wants (#)phenomenon(#) made by sb_y as source>. Thus, **The policeman demanded them to show their papers* instead of *The policeman demanded that they should show their papers* or *The policeman demanded to see their papers*. The same thing happens with the verbs *insist* and *suggest*, which are also verbs of speaking ('use language to express mental phenomenon') rather than state verbs ('experience psychological phenomenon'). For instance **All of them insisted on me to stay to dinner*. **All of them suggested me to stay to dinner*. *All of them insisted/suggested that I should stay to dinner*. **I believe him to work very hard* (Stockwell et al.1973: 570 in Boas 1979: 104; in our explanation, disallowed due to lack of 'state'); ?*I believe the rain to be falling* ('environmental event' instead of 'state'). (first object). *They believe the story to be true* (The non-finite clause refers to a state).

A sentence with a non-finite clause containing a linking verb is discontinuous in the pattern BE ADJ TO-INF (like *John is certain to arrive*) because the presence of linking verbs in such sentences requires that only the subject noun of the 'phenomenon_y' in the non-finite clause should become the subject of the sentence, not the whole non-finite clause. Thus, instead **Kate to be late is sure*, which would reflect the actual meaning [[*Kate to be late*] is sure], we get *Kate is sure to be late* and **Tom to be happy seems*. → *Tom seems to be happy*. In that case the EXPERIENCER of the psychological phenomenon is the implicit speaker (*Tom seems to be dissatisfied* 'Tom_x makes the speaker experience thought concerning Tom_x being dissatisfied as tending to be true').

When a non-finite clause is the only choice for the object slot, its semantic representation in the definition is

flanked by hash marks. Otherwise, as in the verbs *see*, *hear*, *find*₃, *know*₃, or in adjectives, the definition containing any string of semes that is (based on) 'experience psychological state concerning phenomenon' automatically brings about the use of a non-finite clause as a possibility.

3.2.3a II There is one more type of non-finite clauses. Sentences with indirect causatives (§2.2.16b) and the definitional pattern '#sth_x {sb_x}# makes sth_y {sb_y}(not) | make phenomenon / come to be in state' also use a non-finite clause as a complement. Thus, *Joanna was made to run* = 'sb_{indef} made Joanna make phenomenon of running'. Again, it is not Joanna who was made; what was caused was 'Joanna to run' – see also *appoint* and *pronounce* in §3.4.3a, as well as *have*₂₅, *26*, and *27*.

3.2.3 b Dixon (2005: 275) claims that *?I argued /concluded/inferred John to be stupid* and **I decided John to be stupid* are questionable or prohibited because "[i]t seems that Judgement TO can only be related to some straightforward impression or opinion, not to the result of a process of reasoning". The difference between "straightforward impression or opinion" and "the result of a process of reasoning" can be presented as a distinction between stative and achievement verbs. *Believe* (§3.2.10), *know* and *think* are stative verbs (§ 2.3.1) and they allow *I believe/know/think John to be stupid*. *Argue*, *conclude* (§2.4.3c), *decide* (§3.1.2), and *infer* (§2.4.3c) are achievement verbs containing 'instantaneously come to experience mental state' – see §2.3.2b I. For a rational explanation, one should remember the *similia similibus* principle – stative verbs in matrix clauses are attracted to stative verbs in non-finite clauses. The mismatch between state and event is tolerated only for verbs of perception (*I saw her crossing the street*).

Bolinger (1977: 150) noticed that the case of subject in a non-finite clause with the infinitive changes according to the meaning of the verb: *John would be nice to give that job* (John, dative, i.e. RECIPIENT). *John would be nice to fill that job* (John, nominative, i.e. AGENT). *John would be nice to have around* (John, accusative, i.e. COMITATIVE).

The interpretation of a non-finite construction as a clause or a phrase (in terms of a distinction we make) is governed by the meaning of the adjective. For instance, if *glad* is substituted for *certain* in *John is certain to see her*, the meaning of the whole sentence changes drastically: Instead of the speaker as EXPERIENCER in the *certain* sentence (with a non-finite clause), in the *glad* sentence the EXPERIENCER becomes John and the non-finite construction becomes a phrase.

3.2.4 To be

Some verb complements may drop *to* plus the following copula *be*.⁵⁵ This phenomenon is discussed in Dixon (2005: 53, 143, 251- 254), who makes a distinction between Judgement TO and Modal (FOR) TO complements.

3.2.4a *To be* is elided after some “judgement” verbs, defined as ‘(makes) sb_{sp/x} experience mental phenomenon_x concerning phenomenon_y as tending to be true’, like *consider*, *hold*, *imagine*₂, *prove*, *seem*, *suppose*, and *think* (*It seems (to be) true that... Mary seemed (to be) stupid. John thought her (to be) stupid. Tom seems (to be) dissatisfied* ‘The speaker experiences mental phenomenon_x concerning the phenomenon_y of Tom’s dissatisfaction as tending to be true’.

We claim that quite often the tendency to leave or drop *to be* is ruled by the relationship between the person in subject and the person in object. When the influence of the person in subject is considerable, as in official

decisions and judgements, *to be* is out of place, as in *declare sb dead, proclaim sb King, find₄ sb guilty. They voted him (*to be) president*, where *they* is 'sb_{more} than one with power of voting'. The AGENTS in the following constructions all have 'sb_{with power}': *prove sb (*to be) wrong or find sb (*to be) guilty in court; Meat exports must be certified (*to be) free of disease. They ordained him (*to be) priest. The newspapers (the Fourth Estate) reported Miss Brown dead. The boss wants these letters typed*. Owing to the fact that verbs in these cases are governed by somebody powerful enough to affect something, they passivize: *was declared/proclaimed /found* etc. – see §3.2.8. Such verbs constitute a special class – performative non-finite clauses.

When there is no influence of this kind (no 'sth_x affecting sth_y'), *to be* is activated, as in: *He saw her to be honest. *He saw her honest* (see for 'mental state'; cf. *He saw her naked*, with *see* as a stative verb of perception); *I know/assume Mark to be happy. *I know/assume Mark happy. I supposed him to be clever/alive/rich/tall, *I supposed him clever/alive/rich/tall* (Dixon 2005: 143). The same author also draws a semantic distinction between *be* and \emptyset after *make* + DO: "*I made John interested in the puzzle [...]* implies that I did something as a result of which he became spontaneously interested. In contrast, *I made John be interested in the puzzle* carries a more direct meaning - I influenced John to force himself to be interested in it" (Dixon 2005: 254). According to our alternative proposition, the difference can be stated as *I* being more influential in the first sentence, which apparently disagrees with Dixon's claim.

Since 'sth_x affecting sth_y' is missing, such sentences do not passivize: **She was seen by him to be honest. *Mark is known/assumed by me to be happy. *He is supposed by me to be clever*. (These sentences become grammatical when used without an explicit AGENT,

because their implicit AGENT is sb_{indef} , implying a lot of people, and a lot of people are $sb_{\text{with power}}$ – see §3.2.8).

The speaker may insert *to be* according to the tendency expounded – if the speaker wants the COGITATOR to figure as an influential person, *to be* will be left out, otherwise *to be* will be used. Thus: *I consider Mary (to be) cleverer than Fred. They believe him (to be) dead. He seems (to be) good/an idiot. I deem him (to be) an honest man. I supposed him (to be) dead/sick. I want the house (to be) clean when I return. She ordered the floor (to be) cleaned. I found₃ Harry (to be) terribly amusing and I found₃ this chair (to be) comfortable. She likes pizza (to be) hot. I want Mary (to be) doing her homework when her father comes home. We all thought him (to be) an excellent boss.* Apparently, 'sb' is treated as a person whose opinion is respected in *sb find sth irritating/relaxing/frightening/amazing*; *We found the beds very comfortable*, unlike 'we' in *We found him to be very unsure of himself. The injuries proved (to be) fatal* 'The injuries were in a state that made sb come to know and experience thought concerning injuries as fatal as a true thought after some time'. (*prove* <#sth# is in state_x that makes sb come to know and experience thought concerning state_x as true after some time>.) *I* in *I supposed him dead/sick* is probably a doctor whose opinion is respected, while *I* in *I supposed him to be dead/sick*. The distinction in the usage cannot be clear-cut and occurs only as a pronounced tendency because the distinction between persons of importance and others is not clear cut, either. The application of the passive voice follows this tendency – *She was deemed adequate for the job by the commission*, but ?*She was deemed to be talented for ballet by her mother.* ??*She was deemed adequate for the job by her neighbour.*

Dixon (2005: 254) argues that "[w]ith Modal (FOR) TO clauses [containing *order, wish, want, need* and *require*] (*to be*) can be omitted if the main clause subject

does not directly 'control' the complement clause subject in doing something"). Dixon's 'control' shows great similarity with our 'influence', but otherwise this explanation is quite different from ours. On the same page Dixon comes near to our explanation when concluding that "[t]o *be* may also be omitted from a Modal (FOR) TO complement after a small group of verbs which includes *order, wish, want, need* and *require*. This happens when the complement clause subject is not the controller of the activity [...], e.g. *He ordered the floors to be cleaned, I want this picture (to be) restored*".

**The king expects his subjects obedient* is wrong although *king* is 'sb_{with social power}' because *expect*₃ contains 'want sb to make' rather than 'make sb to make': <#sb_x# experiences thought concerning #phenomenon# that sb_x wants ({sb_x}_y) to make - experience - have>. *I e. that you should leave immediately. We e. him to stay. What do you e. of me.* It is the verb with its subject directive that commands the use of *to be*. Therefore *expect* produces *The king expects his subjects to be obedient*, *find*₄ (see §3.2.4a), *elect, excommunicate, pronounce* with 'sb_{with power}' in the subject directive prohibit *to be* (see §3.4.3), *think* with 'sb' without 'power' requires *to be*, while verbs such as *believe, consider, declare* (§3.4.3), *find*₃ ('have opinion', see the examples in §3.2.4 b), and *order*, with 'sb_(with power)', allow the speaker to choose.

When a verb means '#sb# instantaneously comes to know and experience mental state concerning #sth#', 'sth' is viewed as being affected by sb no matter whether sb is with or without power. *To be* is employed and passivization is possible. Examples are: *I find*₂ *him to be much taller than I expected.* *The house was found*₂ *to be haunted* - see §2.3.2.b I.

When a PATIENT noun is followed by an adjectival complement (see §3.3.2c), *to be* is not inserted if the

'state₂' of the adjective is not part of the 'experience mental state₁ concerning phenomenon (in this case 'state₂'). Examples are: *The child was found₁ safe/unconscious.* (The child was found to be safe/unconscious contains find₂), *turn the volume low, paint the wall grey, burn sb alive, leave her unconscious, catch him red-handed, serve mushrooms cold.*

3.2.4b Secondly, for stylistic reasons, *to be* is often elided when the non-finite clause contains the *to*-infinitive: *She found₃ him (*to be) difficult to understand.* *You may find₃ your illness (*to be) hard to accept.* *I found₃ it (*to be) very difficult to give advice.* *I deemed it (*to be) a great honour to be granted an interview with him* (COBUILD Grammar: 547). Contrary to this, *to be* is activated in order to avoid bringing two identical items together, as in *The Guardian concentrates on the likelihood that NATO leaders will declare nuclear weapons to be 'weapons of last resort'.* *To be* also must be used if it is part of the Progressive Aspect; e.g. *The French government is believed to be planning to send transport helicopters to work alongside the Germans* (COBUILD Grammar: 295).

3.2.5 *Be + being*

The pattern SB_y IS BEING ADJ has the meaning 'event concerning sb_{x/sp} made by sb_y intentionally, experienced by sb_{sp} as good - bad', as in *Mary is being ungrateful.* 'Mary behaves ungratefully'. Other adjectives that fit the frame comprise subjective or 'comment on situation' adjectives (see §3.3.6) *absurd, admirable, annoying, brave, clever, cowardly, crazy, good, hasty, horrible, irritating, kind, nice, obnoxious, odd, peculiar, rash, ridiculous, sensible, silly, smart, stupid, wise.* (*Mike was

being quick/prompt/slow because *quick/prompt/slow* do not denote an action of sb_y concerning sb_x.) They also fit the pattern *IT*₅ *BE* _____ *OF*₃ *SB* *TO*₃-INFINITIVE or *SB* *BE* _____ *ING* *V-ING*, as in *It was wise of Peter to go home* or *Peter was wise in going home* (*ing* in §3.1.2. I). But **It was foolish of Doug to hear them talk* (Silva and Thomson 1977: 112) or *?It is f. that they don't have it* because hearing and having something are unintentional states.

3.2.6 To-infinitive

This grammatical category also manifests polysemy. The main meanings are as follows:

1a <sb makes phenomenon_x/experiences mental phenomenon_y !wanting! phenomenon_z'> *He was running/in a hurry to catch a train* ('...wanting train-catching'). *I'm afraid to cross the street*. 'I experience the mental state of fright wanting my crossing the street.' *?I'm afraid to fall down* ('I have the mental phenomenon of fright when wanting my falling down; odd unless I am an actor and I intentionally do a fall; cf. Wierzbicka 1988: 33); *He wants to sell his car*. (In the paraphrase 'He wants wanting selling his car' the two 'want's merge). *I liked/*disliked to help her* (*dislike* does not contain 'want') vs. *I liked/disliked helping her*. *Jane stopped to cry* 'Jane did the event of stopping wanting to cry'; *learn to ride*; *read to get informed*. 'Want' often appears as a seme in Wierzbicka's works (e.g.1988: 88).

Why ask for help? is all right because the meaning is 'The speaker does not want to ask for help and at the same time does not see the reason for asking'. What prohibits *to* in the sentence **Why to ask for help?* is the role of the interrogator who states a decided refusal to ask for help (the use of *why*) and at the same time wants to do so (using *to*-infinitive). It is a different matter when asking *Who to ask for help?* 'The speaker wants to ask

for help but the speaker does not know whom'. There is no interrogative in *One should decide where, when and why to say Yes*.

1b <!when sb_{indef/sp} wants! making - experiencing phenomenon> *He is easy to understand*. 'When sb_{indef/sp} wants the experience of understanding him, this phenomenon is easy'. *This butter is too soft to use*. 'The butter is soft when sb_{indef/sp} wants using it, which is bad (and sb_{indef/sp} cannot use it)'.⁵⁶ **To use this butter is too soft* (cf. **use softly, *using butter is too soft*). *It₃'s noisy to sleep here*. 'When sb_{indef/sp} wants the experience of the state of sleeping here, the environment is noisy (and sb_{indef/sp} cannot sleep). *She is ripe to kiss*. 'When sb_{indef/sp} wants the event of kissing her, she is ripe' (cf. **It is ripe to kiss her. *kiss her ripely*). *The crossword is difficult to solve* ('= *It₂ is (too) difficult to solve the crossword*), when sb_{indef/sp} wants solving the crossword, it is difficult'. When 'sb' is specified, *for₂* is used (*This crossword is difficult for me to solve*); *This is the right thing to do* 'the right thing when sb_{sp} wants sb_{indef/sp} doing'.

1c <!so that sb_{indef/sp} does not want! experiencing> *The movie is too exciting to miss*. 'The movie is exciting to such a degree that sb_{sb} does not want experiencing the state of missing it'. **To miss the movie is too exciting*. 'Making sb not experience the state of missing the movie is too exciting' (cf. **miss excitedly*).

In *to_{1a}* the information about the identity of the person who wants is provided by the subject of the main clause. In *to_{1b/c}* there is no such clue, and the person who wants/does not want is not the subject but sb_{indef/sp}. The subject is semantically a PATIENT or EXPERIENCER. The shift in interpretation is effected automatically when the subject is inanimate because such an entity cannot want anything. When the subject is human, it is one of the

"difficulty-type" adjectives (*easy, difficult, simple, tough,* etc.) that directs the construal to the passive situation – see §3.1.4a V.

2a <phenomenon_x/sb !(not) tending towards! being true / making - experiencing phenomenon_y>. This is in harmony with "[W]hen [an infinitive] is attached it links up tightly as a complement, as something toward which an action tends" (Bolinger 1977: 151). The pattern is N + V + (ADJ/Past Part) + TO-INF. When 'tending to be true' is the current sense, the 'phenomenon_x' becomes 'thought'. *Mark seems to be satisfied.* = 'The thought: 'Mark_x is satisfied' tends towards being true'. *Frank happened to see an old friend* 'Frank saw an old friend when not tending towards seeing him' (Tending is negated but is not absent from the definition!). *Jane began to cry* 'Jane began the event of crying tending towards making the event for some time'. *They are inclined to complain. He is liable to suffer.* 'He tends [tending] towards suffering'. *It is certain to snow.* 'Weather certainly tends towards making the event of snowing'. *John was known to lie* 'sb_{indef} had experience that John tended towards making the event of lying'. *He left France never to return* ('never tending towards returning'); *He claimed to possess a genuine Monet. To see her, one would think that she is a ballet dancer.* 'If sb_{indef} tends towards seeing her, sb_{indef} would think that she is a ballet dancer'. *To₂ see is to₂ believe* 'When sb_{indef} sees, sb_{indef} tends towards believing'. *You may count on him to come. I am made to work hard* ('sb_{indef} makes me tend towards working hard'). *in times to come* 'in times tending towards coming'.

The infinitive is a non-finite form apt to be used when the AGENT or EXPERIENCER is not specified (as in *It is prohibited to litter* 'a lot of sb_{more than one indef} must not litter'.

2b <!so that sth does not tend towards! state> *The liquid is too thin to contain traces of iron.* 'The liquid is thin to such a great extent that it does not tend towards the state of being with traces of iron'.⁵⁷ (Cf. *The liquid is so thin that it can₂not contain traces of iron.*) If the verb lexically denotes an event, in this construction it is interpreted as a state, i.e. as passive; for instance, *too important to ignore* = 'too important to be ignored'.

3 Sememe *to₃-infinitive* appears when there is <sb_{sp} experiences good - bad mental state !when! phenomenon is made - experienced by sb_x> in the definition. Evaluation is also emphasized in Bolinger (1977: 148 "[O]n the speaker's side only approval and disapproval are involved; there is not the variety - reluctance, eagerness, willingness, haste, ability, etc - that is found with a subject's inclination toward an action"). *It₅ was not odd/natural to cry in that situation. It₅ is strange/not normal to be calm in danger. How stupid I was to trust him! He is too quick to react. You were right to do that. Kate was clever not to go alone.* 'Kate used good mind when Kate did not make event of going alone, and sb_{sp} experiences good mental state because of that'. *John was rude to curse. To curse is rude. It₅ is rude (for/of John) to curse. It₅ was ridiculous to cry. It₅ was nice to receive all these presents. It₃ will soon be the right time to act.* (**He was nervous to behave that way*, where *nervous* is attitudinally neutral, becomes acceptable when an attitude on the part of the speaker is added: *He must have been nervous to behave that way* (Bolinger 1977: 147).)⁵⁸ *To live in debauchery is a sin. It is pleasant to hear about that.*

It₅ was essential/foolish/important/interesting/sad /sensible/surprising to listen to her/not to be seen are well formed sentences(with *to₃-infinitive*), unlike **It was certain/likely/sure to listen to her/not to be seen*. These adjectives contain 'strongly true thought' (see §3.3.7) and

require a that-clause. *It*₃ *is certain to snow* is correct because the *to*-infinitive here is *to*_{2a} (= 'The weather certainly tends to snow'). General statements with *to*_{2a/3}-infinitive (*To read historical books is important*) can be made particular by means of *for*_{2/10}, as in *To read historical books is important for*₂ *me* or *It*₅ *is important for*₂ *me to read historical books. It*₅ *is exceptional to be warm in this place.* → *It*₅ *is exceptional for*₁₀ *January to*₄ *be warm in this place.* – see also *for*₁₀ in §3.1.2. I. Accordingly, *certain*, *likely* and *sure* may not accept the anticipatory *it*₅ + *to*_{2a}-infinitive unless they are reinforced by *for*₁₀. Cf. **It is not certain/likely/sure to become a winner in lottery* (The subject of the infinitive clause has to be mentioned.) vs. ?*It is not certain/likely/sure for her to become a winner in lottery* (better: *She is not certain/likely/sure to become a winner in lottery*). Likewise, without the help of *for*₂, *lucky* does not accept the pattern above since this adjective requires a concrete person to be called lucky – see *lucky* in 3.3.7a.

The *to*₅ in *TO-INF + IS + ADJ* and *IT + IS + ADJ + TO-INF* usually implies an indefinite AGENT of the event or an indefinite EXPERIENCER /PATIENT of the state mentioned by the verb in the infinitive (*sb*_{sp}) when no AGENT or EXPERIENCER/PATIENT of the proposition is explicitly mentioned, e.g. *To read books is interesting = It is interesting to read books* 'In the opinion of *sb*_{sp} when *sb*_{indef} reads books, it is interesting for *sb*_{indef}'. This produces a general evaluative statement. It is possible to personalize the COGITATOR by an explicit mention: *She finds Jim to be interesting to talk to.*

In the pattern *IT IS ADJ TO-INF* the adjective is crucial for the interpretation of the whole. For adjectives such as *important* and *foolish*, which contain 'good' or 'bad' invariantly, the infinitive has to be *to*₃, which by the necessity to duplicate obtains 'good' or 'bad'. If the

adjective was *certain*, the only possible sememe of the infinitive could be to_{2a} -infinitive. Other members of the sentence fit in. The *it* in the first type has to be it_5 because it leans on to_3 -infinitive, while in the second type it has to be it_3 . Since the whole chain of interpretation starts from the adjective, which is not the first to be uttered, and the meaning of the first word is grasped only when the hearer receives the final word, the conclusion is that the interpretation of an utterance is not done in a piecemeal way, in chronologically successive steps starting from the first word and proceeding without skipping towards the last one, but is done only after the whole utterance has been received.

The stance adjectives *foolish*, *remarkable*, and *sensible* combine with to_3 -infinitive 'making sb experience mental phenomenon'.

Happy, *interesting*, *lucky*, and *sad* with their 'experience good - bad mental phenomenon_x concerning phenomenon_y' agree with to_3 -infinitive <experience good - bad mental phenomenon_x when phenomenon_y is made - experienced>. The adjectives *surprising* and *remarkable* match to_3 -infinitive with their 'phenomenon makes thought of sb concerning (not)expected phenomenon', while *important* and *sure* ('when sb wants doing sth') enjoy the company of to_{6a} -infinitive. At the same time all these types of the infinitive mix with the adequate non-finite clauses: to_2 , 3, 4 and 5-infinitive with the non-finite Type I clause, to_2 and to_{1b} with Type II.

The pattern TO_3 -INF IS ADJ and its Extraposition Transformation in TG: IT_5 IS ADJ TO_3 -INF as an alternative, are available for adjectives which have semantic elements 'phenomenon made - experienced by sb_x who makes sb_{sp} experience good - bad mental phenomenon' (*essential*, *foolish*, *important*, *interesting*, *remarkable*, *sad*, *sensible*, *surprising*) since the to_3 -

infinitive also contains these elements, only in a different, even reverse order. The Extraposition Transformation is much more frequent because the tendency is to postpone new information (the infinitive phrase) and long stretches of speech.

4 <sb_x experiences good - bad - true mental state_x !because! sb_x makes - experiences phenomenon / {sb_x is in state_y}>. *Bob was satisfied/proud to win the game. Ann was disappointed/sorry/upset to lose the game. John was surprised to have fallen. I was anxious/glad to see her. He was concerned/worried to hear the news. I'm grateful to be alive* (Bolinger 1977: 147). *She was happy to do it.* Sememe *to*₄-infinitive does not agree with any *it* (e.g. **It is happy to know all about her*) because 'sb' here has to be 'sb_x' rather than sb_{indef}.

5 <sth_x makes sth_y !make! phenomenon> *Allow me to introduce myself.*

6 <sb_{sp} thinks sth !if! phenomenon comes to exist> *You must be new around here to be asking such a question. You wouldn't think so (,) to look at him. You are nice, to say those things. You'd be mad to try to swim the Channel* (Bolinger 1977: 144 - 145). *To see her, one would think that she is a ballet dancer. 'If one sees her, ...'. You wouldn't think so, to look at him.*

In the pattern *STH {SB} IS ADJ TO-INF* (distinguished from *IT IS ADJ TO-INF*), *to* can be *to*₁, *to*₂, or *to*₃. With non-finite clauses containing *to*₁ the infinitive refers to a mental event of sb_{sp}, which is presented grammatically as an infinitive clause, and in the definition as an expansion of the directive head, while *STH* is the AGENT or PATIENT of the event. This involves *certain*, *likely* and *sure* as in *She is certain to be promoted* (\neq *She is certain*). But why not with *possible* and *probable*? *John is likely to win*, but **John is possible/probable to win*. This difference has been explained by Wierzbicka (1988: 56):

likely is a psychological predicate, which requires an individual mind as a point of reference, while *possible* is a logical predicate and “[its] sentence can be true or false, regardless of people’s views, thoughts, ideas, and so on”. “*Likely* focuses on people’s thoughts, expectations and knowledge, so it has a psychological perspective; by contrast, *probable* focuses on relationships between events, and so it has a logical perspective” (57). Our definitions bring out these differences in the following way: *likely* and *certain* contain ‘tend towards being’, while *probable* does not, whereas *possible* allows this sense only in conjunction with ‘phenomenon made by sth indefinite’. Thus, ??*John is possible to persuade*. Furthermore, *definite*, which seems to be quite like *certain*, does not sanction the pattern, either. The only difference in the definitions of *certain* and *definite* that can be responsible for this behaviour of *definite* is its lack of ‘tend towards being’. Thence, *It₃ is certain/*definite to rain*. **Ann is definite to win*.

With *to₂* and *to₃* the same construction highlights SB as a person described by ADJ, as in *He was foolish /happy/lucky/sad/sensible to part with her*, which implies *He was foolish/happy*, etc. Adjectives in such usage have been labelled “subject-oriented”. The pattern SB IS ADJ *TO₂* -INF is fortunate when there is a clear ‘sb’ (not ‘sth’ or ‘phenomenon/sb’) as the head, which echoes the definition of *to₂*: <(phenomenon_x made - experienced by) **sb_x** who makes sb_{sp} have mental phenomenon concerning !phenomenon_x - **sb_x**! as good - bad >. *Essential, important, interesting, remarkable* and *surprising* have no ‘sb’ as the head. Therefore, **She is essential/important/interesting /remarkable/surprising to drive carefully*. Still, *important* and *interesting*, which have #sth#, can be found in the construction above in colloquial speech, but only with ‘sb’ in the role of a passive EXPERIENCER of a state, as in *Mary is interesting to listen to*. ?*John is important to persuade*.

3.2.7 Bare infinitive

3.2.7a The infinitive without *to* is used as part of non-finite clauses (see §3.2.3) in three cases (cf. Dirven 1989: 123): (i) after verbs of perception and cognition, such as *hear*, *know*₃ ('have personal experience', see endnote 80), *see*, *listen*, *watch*, called "attention" verbs in Dixon (2005), (ii) with the strong indirect causatives *bid*, *have* (§3.4.6 g), *help*, *let*, and *make*₂ (see §2.2.16c). (Dixon 2005: 252 calls the conjunction of these verbs with the bare infinitive "pragmatic immediacy"), and (iii) after most of modal verbs (see §3.2.7c).

(i) The bare infinitive with verbs of perception signals a close connection of a perception verb with its complement verb. There is no intermediary between the two and their events are simultaneous. The bare infinitive of *like* in *I feel*₁ *like an ice-cream* can be accounted for in the same way; there is no temporal difference between feeling and liking in this case. Actually, liking is a kind of emotion and 'like' entails 'feel' (§4.1).

(ii) The specific characteristic of strong verbs of indirect causation is that in addition to two 'make's they contain the seme 'strong'. Those strong indirect causatives that are part of a non-finite clause use the bare infinitive as complement. Thus, *let*₁ <#sb_x# strongly does not make #sb_{y/x}# not make phenomenon_y that sb_{y/x} strongly wants to make> *She let him kiss her. Let me stay for one more day*. In this case 'strong' remains even in the passive because of the second 'strongly': *He was let kiss her*. The expression 'sb strongly does not want to make' may strike the reader as a paradox, but 'strongly' is necessary in order to invest 'sb' with power to allow an action. *Let*₂ <#sth_x {sb_x}# makes #sth_y# make phenomenon that strongly tends to exist {move}>, e.g. *John opened the door to let the dog in. There are*

holes between the stones that let the wind through (MEDAL). We propose the following definition of *help*: <#sb_x# (strongly) makes (#)sb_y(#) make phenomenon_x wanting that sb_y makes phenomenon_x when sb_y could not (easily) make phenomenon_x alone>. The verb *help* can also be used with the *to*-infinitive because 'make' in 'sb_x makes' need not be 'strong'. In Dixon's words, "When *to* is omitted [...], the sentence is likely to mean that the Helper did part of the activity; when *to* is included [...], it is more likely to mean that the Helper made things easy for the complement clause subject so that s[/]he could do what needed to be done" (Dixon 2005: 201). His examples are: *John helped Mary (to) eat the pudding* (201) and *John helped me (to) write the letter* (251). In *John helped Mary to eat the pudding* John simply wanted to help Mary, for instance by "guiding the spoon to her mouth since she was still un invalid" as Dixon put it, but he did not take part in eating. In *John helped Mary eat the pudding*, John's help was so great that he did part of eating. *John helped me to write the letter* "might be used to describe John facilitating my writing the letter – suppose that he provided pen and ink, suggested some appropriate phrases and told me how one should address a bishop. But in this scenario, I actually wrote the letter myself. Sentence [*John helped me write the letter*], on the other hand, might be used to describe a cooperative effort where John and I did the letter together, perhaps writing alternate paragraphs" (Dixon 2005: 251).

As a stimulus for the bare infinitive defective modals (except *ought* and partially *dare*) contain 'strongly want - expect' in the latter part of a definition. *Ought* requires *to*-infinitive because the expectation is weak – see §3.2.7c.

3.2.7b In passive causation the full form of the infinitive has to be employed because in the passive the AGENT is either left out or recedes to the background, while the object is promoted to the position of subject (e.g. *They*

(AGENT) *made him leave the country* vs. *He (PATIENT) was made to leave the country*. *I heard her sing* vs. *She was heard to sing*. *I asked for him to be shot*, but **I asked for him shot*). *He was seen to steal from the magazine* 'sb_{indef} saw him steal...' as distinct from *They saw him steal from the magazine*. An EXPERIENCER of a perception is active in comparison to the phenomenon or the object perceived. *He helped her lift the heavy box*. → *She was helped *lift/to lift the heavy box*. Dixon explains this phenomenon as a "description of a state" (2005: 252). Only *let* has a passive with the pattern *BE V-ED INFINITIVE* (*COBUILD Grammar*: 299).

3.2.7c *Modal verbs*

Lexical collocators have little to offer when searching for the semantic definitions of modal verbs because they are legion, occurring indiscriminately with all modals; cf. *I/her father/anybody + can/could/may/might/must/ought to /should + borrow /learn /read /swim /understand ...* However, there are well-known grammatical constraints that make these verbs anomalous: **Must read it!* (addressing someone), **Do you can fix it?* **You are maying come in*. **You should to behave yourself*. The infinitive without *to* is employed after most of modals. Moreover, particular meanings of modal verbs can be paraphrased with the help of particular verbs: *order, want, wish, believe, know* etc, and there are selection restrictions with stance adverbs. Thus, "[a] modal adverb and a modal verb may be combined provided that they both express the same or similar modal meanings" (Mihić Pijetlović 2015: 247; *He certainly must/*might have told her*). These restrictions are sufficient to come up with the following tentative semantic definitions.

can **1** <#living thing_x# is strong to | make phenomenon_x / intentionally experience psychosomatic phenomenon_y |

when thing_x wants to make phenomenon_{x/y}>. The possession of power ('being strong') is a state. *He c. swim over a mile. Elephants c. kill crocodiles* (one interpretation). *Jane c. imagine non-existent creatures.* **2** <#sth_x# is strongly expected by sb_{sp} to tend | to be - exist / to make phenomenon> *Cocktail parties c. be boring. It can't be raining. Elephants c. kill crocodiles.* 'It can happen that elephants kill crocodiles.' (Perkins 1982: 248), or, more precisely, 'The speaker strongly expects that elephants kill crocodiles.' **3** (usually informal) <#sb_x# is not expected by sb_y strong to not | make / be affected by | phenomenon_x when sb_x wants to | make / be affected by | phenomenon_x> *You c. visit the museum for free. I c. take a day off whenever I want. These days children c. do what they like.* **4** <#sb_x# strongly experiences perception concerning phenomenon> *I c. see the moon. John c. hear heavenly music.*

Although *can*₁ may be categorized as ability, its meaning is not the same as that of *be able to*. The latter could be defined as <#sb# tends towards making phenomenon>. Sememe *can*₂ is epistemic, ₃ is permission. The use of bare infinitive in *can*₄ is due to factor (1), i.e. the simultaneity of perception and the phenomenon perceived, while in the other three senses we believe the same 'strong' to be responsible for the bare infinitive. It seems that the notion "inherent potentiality", which, according to Dirven (1980: 106), all meanings of *can* share, corresponds to our seme 'strong'.

dare **1** <#sb_x# (wants to) make {not expected} phenomenon that tends to be bad for sb_x> *He dared to swim in a pool with crocodiles. He didn't dare to swim in a pool with crocodiles. Speak up if you d.* **2** <#sb_x# (strongly wants to) make phenomenon that tends to be bad for sb_x> *How d. you open my letter? Don't you d. touch me* (exceptionally in the imperative)! It is obvious

that “to strongly want to do something bad for oneself” is an unusual state of affairs and therefore *dare*₂ is found almost exclusively in interrogative and negative sentences. In such sentences it is often the matter of style and regional speech whether *dare*₁ or *dare*₂ will be used because ‘tendency to be bad’ is subjective. Dixon (2005: 188) offers an alternative explanation: “The two syntactic uses of *dare* carry a semantic difference. The lexical-verb sense tends to refer to an inner state of the subject, as in (1a), and the modal use to some external circumstance, as in (1b).

(1a) He doesn’t dare to touch Mary (he hasn’t the courage, since she is so beautiful and he is too shy)

(1b) He doesn’t dare touch Mary (for fear of catching AIDS)“.

may **1** (usually formal) <#sb_x# is not expected by sb_{sp/y} strong to not make phenomenon_x> *You m. go/smoke. She m. stay one more week.* **2** <#sth# is expected by sb_{sp} to tend | to be - exist / to make phenomenon> *It may rain/have rained.* The proposition after *may* is non-factive and it almost copies the meaning of *possible*, with which it redundantly collocates (*It is possible that it may rain.*)⁵⁹, or is replaceable (*It may have been raining (yesterday).* = *It is possible that it was raining.* *It may be raining (tomorrow).* = *It is possible that it will be raining* (Lyons 1977: 812 - 813). Almost all elements, including ‘strong’, in the definition of *possible* are the same as in *may*: <#(sth that makes) phenomenon_x# that tends towards existence (and unintentionally makes sb_{sp/indef} experience {strongly} strong degree of true thought concerning expected phenomenon_x)>.

*May*₁ is for permission, whereas *may*₂ represents epistemic modality, differing from *can*₂ in the obligatory presence of sb_{sp}. *Can*₂ is under the influence of *can*₁ and keeps traces of ability – see 1.1.3b. “Leech (1971)

attempted to find the distinction between them [a. *Coffee breaks can be a real headache if not regulated.* b. *Coffee breaks may be a real headache if not regulated*] in that the E[pistemic] P[ossibility] of CAN is “theoretical” while that of MAY is “factual”, by which he meant that the former EP had to do with “a general idea in mind” but the latter with “a real contingency” (Yuji Suzuki 1986: 21). Couched in our terms, “theoretical” corresponds to absence of sb_{sp} , while “factual” reflects its presence. This difference may well be the reason why *not* is attracted to the modal in *can*₂ and to the main verb in *may*₂. To take an example, in *You can't be serious*, *can* is negated, while in *They may not come if it's wet*, *not* negates *come* (examples from Leech 1987: 92).

must **1** <# sb_x # is strongly strongly wanted - wished by $sb_{sp/y/x}$ to | make / experience / be affected by | phenomenon_x> *You m. open the door. She m. take the medicine if she wants to restore health. They m. succeed. I must visit the British Museum. You simply m. see the show.* **2** <# sth_x # is strongly strongly expected by sb_{sp} to be - exist> *It m. be raining. You must be John's son. *It m. not be raining. *You mustn't be John's son.*

In *must*₁ ‘ sb_{sp} ’ stands for the meaning of the directive ‘I hereby impose upon you the obligation to open the door’, while sb_y is part of the statement ‘I hereby assert that you are obliged (by some unspecified authority) to open the door’ (Lyons 1977: 832). When sb_x from the directive is repeated in the analysis, that phenomenon corresponds to Geoffrey Leech’s statement (1989: 273) that “*I must(n't)* and *we mustn(n't)* describe the speaker’s own feeling about what is important [while] *have to* [...] often describes what other people e.g. the boss or the government require” (cf. §3.4.6 h). *Must*₁ comprises imperative, desiderative and persuasive

meanings, i.e. deontic modality, and the analysis does not exhaust all meanings of *must*. *Must*₂ is epistemic.

ought **1** <#sb_x# is expected by sb_{sp}_y to tend to | make phenomenon> *You o. to read this. O. I go?* (respectfully investing sb_h with authority and power in a question, which agrees with the bare infinitive) **2** <#sth_x# is expected by sb_{sp} to tend | to be / to make phenomenon_y> *The plane o. to be taking off in five minutes. The bell o. to ring when you close the circuit.*

Dixon (2005: 175) wonders why “the *to* may optionally be dropped after *ought* in questions, e.g. *Ought I (to) go?*”. Our explanation is that in this case the hearer takes place of the speaker in the definition of *ought*.

should **1** <#sb_x# is strongly expected by sb_{sp/y} to make - experience phenomenon> *You s. think twice.* **2** <#phenomenon# is strongly expected by sb_{sp} to be - exist> *The road should be passable now.* **3** <sb_{sp/x} | experiences thought concerning / knows | phenomenon strongly (not) expected by sb_{sp/x}> *How extraordinary that she s. beat them all. He was shocked that anybody s. believe it. It is only normal that we s. expect fair treatment. It is not easy to understand why these demonstrations s. have so misled the American public. This is in case you s. be absent. That many men s. enjoy gambling does not make it better.* ‘The fact that the phenomenon of enjoying gambling by many men makes sb_{sp} experience thought concerning this phenomenon as strongly expected, does not make gambling better.’ The ‘thought’ in the definition indicates that the conjunction *that* is a frequent accompaniment of *should*. This is the “putative” *should* in Quirk et al. (1972: 514). There is only a slight difference between subordinate clauses with *should* and the matching clauses without it. Those with *should* give emphasis to ‘(not) expected’ as in *It’s strange that he*

should be invited by Kate vs. It's strange that he is invited by Kate.

Deontic expectation is expressed by *should*₁, while *should*₂ conveys epistemic expectation.

Have to is dealt with in §3.4.6. h.

Many sentences without (wider) context, and sometimes even with one, are ambiguous, as, for instance, *Philosophy can offer the sort of distinction that can accelerate growth in human understanding* (Yuji Suzuki 1986: 4).

As a seme appearing in semantic definitions, 'can' is used in the meaning of possibility (*can*₂), 'may' is used for permission (*may*₁), while the seme that stands for ability is 'be with power'. *Must* differs from *should* in having 'strongly wanted' in the definition for the former and 'strongly expected' in the latter.

A common feature of most modals is the occurrence of the seme 'strong(ly)' together with those semes that otherwise require the infinitive with *to*: '(not) want', '(not)expect' or 'tend'. This comes under rule (2). Within the semes we chose only *can*₄ follows the principle (1). It is the seme 'strongly' coupled with other semes mentioned that is responsible for the bare infinitive after a modal. The idea of 'strong' brings semes in definitions close together so that no other unit intervenes. The verb *feel* can join the company of modal verbs in the expression *feel like (going for a walk, a cup of tea...)*, with the same 'strongly want'. Within the class of modal defectives, *ought* is motivated by a less strong demand and the following verb activity of the complement has the least potential to become realized, which favours the use of *to*-infinitive.

If *expect*₁ means 'think/believe that something will happen', as most dictionaries propose on the basis of such examples as *I e. that the season will be rainy. We are expecting a rise in salary. What do you e. of negotiations?, I e.(her) to be promoted next month*, how

can we fit its meaning 'expect' into the use of modals complemented by the perfect infinitive when referring to the past or how to understand a sentence such as *We expect (that) it was an accident (CIDE)? Ann may have arrived* cannot be paraphrased as *'It is believed by the speaker that Ann will arrived'. What is missing is a well-grounded tie between the future and the past. This link is provided by the paraphrase 'It is believed by the speaker that it is likely to be proved correct that he arrived'. Such wording is backed by the phrase *I expect* as glossed in *COBUILD* s.v. *expect*₇: "If you say '*I expect*', you mean that you think that what you are saying is likely to be proved correct". So the correct definition of *expect*₁ reads: <#sb# experiences psychological state (*this* thought_x) concerning (#)phenomenon_x(#) as thought_x that tends to come to be true (because phenomenon_x is made by sth)>.

3.2.8 *Passive*

The passive voice is used when an AGENT is backgrounded and the object of the active sentence has to be 'affected', i.e. in the role of PATIENT, a changed entity (see §2.2.2). This role makes the object conspicuous enough to become the subject of the corresponding passive sentence. *Escape* (with 'NOT EXPERIENCED' in the object) and, usually, *enter* (with GOAL instead of PATIENT) cannot be passivized because the object entity is not viewed as affected by its action, as in **Poverty/death/fine/being injured was escaped* or **The room is being entered. They left*₂ (abandoned) *him alone*. → *He was left alone*, but *He left*₁ (went away from) *the town*. → **The town was left*. The verb *owe* is defined as <#sb_x# is wanted to make (#)sb_y(#) come to | be with / experience #sth_x {money_x}# because sb_y made sb_x | be with / experience

| sth_y good {money_x}>. *John owes two dollars.* → **Two dollars are owed by John. He owes his brother \$100 for petrol. He owes \$100 to₂ his brother. I owe you a car.* → **A car is owed you by me.* "The passive is not used in this meaning except with a person as the subject. *You are owed an apology. *An apology is owed to us.*" (OALD s.v. *owe*). It is the obliging person who is affected, not the apology/explanation, but if the second object slot refers to a huge amount, even this is possible, as in *Millions of dollars are currently owed by third-world governments* (Taylor 1989: 188). The verb *compose* <#sth_x more than one# are parts that make #sth_y#> allows the passive. *Oxygen and hydrogen compose water.* → *Water is composed of oxygen and hydrogen.* Water ('sth') is strongly affected by its components as they are its vital parts.

The verbs of perception *notice* and *watch* and the verbs of wanting 'experience emotion because of' (*desire, hate, need, prefer, want, will, wish*) and other verbs of experiencing have no passive when followed by non-finite clauses because neither the person in the object nor the phenomenon in the semantic object are viewed as affected. Thus, *We have₂₅ them cheering* → **They were had cheering (by us), She watched him dancing* → **He was watched dancing (by her).*

But if a passive sentence with a non-finite clause (§3.2.3a I) has an indefinite COGITATOR which vaguely implies a lot of people, this idea conjures 'strong' and the passive is grammatical. *They consider him to be brave* → *He was considered to be brave. It was believed that the house was haunted* (cf. Dixon 2005: 363). *Jane prefers her* (i.e. Jane's) *coffee black* → **Jane's coffee is preferred black.* The seme 'know' does not enable passivization when the knowledge of something is not felt to influence that something to be different. The verb *know*₁ and ₃ can be used in the passive only when the COGITATOR is indefinite: *People know the pilots to be experienced.* →

*The pilots were known to be experienced. People know that the pilots were experienced. → It is known that the pilots were experienced. *The pilots were known. *He is known to be a liar by me/them. People know him well. → He is well-known. But: A lot of people in Europe know₂ German. → *German is known by a lot of people in Europe.* The same 'mental state' conveyed by the non-finite clause *the pilots to be experienced* is affected by, and depends on, the COGITATOR *people*, while 'the German language' exists independently of 'a lot of people in Europe' so that the idea of many has no effect here. Non-privative verbs may be used in the passive freely even though they may contain 'thought' provided it is combined with the causative 'make' (*The theory was proved/shown to be wrong by his pupil*). We define *know* as: **1** <#living thing {sb_x}# experiences (this) true thought concerning #sth_x# (when sth_y is source to make sb_x know sth_x)> e.g. *k. address/answer /cause/one's child/name/rule; known to have existed, known to be competent; k. about₁ /fromg/ofg/that/what/where/why* **2** <#sb# can use language> *He does not k. Japanese.* **3** <#sb {not mentioned}# experiences thought concerning sb | being in social role of sb / because of sth {habitualness}> *She is best known as actress/for her acting.* **4** <#sb_x# has experienced psychosomatic phenomenon_x concerning #phenomenon_y# during sb_x's life> *have known poverty /warmth/it (to) snow in July (OALD)*. In the definition of *know₁* the simple seme 'know', necessary to activate *wh*-words and *of_g*, is homonymic with the lexeme *know*.

Although intransitive as mere verbs, prepositional verbs such as *listen to, run into, look after, hope for₇* as a whole behave transitively and allow of the passive: *The children were lovingly looked after. He was listened to attentively. Good weather is being hoped for, Hope is* <#sb# experiences event - state of thought strongly wanting good phenomenon to exist>. Dixon finds a similar

explanation. He says that generative grammarians “have pointed out that *hope* takes a THAT object complement clause [...] but this does not have a passive [...] although it does have a passive when the complement is extraposed”, and suggests that “the underlying form is *hope for* [...] and that this transitive verb [*hope*] does have a normal passive” (Dixon: 2005: 18). Two other verbs, *contend* and *agree* are also intransitive, but may be used in the pattern *IT IS V-ED THAT* availing themselves of the fact that ‘*this* thought’, which is part of the verbs’ meaning, is a semi-object (see *that*-clauses in §3.2.10) ready to become subject when supported by the indefinite *it*₅ ‘people in general’ (see §3.1.4a V) in line with the use of the passive voice for indefinite AGENTS.

The verb *say*, which collocates with *about*₁, *on*₆, *to*₃, *to*₁-infinitive, defined as <#(sth_x done by use of symbols made by) sb_x# expresses mental phenomenon (#event done by use of language again#) by using symbols {language} to make sb_y come to experience *this* thought and know sth_y concerning sth_z (# indefinite#) (that sb_x knows well / wanting phenomenon)>, is transitive only when an indefinite pronoun (*it*, *something*, *nothing*) or ‘event habitually made by use of language’ (*prayer*, *line* (of a poem), *name*, *word*) is used as object, e.g. *Say something about your childhood*. (Words that are used as quotations do not count as objects; e.g. *say goodbye/yes*.) This verb allows the passive with animate indefinite AGENTS (*It is said that...; She was said to...; see §3.2.3b*), but not with inanimate ones (*book/clock/glance /law/notice + say*) because the indefinite pronoun *it*, referring to people in general, quite regularly shifts from the object to the agent.

It is the equative ‘be’ immediately following a subject directive that is most responsible for opposing passivization because its non-dynamic meaning conditions the meaning ‘unaffected by the subject’. (Cf. the definitions of *escape* in §3.1.2, and the verb *suit* (as in

That dress suits you) <#man-made thing to be put on body# is good, thinking of what is seen of #sb#>, linking verbs §3.4.1a, and modal verbs §3.2.7c).

Grammatical and indirect objects can be promoted to the subject of a passive sentence, which, together with the argumentation concerning the conditions to be met for the subject of a passive sentence to occur, shows that grammatical objects do have certain independence and can exert power as if they were semantic objects. As Elnitsky and Mel'čuk (1984: 280) notice, there is a "linguistic phenomenon: discrepancy and sometimes even a conflict between semantics and deep syntax, on the one hand, and surface syntax, on the other. In every language there is, as a general rule, an established bi-unique correspondence between a semantic target and its surface-syntactic exponent. [...] But in many special contexts these correspondences are disrupted in various ways". The possibility of separating the subject of a non-finite clause from its predicate even when the subject cannot be construed as a semantic object (see §2.5.1a iii) vindicates both the government-binding theory, which holds that in *John considers Mary intelligent*, *Mary intelligent* is one constituent, and the predication theory, according to which *Mary intelligent* makes two constituents (cf. Crystal 1991: 273). The dividing line between a grammatical and a semantic object is thin.

3.2.9 Subjunctive

The subjunctive is a grammatical category of a verbal mood meaning <sb_{sp/x} experiences thought concerning phenomenon (not) expected - wanted by sb_{sp/x} in (relative) present - future> e.g. *She insisted that we leave immediately. I propose that Mr Jones be elected secretary. Everybody stand up!* 'Everybody is wanted to do event of standing up.' *It is advisable that you be present. The lord save us! It is vital that he stop smoking.*

*If there were a misunderstanding between them, I would know of it (dated). People dared not venture into the street lest they be shot (= because they did not want to be shot). Since the meaning of the subjunctive is almost entirely contained within that of *should*, most occurrences of the subjunctive can be paraphrased using *should* (see §3.2.7 c); e.g. *She insisted that we should leave immediately.**

3.2.10 That-clause

The clauses dominated by *that* provide the content of the conjunction *that* (see §3.1.3)⁶⁰ <[sb] experience this thought:>; e.g. *he can do it* in *I know/believe/doubt that he can do it* 'I experience this thought: he can do it'. The subject of the matrix clause introducing a *that*-clause acts as EXPERIENCER (specifically, internal causer or unintentional COGITATOR; see §2.2.16a) of a mental phenomenon and the thought expressed by a *that*-clause is viewed as experienced in a mental phenomenon.

The sentence *I believe that Mary is honest* can be roughly paraphrased as 'I experience this strong thought: Mary is honest', while *I believe Mary to be honest* amounts to 'I experience strong thought concerning the state of Mary being honest, which I want to be true'. Dixon (2005: 140) says that "the verb *believe* means 'think of something as true when in fact it may not be, but the Cogitator will not accept that it may not be'". The definition in § 2.4.7d shows that *believe* can be followed either by a *that*-clause or by a non-finite clause. There are other approaches to explaining the difference between *that*-clauses and *to*-infinitives. Cognitive linguists explain it in terms of profiling: *that*-clauses foreground an entire process (Langacker 1995 in Noël 2003), whereas infinitival complements focus on one participant in the process. This comes naturally as *to*-infinitives introduce a semi-object (*Mary* in our example). Noël himself

concludes that “*that*-clauses tend to express information more central to a writer’s goal and as such they can operate more freely than infinitival complements, which tend to occur as part of subordinate clauses and express information less relevant from the writer’s point of view” (González-Díaz 2004: 363-364).

Another verb, *suggest* is defined in the following way: **1** <#sb_x# uses language to make expression of (*this*) new thought in order to influence sb_y using (#)sth_x(#) to make (#)event(#) that is good for sb_y, when sb_y wants sth_y, so that sb_y knows what to do> *I suggested (going in) my car to my friends. I suggested (that) we go in my car. Can anyone suggest what we should do? (That-clauses include noun clauses with the conjunction what.) s. politely /respectfully /seriously /strongly /tactfully /tentatively ...*He suggested to go.* **2** <#sb_x# uses language to make sb_y come to experience (*this*) thought concerning (#)sth(#) indirectly>: *Are you suggesting she did it on purpose? I would never s. such a thing.*

That-clauses can be used as subjects of passive sentences, which might support the opinion that they are objects of active sentences. But even intransitive verbs such as *reply* can be followed by *that*-clauses if their definitions contain ‘(*this*) thought’. (*Reply* is <#sb_x# uses language to make expression of (*this*) sb_x’s thought influenced by (sth done by use of language by) sb_y>; *r. to comment/question/statement/her; r. that...*) A verb can be followed both by object nouns and *that*-clauses as in *answer* and *guarantee*. (*Answer* is <#sb_x# uses language to make expression of (*this*) sb_x’s thought concerning (#)(man-made thing used to make) sth done by use of symbols {language}(#) by (#)sb_y(#)>; *a. charge /question /girl /letter /that...; a. door /phone (indirect). Guarantee* is <#sb_x# uses language to make expression of (*this*) strong thought concerning #sth_x {good}# that

(#)sb_y(#) wants to exist (in order to make sth_y bad not exist)>: *guarantee (you) satisfaction/security/that....*) So it is not necessary for a verb definition to contain an object directive to produce *that*. The seme 'thought' is the only prerequisite in the analysis of a definition, powerful enough to produce *that*. (Cf. *That he is a liar is known₁ to everybody.*) Therefore, it may be concluded that *that*-clauses can function as weak untypical variants of subjects and objects. We do not consider *that*-clauses to be ever used as real objects because they occur even with intransitive verbs that do not accept nouns as objects. But since certain intransitive verbs may passivize when collocating with *that* (see passive), this fact must be recognized and *that*-clauses should be deemed semi-objects.

3.3 ADJECTIVES

3.3.0 Since nouns are broadly distinguished from adjectives in that "the former connote the possession of a complexity of qualities, and the latter the possession of one single quality" (Jespersen 1924: 81), adjectives remain tied to nouns both semantically and syntactically. In semantic definitions adjectives are represented with an analysis and a single directive, the one that stands for the noun collocator's content. What differentiates adjectives from intransitive verbs, which have roughly the same definition frame, are the links 'which', 'that' and 'who', as relative clauses are used to attach an adjective analysis to its directive.⁶¹ Thus, *red* is defined as <#thing - substance# that is with {strong degree of} colour characteristic of blood>. This formula is valid not only for the predicative use, where the order of the noun in the directive preceding the analysis reflects the actual order in speech or writing, but also for the attributive position. Relative pronouns in English are links almost depleted of

meaning, signalling only the presence of the feature 'human' (*who*) and its lack (*which*), but they have important syntactic functions.

The content of an adjective directive is revealed by applying the collocational method, i.e. by searching for the common meaning of the collocating nouns, while the adjective analysis is established by looking for colligations (§ 2.1.b).

A significant break into semantic types of adjectives and adverbs on the basis of their behaviour, mainly derivation and position, has been made by Dixon (2005: 84 - 91), anticipated in Dixon 1982.

One large class are relative adjectives, such as *big*₁, *difficult*, *heavy*₁, *high*, *large*, *long*, *loud*, *old*₁, *thick* and their antonyms *easy*, *light*, *little*, *short*, *silent*, *small*, *thin*, *young*. Such adjectives are vague and context-dependent (Partee 2009: 14). In our definitions they contain 'degree' and the accompanying 'compared to reference point'.⁶² The same 'degree' always implies 'compared to reference point', so that the latter need not be mentioned in definitions (but see the comment on *good* in §3.6.3d) unless 'degree' is modified by 'strong'. In that case it is the same 'strong' that at least vaguely determines the point on the scale.

Some of adjectives that denote size or weight can be defined anthropocentrically, with 'hand' and 'sb's bodily effort' as reference points – *big*₁ (§4.1), *large*, *small* as '#thing_x# of such size that sb_x can(not) hold thing_x in sb_x's hand' (cf. Wierzbicka 1985: passim), and *heavy*₁ and *light* as '#thing# that sb_x can lift using sb_x's great - little bodily effort'. It would be patently wrong to define, say, a *needle* as a 'strongly thin thing_x that is small compared to average thing_y>' because 'thing' is so broad a concept that an average thing is inconceivable. Improvement is made by <hard strongly thin thing_x that sb_x can hold in sb_x's hand, used to make strongly strongly

thin soft substance be used>. In generic sentences the reference point holds good “for the next semantic unit above it in a taxonomic hierarchy”, as in *Elephants are big* (Chafe 1971: 195), i.e. bigger than most animals. When used attributively, they cannot be interpreted in connection with their superordinates (A small tyrannosaurus is not a small animal; Cruse 2004: 302), but only in terms of the class mentioned, as in *John is a tall boy* (in comparison to most boys) or *John is a tall basketball player* (compared to most basketball players).

When classified in terms of antonymy, relative adjectives have been called “polar” (Cruse 1986: 207 - 208). They accept the pattern X IS X BUT X IS MORE Y THAN Y and X IS Y BUT X IS MORE X THAN Y, where ‘x’ and ‘y’ are antonyms; e.g. *This beach is long, but it is shorter than the other one* and *This beach is short, but it is longer than the other one*.

The corresponding unmarked members contain ‘some amount’ or ‘some degree’ in their definitions, e.g. *big*₂ <#thing# that takes some amount of space in comparison with reference point>, *old*₂ <#living thing# that has lived for some amount of time>. Examples are: *She wasn’t old enough for the responsibilities. A man is as old as he feels. a two-year-old sheep*.⁶³ In the “impartial” questions of the type HOW X IS X? only the positive member of the antonymic pair is acceptable (Cruse 1986: 208 -209), e.g. *How □big is the stone? *How □small is the stone?* In response, the speaker can use comparison with the usual average size as a reference point (*quite big*) or an explicit comparison (*bigger than my hand*), or indirect comparison using standard measures (*three inches long and two wide*).

Adjectives that can be used in the comparative form contain ‘degree’. However, ‘strongly strong degree’ means ‘in the greatest degree’ and therefore disallows the use of the comparative. Adjectives containing ‘use language’ + ‘true’ are rarely compared, but when are, they require the analytic means even if monosyllabic: *fair* ‘honest’, *frank*,

*just, real, right, wrong; *fairer, ?franker, *juster, *realer, *righter, *wronger; *fairest etc.; more/most + fair /frank/just/real/right/wrong.*

Evaluative adjectives, such as *clean, clever, cruel, dangerous, dirty, dishonest, dull, honest, kind, plain, polite, pretty, rude* or *safe*, contain 'good' or 'bad'. Cruse (1986: 207 - 208) calls them "overlapping", having in mind their characteristic to normally accept X IS 'BAD' BUT X IS 'BETTER THAN' Y, unlike ? X IS 'GOOD' BUT X IS 'WORSE THAN' Y. In the pattern HOW X IS X?, the positive member produces an impartial question (*How □polite is he?*), while the negative member is committed (*How □rude is he?*).

Adjectives that contain 'psychological state' (*ashamed, cold, happy, hot, nasty, nice, pleasant, proud, sad, sour, sweet, unpleasant*) form "equipollent" antonyms, i.e. those that resist both ?X IS X BUT X IS MORE Y THAN Y and ? X IS y BUT X IS MORE X THAN Y, where x and y are antonyms (Cruse 1986: 207 - 208). Either member of equipollent antonyms fits into *How □x is it?*, but they are both committed.

Some adjectives describe inherent properties and cannot be followed by locative adverbs (**George is intelligent in New York*; first noticed by R.B. Lees).

Nonstative adjectives, such as *careful* and *cautious* (Lakoff 1970: 159) behave much like dynamic verbs; they allow the use of imperative and collocate with the progressive *be* (see the comment on *of* 3 in §3.1.2 I).

Other adjectival classes treated or mentioned in this book include classifying (§3.3.2a I), intensifying (§3.3.2a II), limiter (§3.3.2a III), strong (§3.3.5), amplifiers (§3.3.2a II), emphasizees (§3.3.2a II), subject-oriented (§ 3.2.6), subsecutive (3.3.1c II), adverbial (§3.3.2b II), predicative (§3.3.2b), postnominal (§3.3.2c), qualitative (§3.3.2a IV), attributive (§3.3.2a), and stance adjectives (§3.3.6).

3.3.1 *Connecting adjectives with nouns*

The method to find out the content of an adjective is to look for noun + adjective collocations. However, in this way only adjective directives can be identified. To discover adjectival analyses, definitions of collocating adverbs and grammar words are helpful.

3.3.1a A noun that collocates with an adjective has to share its semantic scope with the directive. If they are not of the same extension, it is the narrower unit that guides the interpretation. For instance, the adjective *magic* is of wider scope than the nouns *carpet*, *lantern*, *mushroom*, *realism* or *wand*, and each of these collocations is construed as a special kind of the thing the noun denotes. With the narrower extension of an adjective, unless it is an epithet, the noun's meaning automatically narrows under the influence of the adjective. The adjective *pregnant* contains #female living thing that can move#, *neighbour* is <living thing_x that can move and lives close to living thing_y that can move>, so that *pregnant neighbour* joins 'female living thing' of *pregnant* (narrower) to 'living thing' of *neighbour* (broader extension), but with the effect that *neighbour* comes to be textually understood as 'female living thing' (discussed in §§2.4.7b II and 2.4.7c).

3.3.1b Connection between an adjective and its pertaining noun is decisive for the quantificational interpretation of the latter. If the semantic content of the adjective is fully represented in that of the noun, the content of the noun is not changed and thus its whole potential referential range is applicable. For instance, *green* with *cucumber* does not narrow down the denotative scope of the noun, as 'green' is already an invariant attribute of the noun content of 'cucumber'. This is known as "epithet", a kind of pleonasm, the

superfluous repetition of a seme (see §1.1.3c II). On the other hand, *fresh* with *cucumber* does narrow the range of all cucumbers, as not all instances of cucumber need be fresh.

Active zones as defined by Langacker (in Cruse 2004: 75), i.e. the precise loci of interaction between two meanings in combination, such as *red* with *hat* (the whole hat is red), with *book* (outside covers are red) and with *apple* (a significant portion of the outer skin is red), depend on the knowledge of the reality.

Some other relations between nouns and adjectives are treated in §3.5.2. If a noun is monoreferential, as is usually the case with proper nouns, an accompanying adjective can be interpreted either as a stylistic, pleonastic epithet (*beautiful Aphrodite*, *emerald Ireland*) or can lead to “partitive” interpretation (Hlebec 2006) – see §3.5.2a.

3.3.1c *Indirect connection*

“Indirect connection” (Hlebec 2003) between an adjective and a noun⁶⁴ involves the expansion of a directive. For instance, the adjective *cheerful* can be defined as <#sb# who experiences strongly good mental state that is made expression of>, where ‘sb’ is the directive and stands for the collocating noun that denotes a person described as cheerful. If we want the definition to accommodate collocations such as *cheerful flat*, we have to add ‘flat making thoughts of’ (for the usual ‘flat inspiring thoughts’) before ‘sb’, to get the general meaning ‘(thing with space unintentionally making thoughts of) sb who experiences...’ because it is not a flat that experiences a good mental state but a person. So, in fact, ‘flat’ is connected to ‘experience good mental state’ through ‘sb’. The principal part of the directive to which an expansion is added, shall be called the “head”.

Indirect connection is based on metonymy, which is obvious when the brackets within the expanded directive are neglected.

If an adjective is attached to its noun without any such extension, this connection will be labelled "direct" or "absolute" - cf. Taylor 1992: 5 ff.

We have noticed the following three types of indirect connection: via entity, non-inherent and partonomic.

3.3.1c I Indirect connection via entity

Indirect connection mediated through entity is characterized by 'phenomenon made - experienced by' in the expansion, followed by 'thing' (most frequently by 'sb') as the head. Examples follow:

cautious approach '(state = *approach* experienced by) sb_x who {strongly} experiences good mental phenomenon_x concerning intentional event made by sb_x so that sb_x may not experience bad phenomenon_y in future = *cautious*'; *conservative idea* '(mental state_x = *idea* experienced by) sb_x who experiences mental state_x concerning habitualness_x made by sb_{x/y} and does not like to change habitualness_x = *conservative*'; *corrupt practice* '(habitualness_x = *practice* made by) sb who makes morally - legally bad habitualness_x = *corrupt*'; *cowardly withdrawal* '(event_x = *withdrawal* made by) sb who makes event_x experiencing fear, which is bad = *cowardly*'; *furious shout* '(event = *shout* made by) sb_x who is furious' (for *furious* see §3.3.4); *gloomy story* '(sth_x made by use of language to make expression of mental phenomenon concerning sth_y = *story* making emotion_x experienced by) sb who experiences bad and sad emotion_x concerning sth_y

= *gloomy*'; *happy marriage* '(state_x = *marriage* made by) sb_x who is happy' (for *happy* see §3.3.7a); *hopeful message* '(mental phenomenon = *message* made by) sb who experiences good thought concerning phenomenon in future = *hopeful*'; *hopeful smile* '(phenomenon = *smile* made by) sb who experiences thought concerning phenomenon in future as good = *hopeful*'; *sincere answer* '(phenomenon made by use of language by sb_x to make expression of thought influenced by sth_x = *answer* made by sb_y) who is sincere' (The definition of *sincere* is in §2.4.7 d.); *thirsty work* '(event = *work* making psychosomatic state experienced by) living thing_x that experiences bad bodily state when thing_x is without water = *thirsty*'; *his young age/days* '(time phenomenon = *age/days* existing during existence of) living thing that can move (= *he*) who has lived during small degree of amount of time = *young*'; *young fashion* 'habitualness of using things to be put on body which is made by a lot of sb_x more than one = *fashion* when sb_x have so far lived during small degree of amount of time = *young*' (cf. Hlebec 2008a: 178). The predicative *young* in *The clothes she wears are much too y. for her* instantiates exploitation based on *She is too old for the clothes she wears* (cf. ??*young clothes*).

Some indirect connections are based on 'phenomenon made when sb uses' in the expansion, followed by 'thing' in the head, as in *woollen trade* '(habitualness = *trade* made in order to make sb_x come to be with power to use sth when sb_x makes sb_y use things) that are made of wool = *woollen*'.

Indirect connection is also realized when the expansion contains 'with' corresponding to the locative *with*₅ <sth_x {space} occupied by «sth_y»> or the partitive *with*₇ <having «thing_x - amount - form - state» as part of thing_y - unit>; e.g. an indirect locative connection in *double room* '(space = *room* with) beds which are two =

double'. The adjective *shaggy* in *s. dog/sheep/man* establishes an "obverse" indirect partitive connection with an inanimate noun: <#(living thing with) hair# that is strongly long and in bad state>, while in *s. hair/beard/fur/mane* the connection is a direct one.

In indirect connection via entity simple extensions sometimes repeat part of the analysis: 'experienced' in an extension is often copied as 'experience' in the analysis, 'made' as 'make' (3.3.1c I), 'thought' in *sure*₁, etc.

Bracketed semes that are added to head elements in directives are often repeated or radiate their influence in the pertaining analysis. Thus, for instance, *serious*₁ does not collocate with *storm* or *earthquake* because 'bad phenomenon' in #(sb who makes) bad phenomenon# has to be a 'bad phenomenon made by sb', and there is no such sememe of *serious* that contained #environmental phenomenon#, unlike *severe*₅.

3.3.1c II Non-inherent connection

There are also adjectives with a directive head that denotes a phenomenon or something abstract rather than a thing, while 'thing {sb}' belongs to the expansion in the pattern '#(thing {sb} {making} - experiencing) phenomenon {habitualness}# that...'. Such indirect connections are called "non-inherent" (Quirk and Greenbaum 1973: 123; cf. Vendler 1968: 111).

Because words that modify verbs are adverbs, adjectives in non-inherent connection have been sometimes interpreted as underlying adverbs. Hornby (1951) drew attention to adjectives that are used adverbially to indicate degree (e.g. *great*, *big*₃, *small*, *early*, *late*, *perfect*, *complete*), usually with nouns in -er formed from verbs, as in *an early riser*, *great admirer of Churchill*, *a heavy/modest drinker*, *the present/late chairman*. The phrase *perfect stranger* can be

semantically represented as '(sb_x = -er who unintentionally makes) sb_y's thought concerning sb_x as sb whose true identity sb_y does not know = *strange* + strongly strongly = *perfect*', where the directive head is 'thought'. The paraphrase is 'person (= sb_x) perfectly (adverb = strongly strongly) strange (= making sb experience thought concerning sb as not known)'.

Other examples are: *loud canon/pipe/wave* '(thing that makes) sound that is strong'; *an occasional cup of tea* '(cup used for making) drinking that is occasional'; *potential rivals* '(rivals who make) state of rivalry that is potential', *great dancer* '(sb who makes) habitualness of dancing strongly well', *hard worker* '(sb who makes) habitualness of working that is made with strong energy', *big eater* '(sb who makes) habitualness of eating a lot', *big publisher* '(sb who makes) habitualness of publishing that is made strongly', *excellent pianist* '(sb who makes) habitualness of playing the piano which is strongly good', *high achiever* '(sb who makes) habitualness of strongly good achieving', *early riser* '(sb who makes) habitualness of rising early', *former president* '(sb who made) habitualness of presiding during time phenomenon that exists not any more'.

According to one interpretation, *an old₃ friend* is '(sb_x whom sb_y knows and likes, who is not relative and who makes) good relationship with sb_y which has lasted during strong amount of time' (non-inherent connection), with the corresponding direct connection *old friendship*. On the second interpretation, *an old₁ friend* is '(sb_x whom sb_y knows and likes, who is not relative who make) good relationship with sb_y who has lived during strong amount of time' (direct connection, which also occurs in *The friend is old*). (The definition of *friend* is: <sb_x whom sb_y knows and likes, who is not relative, in good relationship with sb_y>.)

For a non-inherent connection the head extension may be the only choice. Thus, in the definition of the adjective *avid* <#sb making habitualness_x# who strongly likes to make habitualness_x>, ‘#sb making habitualness_x#’ is without the ‘#(sb making) habitualness_x#’ alternative, as there is no such collocation as **avid reading*.

The non-inherent connection often occurs with the extension ‘habitualness’ in the union of evaluative adjectives (*good, strong, weak*) and nouns containing the element ‘make habitualness’ (e.g. *king, mother, milkman*), which regularly occur accompanied by ‘social role’ (see §§1.1.3g and 2.2.15), as in *weak king* ‘king who is in social role of making habitualness of ruling in bad and weak manner’, *good milkman* ‘sb_x who is in social role of making habitualness of making a lot of sb_y more than one come to be with milk in good way’ (cf. Vendler 1972: 93). See also §3.3.2a II. There are adjectives that require the presence of “function” nouns (see §1.1.3g), such as the “subsecutive” adjective (in Partee 2009: 13) *skilful*, which we define as <#sb# who is with strong power to make habitualness>. If the ‘habitualness’ is not specified, as in *She is skilful*, the sentence would be too vague out of context. The information is needed about the aspect in which someone is skilful, as in *skilful surgeon* ‘sb_x who is in social role of making habitualness of cutting bodies of sb_y more than one in order to do sb_y good, with strong ability>.

The following sentences are virtually synonymous: *He is a good skier* (*good skier* ‘(sb who makes) habitualness of skiing well’). *He is good at skiing* (*good at skiing* ‘#sb# who is with power to make habitualness of skiing well’), *He skis well* (*ski well* ‘He makes habitualness of skiing well’).

3.3.1c III Partonomic connection

Partonomic connection within a directive (see §3.5.1) is also a kind of indirect connection. It will be marked with angles. For example, the definition of *plump* is <# \ulcorner body (part) of \lrcorner living thing that can move {sb_x}# that has a lot of flesh, which is good>. In *p. arm/bottom/cheek/face/leg*, as well as in *p. body/figure* the partonomic connections 'body part of living thing that can move' and 'body of living thing that can move' are activated, whereas in *p. chicken/woman* the connection is a direct one, by means of 'living thing that can move'. The noun *bag* is < \ulcorner part of substance - things_x in \lrcorner man-made thing_y with space without good-looking shape, used to carry things_x {which are bought - caught}>. In *He ate a whole bag of sweets* or *Take these two bags of coal* the noun *bag* is used in its expanded meaning 'part of substance - things in man-made thing...'. A special case of partonomic connection, called "obverse" is treated in §3.5.1.

3.3.1d Indirect connections of adjectives with nouns often lead to restriction of the adjective to the exclusively attributive position. However, if the phenomenon in the expansion of an entity is repeated in the analysis (as 'experience' in *cautious approach*, *conservative idea*, *gloomy story*, 'make' in *corrupt practice*, *sincere answer*, in §3.3.1c I), the predicative position is allowed. There is one more exception: The restriction to the attributive position does not hold if the analysis contains 'strong'. Thus, the noun phrases *loud canon/pipe/wave* '(thing that makes) sound that is strong' may have their counterparts in *The canon/pipe/wave is loud* owing to the seme 'strong'. Other examples follow.

cheerful news '(sth making mental phenomenon of) sb who experiences strongly good mental phenomenon,

which is made expression of' *The news isn't very cheerful. Outlook/Room/Shopping/Soul/Yellow is cheerful.*

fast road/lane `(surface = lane, court, road used by) thing that is used with strong degree of speed>: *The grass courts at Wimbledon are much faster (COBUILD).*

ingenious solution ~ `(thought = solution of) sb who is strongly good in mind': *The solution is ingenious.*

joyful occasion `(phenomenon = occasion existing with) sb who during short time experiences strongly good emotion = joyful' *Day/Easter/Exit/Giving/Learning/Life/Separation/Skill/Style is joyful.* (The definition of *occasion* is <good phenomenon (during time phenomenon as if existing on line) with sb_x who wants to make sb_{x/y} | experience / be affected by / use | sth good>.)

slow lane/road/field `(surface used by) thing that is not with strong degree of speed, which is sth physical': *Long grass makes the field slower.*

superior smile `(bodily event made by) sb_x who makes expression of sb_x's view concerning sb_x as better and stronger in some respect compared to sb_y (more than one)': *His smile was superior.*

surlly look `(bodily - mental event made by) sb_x who experiences strongly bad emotion and is cold towards sb_y': *Her look was surlly.*

On the other hand, if the extension of a directive is doubled, the connection has to be attributive (in our notation it is marked by two pairs of brackets), even though 'strong' may be present in the analysis. The doubly indirect connection can be illustrated by the collocations *fast food*, *weak moment* and *happy ending*:

fast food '((substance for stomach = *food*) eaten by sb who does) event of eating which is strong in speed': **The food was fast*; *weak moment* '((time = *moment* of) event made by) sb who is not emotionally strong': **The moment is weak*; *happy ending* '((phenomenon_x = *ending* that makes) mental phenomenon_y experienced by) sb who experiences strongly good phenomenon_y concerning phenomenon_x = *happy*' (see §3. 3. 6): **The ending was happy*.

One and the same lexeme may have indirect and indirect connection sememes. For example, *thorough* meaning 'complete' (and typically 'bad') with the directive 'event' has an extension 'sb who makes', which leads to the attributive *a thorough nuisance*, whereas the meaning 'complete and strongly good' and the extension 'sb who makes' allow both the attributive and the predicative kind of connection, as in *a thorough study ~ this study is thorough*.

It would be inconsistent to mix direct and indirect connections. **She is a blonde and new friend* ('blonde' is connected directly and 'new' indirectly [Taylor 1992: 5]).

3.3.1e In the following instances, although the same principle of indirect connection is at work, there is no possibility for substitution on the paradigmatic axis for one or either member of the joint words that enter into the units. Here, the extension to the directive is added to 'space', as in *long/short hole* '(golf hole that is at) space which is far/near from tree to green' or *long call* '(telephone call which is made using) space that is large'; added to 'sound', as in *long mark* '(symbol used in writing which represents) a sound that lasts long time'; or added to 'time' in *long timer* '(prisoner who serves a sentence) during long-time time' or *long ship* '(ship in which) time between drinks lasts long'. These phrases are actually compounds with doubly indirect connections. The extensions in them are specific, culture bound and

require familiarity with the outside world for their interpretation.

3.3.2 Attributive and predicative uses of adjectives

Certain collocations permit only an attributive or only a predicative position of adjectives.

3.3.2a Attributive adjectives

3.3.2a I Classifying adjectives

Denominal and other adjectives that convey the meaning 'that has to do with', i.e. those that establish connection with a nominal notion, tend to be used only attributively. They are usually called "classifying" (or "relational") adjectives, because they denote a kind of something, such as *atomic*, *bridal*, *cardiac*, *countless*, *eastern*, *eventual*, *existing*, *federal*, *introductory*, *maximum*, *neighbouring*, *occasional*, *phonetic*, *remedial*, *smokeless*, *woollen*. Actually, 'that has to do with *n*' is a subcategory of 'kind of'. Semantically, they are much like attributive nouns in the first element of N + N compounds. The pertainym noun that surfaces as the base of the classifying adjective carries its content over to the derived adjective. For instance, the adjective *atomic* is defined as: <#((sth | that uses / is used by) event - thing made by means of / symbol used to make expression of | state# that has to do with atoms>. This complex definition contains five sememes: (i) <#state# that has to do with atoms> (direct connection, as in *a. structure*) + (ii) <#event made by means of state# that has to do with atoms> (indirect connection, e.g. *a. barrage /battle/blackmail/burst/effect/energy /fireball /fires /retaliation/warfare*) + (iii) <#thing made by means of state# that has to do with atoms> (indirect connection, e.g. *a.*

bomb/shell) + (iv) <#symbol used to make expression of state# that has to do with atoms> (indirect connection, e.g. *a. number*) + (v) #sth_x that | uses / is used by | event made by means of state#> that has to do with atoms (doubly indirect connection, as in *a. aggressor/aircraft carrier/army/target/weapon*).

The adjective *backward* is defined as <#bodily movement# that is kind of event made by living thing_x that can move, made in space towards back part of thing_x's body>: *b. gesture/glance/jerk/somersault/step*. Another classifying adjective, *bridal* is defined as <#sth# that has to do with a bride - bridegroom>, e.g. *b. bouquet/gown/party/smile*, based on *bride* <sb_x female who is in strong relation with, and influenced by sb_y male when sb_x and sb_y come to live together legally> and *bridegroom*, defined alike with positions for sb_x and sb_y interchanged. The explanation may be similar to the one for the indirect connection⁶⁵, i.e. the quantity of information "zipped" within the underlying pertainym is too large to tolerate the remote predicative connection. For instance, the verb *bait* is: <#sb# makes bait connected to #thing_x - substance used for catching living things_y that can move#> instead of the complicated <#sb_x# makes substance_x - thing_x that sb makes exist in space near living thing_y that can move in order to make thing_y want substance_x - thing_x to take into body of thing_y and that would after taking substance_x - thing_x make thing_y | make / be affected by | phenomenon as sb_x wants, be connected to #thing_z - substance_y used for catching living things_x that can move#>. The noun *bait* is defined in detail as: <substance_x - thing_x that sb makes exist in space near living thing_y that can move in order to make thing_y want substance_x - thing_x to take into body of thing_y and that would after taking substance_x - thing_x

make thing_y | make / be affected by | phenomenon as sb_x wants>. The underlined noun *bait* “compresses” its wordy definition within the verb *bait*’s definition to make the latter much shorter and more comprehensible.

Other non-predicative adjectives include two more types: non-inherent intensifying and limiter adjectives.

3.3.2a II Intensifying adjectives

When the comparative and superlative are normally ruled out, the adjective is not gradable. Such adjectives resist collocations with adverbs of degree like *more*, *very*, *slightly* or *extremely* (cf. Greenbaum 1970: 30, where intensifying adverbs are classified according to the acceptability of *very* as a modifier). “A number of adjectives are uncomparable, and therefore cannot properly be, though they often are, qualified by ‘rather’ or ‘most’, or used in comparative or superlative form (-er, -est). Among the most common of these adjectives are complete, essential, excellent, fatal, full, obvious, unique” (Collins 1956: 32). Other intensifying adjectives are: *absolute*, *chief*, *first*, *main*, *mere*, *only*, *particular*, *perfect*, *precise*, *prime*, *pure*, *real*, *shut*, *sole*, *total*, *utter* (*utter* <#bad state with sb_{more than one}# that is bad in strongly strong degree> *u. contempt /disregard /disdain /injustice/disgrace*), or *very* (Bolinger 1967: 39). The condition for an adjective to be ungradeable is the presence of the semes ‘strongly strong degree’ or ‘not existing’, because lack of existence is a strongly strong state (as in *dead* §1.1.3b and *free* §3.6.3d). Those among such adjectives that contain the seme ‘strongly strong degree’, like *certain* (‘sure’), as in *c. winner*, *outright*, as in *o. lie*, *pure* (‘sheer’) (*p. fabrication*), *real* (‘undoubted’ *r. hero*), *real* (*contribution*), *extreme* (*condemnation*), *definite* (*alternative*), *exact* (*reason*), *actual* (*housewife*), *utter* (*blackness*), *perfect* (*idiot*), *flagrant* (*injustice*),

mere, *sheer*, were called “amplifiers” in Quirk and Greenbaum (1973: 122-3). “We dislike *anybody rude*, we avoid *something menacing*, we don’t go *anywhere dangerous* [...]. Obviously adjectives which are only used attributively cannot take this position: **nobody mere* **anybody elder* **something sheer* are nonsense” (Broughton 1990: 223) – see §3.3.2a.

Amplifiers can be (a) inherent (when they can be used predicatively, as *a complete victory* ~ *the victory was complete*, *their extreme condemnation* ~ *their condemnation was extreme*, *his great folly* ~ *his folly was great*) or (b) non-inherent (when they are indirectly connected and attributive-only, as in *a complete fool*, *a close friend*, *utter folly*, *the very beginning/end*, *a great supporter*, *a great/*big friend*). Inherent adjectives have an unexpanded directive ‘phenomenon’, while non-inherent amplifiers establish an indirect connection with the directive head ‘phenomenon’ expanded by ‘(sb who makes - experiences)’. Hornby (1951: 101) mentioned adjectives such as *big*, *great*, *small*, *early*, *late*, *perfect*, which are used adverbially to indicate degree, “always with nouns in -er formed from verbs”. Thus, the equivalent phrases are: *really contribute/heroic*, *definitely alternate*, *exactly cause*, *actually his wife*, *utterly black*, *perfectly idiotic*, *condemn extremely*, etc. A common characteristic of non-inherent de-adverbial amplifiers (those adjectives that are semantically derived from adverbs although morphologically it is the other way round) is that in their definitions there is a speaker’s attitude (see stance adjectives in §3.3.7). Non-inherent amplifiers are used exclusively as attributive adjectives because a double ‘strong’ disallows the predicative position - see § 3.3.2b I.

Quirk and Greenbaum (1973: 122-3) also recognize *emphasizers*, another adjectival category with ‘strongly strong(ly)’. The collocation *bloody fool* can be semantically analysed as ‘#sb# who is strongly strongly foolish’, accompanied by emotional and expressive

overtones. Fedorowicz-Bacz (1977) shows that phrases with intensifying adjectives as in *a bloody fool, the blasted door, the blithering idiot, a low-down cheat, (He is) a fantastic sport* cannot be paraphrased by any kind of sentences. She and Bolinger (1967) tend to believe that another kind of transformations is at work here: lexical rather than syntactic. Emphasizers function as sentence adverbials. Amplifiers and emphasizees are called "intensifying" adjectives and they are most often attributive.

3.3.2a III Limiter adjectives

"Limiter adjectives" have a restricted reference in space or time and contain '#sth#' that exists in time phenomenon / space' in their definitions: *the fourth student, the far end of the room, the far south of Africa*. All these adjectives are resistant to grading and not normally used with modifiers such as *very* and *rather*. Limiter adjectives collocate with articles, especially the definite article, with which they share the seme 'only' (see §3.1.1 a), and the seme 'only' (as in *the only occasion*, with an emphasizee *only*) can be atomized into 'one in strongly strong degree', thus bringing limiter adjectives and emphasizees close together. Namely, to restrict the notion of a phenomenon or a thing to its referents in time or space is to determine the moment/period of that phenomenon or the position of the thing. Determiners have sometimes been called "limiting adjectives" in the traditional grammar, which highlights the similarity.

3.3.2a IV "Qualitative" adjectives always used attributively (*COBUILD Grammar*: 71) denote a kind of phenomenon and seem to contain 'strongly good - bad' (*adoring, belated, chequered, faithful, punishing, thankless*, etc.) – See also §3.1.1b II on the similar

meaning of the indefinite article (a_3). They are not very different from “classifying” adjectives.

3.3.2a V The attributive link within a noun phrase, which carries an existential ‘some’ association, entails a narrowed extension of the noun notion and a closer connection between the adjective and the noun. On the other hand, the sentence as a link of a noun and a predicative adjective with its ‘universal’ association, maintains a looser relation.⁶⁵ Apparently, the relatively great neuro-psychological distance between a noun and a predicatively attached adjective accounts for the use of indirect connections along a shorter, attributive path only. As if the nerve impulse sent from an adjective to its collocating noun was lost in the predicative use. In non-inherent connections the adjective clings to the ‘phenomenon’ in the collocating noun so tightly that their union is dissolved in the predicate. Any doubly indirect connection, with its adjectival and noun contents far apart, pins the adjective down to the short-cut, attributive position. This effect is nullified owing to the power exerted by the adjective’s seme ‘strong’ or owing to the sameness of the important semes in the head and its expansion. Both conditions reinforce the relevant connection.

Even if there are conditions that otherwise lead to the predicative position (see §§3.3.1d, 3.3.2b), an adjective with indirect connection without ‘strong’ becomes attributive, as in *speechless*, which refers to a short-time state. Thus, although *He was speechless* is much more natural than *a speechless man* (direct connection), only *speechless rage/horror/fury/wonder*, with indirect connection, is acceptable (unlike **rage/horror/fury/wonder is speechless*).

It seems that restrictions that affect other indirect connections in this respect do not apply to the partonomic connection (§3.3.1c III).

3.3.2b *Predicative adjectives*

There are three cases when adjectives occur only or predominantly in the predicative position: short-lasting phenomena, adverbial adjectives and adjectives obligatorily followed by prepositions.⁶⁶

3.3.2b I The semantic feature 'short-lasting time', which can be understood as a kind of 'weak' time, favours predicative use because a predicative connection is looser than the attributive one. Thus, *ill* <#living thing# that during short-lasting time has bad health>, *faint* <#living thing# that is weak during short-lasting time and has no power to stand> or *sick* <#living thing# that during short-lasting time feels bad in stomach> are used only in the predicative use. In *My car is second*, the adjective *second* refers to a short-lasting event of arriving at the goal after the winner. Other adjectives that require company of a preposition and preclude the attributive position include: *bound*, *compatible*, *content*, *desirous*, *devoid*, *filled*, *glad*, *inclined*, *indicative*, *liable*, *loath*, *ready*, *sorry*, *unlikely*, *willing* (+ *to*-infinitive) among others.

3.3.2b II Adjectives which are obligatorily followed by a preposition, such as *through* (as in *He is through with her*), or *involved* (*She is involved in politics*), are not used attributively (**through man*; **involved woman*). Other examples are: *accustomed*, *averse*, *prone*, *reconciled*, *resigned*, *resistant*, *similar*, *subject*, *unaccustomed* (+ *to*), *reminiscent* (+ *of*), *tinged* (+ *with*).

Adjectives historically originating from the preposition *on* + noun, which changed *on* to *a-* (as in *ablaze*, *apart*, *alone*, *alive*, *asleep*, *astir*, *aware*, *awake*, *awash*; so-called "adverbial adjectives") behave in the same way as prepositional phrase modifiers of nouns (*man in life* **in life man*), i.e. they are not gradable and

do not allow attributive use. They usually denote a temporary state, often a strongly strong degree of state, as in: *The beacon is alight. She was agape in wonder. The boat is adrift.*

A special case of predicate-only adjective is *lacking*, whose strong association with the verb *lack* determines its position. The verb is defined as <#sth_x# is unintentionally in state of not having #sth_y#> *He certainly lacks courage. The letter is lacking a seal.* It is not used in the imperative and passive (But in a test administered by Quirk (1968: Ch. 17) 32 subjects rejected *Food was lacked by the children*, 29 deemed it dubious and as many as 15 accepted it as well-formed! The reason for mitigating the criterion for acceptance may be the association of *lack food* with the verb *eat*, which can be passivized – See *have* §3.4.6i. *He is lacking (verb) courage* and *He is lacking (adjective) in courage* (with *in* carrying the omnipresent function of narrowing the meaning) are so alike that the adjective is always used after a verb, especially because the verb is usually imperfective. The adjective *lacking* is defined in §3.6.3d.

3.3.2c *Postnominal adjectives*

3.3.2c I Adjectives follow nouns that function as objects in the pattern S + V + O + ADJ/Past Part which means 'sth_x {sb} (S) makes phenomenon (V) affecting sth_y (O) when sth_y is in state in state (Adj/Past Part)': e.g. *find₁* <#sb# comes to know and experience (*this*) true thought concerning #phenomenon# when sb_x moves>). *We arrived to find the place abandoned. I found him asleep/gone/standing there. bring the vase damaged, hold the bottle empty, buy/sell cheap, leave₂ her boyfriend sorrowful, return the letter unopened, rescue*

her alive, swallow the lump whole, serve the dish hot, send the parcel unsealed.

3.3.2c II The examples *She towelled herself dry, burn it alive* 'while still alive', *rub the surface smooth, paint the room pink, set the apparatus operative, and preserve it intact* show that the common part of S + V + O + ADJ can also be '#sth_x {sb}# makes #sth_y# come to be in (not) [different] state'; e.g. *Shake it clean* 'Make it clean by shaking' (The seme 'different' is redundant as 'come to be' implies a change.) The verbs here are causative resultative.

In the meaning of the construction S + V + O + ADJ the causative element 'make' is activated in conjunction with an adjective owing to the fact that the adjective of state comes after a verb containing 'make phenomenon'. The same happens with *He slammed the door shut* and the following collocations: *strip bare, brush /lick /pick /scrape /scrub /sweep/wash /wipe + clean, shoot dead, pat/pump/rub/squeeze/suck + dry, strike dumb, hammer/lay /press/roll/smooth/squash + flat, jerk/pull /set/wrench + free, stuff full, spray green, bake/freeze + hard, pile high, cut₁ /force /jam /kick /lever/prize /prop /pry /push/rip/slide /swing /tear /throw /yank + open, scare rigid, crop short, lamp/rash /snap/wedge/zip + shut, colour red, oil soft, knock unconscious, place second, plane/rake/wear + smooth, screw/stretch + tight, spread wide, stain yellow* (Pavlović 2006). In this way an adjective immediately following a verb containing the element 'make' replicates the semantically close connection between the adjective and the verb.

3.3.3 Order of adjectives

If there are several prenominal adjectives belonging in separate categories, their order depends on the meaning and the degree of intrinsicness (see Wulff 2003). First

come the most subjective, evaluative adjectives (with 'good' or 'bad': *beautiful, nice, naughty, lovely, careful, awful*), followed by adjectives of size (with 'small', 'big': *tiny, short*) or condition ('state': *fresh, tattered*), then by adjectives of age ('time phenomenon': *new, old, modern*), of shape ('form': *flat, thick, thin, round, fat, square*), of colour ('colour': *dark blue, green, blond*), of pattern ('with parts of surface': *plain, striped*), adjectives made from participles, and, finally, denominal adjectives of origin (*American, Greek*) and material (*plastic, metal, wooden*) as the most objective. This order is exemplified by *There was a clean small new oval Chinese porcelain plate*. The adjectives *young, old* and *little* "are systematically preferred adjacent to human nouns, as in *the fat little girl, the sturdy young man, and the fragile old woman* [because] the adjective-noun pairs *little girl, young man, and old woman* are taken as semantic units" (Martin and Ferb 1973: 76).⁶⁷

If two adjectives cannot be coordinated (linked by *and*), it means that they belong in different categories, e.g. **tall and slow dancer* (direct connection + indirect connection), **long and false statement* (relative + evaluative), **thick and dolomitic formation* (relative + classifying). Adjectives belonging to similar categories can be coordinated, as in *That is a big (and) beautiful house* (relative + evaluative adjective, both related to appearance; Vendler 1968: 121, 127).

3.3.4 Connecting adjectives with prepositions

The collocational method avails itself of the fact that prepositions as well as other grammatical words and constructions, besides verbs and nouns, take part in defining adjectives. To take an example, the definitions of *concerned*₁ and *concerned*₂ derive from the following definitions of the collocating prepositions: *about*₁ <sb experiencing mental phenomenon concerning «sth»>, *at*₃

<during short time experiencing good - bad {and strong} concentrated emotion because of «sb - phenomenon»>, ?*for*₃ <sb experiencing - making {good bad} psychological phenomenon because of «sth»> (Benson et al. 1986. s.v. *concerned*, state that *for* is rarely used after *concerned* in the sense 'worried about'.), *for*₇ <making phenomenon_x / experiencing mental phenomenon_y | {strongly} wanting «phenomenon_z»>, *over*₃ <[sb] experiencing {bad} mental phenomenon because of «sth»>, *with*₄ <state concerning «sth»>. The definition of *to*₄-infinitive has been added: <sb_x experiences bad mental state_x !because! sb_x makes - experiences phenomenon>, as well as of *to*_{1a}-infinitive: <experiencing mental phenomenon !wanting! phenomenon>, and the conjunction *that* <[sb] experiencing *this* thought:>.

One and the same lexeme may combine on different occasions with more than one preposition not only when different sememes are in question, but also within a single sememe. For instance, *concerned*₂ agrees with *about*₁, *for*₇ and *with*₄, but since their meanings and definitions differ, *concerned*₂ also varies in meaning contextually.

concerned **1** (worried) <#sb_x# who during short time experiences bad concentrated emotion because | sb_x experiences phenomenon / of possible existence of future state that sb_{x/y} might experience> *He was c. about*₁/*?for*₃ *the boy's safety. Ann is c. at*₃ *the failure to find a solution. Jim was c. to*₄ *hear that; c. over pollution. Aren't you c. that he might tell someone?* **2** (interested in) <#(phenomenon made - experienced by) sb_x# who intentionally experiences thought concerning state of sth_x {sb_{x/y}}, wanting - experiencing sth_y in order to make sb_{x/y} be affected by sth_z good>. *She is genuinely c. about*₁ *you.* (roughly = 'She is thinking of you genuinely

wanting that you experience sth good'). *I am c. about₁ learning more. He was deeply c. for₇ the boy's happiness. She was c. that she should ensure profit. I am c. to_{1a} know about it. Tom was c. to_{1a} point out the error. They are c. for₇ enabling the event. c. for cause of Christ/public life/health /understanding relations/her reputation; Psychology is c. with₄ deep motives (indirect connection; 'Psychologists experience thought concerning deep motives, wanting to know about them, so that they may experience sth good.' Science is c. for₇ practice (indirect connection).*

The adjectives *angry*, *furious* and *mad* 'angry' may have a person or a phenomenon as the object of the emotion, but the use of prepositions varies. With *angry* and *furious* *at₃* can be used both for people and phenomena, *with₃* is used only for persons, while *about₁* introduces phenomena. *Mad₁* collocates with *about₁* for phenomena and with *at₃* and *with₃* for people. *Mad₂*, on the other hand, has people as the object of emotion and requires the company of *about₁*. This situation complicates the definitions of these adjectives but reflects the shades of meaning that the adjectives acquire when coupled to the prepositions.

angry <#(event made by) sb_x# who experiences bad | concentrated emotion during short time / mental state / *this* thought | because of sth / concerning phenomenon because of sb_{y/x} who does not make phenomenon as sb_x would like>. *She was a. at/ with him. They are a. that some workers will be fired. They are bitterly a. about the plans to close another hospital. Peter was a. to₄ learn of Mark's betrayal. They are a. about/at their lack of power. angry for being abandoned; an a. response (indirect)*

furious <#((speed of) event_x made by) sb_x# who (during short time) experiences bad and strongly strong | (concentrated) emotion - *this* thought | concerning phenomenon_x / because of sb_y who does not make phenomenon_x as sb_x would like / when sth is not as | sb_x likes (when sb_x comes to know sth_x) (and uses sb_x's energy to make sb_y experience bad phenomenon_y)> *My father was f. when he learned that I smoked. She was f. at her neighbour. He was f. at being dismissed. He is being f. about having been dismissed. Ann was f. about Tom's affair with Jackie. He was f. with himself for being cheated. I was f. not to be woken up. I was f. that they did not wake me up. I was f. with John for telling me to go to bed. She is being f. about having been dismissed. John must have been f. to have had a stroke. I was f. at him for not telling the truth. f. over suggestions; f. at being told to...; f. with himself; f. not to be accepted; f. with John for waking her; absolutely₁ f.; f. battle/efforts/debate/shout (indirect); f. speed (doubly indirect)*

mad **1** <#sb_x# who experiences strongly bad | emotion concerning phenomenon_x / concentrated emotion during short time because of sb_y / mental state because of sb_y who does not make phenomenon as sb_x would like> **2** <#sb_x# who experiences strongly good emotion of love concerning sb_y> *They are m. about each other.*

Thus, we have arrived at our definitions by means of the prepositional definitions, while in speech the particular adjectival alloeme emerges boosted by the corresponding preposition.

Adjectives that profusely collocate with prepositions are easy to define (almost) exclusively with the help of definitions of the latter. To take an example, the adjective *pleased* can be defined by combining the individual

definitions of the collocable prepositions *about*₁, *at*₄, *for*₃, *for*₄, *with*₃, the conjunction *that*, *to*₃-infinitive, and the predicative-only position, as in the following collocations: *pleased about business/at his success/for you/for passing the exam/with the result/to hear good news/that she has passed the exam*. To these we can add *feel*₁ *pleased* and *pleased expression/laugh/look /smile* (indirect connection).

To produce a semantic definition of the adjective *pleased*, the following definitions of function words have been used, omitting senses that obviously do not apply:

(1) *about*₁ <[sb] experiencing mental phenomenon concerning «sth»>

(2) *at*₃ <[sb] during short time experiencing good - bad {and strong} concentrated emotion because of «sth»>

(3) *for*₃ <[sb] experiencing - making {good - bad} psychological phenomenon because of «sth»>

(4) *for*₄ <[sb] experiencing emotion concerning «sth»>

(5) *with*₃ <[sb_x] experiencing good - bad {strong} mental state because of /concerning «sth», which is as sb_x likes>

(6) *that* (conjunction) <[sb] experiences *this* thought:>

(7) *to*₄-infinitive <[sb_x] experiences good - bad - true mental state_x !because! sb_x makes phenomenon / {is in state_y}>

Of course, in the case of *pleased*, only the sense 'good' will be activated and therefore the 'not' of *with* has been suspended.

(8) predicative-only position 'during short time' (§3.3.2b I)

(9) *feel*: Since *pleased* takes part in collocations with *feel*₁ (Do you *feel pleased*?), the definition of the verb *feel* (§2.3.1a) should also be taken into consideration in order to marshal a complete definition of *pleased*.

When combining these definitions, the definition of *pleased* emerges almost automatically. To exclude unwanted prepositional collocators, the semes 'psychological phenomenon' and 'mental phenomenon' have to be reduced to their hyponym 'emotion' of *at*₃ and *for*₄. In order to make this process more easy to survey, we have substituted ordinary numbers for the complete definitions (e.g. the seme 'during short time' occurs in definition (8) for the non-attributive use, and therefore in our definition of *pleased* it is marked as 8, while 2 appears next to 'sb', 'during short time', 'experience', 'good', and 'emotion because of', which all make up the definition (2) of *at*₃:

<#sb_x# who during short time (28) experiences (12345679) good (2357) emotion (12345679) (and *this* thought:) (6) | because (2357) sb_{x/y} makes phenomenon_y {is in state} (7) / concerning (145) sth {phenomenon_y}(123467) | which is as sb_x likes (5)>

In this way, the definition of *pleased* appears to be: <#(expression of mental state of) sb_x# who during short time experiences good emotion (and *this* thought:) | because sb_{x/y} makes phenomenon_y {is in state} / concerning sth_x {phenomenon_y}| which is as sb_x likes>. In a popular version: People are pleased when they are feeling good about something that happens the way they like. (Cf. *pleased* defined by Goddard (1998: 92): 'Something good happened; I wanted this; because of this, this person feels something good'.) 'Emotion'

includes 'concentrated emotion', so that the latter need not be separately stated.

3.3.5 A portrait of wild

In order to marshal the semantic definitions of the adjective *wild*'s sememes we shall follow the usual procedure for the collocational method. Having gleaned information on the collocators of *wild*, we group those that do not seem to change the meaning of the node *wild*. Thus *plant* and *mammal* go together because *wild plant* and *wild mammal* both 'live in natural conditions not taken care of by man'. *Mountain* does not belong here as a mountain is not a living thing. Finally, the semantic material for the analyses that has been tentative is refined and reduced to scientifically valid sememes and semes.

*wild*₁ <#(substance made by) non-human living thing# that is unaffected by sb_x>, as exemplified in the following examples. 'non-human living thing': *Plants grow w.*; *w. animal/barley/dog/flower/mammal/mushroom/rabbit/rose/species/strawberry*; 'substance made by non-human living thing': *w. honey*

*wild*₂ <#space in nature# that is unaffected by sb_x>, as in *The island is a w. and lonely place. w. coast/country-side/land/landscape/moorland/mountain/mountainous region/river*

*wild*₃ <#sth made by use of language# that is in strong degree not true> *w. accusation/allegation/claim/exaggeration/guess/promise/question/rumour/speculation/story/talk*

*wild*₄ <#(event - habitualness made by) sb_x# who behaves [unaffected by sb_y - sb_x's mind and is] affected by sb_x's {bad and} strongly strong degree of emotion as {bad} unusual state> `sb': *The boy is w. and completely out of control. The crowd went w. Those boys have been allowed to run w.; She's totally w. about him. I'm not w. about the idea. He was w. to sing. w. children/students* (Cf. *unruly* <#sth# that sb cannot control (easily)> *u. behaviour/child/crowd/disposition/hair*, which is broader in meaning, covering not only people.) Under *wild*₄ we subsume <#sb# who has no moral control> (marked as 'specific' usage in *SOED*), as in *He has turned out very w.;* 'event - habitualness made by sb_x': *w. abandon/action/argument/fluttering of heart/dancing/excess/orgy/ride/sex/venture* (cf. §3.3.2[b]).

*wild*₅ <#((sb_x's expression of) psychological phenomenon_x of /rbody / sth seen as | part of 1) living thing_x that can move {sb_x}# that behaves unaffected by sb_x's mind because thing_x {sb_x} experiences (and makes expression of) ((strongly) strong degree of) {bad} good psychological phenomenon_x when sth is as sb likes / does not like (which makes {bad} unusual state)> `sb': *He was w. with rage. It makes me w. to see such waste. The noise drove him w. with terror. The fans/audience went w. with excitement/joy;* `body part of sb': *Her silly heart went w.;* `sth seen as |' part of living thing_x that can move {sb_x}': *w. appearance/look;* `psychological phenomenon_x of sb': *Let your imagination run w. and be creative. Their schemes began to sound wilder and wilder; beyond my wildest dreams; w. delight/expectation/flight of sexual fantasy* (see §3.5.2)/*fury/happiness/hope/hysterics/idea/joy/longing/temper;* `sb_x's expression of psychological phenomenon_x': *Her eyes were w.;* *w. applause/cheer/crying/laughter/weeping.*

The collocations *go wild* and *run wild* are in parallel with *go adrift/aground* etc. (see §3.4.1b) and *run aground/amok/dry/high/late/low/scared/short* respectively. The common meaning of the adjectives that collocate with *go* 'become' is 'weak bad unusual state'. Thus, we define *dry* as <#sth# that is in {bad unusual} state without liquid substance>. The adjective collocates with *run* seem to have the same meaning, except for the greater emphasis conveyed by *run*₄ than by *go* due to reflected meaning⁶⁸ effect – see §3.4.1b. Therefore we have to introduce '{bad} unusual state' when creating definitions for *wild*₄ and ₅.

The dubious acceptability of *?He went wild with joy about the idea* leads to the conclusion that *wild*_g and _h should be considered as distinct but very close sememes. That *wild*₅ should house both bad and good emotions is proven by the zeugma test of *Half the stadium were wild with rage and the other half with joy* or *First she was wild with pain and then with euphoria*.

For practical purposes, for the sake of abridgement, and in order to highlight a close connection between the semes of different sememes, we conflated <psychological phenomenon of sb_x...> and <sb_x's expression of psychological phenomenon of sb_x...>, although they belong in different sememes (witness the zeugmatic sentences **Her fury and eyes were wild* or *!His wild fury and eyes surprised her* (*wild* cannot modify *eyes* here). To this case one can apply Apresjan's (2000: 15) observation on regular synonymy of *intelligent/stupid man – intelligent /stupid look/answer, sad/merry boy – sad/merry eyes/smiles, honest/sly person – honest/sly question*. 'sb_x's expression of psychological phenomenon of sb_x...' contains an expansion of 'psychological phenomenon of sb_x...', so they can be presented in one definition covering two meanings. For the same reason we have coupled together <#substance made by non-human living

thing# that is unaffected by sb_x> and <#non-human living thing# that is unaffected by sb_x> of *wild*₁.

*wild*₆ <#event# that is made unaffected by sb_x, which is not as sb_x likes> *w. fluctuation /variation*

*wild*₇ <#sb_x's hair# that is unaffected by sb_x/_y, which makes strongly strong degree of bad state> *His hair was w.; w. hairstyle*

*wild*₈ <#event# that sb_x experiences as exciting {and good}in (strongly) strong degree> *They have some pretty w. parties. This trip has been really w.; w. adventure/shopping spree, w. and romantic love affair*

*wild*₉ <#bodily event# when sb_x uses sb_x's strongly strong degree of energy wanting to touch sth> *w. attack/blow/lunge/movement/pitch/stab; make a w. dash at the door*

*wild*₁₀ <#sb's sound_x# that is {strong and} not affected by sb_x who makes sound_x> *w. voice*

*wild*₁₁ <#phenomenon_x in nature# that is strong in strongly strong degree and strongly bad so that phenomenon_x cannot be affected by people_x as people_x want> *w. night/weather/wind/sea/storm*

*wild*₁₂ <#sb_x# who has not made nature be affected by sb_x> *w. man/native/tribe*

*wild*₁₃ <#sb_x# who makes strongly strong degree of expression that sb_x does not want to be affected by sb_y with power> *w. people*

*wild*₁₄ <#time# that sb_x spends unaffected by sb_x/_y> *We had a w. time in New York. w. youth/days/life*

*wild*₁₅ <#worthy substance_x in ground# that is with bad substance_y>

*wild*₁₆ <#non-human living thing that can move# that comes to be afraid in strong degree> *These game birds are w.; w. horse*

*wild*₁₇ <#event when sb_x uses sb_x's energy wanting to touch sth by motion# that is made by sb_x in bad way> w. *shooting/shot/throw/pitch*

*wild*₁₈ <#sb# who experiences strongly strongly bad mental state> *The misery drove her w.*

*wild*₁₉ (AE colloquial) <#event# that is strongly strong degree unusual, exciting, and good> w. *notes/music interpretation*

The meanings of *wild* in *The joker is wild* and *a wild card* and in *wild mineral/ore* belong to argot and technical language respectively, which are stylistic levels not treated in this book.

If sb_x has not changed (not 'affected') the nature, sb_x cannot be strong (a non-ecological idea!), and therefore *wild*₁₂ has a negative connotation.

The dictionaries we have consulted and probably other dictionaries as well mention 'lack of control' sporadically, while we have found it to be the most important unifying semantic element occurring in almost all the sememes.⁶⁹ Thus *SOED* has 'uncontrolled' for *wild*₅, 'not submitting to moral control' for *wild*₄, and 'not having control of one's mental faculties' for *wild*₁₈. In *OALD* we can find 'out of control' for *wild*₄ and the explanation "If children or animals run wild, they behave as they like because nobody is controlling them". The noun phrase *the wild* has been glossed as 'a natural environment that is not controlled by people', while *wilderness* is said to be a place that people do not take care of or control. The adverb *wildly* is explained by the words 'in a way that is not controlled'. *MEDAL* has 'in a natural or uncontrolled way' for *wild*₁ and 'in an uncontrolled way' for *wildly*.

Of course, when sb_x is not affected by sb_x, we deal with lack of self-control.

If we wish not to proliferate the number of semes, it is better to replace the seme 'be controlled' by the seme 'be affected by sb' and 'control sth' by 'make sth be as sb likes', as we did above. This comes as a natural consequence after noticing the equivalence between 'sb exerts control over sth' = 'sb_x makes sth be as sb_x likes' = 'sth is controlled by sb' = 'sth is affected by sb_x as sb_x likes'. We have already found that 'control' in its wide sense boils down to 'phenomenon_x when sb_y wants to (not) make sth {sb_x} make phenomenon_y' (*under* in §3.1.2 I). 'Sb_x' who makes sb_y make a phenomenon is always stronger than 'sb_y'. That *wild* contains, or is associated with, the notion of strength ('intensity') in a many senses is attested by *wildly* used to emphasize that a quality is strongly great indeed (in informal usage), as in *wildly erratic behaviour*, *wildly romantic book* or *wildly inefficient* (COBUILD).

Now we can search for the seme 'unaffected' in lexemes other than *wild*, which would, if found, bring it out as an important recurrent semantic element in English. There is a noun *abandon*, mentioned above in the definition of *wild*₄. This noun is like *adventure* and *excess* in denoting behaviour without head control by default, even when standing without the support of the adjective *wild*. If *abandon* is defined as <mental state experienced by sb_x who is affected by sb_x's {bad and} strong emotion>, the idea of uncontrolled behaviour is understood although not explicitly stated in the definition. The nouns *delight/despair/grief/impulses/passion/pleasure* as collocates of the corresponding verb *abandon*₂ (in *abandon oneself to delight/despair/grief/impulses/passion*) all denote strong and typically bad emotions. For *to abandon oneself to*₅ we suggest <#sb_x# makes #sb_x# be strongly influenced by sb_x's {bad and} strong emotion>. A lexeme that contains 'unaffected' in its analysis is the adjective *unruly*. The preposition *under*

contains 'be affected' (see §3.1.2. I). However, we could not find any lexeme whose directive contained 'be affected', and have to conclude that, pending further evidence, 'be affected' can only occur as part of a noun definition or of an analysis.

The compounds (see §§2.1.6 and 3.3.1e) *wild taste* 'taste of a wild animal when eaten', i.e. 'taste that is made by a non-human living thing that is not affected by man {deer}', *wildfire* 'a fire that is not under control and spreads quickly', and *wild card* 'sb who might behave in not expected manner', confirm the omnipresent complex seme 'without control' = 'not affected by sb_x as sb_x likes'. (*Wild taste* rests on sememe *wild*_d <#substance# that is made by non-human living thing that lives or grows in natural conditions, not made by man>.)

A characteristic of ordered societies is placing emphasis on the control of elemental forces, human behaviour, and production of goods, while 'savage' (or wild) communities, lack such control. However, in *wild*₅ it is 'good' that tends to occur as a seme, rather than 'bad'. The informal *wild*_g has 'good' as a typical feature and 'because event_x is made with sb_x's little control of sb_x's behaviour' as a corollary. In colloquial, especially AE, *wild* means 'e x c e l l e n t, special and/or unusual' (*CIDE*) or 'exciting, wonderful' (*CDS*), as in *The music they play is just wild* (*CIDE* s. v. *wild*). These sememes have recently sprung up in colloquial usage, which indicates that lack of control has come to be favoured only recently and has not been generally accepted.

3.3.6 "Strong" adjectives

3.3.6a The semes 'strong' and 'weak' appear as values on the "potency" dimension introduced in Osgood's semantic differential technique (Osgood, Suci and Tanenbaum 1957). The reactions of the informants in terms

of these dimensions mainly amount to associations and connotations. What we are interested in are not associations but invariant features that enter semantic definitions. Chafe's feature 'potent' comes closer to the meaning 'strong' as interpreted in this book. According to Chafe (1971: 112), *wood, sand, water, rope, dish, chair* are '- potent', while *heat, wind, lightning, fire, explosion, motor* are 'potent'.

'Strong' will be understood in its abstract meaning 'of great intensity' rather than in the meaning 'of great bodily energy' or 'of great moral strength'. The same 'strong degree' is in ordinary parlance *great* or *high degree* and 'strong (degree of) amount' is *great amount*. The same same will be used in the meaning 'having intense power or influence in social relations', and 'with power' added to 'sb' is its synonym. Its antonym is either 'weak' (with negative evaluation) or 'not strong' (with neutral evaluation, necessary to explain the predicative position of certain adjectives in indirect connection). The reader will come across this notion in different places in this book, and a cumulative comment on its various occurrences will be found in the General Conclusion.

Under this interpretation the adverb *very* means 'strong'.⁷⁰ This is obvious when we become aware of the identity in semantic terms between 'very hot' and 'strong heat' or between 'I very much support the case' and 'I strongly support the case'. For adjectives that shun *very*, *almost* is available, conveying a similar meaning, e.g. *almost/*slightly impossible*.

We define *mild* as <#(expression of mental phenomenon of / event made by) sb_x# who is not strong in event made by sb_x {which is good}> *He's the mildest man. She's not so meek and m. as she seems. too m. a man; His eyes were no longer m. His voice was deceptively m. give a m. answer; m. nature* (indirect) 'strong'. Here the same 'not strong' is preferred to 'weak' because the latter would distort the meaning, which, unlike *weak*, contains 'typically good', and, also, because

without 'strong' the predicate position of *mild* in *Her nature is mild* could not be explained. The phrase *shy smile* can also be presented as *The smile is shy* according to *LLA*, but not according to *COBUILD*. Other adjectives containing 'not strong' are; *sleepless, sleepy, slipshod, slack, shabby, reckless, servile, subdued, delicate* *His behaviour is reckless*.

How do we know that 'strong' is part of a definition? Again by relying on collocations. An adjective contains 'strong' if it does not (readily) collocate with *a little* and *slightly*, e.g. **a little*/**slightly* + *bright/huge/terrified*). The collocations *a little/slightly big* indicate that *big*₁ should not be defined as <<#thing - space_x# that takes strong space_x in comparison with reference point> but rather as <#thing - space_x# that takes great space_x in comparison with reference point>. In other words, 'great' is to be kept apart from 'strong' (= 'intense'). If an adjective accepts *a little* or *slightly* as collocates, it does not contain 'strong', e.g. *a little/slightly* + *amusing /crazy/different /lame/mad* 'crazy'/surprised. The adverb *mildly* as a collocator can also help as a test for absence of 'strong' from adjectives, as in *m.* + *amused /critical /disappointed /humorous /interested /interesting /irritating /shocked /surprised /uncomfortable /venomous*.

The contrast made between lexemes in the pattern *It wasn't just A, it was B* or *I wasn't just A, I was B* as in *It wasn't just large, it was huge* and *I wasn't just scared of her, I was terrified of her* (Cruse 2004: 48) also helps diagnose lexemes containing 'strong'.

An adjective or a noun contains 'strongly strongly good' and 'strongly strongly bad' if collocable with *simply*, exemplified by *absurd*,⁷¹ *adorable, awful, brilliant, dazzling, furious, irresistible, poisonous, and splendid*, as well as the nouns *fiasco, disaster, feast*.

Bad headache and *terrible catastrophe* are well-formed, unlike *?bad catastrophe*, which is pleonastic and "which suggests that the dependent item must not be

weaker than the notion encapsulated in the head" (Cruse 1986: 108). ?*Bad catastrophe* is pleonastic because of *bad* 'bad' + *catastrophe* <sudden strongly strongly bad phenomenon experienced by a lot of sb_{more than one}> = 'bad' + 'strongly strongly bad phenomenon' = ?'bad strongly strongly bad phenomenon', when 'bad' is already present in the noun. *Terrible catastrophe* is better, because of *terrible* <#phenomenon# that is strongly strongly bad> + *catastrophe* <sudden strongly strongly bad phenomenon experienced by a lot of sb_{more than one}>, although *terrible* does not contribute much semantically. It only adds emotional charge. The seme 'strongly' (as in *very*) cannot be added to an adjective already containing 'strongly strongly', due to the weak repetition of the seme 'strong' in conjunction with 'strongly strong' (**very absurd* 'strongly + strongly strongly bad', **very brilliant* 'strongly + strongly strongly good'). However, if *very* is negated, it is allowed, as in *not very terrible*.

Any noun denoting a mental phenomenon, such as *admiration, ambivalence, anger, antipathy, anxiety, aversion, bitterness, calm, commitment, conflict, depression, distress, gratitude, love, mystery, study, temptation*, with the seme 'strong' in their own definitions, is coupled with the element 'strong' when attached to the adjective *deep*. If we only posited <#psychological phenomenon# that is in strong degree> for the definition of this *deep*, that would, through semantic agreement (see 1.1.3c I), create the pleonastic 'strong mental phenomenon that is in strong degree'. But to have 'strong mental phenomenon that is strong compared to reference point' translates into the non-pleonastic 'strong mental phenomenon that is stronger than usual'. By the same token, *a bad headache* is 'a headache worse than the usual headache', while *a terrible catastrophe* is 'a catastrophe that is more strongly bad than the average catastrophe'.

A nominal predicate consisting of an adjective preceded by an adverb can come to the initial, strong

position, only if the meaning of the adverb also contains the element 'strong'. Thus, *He is desperately alone* or *Desperately alone he is*.

In order to elaborate on 'strong' we shall see how it can be extracted from the adjectives *serious* and *severe*.

3.3.6b At first blush, the adjectives *serious* and *severe* may look synonymous when collocations are taken into consideration (cf. *serious/severe* + *anxiety/attack/competition/conflict/crisis/damage/difficulty/disorder/illness/doubt/problem*). Neither *serious* nor *severe* collocate with *a little/mildly/slightly* (see §3.3.5a), so we know that they both must contain the same 'strong'. However, differences are noticeable as well: **serious penalty* vs. *severe penalty*, *serious dilemma/haircut* vs. **severe dilemma/haircut*. To find out the underlying motive for the behaviour of these two lexemes, we must probe into their meanings by means of their complete collocational record.⁷²

serious **1** <#(sb_x who makes) bad phenomenon# that affects sb_y as strongly bad> *This may become s. for₂ Jane; extremely s.; s. + accident/affliction/anarchy/anxiety/argument/attack/blunder/case/concern/condition/conflict/confrontation/confusion/crime/crisis/damage/defeat/difficulty/disability/disorder/dispute/distress/disturbance/embarrassment/error/famine/fear/fight/fighting/hardship/hatred/hostilities/illness/infection/injury/loss/miscalculation/misconception/mistake/obstacle/offence/pain/possibility of war/problem/quarrel/racism/recession/row/shock/shortage/situation/tension/threat/trouble/unemployment/unrest/violence; s. criminal/offender* (indirect) **2** <#(rbody part that makes expression of) mental phenomenon experienced / sth_x made by use of language concerning sth_x and made | by) sb# (who behaves) experiencing strong degree of true thought concerning {bad} phenomenon> *Be s.; Don't look s. I'm*

being s.; *Jack was s. about the problem. You look very s. today. It must be something s.; a very s. girl/person; completely/entirely/extremely/perfectly/totally s.; A man's facial expression should be s. and focused* (indirect via entity). *Is it₃ s. about the disease spreading?* 'Does sth made by use of language by a lot of sb_{more than one indef} (rumour) concerning bad phenomenon_x (the disease spreading) make sb_h experience strong degree of true thought concerning phenomenon_x (about)' (indirect via entity); *His speech turned s.* (indirect via entity); s. + *article/attention/book/business/consideration/debat/difference/dilemma/disagreement /discussion/doubt/political force /idea /implication /interest /issue /literature /matter /music/newspaper/piece of art/point/question/science /suggestion/suspicion/talk/talking/thinking /thought /worry* (indirect via entity); s. + *artist/candidate /contender /runner* (indirect non-inherent); s. *eyes/face* (body part, doubly indirect) **3** <#{mental} phenomenon when sb_x uses sb_x's energy to make event made by) sb_x# who experiences strong thought concerning phenomenon_y that sb_x wants> *She is s. | to follow the plan /about becoming an actress; s. + attempt/blow /competition/effort/endeavour/throw* (indirect) **4** <#(sb_x who experiences thought concerning) state with sb_y more than one# that is experienced by sb_x as strong and good> *Is it getting s. with you and Mary?; s. relationship; Is he s. about the relationship?* (indirect); s. *boyfriend* (indirect); *My girlfriend is s. about me.* (indirect) **5** (informal) <#sth non-living# that is strongly good> s. *eating/haircut/hiking/jacket/money/walking/wine*

The semantic element 'strong' occurs in all definitional analyses of the *serious*'s sememes, and **simply serious* in all sememes except perhaps *serious*₅, proves that *serious* is without 'strongly strongly' in the definitions. Disharmonious collocations are **serious*

skirmish /scuffle because they would lead to the paradox 'strong event that is not strong'.

3.3.6c For the adjective *severe* several sememes emerge, with the following definitions: **1** <#(sth made {by use of language} by)/expression of mental event made by) sb_x with power# who experiences strong mental phenomenon_x when sb_y does not do what sb_x likes, so that sb_y experiences bad phenomenon_y> (the definition based on the meanings of *on*₄ and *with*₁). *She was s. with her pupils; Courts were s. on offenders. s. + critic/judge /mother/schoolmaster; Their remarks were very s.* (phenomenon_x made by use of language; indirect); *The punishment was severe* (phenomenon_x, indirect). *s. + criticism /discipline/penalty/rule/sentence/terms* (phenomenon_x, indirect); *s. + expression /look/voice* (expression, indirect) **2** <#(event made by use of language by sb concerning) bad phenomenon# that is strongly bad> *s. + affliction /anxiety /cold /conflict /cramp /crisis /cutback /damage /difficulty /disability /disorder /distress /disturbance /doubt /embarrassment /epidemic /famine /fear /handicap /hardship /illness/ infection /injury /overcrowding /pain /penalty /pressure /problem /recession /restraint /setback /shock /shortage /unease /unemployment; The threat was severe* (indirect). **3** <#phenomenon when sb_x is wanted to use sb_x's energy# that is strongly strongly bad> *The competition is simply s. s. exam /requirement/strain/test of stamina* **4** <#(state of) man-made thing_x# that looks good with strongly small degree of amount of parts of thing_x> *s. + arch /building /costume /dress /furniture /shoes; Her hair /hairstyle was s.* (indirect); *s. beauty* (indirect) **5** <#environmental phenomenon# that is strongly bad> *s. air pollution /climate /cold /drought /frost /gale /smog /thunderstorm/weather conditions/winter.* **6** <#bad bodily event during short time (that is part of bad bodily

state)# that is strongly strong> s. *attack /cramp /pain /shock*.

In instances where collocates of *serious* and *severe* coincide, as in s. *competition*, there is no total synonymy due to differences both in directives and in analyses. *Serious* and *severe* activate different parts of the *competition's* meaning. *Serious*₃ chooses the indirect path '{mental} phenomenon_x when sb_x uses sb_x's energy to make event made by sb_x' followed by the analysis 'who experiences strong thought concerning phenomenon_y that sb_x wants', while *severe*₃ concentrates on 'phenomenon when sb_x is wanted to use sb_x's energy' in the directive and has 'strongly strong' as the analysis. (And yet *competition* is covered by a single definition <strong contest phenomenon when sb_x, y (z...) more than one viewed as different are together, when sb_x is wanted to use sb_x's energy to come to be with more power than sb_y (z...) >. It has been formulated by combining the directives of *serious*₃, *severe*₃, and certain other lexemes that collocate with *competition* (*bitter/fierce /lose/win c., c. against/among/between*).

That *severe*₂ produces a more intense effect than *serious*₁ is illustrated by *The problem wasn't just serious, it was severe*.

Another factor that leads to lack of synonymy between *serious* and *severe* is polisemy. The nouns *attack* in *serious attack* and in *severe attack* belong to two separate sememes. The former is *serious*₁ (covering both physical and verbal *attack on sb*), while the latter is *severe*₆, as in *a. of asthma/cough/pancreatitis/vertigo*.

3.3.5d The semantic element 'strongly strong' also appears in the definitional analyses of the adjectives *bitter*, *brutal*, *ferocious* and *fierce*:

bitter **1** <#(sth {substance made to exist in body} with) taste# that is strong {and bad}> *b. taste; b.*

poison (indirect) **2** <#(psychological phenomenon experienced by) sb# who experiences bad and strong mental state concerning sth, as if tasting sth bitter (i)> *She was b. about her loss. b. blow/disappointment/experience* (indirect) **3** <#(state of) bad event with sb_{more than one} (in contest)# that is strongly strong> *b. + argument/attack/battle/blow/campaign /clash/conflict/contest/debate/disagreement/dispute /division /elections /exchanges /feud /fight /fighting /quarrel /squabble/strike/struggle/wrangle; b. defeat* (indirect) **4**<#(sb who experiences / expression of / phenomenon_x that makes / phenomenon made by) bad mental state {emotion}# that is strongly strong> *b. + accusation /anger/anguish/controversy/denunciation/disappointment /enmity /hatred /hostility /opposition /regret /reproach /resentment; b. enemy/opponent* (sb, indirect); *b. + criticism /cynicism /irony /laugh /sarcasm /tear /word* (expression, indirect); *b. divorce /parting* (phenomenon that makes, indirect); *b. lesson/memory* (phenomenon made, indirect) **5** <#environmental phenomenon# that is strongly bad and strongly strong> *It is b. out today. The weather turned b. b. + chill/cold/heat/wind/winter*

brutal **1** <#(living thing_x that makes) {bad bodily} phenomenon_x intentionally made by thing_x# that is made in relation to living thing_y and that makes sb_{sp} experience strongly bad mental state> *It was b. of₃ him to₃ kill the pregnant animal. b. + attack /atrocious /beating /death /killing /lie /murder /plague /punishment /rape /treatment /war; The security guards are notoriously b.* (indirect) **2** <#environmental phenomenon# that is strongly bad> *b. + morning light/storm/sun/winter*

ferocious **1** <#(living thing_x that can move and feel / thing_y used to make / state made by / expression of) strong phenomenon made by living thing_y more than one# that is strongly strong {and bad}> *f. + assault/attack /barking /battle /campaign /competition /criticism /cruelty /fighting /onslaught /riot /war; f. animal/beast/dog* (living

thing_x, indirect); *f. dagger/knife* (thing_y, indirect); *f. atmosphere* of competition/determination /expression /temper (state, indirect); *f. + expression /opposition /punishment* (expression, indirect) **2** <#environmental phenomenon# that is strongly bad> *The heat is just f. f. climate/cold/drought/storm*

fierce **1** <#(living thing that can move and feel /expression of){bad} mental state# that is {strongly bad and} strongly strong> *f. + anger /desire /determination/hatred /independence /loyalty /passion /pride /temper*; *f. dog* (thing, indirect); *f. + criticism /expression/eyes /frown /look /roar /whisper* (expression, indirect) **2** <#(sb who makes) {strong and bad} phenomenon with sb_{more than one}# that is strongly strong and strongly bad> *f. + assault/attack/battle/campaign /clash /combat /competition /conflict /controversy /debate /denunciation/fight/fighting/loyalty/opposition/resistance/rivalry/row/struggle/war*; *f. + competitor/critic/opponent /rival/warrior* (indirect) **3** <#(amount of) heat# that is bad in strong degree> *f. blaze/fire/heat* (coming from an object); *f. intensity* (indirect) **4** <#environmental phenomenon# that is strongly bad> *f. + blizzard /climate/cold/heat* (in atmosphere)/*storm/wind/winter*; *f. weather* (indirect)

*Fierce*₂ is in contradiction with *shuffle*, *skirmish*, and *squabble* (minor conflicts), and therefore cannot collocate with these nouns. There are further restrictions: *fierce*₂ does not agree with 'strong' in the collocating nouns *anarchy/battle/chaos/rebellion /revolution*, and with *war* seldom, owing to the pleonasm '{bad and} strongly strong state (n) that is strongly bad and strongly strong (adj)'.

The adjective *blind*, when meaning <#({strong} mental phenomenon experienced by) sb_x# who is not with power to know sth because of sb_x's bad and strong mental state>, requires nouns that typically denote strong mental states: *The critic was blind in his attack. b.+*

acceptance/allegiance/ambition/aspiration/belief/commitment/delight/dream/faith/haste/idea/loyalty/obedience/panic/plan/prejudice/trust (indirect).

The difference between *severe*₅, *brutal*₂, *ferocious*₂ and *fierce*₄, which all mean ‘#environmental phenomenon# that is strongly bad’ lies in their reflected meanings (see endnote 69) associated with their corresponding sememes containing ‘sb’.

This is only a small representative segment of the manifestations of ‘strong’ present in adjectives. Ubiquitous and important, the same feature occurs elsewhere and will be presented for verbs and nouns later in the book.

3.3.7 Stance adjectives

“Stance” adjectives, so named for this occasion, are adjectives that contain at least one sememe from which disjunct adverbs (cf. Quirk et al. 1972: 269-270, called more or less synonymously “interpretation sentence adverbs” in Allerton and Cruttenden 1974: 5-7, “emphasizers” in Greenbaum et al. 1985: 583-591, “stance adverbs” in Biber et al. 1999, Hyland 2004, “comment pragmatic markers” in Fraser 1999) can be derived. “Speakers use stance adverbs to convey their judgements and attitudes, to claim the factual nature of what they are saying, and to mark exactly how they mean their utterances to be understood “ (Biber et al. 1999: 766 - 767). We shall concentrate on a selection of adjectives that are the pertainyms of epistemic disjuncts (*certainly, definitely, evidently, obviously, possibly, probably*), and attitudinal or content disjuncts (*happily, interestingly, sadly, surprisingly*), leaving aside style disjuncts (*honestly, seriously, to be frank, to say the least*. (Cf. Chalker and Weiner 1994: s. v. *disjunct*; Biber et al. 1999.)

Now we shall proceed to defining a selection of stance adjectives: *certain, definite, essential, foolish, happy, important, interesting, lucky, possible, probable, remarkable, sad, sensible, sure, and surprising*, providing definitions and collocators that serve as clues to semantic definitions, and furnishing comments and popular definitions such as could be used in a desk dictionary. Namely, in order to remain user-friendly, lexicographic definitions usually cannot be identified with definitions achieved by a rigorous lexicological method such as ours.

3.3.7a

certain

(1)

Examples: *She was c. about the robber's identity. I feel₄ c. about it. He is quite/absolutely₂/completely/totally c. about winning. She was c. of the truth. He was c. who would win the game. They are c. (that) he will win the game. I am not c. whether he'll come; I don't know/can't say for₈ c.; I feel₄ c. that she is going to make a career. He wanted to make c. for₂ himself that nothing had been overlooked. I was almost c. If you want to be c. of winning her favour, you should adopt a new attitude. Mathematical knowledge is c.; c. knowledge (indirect); !c. person (permissible only in the meaning 'particular unspecified', i.e. 'known to the speaker but not to the hearer'; see §3.1.1d).*

Clues: Elements used as the source for the definition have been: *about₁, absolutely₂* (§3.6.3 b), *completely, feel* (<#sb# experiences vague thought concerning phenomenon> *I felt that I had to apologize. She felt herself to be unwanted. He felt the truth of Ann's words. John felt it to be his duty to tell the police. Mary felt that John no longer loved her), for₂, for₈, more, of₈, (that),*

totally, *wh*-word, non-finite clause, predicative-only position (see §3.3.2b I), **at*, **slightly*, **very* (Greenbaum 1970: 84; *OCD*)

Semantic definition: <#(strongly true thought_x experienced by) sb_x# who during short time experiences in strong degree (*this*) true thought_x concerning phenomenon_x (affecting sb_x as good) and making sb_x know phenomenon_x)>

There is an exploitation of *certain* in *Are you c. of him?* ('Do you have confidence in him?', i.e. 'Are you certain that he will be true to you?' because *he* is a kind of hyponym of *man*₁, the definition of *man*₁ includes 'character' as one of man's facets (see §1.1.2), and the collocating adjective *certain* points to 'being true to sb' as the character trait. Ronald Langacker (1972: 7 - 8) noticed that *certain* can be followed by *of* in front of some noun phrases, as in *I am certain of Dick's loyalty/of Dick's being loyal*, but not in **I am certain of that Dick is loyal*, although *that Dick is loyal* is a noun phrase. So he concluded that "when a that clause is present in surface structure, the preposition is not permissible, and the preposition can be omitted only when the noun clause consists of a that clause [I am certain that Dick is loyal]". In order to grasp the general principle underlying this phenomenon, in the spirit of the transformational grammar, he posited the syntactic preposition deletion rule ADJ P that X → ADJ that X, where ADJ P is *certain of*. The real explanation emerges if we appeal for help to semantics. One should start from the aforementioned definition of *certain* and the definitions for *that* <*this* thought:>, which yields 'I experience this thought: Dick is loyal' and *of*_g <sb_x experiencing thought that makes sb_x know sth> (see §3.1.2. I), leading to 'I experience thought that makes me know that Dick is loyal'. When speakers insist on the c o n t e n t of someone's thought, they use a *that*-clause; when they want to

highlight the *n a t u r e* of a thought, they use the prepositional phrase with *of*. The speaker cannot activate both and has to chose only one.

The 'thought' in the definition is not 'strong', 'good' or 'bad', so that *at*₃ is disallowed as a collocator.

Popular definition: If somebody is certain, they think that something must be true.

(2)

Examples: *The cure/defeat/fact/peril/relief/success is c. Death is c.; Frank's coming is c.* 'The speaker is certain that the phenomenon of cure, death, ... is going to happen'; *Prices seem c. to rise. Kate was c. to win the game (Kate ... to win the game = 'phenomenon'). The future is not c. for little Jim. The textbook is c. to inspire students with confidence. His winning the game is absolutely*₂ *c. (to happen). The team is c. of victory. The whole thing is c. to be explained* 'Sb_{sp} is certain that the whole thing tends toward explanation'. *Nothing is c. with her. There is nothing overwhelmingly c. about the success. Those who argue with their Creator are c. to be destroyed. Destruction is c. for those who argue with their Creator. It*₅ *'s not yet c. who the thief was.* 'Sb_{indef} is not certain...'. *John will, it*₂ *is c., be promoted in January. It*₃ *is c. to*_{2a} *take five years to*_{1a} *finish the project.* 'The speaker is certain that if one wishes to finish the project, the necessary time tends towards lasting five years.' *Be c. to tell John.* 'The speaker wants to be certain that the hearer will tell John'. *It*₅ *is c. that Jane will win. That Jane will win is c. Who will win the game is c. It*₅ *is c. who will win the game.* 'The speaker knows that the thought concerning the [identity of] person winning the game in the future tends towards being true in strong degree'. *c. cure/death /defeat*

/fact/peril/relief/success; the c. advance of age; The evidence is c. (indirect); c. winner (indirect)

Clues: *about*₂, *absolutely*₂, *for*₂, *for*₈, *it*₃, *it*₅, *more*, *of*₈, *(that)*, *very*, *wh*-word, *with*₄, non-finite clause, *to*_{2a}-infinitive, **slightly*

Though *for*₈ makes grammatical conversion of *certain*, *definite* and other adjectives into nouns, we have included it among the clues because the adjectival meaning is still pervasive.

Semantic definition: <#(sth_x that makes) phenomenon_x# that during short time unintentionally makes sb_{sp/indef} experience (*this*) thought that tends towards being true in strong degree, and makes sb_{sp/indef} know sth concerning particular phenomenon_x as the only possible phenomenon (that sb_x experiences as {good}-bad)>.

The relation between *certain*₁ and *2* echoes that between *suspicious*₁ 'not trusting sb' and *suspicious*₂ 'making you feel that sth is wrong'. In *certain*₁ the directive head is 'sb', in *certain*₂ it is 'phenomenon'. This entails the shift in the analysis: The seme 'experiences thought' of *certain*₁ becomes 'makes sb_{sp/indef} experience thought' in *certain*₂, while the principal parts of the analyses remain the same.

General habitual events such as those in **Buying* /**To buy petrol*/**Cure is certain* are not allowed as collocators, but only specific ones, such as *rain* in *Rain is certain*. The same drawback underlies **It*₅ *is certain to*_{2a} *win*, which is without an AGENT mentioned and refers to a general event, such as **Winning is certain*. Exceptions are rare because there are few things of which everybody is certain, like death. **To rain is certain* is ungrammatical because the obligatory *it*₃ is missing – see §3.1.4a III.

?*It₅ is certain for him to_{2a} win* is bad for stylistic reasons since there is a current synonymous construction *He is certain to_{2a} win*.

**John is certain₂ for Jane to_{2a} arrive* suggests the impossible interpretation *'The speaker is certain that John that Jane will arrive', while the same sentence with *certain* makes sense but is ungrammatical.

The adjective *certain* is factive: **It₅ is c. that Jane will win, but she won't win*.

Popular definition: If something is certain, the speaker thinks that it must be true.

Although both *certain₁* and *certain₂* contain 'sb experience thought concerning phenomenon', only *certain₁* collocates with *about* 'sb experiencing thought concerning sth'. The reason is that *certain₂* features this complex seme entirely within the analysis, after '#phenomenon_x# that makes sb_{sp}...', whereas in *certain₁* 'sb' belongs to the directive, the rest being situated in the analysis.

Certain's other sememes have not been dealt with because their meanings are beyond our scope here.

definite

(1)

Examples: *She was absolutely₂/very d. about her intention. He is d. that his wife cheats him. Don't be afraid to be d. and firm. You must be d. with the infinite* (a religious message). *d. views* (indirect); **Jane was d.*

Clues: *about₁*, *absolutely₂*, (*that*), *with₄*, exclusively predicative if 'sb' is in direct connection, ?*more*, **at*, **slightly*, **wh*-word.

Semantic definition: <#(thought_x experienced by) sb_x# who during short time experiences and expresses in strong degree (*this*) true thought_x concerning phenomenon_x>. The 'thought' in the definition is neither 'good' nor 'bad', which bans *at* as a collocator.

Popular definition: If somebody is definite, they firmly state that something is true or are very determined to do something.

(2)

Examples: *The victory is d. Speeding is a d. hazard. It₅ is now d. that something important happened. Is anything d. about the president's resignation? It₅ is d. (that) the president will resign. The president will, it₅ is absolutely d., resign in autumn. That the president will resign is d. He took it₂ for d. that she was right. There was a d. feeling that things were getting worse. I'm not sure – I can find out for d. if you like* (both sentences from OALD). *The book will be a d. bestseller* (indirect, 'This book on sale makes the speaker strongly believe that the sale of the book will be best'). *This horse is d. for stakes* (colloquial, 'winner' deleted after *definite*). *d. barrier/defeat/need/success/victory; very d. improvement; He is a d. front-runner for the job* (indirect). *d. loser/winner* (indirect); **Rain is d.* (because 'rain', unlike *defeat, success* and *victory*, is an event rather than a state). **Kate is d. to be late.*

Clues: *about₂, absolutely₂, for₁, for₈, it₅, (that), very, ?more, *slightly, *wh-word*

Semantic definition: <#(sth {sb} affected by) state_x - habitualness_x# that unintentionally makes sb_{sp}

experience {strongly} strong (degree of?) (*this*) true thought concerning state_x - habitualness_x>

A paraphrase with the sentence adverb *definitely* is possible when 'state - habitualness' becomes the head, as in *The book will definitely be a bestseller, definitely loser/winner* etc. A *d. winner* is 'sb_x who is *definitely* going to win, as sb_{sp} experiences mentally'.

The polysemy of *definite*₁ and *definite*₂ repeats that of *certain*₁ and *certain*₂, with a difference that *definite*₂ restricts its head to 'state and habitualness' in relation to *definite*₁.

Dixon accounts for the unacceptability of **It is definite that the monsoon will come this month* by lack of plan in producing the monsoon (Dixon 2005: 88). We prefer to see the fact that the coming of the monsoon is an event rather than state or habitualness as really responsible for this inappropriateness.

That the speaker who uses *definite*₂ is more resolute than the one who mentions *certain*₂ is reflected in their definitions: 'strongly true thought' of the former vs 'thought that tends towards being true in strong degree' in the latter.

Popular definition: If something is definite, the speaker strongly believes that it must be in such a state as mentioned.

(3)

Examples: *d. accusation/advantage/distinction/evidence/idea/mission/pain/plan/relationship/skill/view* (phenomenon); *d. form/shape* (form); *d. position* (place); *d. date* (time); *They had a d. booking* (indirect). *d. answer/offer/sign/statement/terms/treaty* (indirect)

Clues: typically attributive position, ?*more* ?*very*, ?*rather*

Definition: <#(sth made by symbols to make expression of) {psychological} phenomenon - form - space/(event made concerning) time event# that sb_{sp/x} experiences as (strongly) strong (and the only one)>

Definite may be classified as an untypical non-inherent amplifier – see §3.3.2a V.

Popular definition: If something is definite it is thought of or perceived as very clear.

essential

Examples: *Food is e. for₂ life. Qualifications are not e. What is e. about its shape? Regular watering is even more e. It is absolutely e. (that) all be present. It is e. (that) we should protect the environment. It is e. (for₁₀ him) to drive₁ carefully. To drive₁ carefully is e. Is wealth e. to John? Stable government is simply e. to the economy. Human touch is e. with Alzheimer care. e. detail/feature/concept/truth/vitamin; *It₃ is e. to_{2a} rain.*To_{2a} rain is e. ?'The weather' tending towards raining is essential' (for what ?)*

Clues: *about₂, absolutely₁, for₂, it₅, should₂, simply* (simply defined as <[strongly strongly] good - bad>. Thus, *It₂ simply could not be bad.* 'The situation mentioned strongly strongly could not be bad. '), SUBJUNCTIVE, (*that*), *to₄, to₃-infinitive, with₄, *be* imperative (in good speech style), **more, *very*

Semantic definition: <#sth_x{phenomenon_x}# that makes sb_{indef/sp/x} experience (*this*) thought concerning sth_x {phenomenon_x} expected to tend to affect and influence sth_y {sb_x} as strongly strongly good>. The seme 'sth_x' includes 'sb_y'.

Paraphrases: *Publicity is e. for success.* 'The speaker experiences thought concerning publicity that publicity tends to affect and influence success as strongly strongly good.' *Good working dog is e. for any stock farmer.* 'The speaker experiences thought concerning a good working dog that such a dog tends to affect and influence any stock farmer as strongly strongly good.'

Popular definition: If something is essential, it affects the existence of something else in the best and most influential way. Looking from another perspective, "[T]he essential thing is such that the other thing is inconceivable without it" (Fowler 1965: s. v. *essential*).

foolish

Examples: *They looked f. She is a f. woman. He felt rather f. at the selfish nature of his desire. You are f. about male sexuality.* 'The speaker says that the hearer experiences a mental phenomenon_x concerning male sexuality that makes the speaker experience bad mental state and view phenomenon_x as strongly bad because of the hearer's bad thinking.' *Ann is being f. Peter was f. with his money. Mike felt f. I felt f. that I hadn't been prepared for the fact that his skin would be so bad. f. action/behaviour* (phenomenon made by sb, indirect); *Jane's behaviour is very f. To go by train would be f. Nothing is f. about it all. It₂ was a very f. thing to do. It₅ is f. how he spends his money. It₅ would be f. (for₁₀/of him) to go on foot. It₅ is f. to speed in streets. He was f. to go on foot. We've been talking so much, it₅'s f. that we don't even know each other's names* (mental state experienced by sb, indirect); *f. comment /decision/dream/idea /mistake /pride /reply /situation* ('mental phenomenon experienced by sb' indirect);

Gospel ('sth_x made by use of language by sb_x') is f. to ('makes...') those that are perishing ('sb_y') (...experience strong thought concerning sth_x affecting sb_y as bad because of sb_x's bad thinking'). f. *hat* ('thing used by sb', indirect); (f. *look/mask* ('expression of mental phenomenon experienced by sb', doubly indirect); **His look was f.* **It₅ is f. to rain* is out of place because 'rain' is not an event made by a person.

Clues: The definition analysis above has been produced by combining the definitions of *about*₁, *at*₃, *completely*, *extremely*, *feel*₂ ('experience vague thought'), *it*₂, *it*₅, *of*₃, *slightly*, *that*, *to*₄ (rare), *utterly*, *very*, *wh*-word, *with*₃, *is being* + ADJ, *to*₃-infinitive, non-finite clause

Semantic definition: <#((expression of) mental state_x experienced by / thing used by / sth made by use of language by) sb_x / intentional phenomenon_x {behaviour}# that affects - influences (state_y of) sb_{sp/y} and makes sb_{sp/y} during short time experience in (strongly) strongly bad degree (*this*) thought | concerning / concentrated emotion because of | (sb_x who makes) phenomenon_x (when sb_{sp/y} comes to know phenomenon_x), which is not as sb_{sp/y} likes, because sb_x uses bad mind (when using sth)>

He felt foolish is to be interpreted as: 'sb_x during short time experienced bad mental phenomenon_x because sb_x did phenomenon_y {behaviour} that made sb_x think that phenomenon_y was made because of sb_x's bad thinking'. As *foolish* collocates both with intensifiers *completely*, *extremely*, *utterly* and the down-toner *slightly*, as well as with *very*, the conclusion is that *foolish* is divided between 'gradable' and 'not gradable'.

The complex sense 'made because of sb_x's bad thinking' has been added without any support from the collocational analysis, 'bad' provided by the preceding 'bad' and the knowledge of the language.

Popular definition: Somebody or somebody's action is foolish if their behaviour is regarded as bad because they used their minds in a wrong way.

happy

Examples: *h. couple/cow; John was an absolutely h. man. Kate wasn't h. with her work. I am h. for₄ the guys. Smith was h. (that) he won the prize. He was very h. about winning the prize. I would be h. (for₁₀ her) to pass the exam. Jenny feels h. I've not been h. at all at Jane being chosen. My father is h. how I've progressed. Peter was h. at winning the prize. I am happy to be Mexican/to live in Portugal. I am very h. in my job. John Adams says that he is not h. about such usage of the word. h. accident/discovery/reunion h. (phenomenon, indirect), h. chance/coincidence/ending/exception/idea/knack/memory /phrase /position /retirement /success /thought (mental phenomenon, indirect); Their marriage was h. turn of events (state, indirect); h. face/lips/smile (expression, doubly indirect); h. birthday/childhood/hour/life /moment /morning/new year (time phenomenon, doubly indirect); School is a h. place (space, doubly indirect); not the happiest choice for words (phenomenon_x, doubly indirect); *The chance/exception is h.*

Clues: *about₁, absolutely₂, at₃, completely, feel₁, for₄, perfectly, (that), to₄-infinitive, wh-word, with₃, ??slightly*

Semantic definition: <#((space that makes / time phenomenon_x of / (body part that makes) expression of)

mental phenomenon_y experienced by / phenomenon_z made by / state affected by) sb_x# who (during short - long time) experiences strong degree of good (concentrated) emotion - (*this*) thought (when sb_x comes to know phenomenon_y) concerning sth_x because sb_x experiences - makes phenomenon_z which is as sb_x likes>

Happy has two different meanings covered by a single definition above. One meaning denotes a long-time state, while the other one is with 'during short-lasting time'. Cf. *He was h. about winning the prize and at Jane being chosen. *I have been h. all my life and at Jane being chosen.*

The sentence **happy at being promoted* is not acceptable because there is a priority construction with the infinitive: *happy to be promoted*. phenomenon of being promoted has not been formulated as a non-finite clause.

**That he succeeded is happy* or **It₅ is happy that he succeeded* are ungrammatical since there is no 'sb' to be mentioned as happy.

In indirect connections 'strong', which is typical rather than invariant (cf. *rather/*slightly happy*) seems to be often without effect. *Happy face* contains a connection made indirect three times.

Happy is, strictly speaking, not a stance adjective because it lacks an implicit sb_{sp} (see §2.2.18) and instead of sb_{sp} contains sb_x in the directive.⁷³ And yet, it forms *happily*, a sentential adverb, a comment adjunct, which is a kind of stance. The disjunction appears to feed on the frequent explicit sb_{sp} in *I am happy to/that.... Happily* may have a manner function and a sentential function (Dixon 2005: 420). Sentential is in *Happily, she caught the bus and managed to get in time* and *Happily, the thief missed the bus, so the police caught him*. From the first sentence according to the extralinguistic situation and the knowledge of the world it can be inferred that she was happy, while in the second one, judging by the same

criterion, the thief was not happy, but what is common to both is a semantically drawn conclusion that the speaker was content.

Popular definition: Somebody is happy if they feel very good.

important

Examples: *I think this would be absolutely i. Your health is most i. What is i. about the car? Hay is i. for₂ sheep. The campaign was hardly i. for₂ this election. This result is i. to your final victory. Familiarity with these tasks is i. to achieve. It₅ is very i. for₁₀ a horse to be comfortable in his mouth. It₅'s i. for₁₀ him to have a job. For₁₀ Brenda to participate in our meeting is i. It₂ was i. to her to know. It₅ is i. (that) she should know. It₅ is i. that she attend regularly. It₅ is i. how you win. Why are ethics i. with laws? i. decision/man/book/day/test*

Clues: *about₂, absolutely₂, extremely, highly, for₂, it₂, it₅, should₃, (that), to₄, very, wh-word, with₄, to₃-infinitive, non-finite clause, SUBJUNCTIVE, *slightly, *be imperative*

Semantic definition: <#sth_x# that makes sb_{sp/x} experience (this) thought concerning sth_x {expected phenomenon_x} that influences and affects sth_y as strongly good when sb_{sp/x} | wants to make phenomenon_y / comes to know sth_y>

It is not good style to use *important* in a construction with a non-finite clause without *for*, as in ?*Jack was i. to₂ meet.* ?*John is important to persuade* (colloquial,

passive), instead of *To persuade John/To meet Jack is i.* or *It is i. to persuade John/to meet Jack.*

Popular definition: Something or somebody is important if it influences or affects something or somebody in a strongly good way.

interesting

Examples: *Mike was not very i. to talk to. It is i. how /where/when she made it. It₂ must be quite i. for₂/to you. I find₃ it i. that she claims not to know him. It₅ is i. (for₁₀ her) to travel around Europe. It₅ is i. (that) he should win. It₅ was i. for₁₀ John to win. Tell me something i. about him. (About here leans primarily on tell and merges with the meaning of interesting). What else is i. about her? It₂ is i. with things like sculpture and painting. i. man/book/conversation/idea/question*

Clues: *about₂, deeply, extremely, for₂, highly, it₂, it₅, mildly, should₃, (that), to₄, very, wh-word, with₄, to₃-infinitive, non-finite clause, *be imperative*

Semantic definition: <#sth_x {phenomenon_x}# that unintentionally affects - influences and makes sb_{sp/x} experience good thought concerning sth_x {phenomenon_x} when coming to know sth_x and when phenomenon_x is experienced by sb_{sp/x} as unexpected and good>.

Anna Wierzbicka has suggested "that when such adjectives [as *interesting/amusing/funny*] are used in the FOR TO pattern they begin to imply that the event was not expected, as well as 'interesting', 'amusing', and so on. The fact that these adjectives [...] can take should, supports this" (Wierzbicka 1988: 130-131). According to

the analysis above 'not expected' is an invariant element of the *interesting's* meaning.

OALD offers the following definition of this adjective: 'attracting your attention because it is special, exciting or unusual', while *MEDAL* has 'something that is interesting makes you want to know about it or take part in it'. The wordings are totally different as the former dictionary has laid stress on the unexpected, while the latter emphasizes 'good when coming to know'. Both have captured an essential feature of the meaning, but not the same one.

Popular definition: Something is interesting if it is unexpected and if it makes one feel good knowing it.

likely

Examples: *John is l. to win. The bug is l. to be killed by John. Conflicts are/Possibility is l. to arise. What kind of change is l. to take place? (sb_{sp} wants sb_h to say what thought sb_h experiences concerning kind of change, expecting that that thought tends to be true). It₅ is l. to be shown that John has cheated (≈ 'thought: "phenomenon of John's cheating in the past" makes the speaker expect that the thought tends to be true'). The doctor didn't think it l. that she would heal completely. Our monkey is very/quite l. to run away. It₅ is l. that the boy is late. It₅ was l. that John should have sung. It₅ is l. that Kate won the game. It₅ seems highly l. that he will resign. That the boy is late is l. 'The following thought: the boy is late, tends towards being true.' It₅ is l. for₁₀ a pilot to fly. For₁₀ him to win the award is quite l. It₃ isn't l. to rain. The cause of the disease is likelier (rare)/more likely to be virus than bacteria. This is more l. to be a matter of practice. Mary will, it₂ is l., be late. What is l.*

*about a blue-eyed white cat? This is particularly l. with larger houses in suburbs. That is quite l. with you. l. demand/explanation/possibility /scenario; l. cause /consequence/effect/fate/outcome/victory; John is the most l. man to succeed (indirect). l. successor/voter/winner (indirect); That possibility/explanation /scenario/victory is likely. *It₅ is l. to fly/win. ?His winning is likely (winning is habitualness rather than an event or state).*

A *likely place* denotes a suitable place, which makes a distinct sememe *likely*₂.

The frame IN ALL _____, which is common for *probability* and *likelihood* may serve as indirect evidence, indicating that 'expecting that thought is true' is a common feature which can be carried onto the corresponding adjectives *likely* and *probable*. (According to Greenbaum (1969: 218), *in all likelihood* functions as an attitudinal adverb.) *Sincerity* and *seriousness* also fit this frame, but they function as mode or manner adverbials.

Clues: *about*, *absolutely*₂ (rare), *extremely*, *highly*, *it*₂, *it*₃, *it*₅, *more*, non-finite clause, *should*₃ (not frequent), (*that*), *to*_{2a}-infinitive, *very*, *with*₄, *?slightly*, **be* infinitive

Semantic definition: <#(sb_x who makes / is affected by) event_x - state_x# that unintentionally makes sb_{sp/x} experience (*this*) thought_x that tends towards being true in (strong?) degree concerning expected event_x - state_x>

Our definition does not confirm Wierzbicka (1988: 58), who says that *likely* and *certain* involve wanting, but 'tend' is quite similar.

'Sb_{sp}' can become 'sb_x' only when *for*₁₀ is introduced, which happens obligatorily if the AGENT / EXPERIENCER would otherwise be missing.

Just like *certain*, *likely* is incompatible with general events Cf. **It is not likely to become a winner in lottery.*

vs ?It₂ is not likely for her to_{2a} become a winner in lottery (better: *She is not likely to become a winner in lottery*).

Popular definition: Something is likely if it shows strong tendency to happen.

lucky

Examples: *John was l. (that) he won the game. He was l. to win the game. Smith was l. about₁ his goal-keeping. Mary was l. with the weather. She struck it l. with the weather. Richard doesn't know he is l. to be alive. He doesn't know that he is l. he has married the girl whose father is a millionaire. Nick considered himself l. to have had the opportunity. Are you l. at cards? You are l. in having such a good wife. He was l. in the game. l. applicant/guy/owner/winner; It was l. for_{2/10} you to find a free seat (indirect). It's l. I escaped (indirect). Is anything l. about₂ your efforts? (indirect) It was l. (for₂ you) that no one saw you (indirect). My day was l. (indirect). That was the luckiest escape of my life (OALD; indirect). His escape was l. indeed (indirect). l. coincidence /guess/streak (indirect); l. charm/day (doubly indirect)*

Clues: *about₁, about₂, at₉, extremely, for₂, it₅, (that), to₄-infinitive, very, with₄, *slightly, *be imperative*

Semantic definition: <#((thing that makes / time of) phenomenon_x made - experienced by) sb_x# who experiences in strong degree good mental state_x (*this* thought) concerning sth because sb_x makes - experiences phenomenon_x unintentionally affecting sb_x as good (when sb_x wants to make phenomenon_x, (being with power concerning making habitualness))>

The idea of luck has to be attached to a definite person (or definite persons), which rules out **It was lucky to survive* or **To win is lucky*. When *for*₁₀ is introduced (*It was lucky for him to survive. For her to win was lucky*) the pattern with the infinitive becomes acceptable.

Sentences with *not know* indicate that a person need not be aware of luck he or she has. In that case it is only the omnipresent speaker who attributes this property to the person. Moreover, a lucky person has achieved success without any conscious effort, which is indicated by the seme 'unintentionally'.

Popular definition: Somebody or something is lucky if what happens to them is good for them without their effort.

obvious

Examples: *The meaning will be absolutely o. to the reader. This conclusion is very o. to historians. It₅ was o. from his look that he was angry. It₅ was painfully o. (that) she had left me. It₅ seemed o. that I should do my talk. It₅ is fairly o. to everyone that nature is in danger. That she had left me was o. It₅'s simply o. what they want. It₅ is o. from what she said that she had lied. There's nothing o. about it. This principle is more o. with abstract forms. It₅ is o. where she comes from. It₅'s o. why he did it. It₂ is obvious to rain. She has, it₂ is o., left him for good. o. amusement /annoyance /defeat /distress /exception /explanation /fact /mistake /pleasure /reason/solution/target o. successor/suspect (indirect); *It is obvious to do.*

Clues: *about*₂, *absolutely*₂, *completely*, *extremely*, *from*₉, *it*₂, *it*₅, *more*, *perfectly*, *simply*, *(that)*, *to*₁,

very, *wh*-word, *with*₄, ?*to*_{2a}-infinitive, **slightly*, **be* imperative

Semantic definition: <#(sb_x who makes) mental state_x# that unintentionally influences and makes sb_{sp/y} experience (*this*) (strongly) strongly true thought concerning state_x and come to know state_x (source being phenomenon)>

Unlike the adjective *obvious*, which can express both the speaker's and somebody else's attitude (as in *It was obvious to everybody that he was a stranger*), the corresponding adverb *obviously* is used as a sentence adverb to convey the speaker's attitude only.

Although the adverb *simply* has been attested as one of *obvious*' collocates, we have come across *very* and *more obvious*. The latter collocations seem to be colloquial. That speakers treat *obvious* differently, as an adjective with 'strongly' and even with 'strongly strongly', can be seen in the following quotation: "A number of adjectives are uncomparable, and therefore cannot properly be, though they often are, qualified by 'rather' or 'most', or used in comparative or superlative form (-er.-est). Among the most common of these adjectives are *complete, essential, excellent, fatal, full, obvious, unique*" (Collins 1956: 65). The seme '(strongly) strong' provides a whole range of degrees of intensity from 'not strong' via 'strong' to 'strongly strong'. Bolinger (1977: 108) attributes the notion of import, which corresponds to 'strong', to the appropriateness of the predicate's initial position in *Rather obvious was the lack precautions*, unlike ?*Rather suspicious was the lack of precaution*.

Popular definition: If something is obvious, it very easily makes one know what it is.

There are two other *obvious's* sememes: 'natural' (*the most o. thing to do*) and 'predictable' (*The ending was too o.*).

possible

Examples: *That explanation/result is p.; It₅ is quite / (colloquial) very p. that he said these things. That John will win the prize is p. It₅ is hardly/slightly p. that John will win. John will, it₅ is p., win the prize. It₅ is p. that it₃ might rain. It₃ is p. to rain. It₅ is p. that special introductory units should₃ be produced to get teachers out of the C category (BNC). Frost/Severe weather is p. The guilty verdict is p. It₅ is p. but not probable that I shall buy a new car. Life on Jupiter is not p. Is such a person p.? (colloquial for 'Is the existence of such a person possible?'). Recovery is p. for₂ everyone. Limits are p. of₈ exact ascertainment. 'There is such a state when somebody may know how to exactly ascertain limits.' It₅ is p. to buy petrol here. 'Event sb_{sp} is going to mention right now of buying petrol here by sb_x indef is an expected event tending towards being strongly true.' It₅ was p. (for₁₀ him) to buy petrol. It₅ was p. for_{2/10} a poor girl with talent to rise in society. This was more p. on the east (colloquial = in more cases possible). – Can this river freeze? – Yes, it₂ is p. Anything would be p. of₇ that little beggar (BNC) 'Any action made by that little beggar would be possible'. Everything is p. with God. Just as I can rise above my base instincts, so this is p. with my dog. every p. moment; It₅ is p. for₁₀ a couple to be in emotional relation without sex. It₅ is p. for₁₀ action to be taken. What is p. about your Internet connection? p. answer/cause/choice/chance/cure/danger/effect /exception/excuse/explanation /interpretation /outcome*

/reason /result; p. candidate /financier
 /liar/president/rival (indirect); p. best=-
 seller/proof/sign/solution (indirect); *John is p. to win.
 *The candidate/rival was p. *The truth that John will
 come is p. (Bellet 1977 in Higashimori 1978: 15).

Clues: *about*₂, *entirely*, *it*₂, *it*₃, *it*₅, *of*₇, *of*₈, (*that*),
perfectly, *should*₃, *slightly*, *with*₄, non-finite clause, *to*_{2a}-
 infinitive, ?*more*, ?*very*, **be*-imperative

Semantic definition <#(sth_x that makes) phenom-
 on_x# that tends towards existence (and unintentionally
 makes sb_{sp/indef} experience {strongly} strong degree of
 true thought that makes sb_{sp/indef} know sth concerning
 expected phenomenon_x)>

?*To buy petrol is possible* or ?*It is possible to buy petrol* are not well formed because the topic of the availability of petrol must be restricted, while these two sentences verging on generic are uninformative (cf. *to*_{2a}-infinitive in §3.2.6). *It is possible to buy petrol downtown* is informative and admissible, just like *To turn brine into drinking water is possible* (a piece of information not necessarily known to the hearer). 'Sth_x' is actualised as sb only in combination with *for*₁₀.

Dixon claims that "[*l*]ikely differs from *possible* in that it can focus on the outcome as due to the efforts of the subject – hence [*John is likely to win*] but not [**John is possible to win*]. We attribute the difference to the influence of the grammatical subject *John*, (the semantic one being 'John to win') in the latter sentence, which renders **John is possible* ungrammatical, while *John is likely*, although with *likely*₂, ('John is seemingly suitable for a purpose') is admissible. Another contributing cause may be the fact that non-finite clauses with their meaning 'sb experiences psychological state concerning state – habitualness' are not apt to be used with an adjective that

contains two occurrences of the seme 'make' intruding into this definition.

Popular definition: Something is possible when it shows tendency to happen.

probable

Examples: *Such an explanation/interpretation is p. An election in May seems increasingly p.⁷⁷ A victory for the Labour Party seems highly p. It is hardly/(very colloquial) slightly p. that she will win. It₅ seems very/highly p. that the blonde will win. It₅ seems p. the blonde will win. It₅ seems quite p. that it₃ may rain today. That Mark will win is p. It₅ is p. that Mark will win. Mark will, it₂ is p., win the game. For Mark to win would be highly p. ≈ 'Mark's victory in the future tends to be true in a strong degree.' Rain is p. There is nothing p. about landing on Jupiter. "Is it more p. that nature should go out of her course or that a man should tell a lie?" (Thomas Paine). p. + cause/election /explanation /interpretation /outcome /result; Wilfork (player) p. with illness (indirect). Smith (player) listed as p. with back spasm (indirect). (In both headlines 'not to play' is elided, and with means 'experiencing'.) her p. successor (indirect); the p. venue for the Olympics ('space for phenomena that make sports contests', indirect); *It is probable who will come (no 'know' in the definition). *It is p. (for her) to win.*It is p. to rain.*

Clues: *about₂, absolutely₂ (rare), for₁₀, highly, increassingly, it₂, it₅, more, should₃, (that) rarely omitted, to_{2a}-infinitive (rare), very, slightly, *simply, *be imperative*

Semantic definition: <#(sb_x who makes - is affected by / space for) event_x - state_x# that unintentionally makes sb_{sp/indef} experience thought (tending to be??) true in some degree, concerning expected event_x - state_x>

The definition does not predict **(His) winning is p.* because the directive head is 'event - state' rather than 'habitualness', the situation already met in *likely*. So it requires *It is p. that he will win* or *That he will win is p.*

Popular definition: If something is probable, it is expected to happen.

remarkable

Examples: *His statement was r. for₃ its clarity. John's achievement was the more r. in that he did it alone.* (= The speaker has this thought concerning the phenomenon of his doing it alone: the phenomenon is remarkable'). *Prices were simply r. It₅ is r. (that) he did it alone. It₅ is r. that he should have achieved it.* (See also *that* in §3.1.3.) *To have won this reward is absolutely r. It₅ was r. (for₁₀ her) to learn Chinese so quickly. For₁₀ her to have survived such an ordeal was r. It is absolutely r. how long we've tolerated each other. It₂ is r. to Jack (= sb_y) how she managed to climb the top. There is nothing r. about the film. What is r. about this view is that is centuries old. r. ability/event/feat/speech; The restaurant is r. with a large attendance. r. book/woman (indirect); The boy was r. for₃ his stupidity (indirect) *She is remarkable to win. (Remarkable does not agree with a non-finite clause as defined in § 3.2.3.)*

Clues: *about*₂, *absolutely*₁, *for*₃, *it*₂, *it*₅, *simply*, *should*₃, *(that)*, *to*₄, *very*, *wh-word*, *with*₄, *to*₃-infinitive, **be imperative*, *?more*, **slightly*

Semantic definition: <#(thing that makes) phenomenon_x / sb_x# that unintentionally influences and makes sb_{sp/indf/y} experience {strongly strongly good} / strongly strongly bad | thought_x | because of / concerning not expected phenomenon_x made by sb_y when sb_{sp/y} comes to | know / experience thought_x concerning | phenomenon_x>

The seme 'that' after the directive may refer either to 'phenomenon' or to 'sb_x'. The seme 'sb' is realized jointly with *for*₁₀ and *to*₃-infinitive. *To*₃-infinitive without *for*₁₀ yields 'sb'.

Popular definition: If something or somebody is remarkable, because of what is known about them they are regarded as unexpected and extremely good (usually) or very bad (less usually).

sad

(1)

Examples: *Dick was s. to hear the bad news. I am slightly sad (that) she had to go. Mary feels very s. about the news. They were very s. that he should no longer be the president. John was s. with himself. Paul was s. with all these redundancies. s. eyes/face/music/silence/smile /voice (indirect)*

Clues: *about*₁, *extremely*, *feel*, *should*₃, *slightly*, *(that)*, *to*₃-infinitive, *very*, *with*₃, *exclusively predicative*, **at*₃ (because not 'concentrated')

Semantic definition: <#(strong expression of mental state_x of) sb_x# who during short time experiences bad emotion_x - state_x / *this* thought when {not expected} phenomenon_x is made by sb_{y/x}, and because of / concerning sth which is not as sb_x likes {when sb_x feels heavy and/or like crying}>.

Because *The dog's eyes were s.* and *Her smile is always so s.* are felicitous although infrequent, we introduced 'strong' in front of 'expression' to account for this fact. Indeed, mental phenomena that show by means of personal bodily expressions ought to be strong if they are to be recorded as such.

Sadness is regarded as one of basic emotions (Ungerer and Schmid 1996: 142) and is especially difficult to define. ("[I]t is almost impossible to provide a direct lexicographic explication of a word denoting an emotion" (Apresjan/Apresjan 2000: 203).) In order to make this definition complete we had to distinguish the emotion of sadness from that of anger or depression. To do it, we needed the help of cognitive linguistics and we have made use of idiomatic expressions associated with sadness, such as *one's spirits sink/are low, with heavy heart* and the like. The physiological effects of an emotion stand for the emotion (Lakoff 1987: 381 - 383) and this may help to this aim.

Sad and *unhappy* are not absolute synonyms, as noticed by Goddard (2010: 78). This shows in their definitions (*unhappy* is the same as *happy* with the exchange of 'good' for 'bad', 'not' added, and furthermore - unlike *happy* - *unhappy* collocates with *over*). *unhappy* <#((time phenomenon / space - phenomenon_x that makes) mental phenomenon_y / expression of mental phenomenon_y | of) sb_x# who for {long} - short time experiences bad and strong mental phenomenon_x concerning phenomenon_y experienced, when sb_{x/y} does not do what / when sth is not as | sb_x likes>. The main

difference lies in infrequency of 'strong' in *sad*. The complex seme 'when sb_{x/y} does not do what / when sth is not as | sb_{x/y} likes' corresponds to Wierzbicka's (1999: 60 – 63 in Goddard 2010: 78) 'I don't want things like this to happen' in the explication of *sad*, and it has the same meaning as *dissatisfied*. *I feel₁ so sad/*unhappy about what is happening to you* is inappropriate when said to a colleague in the hospital who is dying of cancer (both examples from Goddard 2010: 78) because *unhappy* typically refers to a long time emotion and is in clash with the present progressive tense of *is happening*. Both *sad* and *unhappy* co-occur with *slightly/a little* + *unhappy /sad*, which indicates that the seme 'strong', signalled by the predicate use of indirect connections is here a variable seme. Because of *over* and *at* after *unhappy* we know that the typical 'strong' of *unhappy* is stronger than the variable 'strong' of *sad*. So the seme 'strong' shifts on a scale of degrees.

Popular definition: If somebody is sad, they feel bad, (almost) like crying, because of a bad unexpected event.

(2)

Examples: *It₅ is s. to lose the game. It₅ is absolutely s. that he should have lost the game. It₅ was s. (that) he had lost the game. It₂'s very s. for you. It₅'s s. (for her) to realize what happened. This is so s. to us both. It₅'s s. about your trip being cancelled. It₅ is s. about John being so badly wounded. There is something s. about that event. What is s. about his last song? He may, it₂ is s., lose the next game. He is s. to listen to. It₅ is s. to listen to him. It₅ is s. where he lives. It₅ is s. how boring watching TV can be. s. affair /episode /life /loss /melody /news/occasion /state; s. day /ending /moment /time ('time', indirect); s. comment /indictment /reflection /reminder /story ('mental phenomenon concerning*

phenomenon', indirect); *s. room* (space, indirect); *s. fact/thought/truth /memory* ('thought', indirect); **The fact/truth is sad.*

Clues: *about*₂, *absolutely*₂ (rare), *deeply*, *extremely*, *for*₂, *intensely*, *it*₂, *it*₅, *should*₃, *slightly*, (*that*), non-finite clause, *to*₃-infinitive, *to*₄ (rare), *very*, *wh*-word

Semantic definition: <#(mental state_x concerning / space for / time for) phenomenon_x# that influences - affects sb_{x/sp/y} and makes sb_{sp} experience (*this*) bad thought_x concerning not expected phenomenon_x when sb_{x{sp}} | comes to know phenomenon_x / wants doing sth>. The seme 'sb_y' is intended for those propositions in which sb other than sb_{sp} (introduced by *for*₂) is sad because of what happened.

Definitions (1) and (2) represent separate sememes, which is proven by zeugmatic **John was sad to listen to and to hear bad news.*

Unlike *happy*, which only sometimes denotes the speaker's mental state, *sad*₂ almost always implies the speaker's specific thought. Therefore, *It*₅ *is sad that...*, but **It*₅ *is happy that....* ?*That he lost is sad* is better than **That he won is happy*, but worse than *That he lost is certain.*

Popular definition: If something is sad, it makes somebody feel sad.

sensible

Examples: *Your decision is s.; It*₅ *was absolutely s. of you to inform the police. To try is s. It*₅ *is s. that each be well represented. It*₂ *is hardly s. to take all that food with*

you. It₅ is s. (for₁₀ a student) to study hard. It₅ is s. that he should save some money. Ann was s. enough to stop driving. Frank is not s. about lots of things. There's nothing s. about marrying. Now you are being s. It is s. to Peter (= sb_y) that she married John. Be s. with alcohol/money/weight loss. It's not s. why she's calling. s. decision /idea /move /precaution /step /suggestion; s. lad /person

Clues: *about₂, absolutely₂, it₂, it₅, of₃, should₃, SUBJUNCTIVE, that, to₃-infinitive, to₄, wh-word (rare), with₂, is being + ADJ, *slightly*

Semantic definition: <#sb_x / phenomenon_x made by sb_x# that influences and makes sb_{sp/y} experience strongly good thought concerning sb_x | because sb_x makes / when sb_{sp/y} comes to know | behaviour expected to be intentionally made by sb_x using good mind (when sb_x activates / uses sth)>

The seme 'phenomenon_x made by sb_x' has been established as an alternative head on the model of *foolish*. Otherwise, *foolish* and *sensible* are opposites; cf. *It is sensible/*foolish that he should travel alone*, as *foolish* does not contain 'expected'; *I felt foolish/*sensible, sensible* being without 'experience vague thought'. The seme 'made by sb with good mind' has been added independently of the collocational method in order to distinguish this lexeme from others of similar meaning. The secondary meaning 'practical rather than fashionable/attractive' has developed through the expansion '(man-made thing to be put on body of)' added to #sb_x#.

Popular definition: If somebody is sensible, their behaviour is regarded as good because he or she uses

good sense. If something is sensible, the speaker thinks that it is made by somebody with good sense.

sure

(1)

Examples: *Jane is not s. about his success. He was so s. of himself. I have never felt surer of success. John is being absolutely s. of getting it. I'm s. he will come. Are you s.? Are you quite s. who she is? I'm s. that Jane will be late. She wasn't s. how she felt about it. I'm not s. where to go. It is difficult/impossible to be s. who is going to win. I wasn't s. for the right colour. You can never be s. with Jane. I was more and more s. that he was going to win. s. grasp/knowledge/understanding ('thought experienced by sb', indirect), s. promise ('thought made by sb', indirect), *sure person*

Clues: *about*₁, *absolutely*₂, *feel*₂, *for*₇, *is being* + adj (rare), *more*, *of*₈, *(that)*, *wh-word*, *with*₄, exclusively predicative, ??*slightly*

Semantic definition: <#(thought_x experienced - made by) sb_{x/sp}# who during short time experiences strong degree of | mental phenomenon_x / *this* {good} true thought_x | that makes sb_{x/sp} know sth concerning sth_x / {strongly} wanting phenomenon_x (which makes sb_x's behaviour)>

In *Be sure to lock the door!* *sure* means 'The speaker wants to be sure that sb_h will lock the door' and the imperative actually refers to *lock*.

(2)

Examples: *The success/victory is s. God's promise is s. Kate is s. to be late. (Kate to be late' is a 'phenomenon' and the semantic "subject" of 'The idea of Kate to be late makes the speaker be sure that this phenomenon will*

happen'.) *It₃'s s. to rain.* ('The environmental state makes the speaker sure that it is going to rain'.) *The telephone was s. to ring again. He is absolutely s. to win the game. One thing is (for) s. s. + death/defeat /disaster/success/thing/victory* 'The speaker is sure that death/defeat... will happen'; ?*It is s. that it will go wrong.* *s. promise* (indirect = 'sb_x's words_x that make sb_{sp} have strong thought that sb_x's words_x concerning phenomenon made by sb_x in the future will come true'); *s. loser/winner* (sb who is affected by phenomenon, indirect); *s. witness* (sb who makes phenomenon, indirect); *s. indication /indicator/promise/sign/way* (phenomenon_x that makes sb experience phenomenon_y, doubly indirect); *s. bet* (doubly indirect = 'phenomenon_x of sb_x giving money that makes sb_x be affected by receiving more money if sb_x's thought concerning phenomenon_y in the future comes true, that makes sb_{sp} experience strongly true thought concerning phenomenon_y', i.e. 'the speaker is sure about the possibility that sb_x is going to win money when betting'. **It is s. who is going to win. s. evidence* (doubly indirect = 'sth_x that makes phenomenon_x be known and makes sb_{sp} think that phenomenon_x is strongly true'); **Bet/Evidence is s.* (doubly indirect; *Evidence is s. to come to light* is a direct connection of the non-finite clause *evidence to come to light* ('particular phenomenon' and the *sure*'s analysis.)

Clues: *absolutely₂, for₁, it₃, that* (rare), *to_{2a}-infinitive*, non-finite clause, **slightly*, **wh*-word

Semantic definition: <#((phenomenon_x that makes) sb_x affected by / sb_x experience) particular phenomenon_y# that unintentionally makes sb_{sp} experience (*this*) {good - bad} thought_x that tends to be strongly true thought_x concerning phenomenon_y>

**Sure fact* is bad for reason of pleonasm, *fact* repeating 'strongly true thought'. *Sure* bans the IT_2 IS ADJ *THAT* pattern for the same reason that *happy* does (see above).

According to Dixon (2005: 88) when *sure* is used with a human subject it always focuses on the subject's efforts, hence the unacceptability of [**That John will win the prize is sure*].” If Dixon was right, the sentence *John is sure to win* would also be wrong. We account for this difference in acceptability by drawing attention to the seme 'phenomenon made by sth', whereas 'that John will win the prize' is 'this thought experienced by sb'.

Although *bet*, *evidence* and *promise* all refer to 'phenomenon_x' of the *sure*'s directive head, only *promise* seems to allow of the predicative position. This means that the seme 'strong' of *promise*, especially when the promise is made by God (see §3.4.3.a) considerably contributes to 'strongly' in the analysis of *sure*, which is less effective in *bet* and *evidence*, where 'the only possible phenomenon' comes to the fore and bans the predicative position.

Sure is non-factive (cf. Kiparsky and Kiparsky 1970: 143 –145) because it has got 'true' without 'know'.

Notice the slight difference between *certain victory* and *sure victory*: *certain victory* is with 'as the only possible', which is lacking from *sure victory*. *Certain fact* is better, just as *very young baby* is more acceptable than *young baby*.

?*It is sure that she will pass the exam* and ?*It now seems sure (that) the election will bring her victory* sound rather informal and are not accepted by all speakers, who prefer *It is clear/obvious that she will pass the exam*.

?*It is sure for her to win* is avoided just like *certain* and *likely* in the same pattern.

**Mark is sure to be foolish* is not well-chosen, unlike *Your wish is sure to be foolish*, because the direct connection is with 'phenomenon' rather than 'sb', while a predicative *sure* prevents such connection. *Sure*, *likely*

and *certain* do normally collocate with *to*_{2a}-infinitive in the pattern above, but only with ambient *it*₃, in verbs such as *dawn*, *snow*, adverbs like *early*, adjectives such as *dark*, *quiet*, nouns such as *midnight*, as in *It*₃ *is likely/sure to*₂ *rain*, *It*₃ *is certain to*_{2a} *be noon*. **It is not sure to become a winner in lottery*. vs ?*It*₂ *is not sure for her to*₆ *become a winner in lottery* (stylistically better: *She is not sure to become a winner in lottery*).

According to LDCE "in BrE, **certainly**, and *I'm certain* are used when one really knows the truth; **surely** and *I'm sure* when one has only a strong hope or belief: *I'm certain he didn't steal it/He certainly didn't steal it: I stole it myself!* | *I'm sure he didn't steal it/Surely he didn't steal it: He's not that kind of person.*" The seme 'strongly' has been marked as typical because COBUILD comments on *s. knowledge/road /understanding/way* as *u s u a l l y* attributive.

Popular definition: If somebody is sure, they know that something is or will be true. If something is sure, the speaker strongly believes it to be true or going to come true.

surprising

Examples: *The decision is very s. We had a s. amount in common. That they have lost is absolutely s. It is not s. (that) they lost. It is not s. (that) he should have jumped at the chance. It is s. what people will do for money. It is s. to/for*₂ *us that he has quit the job. It would be s. (for*₁₀ *John) to resign. Reaction to his report is s. for*₃ *its shock. For*₁₀ *John to resign would be s. This is not s. with a small child. To hear her talk like that is s. It is s. to hear her talk like that. That Mary loves John is s. There is nothing s. about that. What is s. about his behaviour is that he's*

only 10. *s. agility/conclusion/degree/case/speed/success/result; s. person/winner* (indirect); *You are s.* (indirect)

Clues: *about*₂, *absolutely*₂ (rare), *for*₂, *for*₃, *for*₁₀, *it*₅, *should*₃, *slightly*, (*that*), *to*₄, *very*, *wh-word*, *with*₄, *to*₃-infinitive, **be*-imperative

Semantic definition: <#(sb_x who makes - experiences) phenomenon_x# that unintentionally influences, affects and makes sb_{sp/y} experience {good} - bad thought concerning not expected phenomenon_x when sb_{sp/y} comes to know phenomenon_x>

Popular definition: If something is surprising, it is unexpected when somebody comes to know about it.

3.3.7 b Discussion

For an adjective to be a stance adjective, it is necessary that one of its sememes has 'sb_{sp} experience thought concerning phenomenon' in the definitional analysis. The seme 'phenomenon' of the analyses, or one of its hyponyms, is repeated in the directive, either as the head (*certain, definite, essential, foolish, interesting, obvious, possible, probable, remarkable, sad, sensible, sure, surprising*) or in the expansions of *happy* and *lucky*. However, the adjective *sorry* does not produce **sorrily*, although defined as <#(thought_x of) sb_x# who during small degree of amount of time experiences bad thought_x concerning phenomenon that makes sb_xfeel bad>. This is probably due to the fact that *sorry* is abundantly used as a discourse marker, often in its basic form *Sorry* (short for *I am sorry*), with the same function as **sorrily*. This phenomenon reminds us of blocking (Aronoff 1976: 43), the phenomenon of the non-

occurrence of a complex form because of the existence of another form, for instance **stealer* because of *thief* (Bolinger 1975: 109) or *!list* because of *enlist* (Clark and Clark 1979: 798; all mentioned in Bauer 1983: 87).

The great division in Quirk et al. 1972, with attitudinal vs. comment disjunct adverbs, repeats itself with stance adjectives. Attitudinal (evaluative) adjectives *essential, foolish, happy, important, interesting, lucky, remarkable, sad₂, sensible* and *surprising* contain 'good' or 'bad', as distinct from comment (epistemic) adjectives *certain, definite₂, likely, obvious, possible, probable*, and *sure*, which express likelihood, i.e. 'expected to be true' (*possible₂*) or 'strongly true thought' (the rest). Other divisions in Greenbaum (1969) and Biber et al. (1999) rarely match ours.

All kinds of divisions and categorizations within stance adjectives are possible, just as it has been done for stance (disjunct) adverbs depending on the semantic element that is taken as a common seme. The seme 'strongly true thought' without 'expected' is shared by *certain, definite* and *sure*, which can be recognized as Greenbaum's comment disjuncts for truth value with conviction. In Bolinger's opinion (1977: 110), *certain, likely* and *sure* have assertive function like information verbs *assert, fear, remember, say, show*, and therefore: *There was certain/likely/sure/*possible to be an outbreak.*

Certain, likely, possible and *sure* regularly collocate with *to*-infinitive in the pattern IT_3 IS ADJ TO_2 -INF only when the verb of the *to*-infinitive lexically denotes an environmental phenomenon, time phenomenon or distance, with the verbs such as *dawn, snow*, adverbs like *early*, adjectives like *dark, quiet*, nouns such as *midnight* and *dawn*, e.g. *It₃ is likely/sure to₁ rain, It₃ is certain to₁ be noon*. The semes 'environmental phenomenon', 'time' 'distance' have no AGENT or EXPERIENCER that could be specified and require *it₃* as the subject that communicates the meaning of an indefinite AGENT. (cf. **To rain is*

certain. **To be noon is sure*). Since phenomena with an indefinite AGENT are a kind of phenomenon, a strong point can be made for *it* in the pattern *IT IS* ADJ *TO-_{INF}* fulfilling the roles of both *it*₂ and *it*₃.

One of the differences between *sure*₂ and *definite*₂ is the interference of 'sb be affected by / experience' between 'phenomenon_x' and phenomenon_y'.

The only difference between *probably* and *likely*, at least according to the results achieved by dint of the collocational method, seems to be in 'tend' attached to 'to be true' in *likely*, which is rather infrequent in *probable*. The difference has been explained by Wierzbicka (1988: 57) in the following terms: *likely* is a psychological predicate, which requires an individual mind as a point of reference, while *possible/probable* is a logical predicate and "[sentence [with *possible* or *probable*] can be true or false, regardless of people's views, thoughts, ideas, and so on" (Wierzbicka 1988: 56). "*Likely* focuses on people's thoughts, expectations and knowledge, so it has a psychological perspective; by contrast, *probable* focuses on relationships between events, and so it has a logical perspective" (57). In other words, 'tend to be true thought' is subjective, whereas 'degree of true thought' is prevalently objective. This accounts for *It is likely / *probable to rain*, *likely to happen* but ?*p. to happen* (Fowler 1965 s.v. *probable*); **John is p. to win*. Another difference lies in the sphere of style. *Likely* is rather colloquial, while *probable* tends to be formal (cf. *laws/theory of probability / *likelihood*; *calculate the probability / *likelihood* of throwing a 6 in dice).

There are several differences between *possible* and *probable*: (i) the presence of 'typically strongly (expected)' in *probable* and lack of this seme in *possible*, (ii) sb_x being an alternative in *possible*, but not in *probable*, (iii) the regular presence of 'tend' only in *possible*. *Possible* contains 'true {in strongly} strong degree', while *probable* is invariantly 'true in degree'. Cf. *more/most probable* vs

?more/?most possible. Better: *There is a distant /little/low/unlikely probability that...* than *It is slightly probable that....* Unlike **Accidents in heavy industry are always probable*, *Accidents in heavy industry are always possible* is correct due to the fact that only *possible* allows 'habitualness'. The greatest difference lies in the complex seme 'that is expected to tend towards being true', which is attached to the directive 'phenomenon_x' directly when *possible* is concerned, and is far from the *probable*'s directive. This makes *probable* weightier than *possible*.

In *certain*, *definite*, *sad* and *sure* 'sb_{sp}' of sememes (2) corresponds to 'sb_x' of sememes (1), which is a case of "subjectification"; cf. Traugott and Dasher 2005: 96-99 et passim). Thus, *certain fate* is the fate of which the speaker is certain, but *interesting fate* does not entail that the speaker is interesting.

There are instances of 'sb' appearing as the only head: in *certain*₁, *definite*₁, *happy*, *lucky*, *sad*₁, and *sure*₁. *Likely* has 'only sb' _{sp}, but there is no 'sb' in the directive.

In the sphere of probability there is an intensity scale: *definite*₂ is with 'experience {strongly} strong (degree of?) true thought', *certain*₂ and *sure*₂ are with 'experience thought that tends towards being true in strong degree', *possible*₂ has '{strongly} strong degree of true thought', while *probable* contains 'thought expected (to tend) to be true in degree'.

The stance adjectives *certain*, *essential*, *likely* and *possible*, (see §3.3.7) seek the company of *to*₂-infinitive because they mirror its seme 'tend', while *interesting* and *surprising* agree with *to*₃-infinitive repeating its content. The *to*-infinitive within a non-finite clause retains the meaning of *to*₁-infinitive <(make - experience) mental phenomenon_x !wanting / tending towards! being - making - experiencing phenomenon_y>. **It*₂ *is certain/likely/sure for it*₃ *to rain*.

The pronoun *it*₂ agrees with those stance adjectives that contain 'phenomenon' as (the head of) the directive. *Sad* is the only adjective in the stance group that permits *IT IS ADJ ABOUT*: *It is sad / *interesting / *surprising about his leaving the town. *It is certain/definite/sure about his going abroad. *It is foolish/happy/lucky + about + him/his leaving the place.* The definition of *it*₂ is compatible with the second group, but not with *about*, while the first group agrees with *about*, but not with *it*₂. Only *sad* has such a definitional meaning that accommodates both *it*₂ and *about*.

**It is certain/foolish/surprising about his leaving the place* is not permissible unlike *It*₅ *is surprising about John's leaving the place that it was so sudden* because the former makes an inconclusive and unfinished proposition. The gloss of the asterisked sentences is: 'The speaker finds something that has to do with his leaving the place certain/foolish/surprising', which is not informative enough and requires an explanation contained in the following *that*-clause.

Sememe *for*₈ with its seme 'true' agrees only with *certain* and *sure*.

The adjectives that object to *SB THINKS IT ADJ* are *certain*, *definite*, *happy*, *lucky* and *sure*. This is to be expected since in sentences of the type *She thought it* ___ (also *believe/consider/deem/find it* ___) only stance adjectives with *sb*_x in the analysis of the primary sememes may fit. The following construction with the same adjectives is also wrong: **..., which is certain /definite/happy/lucky/sure* (cf. Greenbaum 1969: 216; Quirk et al. 1972: 519), as in **John will become a judge, which is certain*. The primary meaning of *certain*, with 'sb' in the directive head, "casts shadow" on its secondary meanings with 'phenomenon'.

Indefinite pronouns contain 'sb_{indef}'. For this reason *happy* and, usually, *sure*, which do not have 'sb_{indef}' do not collocate with indefinite pronouns *nothing*, *anything*,

everything, what, something, and do not take part in the patterns such as *THERE IS NOTHING ADJ ABOUT₂, WHAT IS ADJ ABOUT₂ IS*, and the like.

The pattern *SB IS ADJ ABOUT₁* is available for all stance adjectives that have 'sb' as the head in the directive. The head #sth# does not count although 'sth' includes 'sb' (in *essential, important, interesting, likely, possible, probable, surprising*), e.g. **She is essential /important etc. about performing difficult tasks.*

3.4. VERBS

3.4.0 When collocations are concerned, verbs are the most important of all parts of speech. In addition to the analysis, their definitions contain obligatory slots for the subject directive and, for transitives, an additional object directive. "Verbs are inextricably linked with the syntactic structure, which may be why people with language disorders often find them harder to handle than nouns" (Aitchison 1994: 11). Hanks (2013: 115) mentions the possibility "that the semantics of a verb are determined by the totality of its complementation patterns" as a hypothesis, which is proven in our book.

Because definitions of verbs include directives, they represent a specific kind of sentences. "Within a phrase [...] the verb is a little despot, dictating which of the slots made available by the super-rules are to be filled. These demands are stored in the verb's entry in the mental dictionary [...]. Each of these entries lists a definition (in mentalese) of some kind of event, followed by the players that have roles in the event. The entry indicates how each role-player may be plugged into the sentence – as a subject, an object, a prepositional object, an embedded sentence, and so on" (Pinker 1995: 113 -114).

When commenting on the meaning of the verb *pelt*, Halliday (1970: 150, 151) said: "An inherent function is one that is always associated with a given clause type even if it is not necessarily expressed in the structure of all clauses of that type [... T]he verb *pelt*, as it happens, is always associated with three participant roles: a pelter, a pelted and something to pelt with [...] so [...] *Roderick pelted the crocodile* is 'inherently instrumental', and although no instrument is mentioned the receiver interprets the process as having an instrumental role associated with it".

The collocational method finds the way to verb directives by searching for the common meaning of their subjects and objects. For definitional analyses, the usual source of information are collocating prepositions. Another source of verb definitions are verb - adverb collocations, as adverbs are the most frequent modifiers of verbs. Parts of verbal definitions with the semes 'state' or 'perception' are reserved for adjectives as collocators.

Within the analyses of verbs there can appear omisable, variable parts, which do not constitute a definition proper, but still provide useful information about certain collocators. They are indicated by round brackets or simply left out if liable to a general rule of a facultative occurrence (e.g. 'space' in *with*). Such bracketed semes conjure up ideas that are not always present in the speaker's mind when using the particular lexeme, but are occasionally activated, as proven by its collocators, and therefore they are important enough to enter the definition. Otherwise, they are out of focus or backgrounded (see §3.4). An example is the verb *levy* <#sb_x with social power# makes sb_y give #amount of money_x to be given#⁷⁵ expected of sb_y because of sth_x that sb_y is with power to use (when sb_x takes sth_x which is base if sb_y does not give money_x)>. The part within the brackets contributes to an alloseme of the verb *levy* denoting compensation if money is not given. In *The*

government levied a tax on excess profits the expansion within the definition is not activated and the prepositional object after *on* corresponds to 'sth_x' in the definition of *on*₉, whereas *The debt was levied on the debtor's goods* brings about the idea of compensation and the preposition *on*₅ is provoked by 'sth_x' within the bracketed semes. There is a third sememe of *on* - *on*₇ 'expected of sb', functioning in *A departure tax is levied on travellers*.

3.4.1 Connecting verbs with adjectives

Verbs are usually connected with nouns and adverbs, but there are numerous instances when they are directly linked with adjectives. In that case only analyses combine and there are no directives to appear.

Most instances of verbs that establish a collocational tie with adjectives amount to the linking (or copulative, equative) verbs or "connectors" (cf. Hockett 1958: 196), i.e. those that can be substituted for *be*. At the same time both the verb and the adjective contain 'state'. This kind of collocation also appears in the conjunction of an intransitive verb followed by a noun (phrase), as in *He felt a reformed man. She looks a lady*.

3.4.1a Linking verbs of perception (see §3.4.8), such as *feel, seem, smell, sound, taste*, require an adjective rather than an adverb to follow. *The soup tastes sour* implies that the soup is sour, but since it is the verb *taste* that the adjective is directly connected to, the taste, too, is described as sour. All such verbs are defined as '#sth# is in state that unintentionally makes sb experience mental psychosomatic state'.

3.4.1b Transitive and intransitive verbs of transformation can be followed by adjectives, as *turn (red), (line)*

become (engaged), grow (big), pick (bone clean), tear (free). They share the meaning ‘#sth_x# comes to be in state’. The definition also covers verbs which contain ‘come to be in same state’, such as *keep, hold, preserve, and maintain*. *She kept her marriage secret. They cannot hold inflation steady*. Again, the complement in the form of the adjective equivocally modifies both the noun and the verb. The nearness of the complement to the verb emphasizes the connection with the verb, conveying information about the resultative change of state, but the adjective also establishes a connection with the noun informing about the entity that changes the state. The same category includes *come, fall* and *go*, whose primary meanings contain the seme ‘move’ (or more specifically ‘move to sb’, ‘move downward’ and ‘move away from sb’ respectively), here used metaphorically for ‘come to be in state’ and thus used as linking verbs. See also *run*₃ + ADJ as well as *drive wild* in §3.3.5. Having negative connotation, *fall* is reserved for the meaning ‘come to be weak’ (as in *fall + apart/asleep/away/back /behind/down /due/flat/ill/lame/moneyless/prey/quiet/sick/silent/speechless/vacant /victim*); also cf. the adverb *down* with a similar meaning in *be down with illness* and the verb *fall* as in *fall in love, fall into + abeyance /decay /decline /depression /discredit /disrepair /disrepute /disuse /error /rage/sleep/temptation, fall in line ‘become obedient’, fall on hard times, fall off the wagon, fall out of use, fall short of sth*.

The verb *go* here has a negative connotation of deviation (metaphorically ‘going away’), and means ‘come not to be in normal state, which is bad’ (*go adrift /bad/bald /bankrupt/blind/broke /crazy /extinct /flat /grey /hog-wild/hungry/lame/mad/mouldy/sick/sour /stir-crazy /weak/wild/wrong; go into a daze; go haywire*, which is colloquial for ‘become out of control’, ‘stop working properly’; cf. similar *go to pieces, go to sleep*), but idioms with *go* can have other meanings: *go easy on sth, go sky-high, go strait*. The opposite *come* has the meaning ‘come

to not be together any more', as in: *come + adrift/apart /loose/undone/unglued/unstuck*, or 'come to be in good state': *come + alive /(a)round/cheap/clean/right/true*. A similar, but less precise conclusion was drawn in Clark (1974), that *come* is never used to denote departure from, nor *go* entry into, a normal state.

There are transitive counterparts of intransitive verbs of transformation in the meaning 'make sth come to be in state': *The noise was driving them all mad*.

If the verb is transitive and contains 'make sth come to be in state' in the definition, like *drive*₂, *keep*, *hold*, the connection between the noun and the adjective is unifying (**The noise was driving them. *She kept her marriage*). If there is no 'make', as in *leave*₃ (*Leave me alone!*) or if the verb contains 'make sth come to be in state' optionally (*He was knocked unconscious. beat sb black and blue, jolt sb awake, scare sb stiff*), 'make sth come to be in state' is additional information to the verb about the real state – see also §3.3.2c II.

3.4.1c Adjectives with the same 'state' can be attached as adjuncts directly to intransitive verbs other than verbs of transformation, and they mean the non-resultative 'while sth is in state'. The state is usually a short-lasting one, as for instance, *She handed him the towel wet. They caught him asleep. She was walking bare-footed* 'While she was walking she was bare-footed', *act strange, play (it) cool* – see also *remain* §3.4.8. *He got off the bench very nervous/*insane* 'When he got off the bench, he was very nervous /*insane'. Getting off the bench is more or less contemporaneous with his being nervous, but to be insane is a long-time state, which does not allow putting it on a line with the short-lasting event of getting off the bench. "Quasi-predicative adjectives are frequent with the usual verbs of state: *lie, stand, sit, hang* [as in] *fallen leaves lying thick and wet upon the paths*" (Jespersen 1965 III: 358). See also §3.2.4. a where a different type of VERB + ([PRO]NOUN) + ADJ is discussed.

3.4.1d A verb in the pattern S + V + O + ADJ has a causative meaning if O is co-referential with S. The verb need not be transitive. Examples are: *John drank himself silly. Frank smoked himself sick last night. Sister Agnes prayed herself out of Purgatory. The horse worked itself free. Grace sang/screamed herself hoarse. He talked himself hoarse.* In such constructions, a prepositional phrase with *to*, like *to death* or *to sleep*, has the effect of an adjective. *John worked himself to death. Grace sang herself to sleep. Sister Agnes sinned herself (in)to disgrace.* (Herbert 1975: 263, 266). Only nouns derived from verbs may function as the object of *to*, while the adjectives are mainly stative and must not be passive participles (Herbert 1975: 265).

3.4.2 "Legal" verbs

There are a number of verbs that we shall call "legal" verbs, which have to do with legal acts and consequently in their directions manifest the same 'legal' either as diagnostic or as typical. In order to define them, we shall follow the usual steps of the collocational method, restricting our choice of collocates to more frequent ones, and start with a small but sufficient corpus of their collocations. These verbs often manifest additional "non-legal" meanings, which will be treated here only sporadically.

abolish + *ceiling/censorship/conscription/foreign exchange control /fox hunting /immunity /institution /law /monarchy /death penalty/pension/practice/capital punishment/quota on immigrants/visa regime /right /scheme /slavery /system /tax.* The definition of *abolish*₁ is: <#sb_{with legal power}# using language instantaneously makes #{legal} state / habitualness concerning {a lot of} sb_(more than one)# come to not exist any more>

Information on inadmissible collocations is also important: *abolish* + **criticism/*hatred /*headache* (not 'legal state' and not 'a lot of sb_{more than one}')/**revolution* (not 'legal state'). (There is another sememe *abolish*₂, defined as <#sb_{with power}# makes #{bad} long-time state concerning a lot of sb_{more than one}# come to be experienced as not true and not exist any more>, exemplified by *abolish*₂ + old *custom/famine/pestilence /plague/unemployment/war.*) The collocation **abolish disaster* is not acceptable because *disaster* denotes an event that often comes suddenly; it is not a long-time state. Its effects can be mitigated or obliterated, but not the action itself.

abrogate + *act/agreement/alliance/article /claim /clause /commitment/constitution/control /custom/law /monarchy /obligation/penalty /practice /privilege /prohibition /quota /responsibility/right/traditional role/system/tax/treaty*

By discovering and applying the common content of the nouns above, we get: *abrogate* <#sb_{with power}# instantaneously makes #(phenomenon made by use of language to make){legal} state - habitualness concerning sb_{more than one}# come to be without legal power>

amend + *agreement/clause/conscription/constitution /document /law /legislation /statement /text; Law can amend constitution.* <#(sth_x legal made by use of language by) sb_x {with legal power}# makes #sth_y made by use of language in writing# come to be different and better than before>

ban + *book/injunction/practice/smoking/use of chemicals; b. sb from sth* <#(sth legal made by) sb_x with {legal} power# strongly expects to make (#)sb_y(#) not make

(#)thing - habitualness(#)> *Book* in *b. book* highlights the distribution facet of *book*, which is 'in order to make a lot of sb_{indef} more than one experience state' – see § 1.1.2 for *book* and §1.1.2d for facet.

*break*₂ + *ban /blockade /ceasefire /convention /curfew /martial law/oath/restriction/rule* <#sb_x# makes phenomenon_x that is not in accordance with #mental state concerning phenomenon_y expected by sb_y with {legal} power who wants to make sb_x (not) make phenomenon_x#>

*bring*₂ + *accusation/action/appeal/case/charges/claim /prosecution/suit* against sb <#sb_x# makes #sth made by use of language by sb_x who wants to make sb_y with legal power make sb_z without social power#>

contravene + *act/agreement/article/authority/convention /custom /law /legislation /social principle /regulation /rule/statement; *c. offer/passport* <#sb_x# makes event that is not according to #phenomenon made by use of symbols {language} by | sb_y with {legal} power concerning (a lot of) sb_z (more than one)#>

endorse + *amendment/appeal/ban/presidential cam-paign /design /idea /measures /research paper /product /remark/treaty; The newspaper endorsed the Republican candidate. The plan endorses the private ownership.* <#(sth made by use of language by) sb with {legal} power# uses language to make #sth# be legal>

establish + *custom/fame/law/order/practice/principle /procedure /quota /regime /reputation /rule/slavery /sovereignty/tradition* <#sb_x with {legal} power / a lot of sb_x more than one# makes #long-time state / habitualness

{made by use of symbols} concerning {a lot of} sb_y more than one#>

impose + *ban/ceiling /censorship /condition /control /embargo /injunction /obligation /order /penalty /prohibition /punishment/quota /regime /regulation /requirement /rule /sentence/tax/treaty/value* <#sb_x {with legal power}# makes #strong {legal} state concerning {a lot of} sb_y {more than one} when sb_x wants to make sb_y (not) make phenomenon_x# affecting sb_y in bad way> – see also §3.5.3.

lift + *ban/martial law/prohibition/rule* <#sb_x with {legal} power# instantaneously makes #legal state concerning a lot of sb_y more than one made by sb_x who wants to make sb_y {not} | make / be affected by | phenomenon# come to be without legal power>

*observe*₁ + *day of mourning/Christmas/custom/holiday* <#sb_x# makes event_x according to #phenomenon_y made by use of symbols by sb_y more than one with power who want to make a lot of sb_y more than one make event_x#>

*observe*₂ + *agreement/ceasefire/law/procedure/rule* <#sb_x# makes event_x according to #legal phenomenon_y made by use of symbols by sb_y with legal power who wants to make a lot of sb_z more than one make event_x#> (Only *observe*₂ is a “legal” verb.)

quash + *conviction/decision/dissent/lawsuit/sentence /speculation/verdict* <#sb_x with social {legal} power# uses language to instantaneously make #phenomenon made by use of language by sb_y {with legal power} when sb_y wants to make sb_z make event# come to be without legal power>

ratify + *act/agreement/amendment/treaty* <#sb_x with legal power# uses symbols {language} to instantaneously make #sth_x made by use of language by sb_y with legal power# come to exist and be with legal power {by writing sb_x's name at the end of sth_x}>

repeal + *act/amendment/law/legislation/prohibition/capital punishment/rule/tax*; **repeal responsibility* <#sb_x with legal power# uses language and instantaneously makes #legal phenomenon_x made by sb_x with legal power who wants to make sb_y (not) make habitualness# come to not exist and be without legal power>

uphold + *amendment/appeal/ban/claim/complaint/constitution/conviction/custom/decision/doctrine/injunction/law/oath/ruling/sentence/statute/verdict* <#sb_x with {legal} power# makes #sth made by use of symbols {language} concerning / affecting sb_z, by sb_y who wants to make sb_z (not) make phenomenon# be with social {legal} power>

violate + *agreement/ceasefire/embargo/law/oath/order/principle/prohibition/regulation/requirement/right/rule*; *v.* + *act/article/clause/constitution* (indirect) <#sb_x# makes phenomenon_x that is not according to #(mental state concerning/sth made by use of language by sb_y with {legal} power who wants to make) phenomenon_y expected by sb_y with power who wants to make sb_x (not) make phenomenon_y>

waive + *act/appeal* against verdict /*ban/breach/certification/claim/classification/clause/condition/exemption/extradition/hearing/immunity/indictment/law/legislation/liability/obligation/observance* of formalities

/prerequisite/privilege/protection /punishment /restriction /rule/succession (phenomenon_y); *w. + fee /charge /cost/duty₂ /fine /import /payment /premium /advance purchase* (amount of money); *agreement /bill/contract /decision + waive ...* (sth made by use of language, indirect); *w.+ house/car/honours /one's rank* (sth that sb is with power to use, indirect); *The vendor waived the requirement. Homeowners waived their right to succession. President waived the observance of procedural formalities.* <#(sth_x made by use of language by) sb_x with legal power# uses language in order to make expression of mental phenomenon that sb_x does not want to make #(sth_y that sb_x is with power to use because of) legal phenomenon_x made by sb_x with {legal} power who wants sb_y to (not) make phenomenon_y# (of making sb_y be (not) with #amount of money#) [exist] and be with legal power>

The notion of legal power is one of social powers – political, religious and administrative. We have decided to assign legal power to *defendant* as in *The defendant has waived his right to anonymity (MEDAL)* although a defendant's position is socially 'weak', because a defendant is also vested with some legal rights and power in a democratic society.

A distinction can be drawn between those "legal" verbs that are invariantly legal and those that are typically legal, either in the analysis or in the directive.

Some of the legal verbs are speech act verbs, i.e. those verbs that contain '#sb# uses {language} symbols' – see §3.4.3. Among these verbs are: *abolish, ratify, repeal, uphold* and *waive*. At the same time *abolish, ratify, repeal* and *waive* are lexical performatives (with 'sb_{with power} uses language to make phenomenon [exist]').

The three basic object directives that can be extracted from this small lexical field are: 'phenomenon concerning

sb_{more than one}’, ‘sth made by use of language’ and ‘phenomenon_x when sb_x wants to make sb_y (not) make phenomenon_y’. At the same time, they embody the essence of legislature – use of language to regulate behaviour of people.

3.4.3 *Performatives*

3.4.3a Research into speech acts belongs in pragmatics, text-linguistics and conversational analysis, but since there are “performatives”, i.e. special speech act verbs used exclusively or typically to “do things with words”, an investigation into performatives, as well as speech act verbs in general, comes also within the scope of semantics. Speech act verbs are defined by ‘sb_x uses language to express (when sb_x wants)...’ in this book, or by ‘in saying that, I was x-ing’ (Goddard 1998: 137), while performative verbs have ‘#sb_x# using sb_x’s social - moral power and symbols {language} make phenomenon [exist]’.

A number of verbs in English when used by the speaker in the first person and the Present Simple Tense have such a strong illocutionary force (emphasizing the purpose of the utterance) that they create new reality merely by speaking under appropriate conditions. It is essential to distinguish between performative use and performative verbs; the performative use is the typical use of performative verbs, but it can be realized by other means if certain felicity conditions are met – “the authority of the speaker to make the utterance, the appropriateness of time, place and other circumstances, and the acceptance by the addressee (and others) of this authority and appropriateness” (Kreidler 1998: 186). “Any verb, even a most common one, the verb *dire* [‘say’], is suitable to make a performative utterance if the formula

je dis que ['I say that'] uttered under suitable conditions, creates a new situation (Benvenist 1975: 211; translated by B. H. from the Serbo-Croat translation). The auxiliary *do* is certainly not a performative verb because its function is to refer to a main verb, but in *I do*, uttered at a marriage ceremony by the future spouse, *do* acquires performative force owing to the question asked by the official and other extralinguistic circumstances. Performative utterances, which belong to *parole*, the language process, should be distinguished from performative verbs, which belong to *langue*, the language system. Such verbs have been investigated by the British philosopher J. L. Austin. Performative verbs exclusively or typically appear in the performative role, but some of them can also be used non-performatively, such as *bet*: *I bet you five pounds he won't come* (performative), *I bet he won't come* (non-performative). The verb *say* may be used in a performative utterance, as Benveniste claimed (*I say that the traitor must be executed!*, pronounced by a king, to adduce an example), but is not a performative verb properly speaking. According to Bolinger (1973), performatives are a kind of attitudinal verbs – see §2.4 and Palmer 1981: 161-6.

If a typology of speech acts could be made by studying felicity conditions (cf. Lyons 1977: 737, Levinson 1983: 240), this is outside of a strictly linguistic investigation, encroaching on psycholinguistics and sociolinguistics, even on legal science and requiring a broader, semiotic approach.

Prototypical performative verbs are related to "[s]peech acts that bring about the state of affairs they name [...]: bids, blessings, firings, baptisms, arrests, marrying, declaring a mistrial. [...] The verbs include *bet, declare, baptize, name, nominate, pronounce*" (Kreidler 1998: 185, who calls them "performative" in a narrower sense than usual). These speech act verbs belong in the "exercitive" group of Austin's performative verbs (Austin

1962), while Searle (1976) classified them as "declarations".

In order to restrict the use of this term the French linguist Emile Benveniste proposed three definitions of performatives. (i) Performative statements are those in which a declarative-imperative verb occurs with an imperative expression, typically in the first person present, e.g. *I order that the population be mobilized*. (ii) The verb in the present is followed by an object and a predicative, in other words, in the S + V + O + ADJ/N pattern, typically in the first person; e.g. *I dub you a knight, I relieve X of his/her duties. Mr X is appointed a minister plenipotentiary* (signed in a document) or *The session is open*. In both types the AGENT has to be a person of acknowledged authority. But there is also a Type (iii) where the speaker commits oneself to an action (*I swear/oblige myself /renounce; We make an arrangement*; Benvenist 1975: 210 -213). When used in performative utterances these verbs have to be assisted by felicity conditions, i.e. used in circumstances which are accepted as appropriate (Kreidler 1998: 185), but these are extralinguistic conditions beyond the domain of semantics proper. Some verbs have performative sememes, i.e. their definitions contain the semes 'use language' or 'use symbols' (e.g. *apologise, thank, congratulate, promise, order, name, warn*), while others are performatives only contextually, i.e. when the elements 'use language' and 'speaker' are contextually added (e.g. *adopt, calculate, choose, class, contemplate, correct, deem, define, diagnose, direct, distinguish, envisage, understand*). Thus, *apologize, thank*, etc. (from the first group) cannot be other than performative, because in order to apologize, thank, etc. by any means one has to perform a symbolic (usually linguistic) action, while in *We choose you president*, *choose* is a performative, as distinct from *We chose chairs for ourselves*, which activity may have been done silently and non-symbolically.

Some among systematic (lexical, non-contextual) performatives may be omitted if they are not part of conventional behaviour. The verbs *bet*, *name*, *bequeath* cannot be omitted, while *warn* and *promise* can, leaving its illocutionary force to the context and the use of intonation. The effect of an expression couched in the imperative mood (such as *Come!*) may be the same as of a finite verb in the first person present, but does not count as a performative utterance because it does not name the speaker and the performer explicitly (Benvenist 1975: 213). Other examples are: *If you don't stop following me, I shall call the police. Gently!* (warning, with fall-rise nucleus). These utterances are performative without a performative verb, unlike *I warn you that if you don't stop following me, I shall call the police* with an explicit performative.

According to the irreducibility thesis "although any particular illocutionary force may be effectively conveyed in various ways, there is at least one form of utterance that (in some languages at any rate) directly and conventionally expresses it - namely, the explicit performative, which in English has the normal form of [...] I (hereby) V_p you (that) S' where V_p is a performative verb drawn from the limited and determinate set of performative verbs in the language in question, S' is a complement sentence (the content of which is often restricted by the particular performative verb), and V_p is conjugated in the simple present indicative active " (Levinson 1983: 244). Our definition: *I hereby* + Present Simple Tense <sb_{sp} using sb_{sp}'s social - moral power (illocutionary act) and strong language (locutionary act) makes phenomenon [exist] / not exist (perlocutionary act)>. The seme 'strong' in 'strong language' is a reflection of 'power' in 'social - moral power'. Examples: *H. I confirm that the signature is authentic. I h. declare a holiday. I h. promise to come. H. I appoint you as authorized proxy to represent me as manager. The*

company hereby undertakes to ... It is herewith disclosed that... (Levinson 1983: 260).

The next section brings portraits of *appoint*, *declare*, *elect*, *excommunicate*, *name*, *nominate*, *promise* and *pronounce*.

3.4.3b

appoint

Examples: *They appointed him (as) captain of the team. They appointed him to be the coach. A lawyer was appointed to represent the child. He was recently appointed to colonel. John Smith was appointed to the board by the manager's decision. (Decision is linked to manager, who is 'sb_{with social power}' through metonymy.) They have appointed a new head teacher at my son's school. Caligula even appointed his horse consul. the newly appointed editor of the magazine; a. administration/commission/committee; Castro appointed himself president.*

- *company/congregation/government/they/Tsar + a. (+ John Smith/him [+ as]) + ambassador /attorney /chairman /chief of department /clerk /coach /director /governor /heir /judge /leader /manager /party member /officer/outsider to the leading party/prime minister/principal/printer/full professor /secretary /successor /superintendent /teacher/treasurer*
- *guardian/they + a. + friend/graduate/monk + to + command/job/office/the order of Franciscans/senior police position/post/rank (role of social power)*
- *Sinn Fein/they + a. + delegate/her + to + board of directors/committee (group of sb_{with social power})*
- *manager/chief/council + a. + anyone/committee /other persons + to act for the clerk/to consider*

changes/*to govern/to lead* in her absence/*to serve*
as secretary

Clues: *as*₃, *by*₂, *to*₆, *to*₉, *to*_{1a}-infinitive, *I hereby*,
performative non-finite clause, ?*seriously*, **jokingly*,
**mildly*, **to be*

Semantic definition: <#sb_x with social power# using sb_x's
strong language_x and sb_x's social power instantaneously
makes (#)sb_y(#) come to be in role of (#)(Γ part of Γ
group of) sb_y with social power(#) working for sb_{x/z} with social
power when sb_x wants to make sb_y make habitualness>

Cf. "To say that a person performed the act named
by the verb implies that he or she did it intentionally, that
if it wasn't intentional, then the AGENT didn't do it under
that description. Illocutionary verbs characteristically have
this feature. I cannot, e.g., promise unintentionally. If I
didn't intend it as a promise, then it wasn't a promise"
(Searle 1989: 551).

In *COBUILD Grammar: 350*, *appoint* is classified
among the "name" group 'giving sb a role or position'.
Dixon (2005: 129) classifies *appoint* as a "social contract"
verb and a "deciding/choose" subtype verb. Dixon (2005:
144) classifies *appoint* among the CHOOSE subtype of
deciding verbs, in which one person (said to be in the
Course role) is preferred out of a number of alternatives.
As Wierzbicka (1987: 124) reports, Hayakawa (1969: 18)
says that *appoint* "refers to a situation "in which a person
is being chosen [by someone else] to fulfill a given
function " and implies "an official situation – in an office,
club or government – in which the choice is made by
means other than an elective process [...] by someone
officially charged with this duty"". In Wierzbicka's
explication there is no suggestion of making choice. One
of the illustrative sentences above suggests that choosing
is not necessarily implied by *appoint* since Caligula's act
mentioned therein was a sheer whim rather than a

considered decision of selecting among candidates. At the same time, this example indicates that *sb* is 'sb' canonically, and that in perverse situations 'sb' can become 'animal'. Neither does the collocational method indicate 'choose', because the grammatical collocations **appoint among/from* are ill-formed, while *choose*, *pick (out)* and *select* can be followed by the prepositions *among* and *from*.

Appoint takes part in three patterns warranted by the definition: *appoint sb as sb*, *appoint sb sb* and *appoint sb to be sb*, as in *They appointed her (as/to be) director*.

The seme 'social power' is a hyponym of 'role'. Consequently the definitions of *as*₃ and *to*_g with the seme 'social role' in the pre-directrix automatically apply to *appoint*, *name* and *nominate* with 'social power'. The unacceptable **Brutus appointed Marcus (as/to be) slave*, where *slave* (= 'sb_x who is in socially weak state when sb_y uses sb_x as sb_y wants') denotes a social role, proves that *appoint* must contain 'sb_{with social power}' in the object, as a feature which is more specific than 'social role'. The seme 'sb_{with social power}' covers a whole range of varying degrees of power, from *class president* to *President of the Republic* and *emperor*. For example, *bureaucrat* /*bourgeoisie/leader* /*official/officer* can be collocators of the adjective *petty*, defined as <#sb_{with social power}# who is not strongly important>. The seme 'social power' seems to be the power of authority in the administrative, legal, religious, economic, political, military and educational rather than the medical or scientific sphere. For example, *ceasefire* is defined as <(short time during) state made by use of symbols {language} by sb_{x+y} with military power when sb_{x+y} want to make a lot of sb_{more than one} make peace at same time and space> (*achieve/break₂/violate* c. *with sb*) *achieve* <#sb_x# makes #state# [exist] that is good for sb_x {using sb_x's strong energy}>.

While *schoolmaster, judge, court, and critic* obviously denote somebody with power to make another person do something, and mother can be such a person typically, the sentence *The young man was severe with his father* indicates that *the young man* has contextually become 'sb_{with power}' – see §3.3 5 c.

Only the object of the active clause, not the object complement, can be the subject of the passive clause (*COBUILD Grammar*: 350): *He was appointed chairman.*

declare

1

Examples: *They declared war on them. The President declared a holiday. The court declared the law unconstitutional. The commission declared him to be clever. The judge declared Mary to be the winner. They declared him to be dead/innocent. The mayor is going to d. the meeting/bridge open; I (hereby) d. the meeting closed. The judge declared Mary (to be) the winner. The psychiatrist declared him (to be) insane. They declared him dead. He was declared innocent. This I d. about the Lord:...d. the area the national park; d. state of emergency by issuing a government's decree; d. the election invalid*

Clues: *about*₁, *by*₂, *on*₂, performative non-finite clause, *I hereby*, *(to be)*, *?seriously*, **joking*, **mildly*

Semantic definition: <#sb_x {with social power}# using sb_x's strong language_x, sb_x's social - moral power and sb_x's mental energy strongly wanting to affect sth, intentionally and instantaneously makes #state_x# [exist]>

Both *?d. seriously* and **d. jokingly* are anomalous, producing different effects: the former is paradoxical

while the latter is tautological. That the language which the person who declares₁ uses is 'strong', is indicated by ?*seriously*, i.e. 'language that conveys intense intention'.

2

Examples: *Mike declared his innocence. I d. my intention of marrying Jane (Wierzbicka 1987: 350). John declared his love. He declared that he would not surrender. It was the first newspaper to d. for the senator. She declared herself hurt. They could not d. where they stand on that matter. He declared to her that he was true. He declared when the restrictions have been violated. (Here when the restrictions have been violated is the object referring to a state, not an adverbial complement.) I d. that I intend to marry Jane (Wierzbicka 1987: 350). d. for freedom; d. against slavery; d. their opposition to regime; d. falsely*

Clues: *by*₂, *for*_{1a/b}, *against*₃, *that*, *to*₃, *wh*-word; ?*so*, ?*I hereby*, ?*seriously*, ?*jokingly*, ?*mildly*

Semantic definition: <#sb_x# using sb_x's strong language intentionally and instantaneously makes sb_{indef/y} come to know sb_x's *this* (#)thought(#) concerning (#)state_x(#) in order to make | sb_{y/z} be viewed as being in state_x / state_x not exist)>

Sentences in which the AGENT is a person with social power much more frequently leave out *to be* than take it (see §3.2.4). When used with *to be*, nouns such as *judge*, *lord mayor*, *president* or *court* still denote a person/persons with power, but only on the basis of their lexical content while syntagmatically they are simply the hyperonymous 'sb'.

According to Dixon (2005: 276), this meaning of *declare* belongs in the REPORT subtype of the verbs of speaking. Austin (1971: 155 -157) also makes a difference between an exercitive (= *declare*₁, as in *declare closed/open*) and a commissive *declare* (=

*declare*₂ in *declare my intention* and *declare for*). Wierzbicka (1987: 349) states that *declare*₁ differs from *declare*₂ in having one extra component 'I assume that after I have said this, in this way, people will have to do some things because of that', which accounts for the performative use of *declare*₁. She adds that even the speakers of *declare*₂ conduct themselves "as if they had the authority to formulate a view which would bind everyone. [... T]he speaker who *declares* something feels quite confident that by saying what he wants to be the case (or what he wants to be accepted) he can cause it to be the case (he can cause it to be accepted)" (Wierzbicka 1987: 348). She notices that *declare*₂ takes *that*-clause and has a truth value unlike *declare*₁. Our definition shows that *declare*₂ contains the seme 'know' without 'true', so that it is *non-factive*.

For a comment on *declare* and other "declaratives" see Ross 1970.

elect

Examples: *They elected him pope/mayor. They elected Mike* (the function recoverable from the context) *by a unanimous agreement. The congress/voters elected members. She was elected to Parliament. He was elected president. We elected Jim chairman. Jim was elected to Congress. You could be elected as a member of Parliament. They elected him to represent them. e. among several candidates; e. from a weak field of candidates; e. + executive/leader/judge/politician* (sb_{with} social power); *e.+ assembly/chamber/council/government /legislature/party* (group of sb_{with} social power)

Clues: *among*, *as*₃, *between*₁, *by*₂, *from*₈, *to*₉, *to*_{1a}-infinitive, **to be*, **I/we hereby*, *??seriously*, **jokingly*, **mildly*

Semantic definition: <{most} #sb_x more than one# using strong symbols instantaneously make (#)sb_y(#) come to be in social role of #(group_x of) sb_{with social power}# who work(s) for (group_y of) sb_z with social power, source being sb_a more than one, and want to make sb_y make habitualness>

Unlike *appoint*, the verb *elect* can be followed by *among* or *from*, and has *choose* as its superordinate. One may *fight/win/lose elections* because there are a number of candidates among which a choice is made.

Since electing is done collectively by individual voting, **I/We hereby elect* is not possible.⁷⁴

Elect is not a declaration performative, as shown by **I elect you president* or **We elect you president by voting* (as distinct from *They elected him chairman/leader /president*). This unusual situation is brought about by electing as a democratic means, which does not allow a single speaker, not even a collective of single speakers, to create a new situation merely by speaking. A person is elected to a function by counting the number of votes, which is a different thing.

excommunicate

Examples: e. *from church/religious community (by saying a formula)*

Clues: *by*₂, *from*₄; *I hereby*; *??e. without words*, **to be*, **seriously*, **jokingly*, **mildly*, **non-finite clause*, **e. without anybody knowing about the excommunication*

Semantic definition: <#sb_x with religious power# using sb_x's strong language_x and sb_x's power instantaneously makes #sb_y# come to not be with religious group any more because sb_y did sth bad>

name

Examples: *President will n. a prosecutor to investigate; A consul general is named to St. Domingo.*

- *we/president + n. (+ her/Mark Davies [+as/to be]) + candidate/captain/guardian/head of the company /his replacement/secretary/her successor of state (sb_{with social power})*
- *they + n. + board of six (group of sb_{with social power}) guardian/Ministry/they + n. + friend/graduate /monk (sb_y) + to + bishopric/job/office/the order of Franciscans/senior police position/post/rank (role of social power)*
- *they + n. + John Smith + to + committee (group of) sb_y with social power to investigate*
- *manager/chief/council + n. + anyone/command /committee/other persons (group of) sb_y (with social power) + to act for the clerk/to consider changes/to govern/to lead in her absence/to serve as secretary*

(Replacement in President named his replacement is not invariably 'sb_{with social power}', but contextually it copies (iconically "replaces") the 'sb_{with social power}' of his, which also contextually adopts this seme in a chain of transfer starting from the AGENT president, secretary of state or some other lexeme defined as such.)

Clues: *as₃, to₆, tog, (to be), I hereby, to_{1a}-infinitive, truncated non-finite clause, ?seriously, *jokingly, *mildly*

Semantic definition: <#sb_x with social power# using sb_x's strong language_x and sb_x's social power intentionally and instantaneously makes (#)sb_y(#) come to be (#)(part of group of) sb_y with social power(#) in role of sb_{with social power} when sb_x wants to make sb_y make phenomenon {habitualness}>

nominate

Examples: *They nominated him to be their representative. He was nominated for an award. She nominated Frank to the board of managers. He has been nominated to the committee (group of sb_{with social power}). Sovereign nominated the lower grade of officer (role of sb_{with social power}).*

- *Caliph /clan /Royal Council /court /governor /everyone/judge + n. + arbiter /bishop/body of members /the chief /cadi /chaplain /chief /commissioner of education/council/members/overman/sheriff (sb_{with social power})*
- *debtor/president/she + n. + child/her/slave/wife (+ as) + candidate /manciple /representative /spokesperson (sb_{with social power})*
- *crown/Emperor/Pope/guardian/they + n. + friend /graduate/monk/person + to + benefic /bishopric /command/job/office/the order of Franciscans /senior police position/post/rank (role of sb_{with social power})*
- *president + n. + him/John/son + to be present at the meeting/to go to the meeting/to hold the benefice/to represent his country/to serve as chairperson*

The construction *appoint/nominate + to be* is rare. The *SOED* explicitly mentions that with *name* it is

obsolete, which may hold good only for British English. This is predicted by the *to be* rule (see §3.2.4a). The pattern of the *sb + nominate + sb + to₇ + the bishop* type has also become obsolete.

Clues: *as₃, for₆, to₆, to₈, (to be), to_{1a}-infinitive, I hereby, ?seriously, *jokingly *mildly*

Semantic definition: <#sb_x with social power# using sb_x's strong language_x and sb_x's social power intentionally and instantaneously makes (#)sb_y(#) come to be (#)sb_{with} social power(#) in (#)role of sb_{with} social power(#) (and come to be part of group of sb_{with} social power) when sb_x wants to make sb_y make phenomenon {of social power}>

Even *hostage* can be understood as 'sb_{with} social power', i.e. <sb_x with social power to make sb_y do what sb_z wants when sb_z uses language to express that sb_z will make sb_x feel very bad if sb_y does not make phenomenon as sb_z wants>. This proven by *The commander nominated the minister's daughter as hostage.*

promise

Examples: *He promised to let me know. John promised (Jane) that he wouldn't lose money. Mary promised him never to lie to him again. I've promised myself some fun. I can't p. anything. I've promised my books to the library. I hereby p. to come (Levinson 1983: 245). But she promised! He promised so. p. investigation/secretcy; p. faithfully/solemnly; *Peter was promised to go. ?Jane promised that she would buy present John with a gift, while nobody knew anything about her decision.*

*Tom promised the men to like himself/*themselves /*each other* proves that the realization of the phenomenon promised rests on the speaker.

Clues: to_{1a} -infinitive, *that*, to_2 , *sb sth*, *so* (see §2.4.3.c), *I hereby*, *?seriously*, **jokingly*, **mildly*, **passive*

Semantic definition: $\langle \#sb_x\#$ using sb_x 's strong language $_x$ and sb_x 's moral power intentionally and instantaneously makes $(\#)sb_y(\#)$ come to experience (*this*) worthy thought of sb_x who strongly wants to make sb_x (not) make $\#$ (thing that sb_y will be with power to use when making) {good} phenomenon $\# \rangle$.

Implications are: If somebody breaks the promise, he/she will be considered to be of weak character and therefore sb is obliged to keep the promise. The power of the speaker's intention as a promiser's solemn decision is conveyed by 'moral power', reflected in ' sb_x strongly wants to do' and 'worthy thought'. At the same time, the moment when *I hereby* is added it is indicated that sb_x in *promise* uses language strongly.⁷⁶ "[Commitment] implies the hearer, as no commitments are made as monologues under normal circumstances" (Hickey 1986: 70). The presence of a hearer is covered by 'makes $(\#)sb_y(\#)$ come to experience thought of sb_x '.

How the sentences *I promise (that) I'll be there at two o'clock* and *I promise to be there at two o'clock* are related, grammatically and semantically, is according to Lyons (1977: 738), a controversial question. After the collocational method has been applied, it is easy to decide. There is no semantic difference, only a difference in foregrounding: in the former sentence it is 'thought' that is emphasized and 'want' implied, while in the latter one 'want' is in focus whereas 'thought' is implied. Likewise, the lexical meaning of *promise* in *I hereby promise to come* and in *He promised to come* is the same. What is different is the performative usage in the first and a descriptive usage in the second (Levinson 1983: 245). According to our criterion, *promise* is a speech act verb,

but as it lacks 'sb_{with power}' in the directive, it is not a performative par excellence, although 'moral power' does occur in the analysis.

The *OALD* has rightly treated *I (can) promise you* as an idiom "used as a way of encouraging or warning sb about sth", as in *I can promise you, you'll have a wonderful time* (s.v. *promise*) or *I promise you you'll catch cold if you don't wear an overcoat* (Hickey 1986: 80).

The noun *promise* is one from the group with 'phenomenon expected by sb_x with power who wants to make sb_{y/x} (not) make phenomenon', together with *ban, blockade, contract, control, convention, curfew, embargo, engagement, law, regulation, rule, treaty, truce*, the nouns that collocate with *break*₂ (see §3.4.2). The collocations *pledge + faith/promise/troth/word* give rise to the same 'event made by use of language to make expression of worthy thought', which can be transferred to the definition of the verb. Likewise, *promise* (n) collocates with *under*₂ <according to «sth made by use of language by sb_x with moral power who wants to make sb_x (not) make phenomenon»>.

The epistemic non-intentional meaning of *promise* (as in *Tomorrow promises to be a nice day*) lies outside the scope of this chapter.

pronounce

1

Examples: *The judge/jury pronounced against/for the defendant. The court pronounced against my claim to the land. p. judgement/sentence/verdict; p. sb guilty /innocent; p. them husband and wife*

Clues: *against*₃, *by*₂, *for*_{1a}; *in favour of, I hereby*; performative non-finite clause, ?*seriously*, ?*jokingly*, ?*mildly*, ?*to be*, ?*p. without words*, ?*p. without informing anybody*

Semantic definition: <#sb_x with legal power# using sb_x's strong language_x and sb_x's legal power intentionally and instantaneously makes (#)phenomenon made by use of language_x by sb_x with legal power when sb_x wants to make sb_y make event(#) [exist] (in order to make sb_y | socially weak when sb_y is viewed as bad / be affected by sth good)>

2

Examples: *They pronounced the country to be in a state of war. Doctors p. about menopausal women. Humans ask the supernatural to p. about past, present and future. She pronounced herself too tired to go on working. He pronounced himself satisfied. She was competent to p. on that matter. I cannot p. that he is out of danger. I cannot p. him out of danger. The government pronounced that they are no longer a nuclear state by issuing an official statement. Everyone pronounced the dinner to be very good. The dessert was tried and pronounced delicious. I remember you pronounced the man a fool. p. judgement/opinion, p. sb dead by an official medical statement; p. on all kinds of subjects*

Clues: *about*₁, *by*₂, *on*₆; (that), (to be), truncated non-finite clause, *jokingly, *mildly

Semantic definition: <#sb_x {with power}# using strong language intentionally and instantaneously makes sb_{indef} come to experience sb_x's *this* (#)thought concerning state(#) that sb_x knows well>

Sentences can be constructed which show that examples of *pronounce*₁ belong in one sememe, such as: *John Smith lived in a small town where he was the only doctor and the registrar, so that he pronounced people dead and married.* Wierzbicka (1987: 351) prefers not to

split *pronounce* into two meanings, but zeugma in **The jury pronounced him guilty and themselves satisfied with the judgment* proves that *pronounce*₁ and ₂ are different. **The minister pronounced them man and wife and the judge the sentence* sound wrong because a non-finite clause and a noun as objects are too disparate to be covered by a single verb.

In *OALD* and *MEDAL* causation ('make') is only implied, while Wierzbicka is quite explicit in this respect. Also, the agent's mental state featuring in our definition of *pronounce*₂ is vaguely suggested by *OALD* and *MEDAL*, and explicitly treated in Wierzbicka's explication (1987: 350), which runs as follows:

I assume that people want me to say something about X that will cause them to know what they should think of X

I assume people understand that I am someone who knows much about such things and who can say what people should think about them

I say: Y

I say this, in this way, because I want to cause people to know what they should think about X

I assume that after I have said this, in this way, people will have to do some things because of that

3.4.3c Conclusion

Stated in definitional terms, the common meaning of all the meanings of our speech act verbs is '#sb_x# using language makes sb_y come to be...', while performatives have 'sb_x with power using sb_x's language_x and sb_x's power intentionally and instantaneously makes sth'. In other words, they mean 'do something by using words', which echoes Austin's title. Their semantic definitions show that performativeness is a matter of degree. For one thing, definitions that contain sb with power rather than sb_x in the subject position should be separated from those

that have sb_x instead. *Appoint* and *name* are performatives of the first degree, having 'sb_{with social power}' both in the subject and in the compulsory object. *Pronounce*₁ and *declare*₁ are with 'sb_{with legal power}' in the subject position, while *pronounce*₂ contains 'sb_{with power}' as a typical feature. *Excommunicate* has 'sb_{with religious power}' in the subject. They also rank high as performatives. *Elect* is lower on the scale as it has 'sb_{more than one}' instead of 'sb_{with power}'. However, a group of people in a body, especially majority, is endowed with power. *Promise* implies 'moral power' of the person in the subject. *Declare*₂ is with 'sb_x' rather than 'sb_{with power}' in the subject slot. Thus, a basis for a different classification can be made if sub-types of sb_{with power} are distinguished: i.e. sb_{with social power} (*appoint, name, nominate*), sb_{with legal power} (*declare*₁, *pronounce*₁), sb_{with religious power} (*excommunicate*), sb_{more than one} (*elect*), sb_{with moral power} (*promise*), and sb_{with power} (*pronounce*₂).

Speech act and performative verbs have been classified by various authors, notably by Austin (1962, 1971) and Searle (1976). Austin's conception of exercitives covers a very broad class that includes semantically distant *warn, beg, entreat, pray, and pardon*. Austin's "verdictives" make up a heterogeneous group of verbs such as *acquit, place, assess, locate, measure*, which are semantically not speech acts at all and *convict*, which is a performative proper (Austin 1971: 152). Only on special occasions, pragmatically, all these verbs can function as performatives, as in *assess the damage to be 1500 pounds* (pronounced by a judge).

When evaluating Austin's typology, the opinion that "[t]here is a strange lack of incisiveness about classification itself" (Cerf 1969: 356) is not solitary.

Wierzbicka (1987: 9) has warned that "classifications which are not based on serious analysis are unlikely to be very helpful, for all that they may incorporate certain casual insights. To be able to compare and to classify speech acts on a principled basis we must first discover the structure of the individual speech acts (codified in separate lexical items). Classes have to be distinguished in terms of precise semantic components". Even then "there is no way [the whole vocabulary of speech act verbs] can be neatly divided into non-arbitrary classes' (Wierzbicka 1987: 28). These groupings are partly arbitrary.

Appoint, elect and *name* can choose between two objects in its definition (*a./e./n.* + (*him*) + *chief*), while *nominate* can have as many as three (*n.* + (*him*) + *chief*; *n. rank*). As a general comment on performative verbs, we may state that there is a scale of performativeness, starting from (i) verbs with exclusively performative sememes (*pronounce, name*), whose realization when felicitous, i.e. accompanied by an authorized person and requisite circumstances, has to affect other people, the pattern used being 'SB + V + SB + STH/ADJ', (ii) typically performative sememes (*order, warn*) when the speaker assumes the role of sb_x with power and wants the interlocutor to behave as sb_x wants, therefore followed by *to*_{1a}-infinitive 'want', (iii) personal performative sememes (*promise, apologize*) uttered by persons who need not be with authority, but are pronounced in seriousness with moral responsibility, (iv) verbs with quazi-performative allosemes (*wish you welcome/good luck/all the best/disaster*), which only conveys the speaker's wish. In all these cases the speakers refer to themselves as *I* (rarely *we*). Of course, the typology of speech acts based on felicity conditions belongs in pragmatics and sociolinguistics, perhaps even in anthropology, but our concept of sb_{with power}, although essentially a pragmatic and social category, is at the same time pertinent to

semantics because it often occurs as an invariant, or at least a typical, element of the lexical definition.

When the object is an abstract 'sb' without a subscript, no accompanying indefinite article surfaces (cf. *She is translator. He became incumbent of a church at Twickenham; He became canon of York.*). This is a notable instance of a "weakly referential" nominal (Declerck 1988: 56 in Laffut 2006: 202), i.e. a noun refers to a nomenclatural function. The same phenomenon occurs in the complement to the *appoint's* object.

It is possible for a single definition with two object directives to accommodate both *appoint/name/nominate + director* and *appoint name/nominate + him/John + director*, etc. Thence, if the speaker opts for *him, somebody* or *Mary* as the object, he or she has to use *director, teacher, candidate*, etc. as a complement to the object, and if he or she chooses to place *director, teacher*, etc. in the object slot, no other object is needed in the same construction. Thus, *They appointed him (to be) president*, but **They appointed him* (with nuclear stress on *point*).

Nouns and pronouns whose definitions do not denote people with power (like *debtor* or *he*; see *nominate*) acquire this role when collocating with performatives.

Since neither Werzbicka's nor our definition can do the job for a dictionary, we propose the following popular definitions based on the semantic definitions:

appoint <to make a person hold a post of responsibility by announcing the decision officially and publicly>

*declare*₁ <to create a state by addressing the public as a person in authority, who have to seriously think about the state>

*declare*₂ <to say in order to make people know what one seriously thinks about something>

excommunicate <to make sb be no more a member of a Church by saying that officially>

*pronounce*₁ <to create an important state by saying publicly as a person in authority >

*pronounce*₂ <to say in order to make people know what one seriously thinks about a state>

The *LLA* offers lexicographic definitions that somewhat resemble our scholarly definitions: "If someone in a position of power, especially an employer, appoints someone, they officially choose someone for an important job or position in an organization". *To name* is "to publicly say who has been chosen for an important job or position in an organization". "If someone, especially a group of people, *nominates* someone, they officially choose that person for a particular job, piece of work to do etc, because they are the best person to do it."

3.4.4 Factive and non-factive verbs

The so-called "factives" ("putatives") are verbs and linking verb + adjective/noun collocations with the seme 'experience' that presuppose that the content of the complement is true (cf. Vendler 1972; Bolinger 1977; Kreidler 1998: 231). The most reliable collocational signal of factivity is the possibility of co-occurrence with *wh*-nominals (Vendler 1980: 280 in Chrzanowska 1986: 131), which entail 'know', but for the factives proper an additional seme 'true thought' is necessary. (Verbs which contain 'true' agree with 'good', as in *We believe that man to be sane/*demented*, but 'bad' is possible in formal style: *I believe accusations to be false* [Bolinger 1977:

127]). Factive verbs collocate with *from*g 'source' (*I know₁ it/*think so from the newspapers*), do not allow neg-transportation (*I didn't know he had coped with the task well* ≠ *I knew he had not coped with the task well*), and co-occur with positive evaluative adverbs such as *well*, as in *I know perfectly well that you are against rigid measures* (Ju. D. Apresjan in a handout accompanying a Belgrade lecture). Factives are: *acknowledge, admire, amuse, blame, bother, concede, confess, consider* <#sb# experiences thought concerning state_x that tends to exist>, *deplore, discover, envy, excuse, find₁* (see §3.3.2c I), *find out, forget* 'not know any more'; *guess₂* 'come to know by chance', *hate, hear, hold* 'have opinion', *ignore, indicate* (§2.4.3b), *know₁* (§3.2.8),⁷⁷ *learn, love, notice, observe, prove, realize, recognize, regret, rejoice, remember, report, resent, reveal* (§3.2.8), *see, sense, suspect, understand₁* 'comprehend', and *welcome; be amazing, be annoyed, be aware, be glad, be important, be indifferent, be obvious, be proud, be sad, be sorry, be surprising, be upset*. Factive presupposition is a relation between two sentences with a verb whose complements remain true under negation. Thus, in both *He regretted spending the money on betting* and *He did not regret spending the money on betting* the presupposition is that he had spent the money on betting.

Only thoughts or language that express thoughts can be true or false. Phenomena in the outer world are true or false only vicariously, via thoughts that refer to them.

Non-factives "commit [...] the speaker to neither the truth nor the falsity of the proposition" (Lyons 1977: 796). They do not contain 'know' and cannot be used with *wh*-nominals. To this category belong: *be afraid, agree, assert* <#sb_x# uses language to make expression of sb_x's (*this*) strong thought concerning (#)mental state(#) as true>, *assume, believe, claim, decide, deduce, doubt* (§2.4.3c), *dream, fear, feel, guess₁* 'suppose', *hope,*

*imagine*₂ <#sb# experiences strong psychological state concerning #sth_x# as if true (wanting to know sth_y)>, *report, say, suppose, think, understand* 'believe that sth is true'; it is *likely, it is probable, it is sure*. Non-factives agree with *so* (*I believe/guess₁/understand so*; see §2.4.3c) and co-occur with truth-adverbs such as *correctly, rightly, wrongly* (*He rightly/wrongly thought that it wouldn't help*).

Some verbs, like *admire, guess₂, know, remember* and *understand*, have both factive and non-factive sememes. In *I insist that Ronald works very hard*, *insist* is factive, whereas in *I insist that Ronald (should) work very hard* it is non-factive (Kreidler 1998: 164). *Admire₁* is factive while *admire₂* is non-factive (§2.3.1 a); cf. **I admire₁ her beauty although she is rather plain* vs. *I was admiring₂ her beauty although she was rather plain*. In *She guesses/understands that the game is over* is also ambiguous between factive and non-factive interpretation, as suggested above.

Chrzanowska (1986: 139) quotes and supports Lakoff's (1975: 221) remark that factivity is gradable. Bolinger (1977: 69) wrote: "An attitudinal verb such as *be sorry* is not as strongly factive as a verb that expresses just one's emotional reaction, such as *resent*: [...] I'm sorry she did that, if she did. [...] *I resent it that she did it, if she did. [...] *I resent that she did that. [...] I resent it that she did that. *Resent* requires *it*, and is also the verb that will not admit questioning of the fact". *It₃ was possible to rain in the afternoon, and it₃ did rain. ?It₃ was possible to rain in the afternoon, but it₃ did not. ??It₃ is possible to rain, but it₃ won't* ('true thought that makes sb know' §3.3.7a). Another factor leading to weak factivity could be the same 'short-lasting time' of some adjectives with 'experience', including *glad* and *content* (see §3.3.2b I).

Another category to be distinguished in this sphere is contrafactivity (neg-factivity). "Contrafactive constructions presuppose the falsity of the proposition expressed in the complement clause, e.g. *wish* and *pretend*, as in *I pretended the cat was in the garden*" (Crystal 1991, s.v. *factive*). The semantic definition of *wish* can be found in §1.1.3c II, while *pretend* is: <#sb_x# makes phenomenon_x wanting to influence sb_y to experience not true mental phenomenon_y as thought that is true concerning #phenomenon_z#> (clues: to 'experiences mental phenomenon_y wanting phenomenon_x' – to_{1a}-infinitive), to 'influence'– to₄, to 'thought' (*that*), to 'phenomenon_x' – *friendship, illness, sleep...*). The unifying element of contrafatives is the seme 'experience - make phenomenon wanting' in the definitional analysis.

Factivity of adjectives follows different rules. The occurrence of 'sb_{sp}', as in *certain₂, likely, obvious, remarkable, sad, sure, surprising*, leads to factive interpretation since it is not possible to assert and deny one's own opinion in a single clause (cf. **It is certain that she will pass the exam, but she'll fail*).

3.4.5 "Strong" verbs

The seme 'strong' is a common feature to be found in adjectives (see §3.3.5a), verbs, nouns (§3.5.3), adverbs and prepositions. Let us take an excursion into some verbs containing this seme in their definitional analyses.

We have found the following nouns that can be used as a subject of the verb *abate*: *anxiety, eagerness, energy, enthusiasm, epidemic, fighting, flood, interest, noise, nuisance, pain, pollution, price, sound, speed, storm, tax, terror, violence* and *wind*. Several (*eagerness, epidemic, fighting, flood, storm* and *violence*) contain 'strong' by definition, which is proven by

inappropriateness of **mild/*slight* as their collocates (cf. 'strong' adjectives §3.3.6). And yet, not only *fighting /storm + abate*, but also *interest /pain/sound/speed + abate* convey the meaning of becoming not strong or less strong. The latter group of nouns does not contain 'strong' as an invariant feature, and yet *The interest/pain/sound/speed abated* is well formed. On the other hand, the subject (which is apparently always 'event') of *abate* has to be 'strong' because only something strong (marked sense) can become less strong. The conclusion is that the verb *abate* (both its transitive and intransitive sememe) imposes the seme 'strong' on those nouns whose definitions are neutral as regards this seme (like *pain, sound* and *interest*) due to the 'less strong' in the analysis. Of course, if a noun contains 'weak' by definition, no collocation with *strong* or *abate* is possible since it would produce a paradox (such as **strong whisper* or **The whisper abated*). Besides, to complete the definition of *abate*, one would have to add the information that 'bad' is its typical company, as the nouns *epidemic, fighting, flood, noise, nuisance, pollution, storm* and *violence* denote something bad by definition. The nouns *interest, energy* and *sound* are not 'bad' by definition, and these nouns will not become 'bad' when coupled with *abate*. This reasoning leads us to the conclusion that it would be wrong to define *abate* as: <(#sth# makes) #{bad and} strong phenomenon# come to be less strong {and less bad}> because 'strong' in the definition of *abate* is activated in the directive under the stimulus from the analysis. Thus we come with *abate* defined as <#{bad} phenomenon# comes to be less strong / not strong any more>.

Hanks (2013: 182 – 184) takes collocations with nouns that do not contain 'bad' + *abate* to be "exploitations of the norm". Since we have found more than one counterexample to 'sth bad' + *abate*, we prefer to introduce 'typically bad' into the directive of this verb. From our definition issues that the collocation **breeze*

abate (vi) is rejected because 'less strong' or 'not strong any more' in the analysis automatically presupposes that *breeze* was 'strong'. This is not the case either invariantly or contextually, the definition of *breeze* being <weak long-time air that moves in nature>.

The verb *succumb* can be defined as <#sb# comes to be strongly weak when affected by a {bad} event>. We know that the 'event' here is typically 'bad' and often 'strong' since it is able to make 'sb become very weak', but 'strong' must not enter the definition. In the sentence *His health was so impaired that he succumbed to a banal cold* the lexeme *cold* contextually receives the feature 'strong' because if a cold made a person succumb to it, we interpret that it was strong enough to cause havoc. On the other hand, it may seem that *cold* is not 'strong' because a *banal cold* stresses the idea of ordinariness and lack of importance. Both impressions are valid, the former relating to a contextually present 'strong' induced by 'strongly weak', and the latter to lack of invariant 'strong'. The sememe 'strong' is liable to changeable interpretation depending on context and it has no absolute value. The strength of pneumonia and persuasion cannot be on the same footing in *When she was 64 she succumbed to pneumonia* and in *Father succumbed to our persuasion*. But the latter sentence conveys the idea that persuasion was so strong that father had to change his decision, and linguistically they are both contextually 'strong'.

The seme 'make sth come to not be in strong state' in the definitional analysis also imparts strength to the directive AGENT. Such lexemes are exemplified by *break* (§§1.1.3d and 2.5.2c II), *subdue*, *shatter*, *quell* (§3.5.3), *melt* (§3.5.3.) and *rescind*. *Shatter* is <#sth# makes #thought that sth is good - true# to be weak>, as in *s. confidence /illusion/record/stereotype*; *subdue* is <#sb# makes #sth# come to be weak>; *s. anger /brightness/colour/conversation/country/delight/excitement/fear /light/noise/passion /rebel/temper/tribe/voice*.

The seme 'with power' is a variant of 'strong' deriving strength from sb's powerful position in society. We designate as sb_{with power} only those sb_x's that are by definition with power to make sb_y do as sb_x wants.

The so-called "persuade" verbs contain 'sb_x uses language to make sb_y make - experience phenomenon'. Fischer (1989) has set four tests that separate "persuade" verbs from the rest: (1) lack of paraphrase between the active and passive constructions of "persuade" verbs: *I persuaded a specialist to examine John* ≠ *I persuaded John to be examined by a specialist*. *I expected a specialist to examine John* = *I expected John to be examined by a specialist*. (2) only with "persuade" verbs there are selection restrictions between the matrix verb and the following NP: *I expected a house to be built by John*. **I persuaded a house to be built by John* (3) there is no possibility of *there*-insertion with "persuade" verbs: *He expected there to be a friend of his at the station* **He persuaded there to be a friend of his at the station*. (4) The *that*-clause construction is possible only after "persuade" verbs: *I expected John to give a lecture*. **I expected John that he would give a lecture*. *I persuaded John to give a lecture*. *I persuaded John that he should give a lecture*.

We define *persuade* as <#sb_x# using sb_x's language strongly makes #sb_y# experience (*this*) thought concerning phenomenon_x as good (so that thing_x wants to make phenomenon_x)>. *Convince* is: <#sth {sb_x}# (uses language to) make #sb_y# experience (*this*) thought concerning phenomenon_x as true (so that sb_y wants to make phenomenon_x)>; *She convinced him that she loved him*; *Her kiss convinced him of her love*. A difference between *persuade* and *convince* is that *persuade* requires a human AGENT, while *convince* sanctions any AGENT including inanimate, which, together with **She convinced him into buying the parrot* indicates that *convince* does

not require as strong an AGENT as *persuade*. *Persuade*, like *bully*, *cajole*, *charm*, *coax*, *coerce*, *entice*, *intimidate*, *lure*, *nudge*, *press*, *provoke*, *scare*, *seduce*, *spur*, *tempt*, *terrify*, and some other “persuade” verbs when ‘using language’ in their definitions is activated, has an additional seme ‘strongly’ that matches *into*₁, unlike *convince*, *induce*, *encourage*, *prompt*, *sway*, and some other “persuade” verbs incompatible with *into*.

A strong AGENT is also implied in the “strong influence” verbs such as *blackmail*, *bully*, *charm*, *coax*, *coerce*, *condition*, *deceive*, *intimidate*, *lull*, *press*, *persuade*, *provoke*, *shame*, *steer*, *tempt*, which include “persuade” verbs – see 1.1.3c I. They all mean ‘sb_x strongly makes «sb_y» make phenomenon’ and collocate with the preposition *into*₁.

There are a handful of reflexive verbs that also instantiate the seme ‘strong’, proven by the incongruous **slightly* + *apply/exert/enjoy/impose/justify* + *oneself*. They share the meaning ‘#sb_x# strongly uses energy of #sb_x# wanting to make event’. *Strain oneself* has {strongly} because *slightly* is allowed as a collocator.

The verbs *like* and *love*, both with ‘strong’, shun the adverb *much* (‘strongly’) if it is not fortified by the intensifiers *very*, *so* or *too*. This is in order to avoid tautology created by adding *much* which in this case is not informative. When negated, as in *I don’t like him much* there is no tautology – see §1.1.3c II.

The seme ‘strong’ occurs in the analyses of the verbs *bolster/boost/raise*₃ <#sth# makes #spirit# stronger>, as in *b./r. confidence/courage/ego/image/morale/spirit*, as well as in “legal” verbs (§3.4.2). Some other sememes of *raise*: **1** <#sb_x# uses language to make expression of #mental event when sb_x does not know in order to make sb_y think about sth> *r. + dilemma/issue/matter/question/subject* **2** #sb_x# makes sb_y experience #good - bad mental event#> *r. + complaint*

/doubt /expectation /fear /hope/misunderstanding /suspicion

A powerful person ($sb_{with\ power}$) projects his/her power to the action or state imposed by him/her, so that these verbs contain 'strong' by a phenomenon similar to transfer (§2.4.7 c). The same phenomenon may be responsible for copying the seme 'strong' from an analysis onto the directive, or vice versa, or from a pre-directrix onto the directrix in the same definition; e.g. in *Mike talked Pete into buying the car*, Mike becomes relatively 'strong', i.e. psychologically stronger than *Pete* owing to the meaning of *into*.

The seme 'strong' occurs in a variety of shades and situations. Agentive 'sth' when other than 'sb' emanates least strength, as in *The flood convinced her that she should have the house built at another site* or *kiss convince* in our example, *ambition, curfew, defeat, dispute, fuss, misery, tempest, terrorism* 'invariably strong', *panic* 'typically strong'. The seme 'sb' in the same subject place is a bit stronger. This is 'strong' of the nouns such as *congress, doctor, manager, president, priest, teacher, treasurer* 'invariably strong sb' = ' $sb_{with\ power}$ ' – see §§3.4. 2, 3.4.3 and 3.5.3.

3.4.6 Have

Words denoting possession (like *have, own, possess*) belong in the group of common everyday abstract words which are most elusive when a lexicographer or a lexicologist wants to define them. Special attention has been dedicated to *have* in the works of Talmy (1976), Comrie (1976b) and Ritter and Rosen (1997). To mention *OALD* as a random choice source, *have* in its primary meaning is defined as *own, hold* or *possess, own* as *have something that belongs to somebody*, while *possess* is defined as (formal) *have* or *own*, thus completing the vicious circle.

While the directives of *have* pose little problem, an effort is required to discover the analyses of this verb's sememes. This can be done best by experimenting, using the verb *have* in sentences and strings of words that highlight certain aspects of its meanings. The individual semes of *have* will be grouped according to the subject's role.

3.4.6a *possession sensu strictu*

Starting from Wierzbicka's discussion (1988: 345) of the basic meaning of *have*, where she suggests that the possessors of *have* can (= have a certain power to) do with their possession what they want, the primary meanings of *have* can be defined as *have*₁ and *have*₂ in the following way, reducing it to its semantic components, although Goddard and Wierzbicka (2002) added 'have' to their list of semantic primes.

1 <#living thing {sb}# is with power to use #sth - time - substance - space# {habitually}> *I h. a lot of books. She has pension and a maid to help her. I h. not enough time. I had five minutes to escape the danger. The bear has its den. My plants h. good soil/enough light. We h. good schools. He has a bakery. Suppose you h. a row of cells. They h. chewing gums at Smith's. h. job/position/post* (role of social power) **2** <#living thing_x# is with power to use #thing_y# when thing_x and thing_y are together {thing_y touching / near thing_x}> *He had withg him a copy of a London paper. I h._{1/2} enough water here. She had red shoes on her feet. He had the bar to himself.* **3** <#sb_x# is with power to use #mental state of sb_x {with power} who wants to make good phenomenon for sb_{x/y}#> *I h. my rights and my responsibilities. You h. my assent.* **4** <#living thing_x# comes to be with power to use #sth_x# (source being living thing_y)> *She had a present fromg*

him. H. a seat! Tom is going to h. a letter and a phone call.

The seme 'power to use' is an essential property of the meaning of *have*₁, which is also reflected in Erich Fromm's discussion on the having mode in societies. "The person who owns private property is its sole master with full power to deprive others of its use and enjoyment" (Fromm 1979: 75). 'Sb's power to use sth' can be further reduced to 'sb_x's relation concerning sth_x in which sb_x is strong to make habitualness_x of using sth_x when sb_x wants to'. 'Relation' is a frequent seme occurring in most sememes of *have*. It is an abstract invisible phenomenon of mental, physical or chemical nature connecting at least two entities.

The typical meaning of *have*₂ is most obvious when possession is attributed to a non-human living thing that can move. If a bird is said to have a worm, it has probably caught it and holds it ready to eat. The power with which the bird is vested is a purely physical (bodily) capability. The following sentences with *have*₁ show that the kind of power to use a thing when humans are in question varies in contexts considerably.

I have a cottage in the mountains, but the only road leading to it is ruined, so I can never go there (= I am with legal power to use the cottage, but without physical power to use it).

Pete has a car, but he has stolen it (= Pete is with physical and mental power to use the car, but without legal power to use it).

Tom has a car, but he cannot drive it because he has not yet learned how to drive /because he has not got the license (= Tom is with legal power to use the car, i. e. he has the right to sell the car as an owner, but he is without mental/legal power to use the car as a driver).

Johnny had two books that had been saved after the shipwreck, but he couldn't read them because he was

illiterate (= Johnny was with physical power to use the books, but he was without mental power to use them).

Mike keeps a fettered bear. But the bear has its den, and it suffers in captivity. (The bear is with physical power to use a den under normal circumstances but not in captivity).

If we in *We have a wide range of products* refers to salesmen who are not the owners of the products at the same time, the verb *have* means 'be with power to use products for sale'.

This means that the primary *have* includes physical, mental or legal power. 'Legal power' (or sometimes 'moral power') is in everyday parlance *one's right* to do something. Further, there are several subtypes of legal power, such as the right to have at one's disposal, to control, to make free use of something, or to sell. These various kinds of possession are allosemes of a single sememe, as proven by zeugma in

Jim and Tom have each a car. Jim owns his, and Tom has stolen one.

In the meaning 'be with legal power to use', *have*₁ is used only in general statements, not in deictically referring expressions. Instead of **John has that car*, one would say *John owns that car*. *John has*₂ *that car today* would be said in the sense 'be using', i.e. 'be with physical power and permission to use' (Dixon, 2005: 124; 362). This means that *have* is used, as our semantic definition states, either for a general possession (*have*₁) or as a concrete instance of using something (as *have*₂), but not when mixing general possession with a particular, deictic application. *I have a lot of Shakespeare's plays at home and a copy of Hamlet with me* proves that *have*₁ and *have*₂ are closely connected in meaning. But we still prefer to consider them separate sememes on account of zeugmatic sentences such as **She has a pension* ('She receives a pension regularly') *and \$ 100 on her*.

According to Lyons (1977: 723), the answer to *Where is the book?* can be *John has it*. Here *have* is used as a locative copula, and *John* as a variant of the underlying locative subject. This answer has the same function as *It's on the table*. As we see it, this happens due to the prototypical meaning of *have*₂, i.e. hold (in one's hands). Metonymically, if somebody holds a thing, it is at the place where somebody is situated.

In *have*₄ the contextual verbal aspect of *have* is inchoative (inceptive, ingressive, i.e. specifying the beginning of an action) instead of the typical stative (cf. Hlebec 2007: 123) as a result of mentioning a past or future tense instead of the present and mentioning the origin of having, or as a result of some other linguistic and extra-linguistic factors. Seldom does it occur in passive, as in *There is nothing to be had here* (SOED s.v. *have*).

3.4.6b *partitive possession*

5 <#thing_x - phenomenon_x - unit_x# has #thing_y - form - amount - sth seen - sth heard# as part of thing_x - phenomenon_x - unit_x> *Mary has delicate hands and silky hair and this wood a silky texture* (thing). *The Green Party now has nearly 50,000 members* (thing). *The house has two storeys* (thing). *She has a beautiful appearance* (form). *It has a shape of a ball* (form). *The year* (unit) *has twelve months* (amount). *The flag has three colours* (sth seen). *The valley has beautiful scenery* (sth seen). *The song* (phenomenon) *has a catching tune* (sth heard).

6 <#living thing# is with #body {part}# in state during short time> *He had his head down*. *The snake had its body around his waist*.

Sememe *have*₅ contains 'have', which is not a semantic prime and can be reduced to 'is (partly) made of', while *have*₆ contains a typical 'part' in the object slot. *Have*₅ includes both alienable and inalienable possession

(see §3.5.1 on partonomy), and we shall use the seme 'have' in this meaning. *The barber cut₄ me on the cheek/*the hair* (Anderson 1974: 2 in Stojanović 1996: 176) and *Peter is strong in hands vs.*Peter is strong in hair* indicate that cheek and hand are inalienable parts of body, unlike hair. Similarly, *The bomb hit the house in the roof/*curtains* (Stojanović 1996: 259). Besides the auxiliary *have*, *have₅* can be shortened as in *He'd a good mind not to go* and *She's no imagination, never has had* (Agatha Christie, *The Hollow*. Chapter 8).

Have₂ and *have₆* are obviously closely connected because both refer to a temporary state. In *have₂* the subject uses a thing that is foreign to its body while in *have₆* the subject uses (a part of) its body to bring it into a position, the use being implied.

A combination of *have₂* (alienable possession) and a *have₅* with inalienable possession is not allowed; e.g. **She has a plump body and red shoes on her feet*. This is improved when an alienable possession *have₅* is introduced: *?She has blond hair and red shoes on her feet*.

In all the sememes of this group there occurs the seme 'part', and even 'body' can be conceptualized as part of a creature. Thus 'appearance' in *have₅* is part of her (i.e. of 'she'), proven by *I like her, especially her appearance*.

3.4.6c *experiencer*

The next group of sememes contains the seme 'experience' of *experience₁* (see endnote 4). The most inalienable possession is that of experiencing one's own thoughts and emotions and bodily states. "With respect to the state verbs [of thinking], *have* is the most common [auxiliary]: one has beliefs, opinions, suspicions, desires,

regrets and what not [...] [The] propositional state is like possessing something" (Vendler 1970: 91). There is no 'power to use' as in have₁₋₄, but its implication is possible. Actually, 'be with power' verges on the meaning of 'experience' because 'power to use' can be envisaged as an inherent inalienable property of the possessor. (This view embodies the fundamentals of capitalism.)

7 <#psychological event made by use of language# expresses *this* thought that sb_{sp} will immediately mention> *Gossip has it that they were secretly married. The local legend had it₂ that...; ...as the rumour has it₂...* **8** <#sb# experiences #psychological state# habitually/during short time> habitually: *Mary has wit and intelligence. He has a brilliant mind, but also a belief in extraterrestrials. Susan has a horror of spiders. Alice has concern and love for her children as well as great expectations about them. Paul has an ambition to become a singer.* during short time: *She had no doubts. Mark had no strength to run. How dare you h. the impudence? H. pity on him. H. mercy on us. H. a goodness to leave now. I h. a brilliant idea/plan/strategy. I h. nothing against them. He had intelligence to escape.* **9** <#living thing# experiences #good - {bad} bodily state# habitually / during short time> habitually: *She has arthritis and a broken ankle. Ann has good health.* during small amount of time: *I h. a toothache.*

The lexico-semantic items *have*₈ and *have*₉ exemplify the meaning of internal causation – see §2.2.16 a. One meaning of *have*₈ and *have*₉ contains 'habitually' and another one 'during small amount of time', proved by **She kills spiders as she has hatred of them, but now for once mercy on one of them*, which combines the two, unlike *She has both fear of spiders and mercy on them because she never kills them*. The difference that exists between the two sememes covered by a single definition in *have*₈

and \mathfrak{g} each is similar to that between countable and uncountable nouns – see §3.2.2.

The seme 'have' in $have_5$ and \mathfrak{g} is the converse of 'be part of'. Thus, *She has long legs* is the converse of (stylistically awkward) *Long legs are part of her* and *The valley has beautiful scenery* is the converse of *Beautiful scenery is (sth seen as) part of the valley*. ...*the rumour has it* ↔ ...*it is part of the rumour that...* This comes as a normal consequence of the seme 'part' being mentioned or implied in the analyses of the two definitions.

Certain instances of $have_8$ can be glossed as 'be with power to use' in the manner of $have_1$ or $\mathfrak{2}$, as in *Mary has wit and intelligence* = 'Mary is with power to use her own wit and intelligence', but this is possible only when a 'psychological state' is good. When the state is bad, such a paraphrase would be patently wrong, as 'I am with power to use a toothache' or 'She is with power to use hatred of spiders' are absurd.

3.4.6d *relation*

For *have* with relatives, friends and members of a community in the object ($have_{10}$) a different definition should be used. *Has* in *John has a son* cannot be glossed as 'John is with power to do whatever he wants with his son' (although Wierzbicka in 1988: 345 proposed this "autocratic patriarchal" paraphrase). But if we substitute *exist* for *be*, the paraphrase is improved. 'John exists with one son' or 'John exists and there also exists a male person that he has begotten' comes closer to the meaning of the sentence above. The same argument applies to *John has a boss* 'John exists and there also exists a person that officially controls John's work.' It is unusual to join *son* and *boss* in one sentence, as in ?*John has a son and a boss* because of typically different roles that the 'possessor' plays here. However, *John has a boss and a*

domineering son, who both mistreat him is acceptable, since John's positions become the same. Therefore 'be in strong relation' seems to be a handy umbrella definition for all kinds of such parallel existences accompanied by an important relationship. (*MEDAL* and *OALD* also classify this type of *have* under the heading RELATION.) See also the *casualty* example in §2.2.0.

10 <#living thing_x# is - exists in strong relation with #living thing_y#> *I have few friends. How many children h. they? She didn't want to h. him in marriage. He had no equals. Who can we h. as treasurer? I h. withg me Professor Jones, who will help you explain this. We h. a maid/man who comes in regularly.* (The notion of relation in this sentence is quite similar to the notion of 'with power to use sth' of *have*₁.) **11** <#non-living thing_x# is - exists in strong spatial relation with #non-living thing_y# when thing_x and thing_y make whole>. *The house has a garden. The barn has some pine trees behind it. Jack's pocket will h. a hole in it. The wall has some paintings hanging on it.* (The last three sentences have been taken from Emonds 1976 in Breivik 1983: 55.) **12** <#sb_x# is connected with #long mental state made by a lot of sb_y more than one who think of sb_x#> *h. a role/a good reputation. He has a strange name.*

The possession in *have*₁₀ is called "reciprocal" (in Stojanović 1996: 11). There is a converse antonymy of *John has a son* as *John's son has a father*, although the latter sentence is tautological.

The sentence *The garden has a table* is synonymous with *The garden is with a table* and is referentially (partially) synonymous with *There is a table in the garden*. Another sentence *The house has a pond* is synonymous with *The house is with a pond* and it can be paraphrased as *There is a pond beside the house* (cf. Breivik 1983: 55). In both sentences there is an idea of

functional connection between the garden/house and a table/pond respectively. In the sentences above, a table is a part of the garden, proven by *I like the garden, especially the table*, while in the *pond*-sentences a pond is not a part of the house. **I like the house, especially the pond* (cf. Grzegorek 1977: 13). What is common to both, however, is the idea of what is called "functional proximity", a strong association in the speaker's mind between the notions of 'garden/house' and 'table/pond'. Namely, in these sentences 'garden' and 'table' as well as 'house' and 'pond' go together as a whole. If the speaker wanted to describe a state in which there is a fly near flowers, he/she could not say **The flower is with a fly* or **The flower has a fly* because *flower* and *fly* are not in functional proximity. If *bee* is substituted for *fly*, the sentence becomes acceptable, because bees alight and feed on flowers. Also, once the scene becomes part of a painting, both sentences become all right because a flower and a fly make a whole in a picture. In a crowded bus the closeness of the speaker to other commuters is undeniable. And yet one cannot say **I had with me fifty passengers on the bus* because the proximity is not of a functional kind and commuters do not make use of the fact that they are close to one another. They are mentally rather distant, unlike in *I have with me Professor Jones, who will help you explain this*. In like manner Lindstromberg (1997: 209) says: "**Ann's in the garden with a table* [...] is completely vague about any association between Ann and a table. It is not even easy to infer an association. But if a hint of some association is given, then use of *with* becomes markedly more possible. Thus we might construe [*Ann is in the garden with her new table*] as suggesting that Ann is very attached to a recent purchase and likes admiring it at close range". This means that for the notion of functional proximity there has to be a mental bond of attraction, similar to magnetic attraction, to enable the realization of 'be with' (or *be with*) and *have*.

That the grammatical subject in sentences with *have*₁₂ plays a rather inactive role is most obvious in *Van Gogh has a worldwide reputation as a painter* because this sentence has become true only after Van Gogh's death. The feature 'to be connected with' certainly does not recall an active AGENT and is even far from EXPERIENCER.

3.4.6e recipient/patient

13 <#(event made by use of language by) sb_x# comes to be / is | with #{mental} event# made by sb_{x/y}> *She had a compliment from him, but also a complaint. May I h. your attention! Kate had no formal instruction in music. She had help from her friends. h. an injection/a driving lesson* **14** <#sth# is affected by #{good - bad} phenomenon#> *I h. an opportunity to sell the car. I'm not having much success. She has a happy marriage. We h. had enough of violence. Jane had an accident. She hasn't been having much luck recently. We didn't h. much difficulty. He has a problem with his wife and a lot of worries in business. I h. my right front tooth missing. The book has a page missing. They've had snow up in Scotland. I had my car stolen.* (The objects are the phenomena of *right front tooth/a page missing* and *my car stolen*, not merely *right front tooth* and *my car*.) *Last year the place was so full that we had people sleeping on the floor.* (The semantic object (object directive) is 'people sleeping on the floor', which connotes a bad state.) *The stocks had a fast run-up.* **15** <#living thing that can move# is affected by #time phenomenon#> *He had a long working life. I had a boring afternoon. I'm going to h. a good time.* **16** <#sb_x# wants to be affected by #event# that sb_x does not like> *I won't h. such behaviour any more! I won't h. the dog in the house!* **17** <#sb_x# makes and is affected by #event made by sb_x +

*y#> They had a friendly meeting and then a quarrel. Shall we h. a game of chess? We had elections and a holiday last week. 18 <#sb_x# makes and is affected by #{bodily} event / perception# whose name is derived from a verb, which is good for sb_x, that can be repeated during short-lasting time> (An extensive discussion on this use of *have* were presented in Wierzbicka (1988) and Dixon (2005), on which our definition has been based.) *Mary had a walk. H. a choose/look /read/throw. H. a use of my pen. Have a peep/shower/swim.**

The occurrence of the seme 'affected' in this group can be explained by imagining the state of being affected as part of a living thing, that part being at the same time a kind of possession of the living thing, and a kind of experience, in the sense of *experience*₂ – see §1.1.3c I.

'Bodily state', especially when bad, in *have*_g, can be construed not only as experienced, but also as affecting a living thing.

*Have*₁₇₋₁₈ show elements of causation as well, which is manifested by 'make'.

In *have*₁₆ there is incongruity between the first half of the definition and the latter half, and the masochistic tendency of sb_x who wants to experience something that sb_x does not like is avoided by obligatory use of negation in sentences.

3.4.6f *possessor of knowledge*

19 <#sb# knows #language#> *I h. no German. 20 <#sb_x# comes to know #mental event that makes sb_x know sth_x# with sth_y as source> *She had bad news and a piece of advice from him. He had no information about her.**

In *have*₁₉₋₂₀ 'knowledge of a language', 'news', 'information', 'advice' or 'fact' constitute a special kind of

experience and mental possession. *Have*₂₀ relates to *have*₁₉ in the same way as *have*₄ to *have*₁₋₃, i.e. in the former there appears the inchoative aspect.

3.4.6 g causer

In addition to *have*₁₇₋₁₈ a big group of *have*'s sememes contains causative meanings rendered by 'make' in their definitions, while *have*_{23 – 31} merge with 'be affected by'. A vague notion of 'experience' is implied in all.

21 <#sb_x# makes #sb_y# make state when sb_x and sb_y are together> *John would be nice to h. around. He had the guests in the dining room. He has his friend staying with him at present. We had them to₅ stay.* **22** <#sb_x# makes #substance# come to exist in sb_x's body through sb_x's mouth in order to make sb_x feel good> *They had a cake and a lemonade.* **23** <#female living thing_x that can move# makes #baby# come to not exist in space of thing_x's body any more> *My wife had twins yesterday.* **24** <#sb_x# is affected by #sth# that sb_x made [exist]> *He has four hundred paintings, five articles and six novels.* **25** <#sb_x# makes #sth {sb_y}# make phenomenon_x because sb_x wants phenomenon_x> *I'll h. the TV set in this room. H. him call me. He had his assistant (to₅) run the errand. I had my daughter wash the car. I had him dismissed. She had him reading poetry aloud. Jane has her husband pick her up from work every day. I've had my hair cut₅ (cut₅ <#sth_x {sb_x}# makes #thing that grows# shorter when sb_x uses sth_x sharp>). The king had his portrait painted by a famous artist. H. your tickets prepared.* **26** <#sb_x# makes #non-living thing / substance# make phenomenon that sb_x wants> *John has a wheel turning. John has the water running in the bathtub* (Dieterich 1975: 173) **27** <#sth {sb_x}#

unintentionally makes #sb_y# experience psychological state concerning state - habitualness> *The problem had me stunned. She had us worried. His sad story almost had us in tears. Economic revival has Russians yearning for what the West has.* **28** <#sb_x male# makes #sb_y female# be with sb_x making sexual event> (informal) *He had her on the sofa.* **29** <#sb_x {not mentioned}# makes #sb_y# make phenomenon_x good for sb_x and bad for sb_y when sb_y does not think that phenomenon_x is bad for sb_y> (slang) *I think you've been had in this deal.* **30** <#sb_x# makes #sb_y# come to be weaker than sb_x in contest event> (informal) *I had him there. Your opponent in the debate had you on every issue.* **31** <#sth# makes #part of event_x made because of event_y# [exist]> *h. Effect /impact/influence/result* **32** <#sb# makes #event made by sb more than one who are together during short time# [exist]> *h. Appointment /concert /meeting /party /show/trial* **33** <#sb_x# strongly touches #sb_y# making contact with sb_y's body part> *He had him by the arm/hair/throat.*

In *have*₂₅₋₂₇ the nouns are semi-objects (§3.2.3a I i) and the real objects are the non-finite clauses.

In Dixon's words (Dixon 2005: 198), the causative sense of *have* refers to the causer bringing something about, arranging that something happens. Whoever or whatever is a cause of something is invested with the power of creation, which provides a link of this sense of *have* with the possessive *have*, where power is a salient definitional feature. This fact accounts for the use of bare infinitive (§3.2.7a) in such cases. 'Sb_y' in *have*₂₅ is in social relations always a willing and obedient person.

*Have*₂₂ was explained by Fromm as follows. "Incorporating a thing, for instance, by eating or drinking, is an archaic form of possessing it [...] By eating another human being, I acquire that person's powers" (Fromm 1979: 35). As usual, Fromm associates secondary

meanings of *have* with its primary meaning of possession, and his comment on *have*₂₈ was: “[O]nly in those who must *have* what they like will this mental enjoyment [in interpersonal relations of a man and a woman] habitually result in the desire for sexual possession” (Fromm 1979: 113).

*Have*₂₅ is the “directive” causative, while the possession conveyed by *have*₃₁ is called the “resultative possession” (Stojanović 1996: 11).

3.4.6 h *expected to do*

The last group of *have*'s sememes contains ‘wanted to make’ as a defining seme. It is the idea of somebody strong that wants or something tends towards, a state to be created, that gives *have* these meanings. Similar to modals, which contain ‘strongly wanted’, *have to* is a semi-modal with a weaker variant of ‘strong’ realized through the mere presence of ‘wanted’, because when sb_x wants sb_y to do sth, sb_x is implied to be relatively strong.

33 <#sb_x# is wanted to make event_x - habitualness_x because of (#)strong state experienced by sb_x when sb_y {with power} wants to make sb_x make event_x - habitualness_x(#) by use of language of sb_y> *He has his duties/obligations. I h. six orders and a job to do. He has a demand to clean the room. Mary has a garden to attend to. A garden is a semi-object as the object directive includes non-finite clauses Type II. The underlying sense is ‘sb_x (with power) uses language to make sb_y make phenomenon’ (see §3.4.3.a) and carries a performative tinge. **34** <#sth_x {sb}# is wanted to make phenomenon because sth_y indef wants - tends so> *You h. to be careful. I was having to work every weekend. I h. to go. (I am having to go is marked as acceptable in Quirk 1968: 172!)**

Much has still to be done. **35** <#sth# strongly tends to be> *Just tonight the train had to be late. Things h. to get better.* (epistemic necessity)

Dual means of negation for *have* (*I haven't* or *I don't have*)⁸⁰ and the complementary *to*-infinitive show that *have*₃₃ behaves as a semi-modal — see §3.2.7 c.

3.4.6 i The vague general idea that unites all the meanings of *have* is that of attaching something to an entity to become its part. This notion is not unlike the general function of adjectives to attribute characteristics to an entity. This accounts for the referential equivalence of *She has beauty* and *She looks beautiful*, *Ann has health* and *Ann is healthy*, *Mark had no strength to run* and *Mark was not strong to run*. A paraphrase with *be* or some other linking verb is also sometimes available: *Mary has silky hair* and *Mary is with silky hair*. *The house has two storeys* and *The house is with two storeys*. In Arabic, for example, *Ahmed has a car* can be rendered literally 'A car is with Ahmed'. It is evident that 'be with' is an amalgam of two semantic elements, the first — 'be', a mere link used as a carrier of tense and person, and the second — 'with₁', semantically (and atomistically) defined as 'existing in same (= not different) time and space'. Therefore, *She has silky hair* can be glossed as 'She exists in the same part of space (i.e. her body) as her hair, which is silky'. The main difference between *is with* and *have* is that *have* is a transitive verb, while *be with* is intransitive. (According to Isačenko (1974:76), the meaning of *have* can be analyzed as 'be' + transitivity (quoted in Stojanović 1996: 205).) Grammatical transitivity without semantic transitivity creates an illusion of affecting the entity in the object and that makes the greatest difference that promotes the use of *have*.

In many sememes of *have* there is a pervading idea of power. The notion of power is ambivalent, just like the connotations of *have*. The psychologist Erich Fromm (1971: passim) distinguishes between 'the power of' as an

inner capacity, like love, which is positive, and 'the power over', such as domination and irrational authority, which is negative. As stated by Fromm: "[M]y [non-alienated] activity is a manifestation of my powers" (1979: 94). The only things that we naturally and inherently have (possess) are our mind and body. Says Jovo Toševski, M.D.: "Man has nothing so strong and so personal as his memory. It is his only treasure that he possesses" (2011: 12, translated by B.H.).

Have in most meanings which render it a relational verb (§2.3.1 b) cannot be passivized (cf. Wierzbicka 1988: 44-5) because its object is not an affected entity (e.g. **A nice little car is had by me* [Quirk 1968: 197]). "The verb *have* (*have got*) in its proper sense is seldom used in the passive (though it may be used, e.g. in "This may be had for twopence at any grocer's"" (Jespersen 1924: 168). This is borne out by the definitional paraphrases: 'sb is with power to use sth', 'is be with', 'is in relation', 'tend to be', 'is wanted', 'is affected by', 'is made of', and 'is connected with'.

Another category of *have* without passive is the EXPERIENCER *have*, with internal causation in which the object is never viewed as PATIENT. What is affected here is the EXPERIENCER, while the object is a STIMULUS — see §§2.2.5, 3.4.6. c and 3.4.6. f.

While *The cakes were eaten in a jiffy* is well-formed, **The cakes were had in a jiffy* is not, which proves that *have* 'eat' is not fully synonymous with *eat*. The latter verb emphasizes the use of the organs and the change of a solid substance made to be in body (<#living thing_x that can move# makes #solid substance# come to be soft and exist in thing_x's body through thing_x's mouth>), while *have* neutralizes the difference between a hard and liquid substance and focuses on pleasure. The contrast between *boil water* and *brew beer/coffee/marijuana/tea* hinges on the same distinction: *water* = 'liquid substance that makes living things exist' vs. *beer/coffee/marijuana/tea* 'liquid substance that sb drinks for pleasure'. We believe

that most speakers of modern languages differentiate between these two kinds of liquid. However, they need not make use of this or any other selection restriction. In German, for instance, the verb *kochen* is used with *Wasser*, *Kafee* and *Tee* (Lipka 1992: 167), but with *Bier*, which denotes a traditional native drink, a special verb *brauen* is employed.

When causation concerns a state as the object, passive is ruled out because the entity mentioned in the non-finite clause is not directly affected by the activity of the subject, as in **The TV set in this room will be had by me*. (The seme 'event' or 'state' in the directive corresponds to a non-finite clause. Therefore, the semantic object in *have*₂₅ is *the TV set in this room, him call me, my assistant (to) run the errand, him dismissed, etc.*) **He was had dismissed by me. *The King's portrait was had painted by a famous artist.*

If the strength of causation is so great that it affects the object noun referent, then the passive is possible, as in *have*₃₀. Inchoative (= 'come to be') of *have*₄ enables occasional passivization because the change made by inchoativity implies activity that affects the object of the active sentence (Dixon 2005: 360).

Unlike *have*, the verb *own* may be used in the passive and, by a significant number of native speakers, in imperfect. (In a test administered by Quirk (1968: 198) 31 rejected, 20 accepted and 25 judged to be questionable *They are owning hundreds of acres.*) This indicates that the slight difference in the definitions of *have*₁ (<#living thing_x# is with power to use # time - space - substance - sth#) {habitually} and *own* (<#sb# is with legal power to use #thing#) accounts for this phenomenon. "Own implies legal or official right to a thing" (Dixon 2005:123). With *own*, what is affected is the thing in the object, while with *have* the thing possessed is in relation with the possessor (cf. footnote in (c) 8). Here the definitional seme 'legal' exerts the

decisive influence due to its strength. It is up to the legislation of a particular country how to understand the notion of possession, e.g. can an owner of a painting bought from an artist make alterations to the painting. If *have*₁ occurs in a context that suggests legal possession, then *have* and *own* can be contextual synonyms. The verb *possess* is a partial synonym of *have*. "Possess indicates that there is a strong emotional or mental connection between owner and possession" (Dixon 2005: 123, 363). *Possess* takes the names of objects as well as notions of quality, ability, knowledge or emotion as grammatical objects: **1** <#sb# is with legal power to use #thing# *He never possessed much money.* **2** <#sb# experiences #good psychosomatic state# *He always possessed good health.*

According to the semantic definitions of functional proximity *have*, which include cases of inherent possession, in these definitions 'power' is not given as a salient feature but is only implied, probably because this kind of power ('the power of') is given us from birth. It is the power to use, which often (but not invariantly) becomes 'the power over', that is the salient feature of material possession *have*. (Schopenhauer (1916: Chapter 1) divided the goods of human life into three categories: (i) personality (i.e. health, strength, beauty, temperament, moral character, intelligence (ii) possession (i.e. property owned) and (iii) what man represents (honour, social position and fame). It is easy to recognize in them three types of having: inalienable possession (*have*_{5, 8} = i), possession *sensu strictu* (*have*₁ = ii), and the "possession" of *have*₁₂ = iii.)

The test of zeugma to separate the lexical meanings of *have* is often unfit for this purpose. For instance, the sentence *I have a beautiful house, nice children, and a happy marriage* in Fromm (1979: 31), conjoining *house*, *children* and *marriage* as the object directives of a single clause, suggests that *have* here is monosemic. However,

the respective meanings of *have*_{1, 10} and 14 are too wide apart to allow such treatment: <#living thing {sb}# is with power to use #sth - time - substance - space# {habitually}>, <#living thing_x# is in strong relation with #living thing_y#> and <#sth# is affected by #{good - bad} phenomenon#>. The speaker /investigator may also be in doubt in *?He has an ambition to become a writer and a problem how to become one* and probably in many others as well. On the other hand, some sememes of *have* may have been overdifferentiated, as suggested in the comments on *have* 9, 10, 17 and 18 in §3.4.6 c, e, f, g.

The expression *have got*, which is often used instead of *have*_{1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 14, 21, 27, 32, 33, 34} or 35, is widely distributed over the whole range of *have*'s categories (*Have you got a pencil? She hasn't got blue eyes. She's got good temper/health. I've got a brother. You've got to go now.*) and it would be interesting to find out the sememes they share.

3.4.7 "Light" verbs

A so-called "light" verb (*do, get, give, have, make, put, take*, as in *do a harm, get a grip, give a reception, have a talk, make a vow, put an end, take a rest*) makes "comparatively little semantic contribution to the sentences in which it is used" (Hanks 2013: 288). The advantage of collocations with light verbs in combination with nouns is that the nominalization enables counting and shifting within the thematic structure and the usage of an adjective instead of a non-existent adverb, while the verb contributes to a certain shade of meaning (cf. Olsson 1961, Renský 1964). Because their meanings merge with those of their collocators to produce near-synonyms of monemes (e.g. *give an order* ≈ *order*, *give a laugh* ≈ *laugh*, *have a smoke* ≈ *smoke*, *do the shopping* ≈ *shop*),

most linguists refuse to allot a particular meaning to any of these verbs and believe that they are depleted of meaning. However, light verbs do have particular meanings, as demonstrated in this book when analysing *have*, *make* and *do* – see §2.1.5a and *have*₁₈ in §3.4.6e.

3.4.8 Linking verbs: a portrait of remain

Linking verbs are: *appear*, *be*, *come*, *continue*, *fall*, *feel*, *grow*, *happen*, *look*, *persist*, *prove* <#sth# comes to be experienced as | (this) true thought concerning / good | state> (e.g. *The dispute proved (to be) impossible to resolve*), *remain*, *resemble*, *run*, *seem* (see §2.2.16a), *show*, *smell*, *sound*, *taste*, and *turn*. They are intransitive stative relational verbs that can all be replaced by *be* without losing the basic meaning and often redundantly followed by *to be* – see also §2.2.1c.

In order to assess the value of the collocational method and the definitions constructed by its means, we shall endeavour to give answers to Ross's (1977: 127 - 134) numerous queries about the linking verb *remain*. Ross made a note in "Squibs and Discussions" in order to "call attention to some [...] unique properties of the verb *remain*" which is "subject to a raft of weird restrictions". The restrictions, which are, as Ross suspected, mainly semantic rather than syntactic, include: (a) the ban of negation, as in **The cost doesn't remain to be computed*. *?The color of the saris never/seldom/hardly remains to be decided upon*. **Harold remains to be given no books*, **All the letters remain to be unopened*, "though negatives that have been incorporated into a quantifier modifying the subject of the sentence are all right", as in *Nothing remains to be arranged for*. *No books remain to be given to Harold*. *All the letters don't remain to be opened*, (b) "progressives seem totally out, perfects only slightly better, and only some modals are unhopeless, if any", as in **These books are/have been remaining to be*

*filed.*Though remaining to be promoted, Maggie is cheerful. ??This case has remained to be settled. An acceptable settlement would /?may /?mus /?*might /?could /?should/*will remain to be agreed upon.* (c) "As is often the case when negging is bad, questioning is difficult", as in *?Does the carpet remain to be vacuumed? ?Why do you remain to be convinced?* (d) "raising the subject of a *remain*-sentence usually produces a bad result:" *It is known that the price remains to be agreed on, but: *The price is known to remain to be agreed on. ?For this fact to remain to be taken into account was a disgrace.* (e) "other processes that render a *remain*-clause non-finite must be blocked:" *Jim claims that he remains to be examined by Dr. Hamstress. That this fact remained to be taken into account was a disgrace, but: ?We want to remain to be mentioned in official dispatches. *Jim claims to remain to be examined by Dr. Hamstress.* (f) the next verb has to be *be* and it has to be passive: *The guest room remains to be/*get broken into. ??These reports remain to get/receive the kind of study they deserve. *They remain to be cadets/drinking wine. *We remain to know₂ the Cyrillic alphabet. *Bill remains to undergo knee surgery.* But there are exceptions: *It remains to demonstrate /determine /prove /show /?argue /?say/?state /?note /?*announce/*concede* (<#sb_x# uses language to make expression of (*this*) (#) thought(#) in order to make sb_y know (#)sb_x's weak state(#) as true> *The government conceded defeat (weak state). I concede you that point (thought). *He conceded himself defeated.) that we are the sole heirs of Turg-u-luw-um ?< It remains to be demonstrated /determined etc. that we are....* (g) the passivized verb in the complement of *remain* must be agentive or volitional: *Headway remains to be made on the knotty problem of deblenification. Harry remains to be surprised by/*at Dr. Muck. Zack remains to be equaled/excelled as a raconteur. It₅ remains to be proved/shown/?discovered/*believed/*known/*thought;*

**It_{3/5} remains to rain.* We can add another constraint (h): *remain* cannot be passivized (cf. **Mark's best friend was remained by John*).

More than thirty years after Ross declared that he knew "of no way to explain the abundant mysteries with which *remain*-sentences are surrounded" (133), definitions reached by the collocational method can solve the conundrum.

Dictionaries usually register three sememes of the verb *remain*, for which we propose the following definitions: **1** <#sth_x# is in state_x and tends to be in state_x (when sb_{sp/y} thinks that sth_x might - should be in state_y)>; e.g. *The economy remains fragile; Population growth remains a serious issue. Her answer remained 'no'. Man remained a hunter for thousands of years. Promises by MPs remained just promises. They remained the best friends. He will r. (as) manager of the club. John remained a bachelor. I r. to be convinced that your plan is feasible. He'll r. hanging about. The rate remained at 50%. It remains uncertain whether he is the winner. It remains possible that bad weather could destroy the crops. Let things r. as they are. r. hungry/motionless/seated/silent/standing/unchanged* **2** <#sth_x# exists / tends to exist | when (part of) sth_y does not exist any more> *Only half of the original workforce remained. Few sites remained to attract industry. After the fire, little remained of the house. Only a handful of these rare fish r. in Scotland. There remained one significant problem. Problems r. The fact remains that she lied to us. It remains true that he lied. The question remains whether.... Question remains about his honesty. If you take 2 from 10, 8 remains. It only remains for me to say that...* **3** <#sth {sb}# continues to exist in space> *When the others have gone, Mary remained. I shall r. to see the end of the game. They remained in Mexico. R. at your posts! The plane remained on the ground. The painting remained with the artist. She left, but I remained behind.*

Remain is a linking verb when containing 'be', which occurs in *remain*₁ and *remain*₃. *Remain*₁ can be paraphrased as 'still be (and not change)' or 'continue to be the same as before', where 'be' is a linking verb, *remain*₂ as 'still exist (after everything else has gone)', and *remain*₃ as 'still occupy the same place/job' or 'stay in the same place/job and not leave it'. The same 'sb_{sp/y} thinks that sth might - should be in state_y' of *remain*₁ is usually an implication. The implications for some of the sentences above could be: 'Man remained a hunter for thousands of years, but a real advance occurred when they began farming'. 'They remained to be friends in spite of the distance that separated them'. 'He will remain as the manager of the club in spite of the protest'. 'I remain to be convinced that your plan is feasible in spite of what they say'. 'It is known that the price remains to be agreed on, while other items have been agreed on'. With *remain*₁ a complement is obligatorily required by 'be in state' in order to provide 'state' with information about the kind of state.

We have noticed instances of ambiguous or equivocal uses of *remain*. Thus, *A few hundred soldiers still remain* is ambiguous between *remain*₂ and *remain*₃. In *Most troops were killed, but a few hundred soldiers still remain* it is *remain*₂, while in *Most troops have now been withdrawn from the region, but a few hundred soldiers still remain (CIDE)* it is *remain*₃. The example sentence *Her unhappy face remained with me throughout the rest of my journey* from LLA (p. 1302) has been rightly classified as containing *remain*₂₋₃. Her face can be conceptualized by me (i) as an image that still existed after the rest of her vision had gone or (ii) as an image still occupying my mind.

The cases treated by Ross constitute a special meaning of *remain*, which justifies the introduction of *remain*₄. Examples are: *It remains to be seen if you are*

right. A few problems r. to be discussed. Much remains to be accomplished/done/settled can be glossed as 'Much has yet not been done and still needs to be done'. *Remain*₄ is subjective like *seem* (see §2.2.16a), another linking verb, because they both express the speaker's attitude. But unlike *seem*, whose meaning does not change when *to be* is inserted (*She seems (to be) lonely*), with the addition of *to be*, *remain*₁ becomes *remain*₄. This difference arises from the difference in the meaning of *to be* after *seem* and after *remain*. With *seem*, *be* is a facultative link carrying the meaning of the infinitive; with *remain*, *to be* is a modal defined as <#sth# is expected by sb to be in good state>, characterized in Dixon (2005: 261) as "a verb which most often 'has a human subject who is scheduled to be involved in an activity'". We define *remain*₄ in the following way: <#sth_x# is not in state_x and - but is expected by sb_{sp} to be in good state_x>. As their definitions coincide significantly, it is obvious why *remain* is always followed by the modal *to be*, thus forming a passive infinitive. The active infinitive is dated: *What remains to tell...* instead of *What remains to be told...* (Tennyson, in *SOED* s. v. *remain*).

The following collocations and bans on collocations have been employed to reach the definitions, and at the same time the definitions cast light on the restrictions.

(a) **The cost doesn't remain to be computed*. *'The cost has not been not computed (= has been computed) but should be computed'. **Harold remains to be given no books*. *'Harold has not been given books but he should be given no books'. **All the letters remain to be unopened*. *'All the letters have been unopened, but they need not be unopened'. **No books remain to be given to Harold*. 'No books have not been given to Harold (= All books have been given to Harold) and no books need to be given to Harold'. **All the letters don't remain to be opened*. 'All the letters have not been not opened (= have been opened) and they cannot be unopened'.

(b) All linking verbs are stative. As a stative verb, *remain* is not used in the imperfective aspect (see §2.2), be it in full or short form: **Though (she was) remaining to be promoted, Maggie is cheerful.*

The perfect phase is out of place in collocations with *remain* because its basic meaning 'link between the past and the present' is in clash with the *remain*'s future-oriented 'is not and - but is expected to be'.

Epistemic modals (see §3.2.7 c) contain 'is (strongly) (not) expected by sb_{sp} to tend to be - exist - make', which does not tie in with 'is not in state_x and - but is expected to be in good state_x' of *remain*. To say **These books must remain to be given as a gift* is muddled thinking.* 'These books are strongly expected to not be affected by being given and/but are expected to be affected by being given.' We have no other plausible explanation for the acceptability of *would* except that unlike the rest of modal verbs, it harmonizes with 'expected by sb_{sp} to be in good state' in the *remain*₄'s definition. Therefore *It remains to...* is like the evaluative pattern *IT + IS + ADJ + TO-INF* - see §3.2.6 (3).

(c) The cue to (c) prohibitions was given by Ross himself.

(d) Non-finite clauses contain 'psychological state concerning phenomenon' (see §3.2.3), and so they cannot establish connection with *remain*.

(e) Two infinitives in succession are avoided for stylistic reasons.

(f) As already explained, the modal *to be* is mandatory after *remain*₄ unless the definition of the complementary verb contains 'make sb know' near the beginning, just as it happens in *demonstrate* (see §2.3.1 a), *determine*, *prove* and *show*. The phenomenon of the potentially passive meaning of 'make sb_{indef} know' is due to coupling *it*₅ (§3.1.4a V) with *to*₃-infinitive [§3.2.6 (3)]. Therefore *It remains to demonstrate how rich he is* can be paraphrased as 'It remains to make sb_{indef} know ...' or 'It remains to be made known...'. '.

(g) The 'state' of *remain* has to be created by an event of a causative verb (with 'make'), because the 'state' is 'affected' rather than 'experienced'. As Ross noted, in *Harry remains to be surprised by Dr. Muck*, *surprised* is a verb, while in **Harry remains to be surprised at Dr. Muck*, it is an adjective. The correct construction with *remain* and an adjective would be *Harry remains₁ surprised at Dr. Muck*. (For *surprised by/at* see §2.5.2d.)

(h) *Remain* is a linking verb, and linking verbs cannot be used in the passive voice because the entity in the predicate is not affected by the verb: *She appeared as an actress*. □ *She was an actress*. **She was appeared as an actress*. *The texture feels smooth*. □□*The texture is smooth*. **The texture is felt smooth*.

3.5. NOUNS

3.5.0 Just like the meaning of verbs and adjectives, the meaning of nouns can be probed into by using the collocational method. The major difference is that in the case of nouns there are no directives. But directives stand for collocating nouns and thus represent the main source of noun definitions. This difference has been stated in a different way in Hanks (2013): "there is no syntagmatic framework of valencies for noun analysis (as there is for verbs), so it will readily be seen that there is much more room for lexicographical creativity in organizing the collocates" (136). "For common nouns (i.e., nouns that do not denote events and specifically, nouns that function as referring expressions), a different approach [than that for verbs] is called for. Rather than looking for the argument structure, the analyst should look for statistically significant collocates in the environment of the target word" (134). We have restricted the application of the collocation method to words that contract a structured relationship, while Hanks appeals for search after

statistically relevant collocates that do not occur in grammatical relationship (like *spider* co-occurring with *scorpion* and *cockroach*). For our method this is not indispensable, not even necessary, but can be useful in confirming the membership in a class of nouns. To establish the semantic definition of a noun one has to look for the directives and directrices because they are tailored to noun content.

There are four main types of noun definitions with SUBORDINATE (DOWNGRADED) PREDICATIONS, i.e. predications expressed as relative clauses to limit the meaning of the head word. They are:

A 'person w h o does sth actively' (*bookseller, teacher, footballer, queen, baker*)

B 'person w h o experiences sth made actively by sb else' (*pupil, customer, subject*)

C 'thing w h i c h is used for sth' (*razor, telescope, book, ship, furniture*)

D 'sth w h i c h is part of sth else' (*arm, keel, door, corner*; Leech 1990: 209).

For A see §§1.1.3g, 2.2.15 and 3.3.1c II, for B §2.5.2c II, C is elaborated on in §2.4.6, D in §3.5.1.

The meaning of nouns denoting things is much less dependable on context than that of other words because names of things are relatively independent of other words in syntagmatic relation, which reflects the nature of the entities themselves. The difference between the status of a marker in noun definitions and the adjectival directive throws light on the fundamental difference between nouns and adjectives. Having no directives, nouns have compact meaning and their defining content after the marker *m e r g e s* with the marker in a categorizing function, formally signalled by the relative pronoun. However, the analysis of an adjective is *j o i n e d* to a detachable directive, with its variable content in particular language use. This statement is supported by Wierzbicka (1988: 468): "a noun indicates a categorization; an adjective, on the other hand, indicates a mere description [...]. Thus,

one might describe a person as tall, thin, blond, freckled, and so on. But if one categorizes a person as a hunchback, a cripple, a leper, a virgin, or a teenager, one is not mentioning one characteristic among many; rather, one is putting this person into a certain category, seen at the moment as 'unique' [...] One might say that a noun is comparable to an identifying construction: 'that's the kind of person that this person is'. An adjective, on the other hand, is comparable to a simple predicate compatible with many other such predicates: 'this person is X, Y, Z'.

Typically, the meaning of nouns is complex and subject to perspectivization leading to different facets (see § 1.1.2). "Atypical nouns which focus on a single feature, such as *hero* or *saint*, are more readily accessible to comparison and 'measurement', of a kind, than more typical ones. *X is greater hero/saint than Y. ?X is a greater boy than Y.* " (Wierzbicka 1988: 486). "[A] semantic derivation of a noun from an adjective whereby nothing seems to be added to the meaning of the adjective (other than the idea of categorization) tends to be accompanied by the emergence of expressive components [as in *fatso*, *fool*]" (Wierzbicka 1988: 474).

One would expect abstract concepts of phenomena to be basically represented in semantic definitions by verbs or adjectives. But this is not always feasible. Nouns have an aura of "thingness" beyond semantics, reifying even the most abstract notions (cf. Wierzbicka 1988: 470). Some concepts, such as 'light', 'time', 'space' or 'thought', which are semantic primes, are best expressed as nouns. They are more independent than less abstract phenomena (like *walking*, *arrival*, *sleep*, *change*, *love*, *existence*, *day*, *cleverness*, *scholarship*, *north*). To take 'thought', it is classified as a kind of mental phenomenon, while the very idea of phenomenon, although different from a 'thing', is expressed in terms of a noun rather than a verb or an adjective. So it seems that abstract nouns are the most suitable to express abstractness. If we insisted on '#sb# thinks well about sth' instead of '#sb#

experiences good thought concerning sth', we would miss the expression of the relation between the COGITATOR and the thought, which is couched in terms of an inherent 'experience' (see §3.4.6 c). Moreover, there can be countable manifestations of thought, light and time, which would be lost in a verbal formulation.

Round brackets within a noun definition are used to represent two sememes, one without bracketed semes and another one that includes bracketed semes; e.g. *application* <(sth made by use of language in writing in) event when sb applies> stands for: **1** <sth made by use of language in writing in event when sb applies> and **2** <event when sb applies>.

3.5.1. Partonomy

Part-whole relation is called "partonomy" and if it relates to nouns, it is named "meronymy", as in *A roof is a part of a house*. If 'part' is the typical seme, the meronym is optional, as *cellar* in relation to *house*. The relation of partonomy viewed from a different, whole - part direction is called "holonymy", expressed by *with*₇ or *have*₅₋₆, as in *tree with branches, face with beard, hand has fingers, door has handle*. On the notion 'part' see Cruse (1986: 157, 160).

The seme 'part' occurs in definitions of those lexemes that denote parts of entities in the outer world. For instance, the elbow is part of the arm, and also *elbow* contains 'part of arm' in its definition. Entity A (e.g. leg) is part of entity B (body) in nature, just as the lexeme referring to entity A (*leg*) has to be defined in terms of meaningful element B ('body') 'long thin hard outer body part that moves and is used as base for moving on ground'.

A special type of partonomy is realized by means of the so-called 'unit nouns', which are used "to turn lumps of mass into units" (Broughton 1990: 183), here defined

as <arbitrary part constituting sth> (cf. the definition of *of*₁ in §3.1.2. 1) in, for instance, *a piece of coal/poetry /advice/news, a bit of cloth/fun/expenditure, a drop of oil, a strand of hair, a glimmer of hope*. In such instances the first noun conveys the idea 'arbitrary part', whereas the second denotes the uncountable generic notion.

There are also constructions in which *-ed* adjectives are added to nouns, where the adjective conveys the meaning of partitive possession (see §3.4.6 b) and nests a noun which denotes a part of the head noun, like: *a bearded* (= *beard* (noun) + *-ed*) *man* (head noun), beard being part of a man. This is a case of disguised meronymy, because the noun (here *beard*) which is notionally linked to another noun (here *man*) is accommodated within an adjective. Simple *-ed* adjectives built from base nouns incorporate entities that are not inherent semantic parts of the collocating nouns and such partitive possession is called "alienable". For example, *a camera'd bystander* is acceptable, unlike **a headed boy*, where *headed* would require a modifier, as in *a red-headed boy* (Hirtle 1970: 27). This phenomenon motivates us to define the noun *boy* in such a way that 'head' is contained in its definition, at least indirectly in order to indicate the inalienable possession. This can be the way to do it: *boy* <*sb*_x young and male human living thing (and child of *sb*_y in relation between *sb*_x and *sb*_y, which is *sb*_{more than one})>; *head* <main body part of human living thing with two eyes, two ears, mouth, nose, face, chin, and forehead>. *Boy* implies having a head inherently via the following chain: '... human living thing' (*boy*) → 'with main body part of human living thing...' (*head*). In the same spirit Robert Beard (1976: 52) wrote: "Any lexical feature which also appears later in the lexicon as the heading of an independent lexical entry, ascribes that independent entry, with its entire semantic feature inventory to the entry under which it occurs as a feature". But contrary to Beard, who also said that "[s]ince *animal*

is not so much a part of the definition of *foot* as *foot* is part of the definition of *animal*, *animal* does not have to be repeated under *foot*, thus effecting an enormous lexical economy", we believe that it is more expedient to mention 'animal', ie. 'living thing that can move' in the definition of *leg*, rather than to mention 'leg' (or any other part of an animal) under *animal*. The connection between *leg* and *animal* will be established indirectly through the common feature 'living thing that can move' appearing in both definitions.

In a kind of contiguous metonymic connection the seme 'part' can occur as an expansion of a directive (§3.3.1c). Thus, in the definition of *young* the angles mark the partonomic connection: *young* <# rbody part of/emotion of/phenomenon made by/time of existence of) living thing# that is of kind that has lived during small amount of time {who is inexperienced - immature - small}> e.g. *y. arm/eye* (cf. Hlebec 2008a: 178).

Although collocations *She is fair/blonde*, *blond man/hair*, *fair skin/complexion/hair* suggests a partonomic connection, it would be wrong to posit a definition <# rbody part of r sb# who is of light colour>. Nose, ears, hands are outer body parts, and yet collocations **fair nose/ears/hands* are not permissible, not to speak of *blond(e)*, which agrees only with 'sb' and *curl/hair/lock*, while 'sb who is of light colour' is patently wrong. Therefore, after the ordinary partonomic connection has been discarded, we opt for *blond(e)* <#(sb with) r part of r hair# that is of light colour> and <#(sb with) hair - skin# that is of light colour> for *fair*. The connection in this case is indirect, specifically an "obverse" partonomic connection (§3.3.1c I), where the head is 'part of' expanded by 'sb' connected by means of the seme 'with', not the other way round. The ordinary partonomy is present only as a local expansion of 'hair' in *blond(e)*.

For partonomy to play significant role in constructing definitions, the seme 'part' ought to be

prominent (“salient” in Rasulić 2016: 255). Thus in Cruse’s example (2004: 212) *I see you’ve got yourself some wheels/*a clutch pedal* in the definitions of *wheel* <rotating round man-made thing which is prominent part of man-made thing {means of transport used to make thing move}> there is a ‘prominent part’, while *clutch pedal* is not defined as such. So is a wing prominent in relation to an airplane.

Partonomy also includes the relation between members and groups to which they belong (e.g. *ship* : *fleet*, *soldier* : *regiment* and *bird* : *flock*; Rasulić 2016: 242). This is shown in definitions as ‘part of group’ e.g. in *appoint*, *excommunicate*, *nominate* § 3.4.3b. We prefer to define a group holonym in terms of a member meronym rather than the opposite because in this case meronyms seem to be basic. Therefore, *flock* is <group with birds as parts of group> (see the definition of *bird* in §1.1.3c I). If in the *bird*’s definition the same ‘part of group’ were mentioned, it would, at best, act as a variable typical feature.

3.5.2 Relations of nouns with adjectives and verbs

3.5.2 a Partitivity

“Partitivity” is a lexical relation between a noun and the pertaining adjective in which the adjective denotes part of the noun’s denotatum (Hlebec 2006). This is the case with the following examples: *Southern Africa*, *northern Canada*, *left/right* + *heart/body*, *hard/soft palate*, *lower/upper mast*, where the only possible interpretations are: ‘the south part of Africa’, ‘the northern part of Canada’, ‘left/right part of the heart/body’, ‘the hard/soft part of the palate’, ‘the lower/upper part of a mast’. The collocating adjective is interpreted as partitive if a particular orientation: anthropocentric (or egocentric),

geocentric (absolute) or object-centred (or intrinsic), leads to a single entity. ("After the semantic elements in definitions referring to spatial dimensions have been classified, three basic cases of orientation emerge: 1. orientation in relation to man, 2. orientation in relation to the horizontal surface, and 3. orientation in relation to the object" (Hlebec 1983: 277).) According to the anthropological orientation man has two ears and therefore the adjective *left* in *the left ear* is not interpreted partitively. But *the inner/outer ear* does lead to a partitive interpretation because man has no two ears of which one were outward and the other inward. *The upper/lower thigh* has to be 'the upper/lower part of the thigh'. (It is clear that the collocation *the lower arm* is not well-formed because there is a ready compound conveying the same meaning, i.e. *forearm*. In the same way, *thigh* and *shank* block the use of ??*the upper/lower leg*. The same principle stands in the way of **staying of tourists*, **sleeping of the infant*, **evaporating of water*, ?*walking of protestants* because here there are at disposal converted nouns *stay*, *sleep* and *walk*, as well as the noun *evaporation*.) Ship masts are distributed in space on various places rather than on various heights. Therefore *the lower/upper mast* is interpreted as 'the lower/upper part of a mast'. *The lower Danube* is 'the lower part of the Danube' rather than 'one of the Danubes which is lower' or 'the Danube, which is lower all its course'. And yet, *the long Danube* is not 'a long part of the Danube' but is a description of what the Danube is like in its entirety (see §3.3.1 b). In both cases, this river is viewed as a unique entity, but there is a difference in orientation; in the former case the orientation is geocentric, while in the latter it is object-centred.

Since space and time often go hand in hand in metaphorical expressions, it is to be expected that an analogous phenomenon should occur with time expressions, where 'a phase' would be a kind of 'part'. Collocations with adjectives denoting duration and nouns

referring to an event consisting of parts, such as *pulse* and *coughing*, are capable of imposing a partitive reading at least as one possibility (meaning 'parts in plural'). Thus, *short pulse/coughing* could be either a pulse or coughing of short duration, or a pulse or coughing with short intervals.

Manifestative adjectives denoting existence in a part of time collocate with proper names to designate a person or an area in one period of their existence. Here we also deal with a temporal partitivity. It is the *idea* of a person living, or of an area existing, in a period of time that is highlighted, as in *the young/mature Shakespeare, the earliest London, the new China/Turkey*. The same emergence of 'idea' in paronymy occurs in *the greater London* 'part of i d e a of London that denotes more space than what is typically thought of as London'.

3.5.2 b *Partitive transitivity*

"Transitivity" is a semantic relation which occurs under the condition that if A is related to B in a way, and B to C in a way, then A is related to C in the same way as B to C, e.g. if A is bigger than B and B is bigger than C, then A is bigger than C.

"Partitive transitivity" (Hlebec 2010: 75-77) is a kind of transitivity that occurs in sentences containing meronymic relationship. This happens on condition that the definition implies that the physical link between two entities A and B is preserved. Thus, *He cut₄ his finger* (*finger* <one of long end p a r t s of the hand>; *fingers* 'long mobile ending part of the hands' Wierzbicka 1980: 84) \subset *He cut₄ his hand*, because *cut₄* 'make an incision' does not presuppose severance. (For a full definition of *cut₄* see §2.2.6.) However, *He cut₃ a branch from the tree* (*from* signalling separation) $\not\subset$ *He cut₁ the tree*. Also, *He was eating his starter* \subset *He was eating his lunch* (*starter* <first p a r t of a meal>, *eat* defined in

§1.1.3c I.). When the event of eating one's starter is in progress, it is still a part of the meal. But, *He ate (up) his starter* ≠ *He ate (up) his lunch* because by finishing one's starter, which is conveyed by the perfective aspect, the speaker views the starter as a whole on its own, independent of what may follow. The imperfective aspect communicates 'event viewed as consisting of p a r t s', the perfective aspect 'event leading to state viewed as a w h o l e'. Cf. "The event [couched in terms of the perfective aspect] is viewed in its entirety and is treated as unanalysable" Cruse 2004: 288) and "A perfective sentence treats an activity as a unit, without regard for its internal composition. It may have a duration in time but this is not taken into account in the perfective statement. By contrast, an imperfective statement refers to the activity as spanning a period of time" (Dixon 2005: 216). Thus, *He was eating* (event in p a r t s) + *starter* (p a r t of a meal); *He ate (up)* (event leading to a state of a meal finished) + *starter* (p a r t of a meal). In the latter case, although *starter* retains its lexico-semantic constituent 'part', contextually under the influence of the perfective aspect, it becomes a self-contained event.

When there is a meronymic chain of parts, those parts that are far from one another cannot make a transitive connection. "[T]ransitivity decreases with the increasing distance between the part-whole hierarchy levels. For instance: *A nail is a part of a finger. A finger is a part of a hand. A hand is a part of an arm. An arm is a part of a body. A nail is a part of a hand. ?A nail is a part of an arm. ??A nail is a part of a body.* (Rasulić 2016: 255).

The relationship between nouns that are involved in the pairs of the sentences above is primarily paradigmatic, although occasionally they can be connected syntagmatically, as in *all the fingers of her hand, the starter of an exquisite lunch*.

3.5.2 c *Connexity*

3.5.2 c I Another phenomenon that has to do with partonomy syntagmatically has been labelled “connexity” (Fontenelle 1997) or “connectivity” (Hlebec 2003). This term will be used to refer to the phenomenon that occurs when a noun containing the semantic element ‘part’ intervenes between two words which could collocate directly as well. Thus we have *He fulfilled the set of requirements*, where *fulfil* and *requirement* can be combined directly, as in *fulfil requirements*, while *set* (as well as *of*) contains the semantic element ‘part’ intervening between *fulfil* and *requirement* to add information on the extension of requirements. The noun *set* is grammatically the head of the noun phrase *the set of requirements*, but semantically it can be interpreted as an extension of the noun *requirement*, which is semantically more important and carries more information than *set*. Couched in different terms, “[i]t should also be noted that the correct identification of the head makes it possible to keep track of adjective-noun connexity, as in: *a warm round of applause, a good stroke of luck; a sound piece of advice*, where *warm, good* and *sound* can only be translated with reference to *applause, luck* and *advice* respectively (Fontenelle 1997: 4).

Another subtype of connexity occurs with nouns denoting some category, such as *type, kind, sort, class, category, genre, race, make, version, variety*, etc. These categorizing nouns also contain the same ‘part’, but unlike the ‘group’ nouns of the first type, with ‘{a lot of} sth more than one that consist of parts’, their definitions contain a more abstract idea ‘part of all potential manifestations of what the collocating noun denotes’ or, in simpler terms, ‘sth that is part of {a lot of } sth more than one’. Thus, *deep*, which may be combined with the noun *thinker*, can be separated from that noun by the noun *type* (as *deep type of thinker*), while the semantic connection with *thinker* remains. Other examples are: *I don’t like blatant*

types of misleading advertisements, which can be changed to *I don't like blatantly misleading advertisements*, the difference being in treating the element 'blatant' in the form *blatantly* as a degree of 'misleading' rather than viewing it as a classifying element for misleading advertisements in the first sentence. Similarly, *a greyish shade of yellow* is referentially the same as *greyish yellow*, for the reasons stated, because 'shade of yellow' = 'kind of yellow' = 'part of all manifestations of yellow'. In taxonomy or hyponymy no connection in terms of a noun denoting a taxonomic order (like *kind, type, sort*) is necessary between the superordinate term (hyperonym) and the subordinate term (hyponym) because the information that one notion is a hyponym of another is contained in their definitions. Thus, *A rose is a flower*. However, an optional (and redundant) taxonomic connective is possible: *A rose is a (kind of) flower. Gold is a (kind of) metal substance*.

The phenomena observed here seem to be instances of semantic motivation: if a noun means 'part', then in semantic terms it behaves as a dependent *part* of a noun phrase. Namely, in the examples above *set of requirements* amounts to 'part of all possible requirements', *type of advertisements* boils down to 'part of all possible advertisements', *literature of cheerful nature* is a 'cheerful part of all possible literature', while the verb (*fulfil*) and the adjectives (*blatant* and *cheerful*) are semantically in closer affinity with the nouns at a distance (*requirements, advertisements* and *literature* respectively) than with the neighbouring nouns (*set, type, nature*).

3.5.2. c II Connexity has another manifestation, when an abstract noun which denotes an inherent property as an inalienable part of an entity is employed, such as *colour, dimension, nature, sound, stature, time, weight*, etc. to the collocation of a noun and an adjective. An example is: *I prefer literature of a more cheerful nature*.

Referentially nothing is lost if this is paraphrased as *I prefer more cheerful literature*. In yet another example *He was a gentleman of tall stature*, *stature* is an inherent part of a person, and the sentence could be paraphrased as *He was a tall gentleman* (cf. Apresjan 1977: 17 – 19). In *The hat is of red colour/red in colour*, *colour* is a common property of objects and it is mentioned redundantly – red is a kind of colour. Words which stand in ‘kind of’ relation may collocate at a distance, as in *Maybe that coat was blue. I never remember the colour/*shape/*location of anything* (Grzegorek 1977: 13).

The nouns that denote a parameter in the constructions above are preceded by the preposition *of*₁ or *with*₇ (*music with beautiful sound*), which contain ‘part’ (an inherent property). The preposition *of*, which has a general meaning of ‘part’ is used after a noun which contains the element ‘part’ and before a noun which refers to the whole range of possible referents (e.g. *a(n excellent) type of wine*). It can also be used after a noun which refers to a specific entity and before a noun containing the element ‘part’, but then it has to be modified (e.g. *the wine of an excellent type*).

3.5.3 “Strong” nouns

The following section discusses a number of nouns that contain the seme ‘strong’, in the way employed with adjectives and verbs – see §§3.3.6 and 3.4.5.

The seme ‘strong state’ is manifested in: *ambition*, *excitement*, *speed* (marked sense), and they do not form collocations with *mild* or *slight*, just as *a little* and *slightly* provide the test for strong adjectives (§3.3.6a). The deviation of **I feel*₁ + *faint /mild /slight* + *agony /allegiance/amazement/anger/anguish/ardour/avarice /aversion/bewilderment /despair /distress /enmity /enthusiasm /frenzy/grief/hatred/jubilation/love/panic/suffering /wrath*

(+ *in my heart*) proves that *agony*, *amazement*, *bewilderment* etc denote invariantly strong emotional states.

The following nouns denote strong and bad states: *anguish*, *backlash*, *bankruptcy*, *cancer*, *defeat*, *depression*, *despair*, *disaster*, *distress*, *emergency*, *famine*, *frost*, *grief*, *haste*, *malaria*, *rage*, *suffering*, *terror*, *unemployment*, *war*, and *wrath*. These nouns can, more or less felicitously figure as objects of the verb *suffer*₁ and ₂ (see §2.4.7 b), which contain 'strong and bad phenomenon'. This verb has potential for activating the seme 'strong and bad' in the object noun even when it does not contain 'strong', as in *suffer + consequence/effect of....* Also, the noun group above collocate with the adjectives *devastating* <#strong and bad event# that makes strongly strongly bad phenomenon> and *uncontrollable* <#{bad} event# that sb cannot control and is strongly strong> – cf. *simply devastating/uncontrollable* (§3.6.2.a). As their directives contain 'bad' and '{bad}' respectively, in the collocations *devastating/uncontrollable + consequence/effect*, the monovalent adjectives with 'bad' trigger 'bad' in the ambivalent nouns *consequence* and *effect* – see §2.4.7. b I.

The seme 'strong' also occurs in the object directive of the verb *impose*, defined in §3.4.2. The subject of this verb is by implication 'sb_x with power', as it always refers to a person who has some kind of power or influence, due to 'make' in the analysis and 'strong' in the object directive (cf. Hlebec 2007: 88-89), unless this is explicitly negated, as in *He could not impose his will on her*. Nouns that occur as the objects of *impose* include: *ban*, *blockade*, *boycott*, *burden*, *ensorship*, *condition*, *constraint*, *control*, *criterion*, *curfew*, *cut*, *deadline*, *demand*, *discipline*, *duty*, *embargo*, *state of emergency*, *excise*, *fee*, *fine*, *injunction*, *law*, *limit*, *limitation*, *measure*, *morality*, *moratorium*, *obligation*, *order*, *penalty*, *punishment*, *quota*, *regime*, *regulation*, *religion*, *requirement*, *restraint*, *restriction*, *rule*, *sanction*,

sentence, strain, suspension, tax, term, treaty, tyranny, value, veto, will (for a definition see §3.4.2)

A group of mental phenomenon nouns can be followed by the preposition *over*₃ (§3.1.2 I) in causative meaning: *agony, alarm, anger, anguish, annoyance, bitterness, brooding, concern, contrition, delight, despair, depression, desperation, disappointment, discontent, dismay, displeasure, distress, doubt, embarrassment, emotion* ('strong and bad' by transference), *enthusiasm, envy, excitement, fear, frustration, fury, glee, gloom, grief, inhibition, jealousy, jubilation, lament, misconception, misery, misgivings, panic, passion, pleasure, problem, rage, regret, rejoicing, sadness, suffering* (rarely), *surprise, suspicion, temper, unease, wonder, worry*. They typically denote a strong and bad mental state, usually an emotion. Another group of nouns followed by the causative *over*₃ denote a 'bad mental phenomenon with - concerning sb_{more than one}': *argument, battle, clash, conflict, confusion, dispute, difference, disagreement, disorder, feud, fight, fuss, issue, misunderstanding, protest, quarrel, rift, row, scandal, split, struggle, tension, trouble, war, wrangle*. The same collocational reactance with *over* of nouns denoting strong and bad emotions and those that refer to conflict and disorder comes as something quite natural, since conflict and disorder metonymically imply strong and bad emotions.

There is a group of nouns that share the denotation of interpersonal, typically massive disorder, i.e. 'strong and bad phenomenon with {a lot of} sb_{more than one}': *anarchy/assault/attack/battle/chaos/commotion/confusion /crisis /disorder /disturbance /epidemic /hell /hostilities /plague /rebellion/revolt/revolution/riot/terrorism /trouble /unrest /uprising/violence/war*. As objects, they agree with *control, quell* and *foment*⁷⁸, as subjects – with *break out*, and also with the adjectives *severe*₂ (§3.3.5 c), *fierce*₂ (3.3.6 d), and *violent*₁⁷⁹ because these

adjectives contain directives that support the nouns. Such is also the directive of the verb *rage* <# strong and bad event with a lot of sb_{more than one}# exists during long time>, as in *battle /disorder /epidemics /fighting /murder /riot + rage*. The same 'strong {and bad} mental phenomenon with {a lot of} sb_{more than one} who use language' is present in: *argument, conflict, controversy, debate, disagreement, discussion, dispute, feud, misunderstanding, opposition, quarrel, row, words* ('angry talk'), *wrangle*. The compatible verbs are *dodge, resolve, settle*, and *skirt*, which require these nouns as the object.

There are verbs that have '{bad} mental phenomenon when sb_{more than one} do not know' as an object, such as *clarify, clear up, dispel, dodge, relieve, resolve, settle*, and they collocate with nouns such as *crisis, disagreement, dispute, problem, trouble* (see §3.1.2), which can receive the same 'strong' contextually.

Only nouns classified as 'strong {and bad} emotion, like *agony* and *despair* (see the second paragraph of this section), can be inserted into the frame *abandon oneself to* _____ (see §3.3.5). Since these nouns come under 'strong event', *overcome* (always 'bad') and *overwhelm* also combine with them as objects and subjects respectively. Another verb that requires these nouns as objects is *generate*. *Abandon oneself to, generate* and other such verbs accept as collocates nouns without 'strong' as a distinctive feature on condition that this feature is contextually induced, as in *generate / o u d laughter, abandon oneself to a d e s p a i r i n g feeling*.

Why are desires but not wishes normally said to be overcome or overwhelming? Because the verb *overcome* and the adjective *overwhelming* require nouns that denote strong emotion or some other strong mental phenomenon of sb who wants to make phenomenon, and, unlike *wish, desire* is invariably 'strong'. This difference is recognized in most dictionaries. All nouns that denote such a class of strong mental phenomena occur in the frame *burn with* _____, as in *I was burning*

with *addiction* /*affection* /*ambition* /*aspiration* /*ardour* /*curiosity*/*desire*/*hope* /*ideal* /*love* /*rage* /*tenderness*. Still, this does not mean that each of these nouns contains the seme 'strong' by definition. This is the case only with *addiction*, *love*, *desire*, *ideal* and *rage*, proven by the fact that they do not collocate with *slight* or *mild*. Others receive 'strongly' from the analyses of the verbs *overcome* and *burn* and the adjective *overwhelming*. For *wish* to be used in this frame, some contextually induced reinforcement would be necessary, such as *He was burning with a fervent wish to kiss her*.

The complex seme 'strong {bad} and hot emotion' occurs in the object slot of the verb *quell*, in the indirect object slot of *boil/fume/seethe/smoulder with*, and, with {bad}, in the directive of the adjective *burning*. These verbs and the adjective are connected to the nouns *anger*, *anguish*, *anxiety*, *determination*, *frustration*, *hatred*, *impatience*, *indignation*, *passion*, *rage*, *resentment*.

The complex seme 'strong and bad event when sb_x touches sb_y' can be found in the definitions of *administer* /*apply*/*deliver*/*dodge*/*fetch*/*hit*/*land*/*repel*; *hefty* /*savage* /*sound* + *beating*/*blow*/*hit*/*punch*/*slap*/*stab*.

The adjective *false* occurs in collocation with the nouns *argument*, *assumption*, *belief*, *doubt*, *impression*, *information*, *misconception*, *myth*, *stereotype*, *surprise*, *suspicion* (direct connection), *fear* (indirect connection). The definition of *false* is presented in §3.5.3.

The seme 'strong' can be downgraded as well. Thus, verbs *melt* <#{bad} emotion# comes to be weak> (as in *heart* /*worry*/*rage* m.) and *quell* <#sth# makes #{bad} mental phenomenon# come to be weak / not exist> (q. *fear*/*excitement*/*doubt*) contain 'come to be weak' in their analyses. The seme 'strong' moves on a scale of degrees (see *sad* in §3.3.7a).⁸¹ The notion of 'power' (= 'socially strong') in definitions can also be negated, in the form of 'weak'. For their objects, the verbs *break*₂, *defy*, *lift*₁ and

obey require nouns with 'phenomenon_x when sb_{with power} wants to make sb_y (not) make phenomenon_y' in the object directive. We defined *break*₂ in §3.4.2. The full definition of *lift*₂ is **1** <#sth# makes #spirit# stronger> *l. heart/morale/spirits* **2** <#sb_x with legal power # makes #legal state experienced by a lot of sb_y more than one concerning phenomenon_x expected by sb_x who wants to make sb_y {not} make / be affected by | phenomenon_x because of law# come to be weak legally> *l. ban/blockade/curfew/martial law/restriction/rule.*

3.5.4. "Legal" nouns

On the basis of the directives ascertained in the section on legal verbs (see §3.4.2) and supported by collocations with prepositions, we can construct the content of "legal" nouns, i.e. those with the feature 'legal' in their definitions, adding semantic material to complete the meaning. Some of these nouns are legal nouns proper if they contain the seme 'legal' by definition. Some contain 'legal' as a typical feature. All these nouns can be followed by *to*₁-infinitive as an exponent of the seme 'want'.

accusation <new event made by use of language by sb_x experiencing *this* bad thought concerning sb_y when sb_x wants to make sb_z indefinite {with legal power} make sb_y socially weak because sb_y is viewed as bad> (collocations, mostly used as clues: *bring/make a. against sb; a. of theft. a. that*)

act <sth made by use of language in writing by sb_x with legal power to make legal state concerning sb_y more than one when sb_x wants to make sb_y (not) make phenomenon>

(*abrogate/amend/contravene/ratify/repeal/violate/waive*
a.)

action <event made by use of language in writing by sb_x who wants to make sb_y with legal power make sb_z legally weak because sb_z is viewed as bad> (*bring/take a. against sb*)

amendment <sth_x new made by use of language in writing by sb_x with legal power over a lot of sb_y more than one concerning sth_y made by use of language by sb_{x/z} with legal power when sb_{x/z} wants to make sb_y (not) make event habitually, in order to make sth_y different and better than before> (*endorse/make/ratify/repeal/uphold a.; a. to₁₂ Act*)

appeal **1** <sth_x made by use of language by sb_x who wants to make new worthy state and to influence sb_y with social power/sb_y with power more than one in order to make sb_y make sb_z | experience / use / be affected by | good phenomenon_y> (*strong a., make a. for₁/to₄*) **2** <sth_x made by use of language by sb_x who wants to influence sb_y with legal power who might, using sth_x as base, want to make sb_z (not) make phenomenon and make sb_z weak socially {legally} because sb_z is viewed as bad> (*legal a., bring/lose₃/make/uphold/win₁* (see §2.3.2b I) *a. against, a. for₁/to₄, on₅/under₂ a.*)

lose₂ <#sb# comes to be without (#)sth {worthy} (#) in (#)contest(#), which is bad event> (The collocation *lose appeal₃* is used in the meaning 'lose attraction', with *lose₃* <#sb# comes to not any more experience #mental phenomenon#> *l. appeal /control /hope /interest /memory.*)

article <sth_x made by use of language in writing by sb_x with legal power, which is part of sth_y made by use of language in legal writing to make legal state concerning a lot of sb_y more than one when sb_x wants to make sb_y (not) make phenomenon habitually> (*abrogate/contravene /violate a.; under₂ a.*)

ban <legal state_x made by use of language by sb_x with power concerning a lot of sb_{more than one} and affecting event_x, wanting to make sb_y not make event_x> (*break₂/ease/impose/lift/uphold b. ong sth*)

ease <#sb# makes #phenomenon# come to be less - not bad>

blockade <bad - strong event made by (use of language by) sb_x with social power who wants to make {a lot of} sb_y {more than one} not make habitualness_x {of moving}> (*break₂ /impose/lift b.*)

case <worthy event made by use of language in legal contest when sb_x wants to make sb_y with legal power make sb_z legally weak because sb_z is viewed as bad> (*bring/lose/win₁ c. against sb*)

ceiling <legal state affecting certain amount of sth_x and concerning a lot of sb_x more than one when sb_y with social power wants to make sb_x be not with power to use more than sth_x> (*abolish/lift c.; impose c. ong sth*)

ensorship <legal state concerning a lot of sb_x more than one made by sb_y with social power who wants to make sb_x not see - hear (parts of) sth made by use of symbols> (*abolish/impose/lift c.*)

charge <sth_x made by use of language as new state when sb_x wants to make sb_y with social {legal} power make sb_z socially weak because sb_z is viewed as bad> (*bring/make c. against sb*)

claim 'right to have' <(sth_x made by use of mental energy and language by sb_x who strongly wants to make sb_y with {legal} power make) legal state concerning sb_{x+z} more than one, when sb_x wants new good state in order to make sb_x come to be with power to use sth_y and to make sb_z legally weak because sb_z is viewed as bad> (*abrogate/bring /establish/have₃/make /uphold/waive c.; c. against/for₇, c. on₂, to₁₂*) **Lift claim* is inadmissible because *lift* is attracted to 'legal state concerning a lot of sb_x more than one when sb_y wants to make sb_x {n o t} | m a k e / b e a f f e c t e d b y | p h e n o m e n o n'.

clause <sth made by use of language in writing by sb_x with legal power to make legal state concerning {a lot of} sb_y more than one when sb_x wants to make sb_y make phenomenon> (*abrogate/violate/waive c.*)

commission <group of sb_x with social power made by sb_y with legal power by using sb_y's language_x to make sb_x make phenomenon concerning sth that sb_x know well> (*appoint c.; c. for₇/on₆*)

*conscriptio*n <(sth made by use of language in writing by sb_x with legal/military power to make) legal state concerning a lot of sb_y more than one when sb_x wants to make sb_y make fight> (*abolish/amend/ratify c., under₂ c.*)

constitution <sth made by use of language in writing by sb_x with strongest power in country, who want to make

long-time legal state concerning a lot of sb_y more than one and want to make sb_y (not) make phenomenon habitually> (*abrogate/uphold/violate c.; under₂ c.*)

control <strong worthy {legal} state concerning a lot of sb_x more than one made by sb_y with power over sb_x who wants to make sb_x (not) make phenomenon habitually> (*abolish/abrogate/achieve/exert/implement/impose/lose₂, relinquish/win₁*)

exert <#sb_x# makes #phenomenon# come to be strong by using energy of #sb_x#> *e. attraction/authority /control/dominance/effect/effort/fascination/force/impact/influence /leverage/pressure/pull/quality/stress/will; e. oneself*

relinquish (formal) <#sb_x# comes to not any more | be with / have #sth_x strong# (and influence sb_y to have sth_x)> *r. authority/belief/claim/command/duty/habit/sb's hand from one's grip /hope /independence /office /plan /possession/post to sb /power /responsibility /right /sovereignty*

embargo <sth_x made by use of language by sb_x more than one with greatest power to make strong long-time legal state concerning sth_y made by sb_x who want to make a lot of sb_y more than one from sb_y's country not export sth_y to sb_x's country, affecting sb_y> (*impose/lift/ violate e., e. against/on sth; under₂ e.*)

immunity <worthy legal state concerning sb_x {more than one} made by sb_y with legal power who wants to make sb_x be not affected by law> (*abolish/lift/lose/waive i.; i. from sth*)

injunction <legal state_x made by use of language by sb_x with legal power concerning a lot of sb_y more than one, made by sb_x who wants to make sb_y (not) make event, affecting sb_y> (*impose/lift/overturn₁/uphold/waive/win₁ i.; i. ban sth; i. against/on sb*)

overturn **1** <#sb_x with legal power# uses language to make #state_x made by use of language by sb_y with legal power who wants to make sb_z make phenomenon# come to be legally weak> *o. Conviction /decision /indictment/judgement/critical parliamentary question/sentence /verdict* **2** <#sb# makes #sb with greatest power in country# come to be weak> *o. government/regime*

law <long-time legal state concerning a lot of sb_y more than one made by use of language {in writing} by sb_x with legal power who wants to make sb_y (not) make phenomenon habitually, affecting sth> (*abolish/abrogate/contravene/establish/repeal/uphold/violate l.; l. against/on sth; offend against l.*)

legality <legal state made by use of language {in writing} by sb_x with legal power who wants to make sb_y (not) make phenomenon habitually> (*uphold l.*)

legislation <state made by use of language in writing by sb_x with legal power over a lot of sb_y more than one who wants to make sb_y (not) make phenomenon habitually, affecting sth> (*amend/contravene/repeal/waive; l. against/ong; under₂ l.*)

penalty <legal state_x affecting sth concerning a lot of sb_y more than one who are affected by sb_x with legal power who wants to make sb_y (not) make phenomenon_x because of

bad phenomenon_y made by sb_y (*abolish/abrogate/impose/waive p.; on₅/under₁ p.; p. for₃/on₈ sth*)

pension <(worthy long-time legal state concerning a lot of sb_x more than one who are with) amount of money_x, source being sb_y with legal power, for sb_y's work in the past at the time when sb_x does not work any more, using money_x as base habitually for living> (*abolish /claim/lose p.; p. from₉; on₅ p.*)

prosecution <state made by use of language when sb_x {with legal power} experiences bad psychological phenomenon_x because of phenomenon_y made by sb_z, when sb_x wants to make sb_y with legal power make sb_z weak socially because sb_z is viewed as bad> (*bring p. against /for₃/over₃*)

regulation <(sth made by use of language in writing by sb_x with social power which makes) long-time legal state concerning sb_y more than one when sb_x wants sb_y to (not) make phenomenon habitually> (*contravene/impose /violate r.; strict r.*)

rule <(long mental {legal} state made by) sth made by use of language by sb_x with {social} power who wants to make sb_y more than one (not) make phenomenon_x habitually, wanting to make sth legally weak / in order to make sb_y experience (*this*) thought concerning phenomenon_x and know manner - whether to make phenomenon_x> (*contravene/establish/impose/lift/repeal /violate/waive r.; do/offend against₃ r.; under₂ r.; r. about₁/for_{1b}/on₈; r. how/that/whether*)

ruling <sth_x made by use of language by sb_x with legal power who wants to make sb_y (not) make phenomenon, affecting sth> (*uphold r., r. against/on* sth)

sentence <(sth_x made by use of language by sb_x with legal power {not mentioned} which makes) legal state made by sb_x who wanted to make sb_y (not) make bad phenomenon_x and wants to make sb_y experience bad psychological phenomenon_y because sb_y made phenomenon_x> (*impose/overturn/uphold s.; severe*₁ s.; s. *for*₃ sth)

sovereignty <long-time legal state concerning a lot of sb_x more than one made by sb_y with political power who wants to make sb_x (not) make phenomenon habitually and who is stronger than any sb_z with political power> (*establish/violate s.; s. over*₂ sth)

statute <sth made by use of language in writing by sb_x with legal power to make) legal state made by sb_x who wants a lot of sb_y more than one (not) to make phenomenon> (*impose/uphold s.; under*₂ s.)

suit <worthy event made by use of language when sb_x wants to be with more legal power than sb_y and to make sb_y with legal power make sb_y weak legally in legal contest because sb_y is viewed as bad> (*bring/dismiss/lose/win*₁ s. *against/over*₂ sb)

3.6. ADVERBS

3.6.1 As Chalker and Weiner (1994 s.v. *focusing adverb*) say, “[t]he classification of adverbs is notoriously difficult and there is considerable variety in the way it is done”. D. H. Roose has claimed that “[t]he difficulty [to define adverbs] lies not so much in the fact that what are called ‘adverbs’ are a mixed lot, but rather in the fact that those at one extreme seem to show more grammatical function than lexical meaning (*too, so, very*) while those at the other extreme are primarily lexical and include phrases (*quickly, now, by the way*)” (Shetter 1966: 661). Adverbs derived from adjectives (conversion included) have lexical meaning (cf. Roose 1964), while linking adverbs (*additionally, altogether, firstly, namely*) serve the pragmatic function of connecting spans of discourse.

There is a traditional classification of adverbs into adverbs of degree, intensifying adverbs, spatial, evaluative, modal, temporal, sentential, and manner adverbs. Tense can be significant when identifying the collocations of temporal adverbs (Matthews 1991: 35), as a consequence of the fact that both lexical and grammatical categories have a role in semantics. If *yesterday* is defined as <phenomenon existing [one day before time of sb_{sp}’s utterance]> and if the principal meaning of past tenses is ‘before time of sb_{sp}’s utterance’, then a correlation between *yesterday* and past tenses has been confirmed. At the same time, *yesterday* can be said to contain ‘time of sb_{sp}’s utterance’ as a pragmatic feature just as pronouns do. Any verb possesses the features ‘time’ and ‘space’ (‘place’) inherently so that their mention in definitions is dispensed with.

“Properties of adverbial derivation can bigly be predicted on the basis of the semantic type an adjective belongs to” (Dixon 1977: 39). Thus adverbs of manner are typically (but not exclusively) formed by *-ly* added to the adjective base. The difference between an adjective of behaviour and the corresponding adverb is functional

rather than semantic. Namely, adverbs modify verbs denoting behaviour, while adjectives modify agent nouns. Since behaviour events are necessarily done by agents, the characteristic attributed to an AGENT (*reasonable, reckless, enthusiastic...*) can also be viewed as a manner in which the behaviour is done (*reasonably, recklessly, enthusiastically...*). Elvis Presley sang in AE *Love me tender, love me true* because *be tender/true* (when loving) is denotationally the same as *love tenderly/truly* – see §2.1.7.

In order to find out the semantic definition of an adverb, definitions of collocating verbs are used, assisted by definitions of the adjectival pertainyms. The content of an adverb proper will be indicated by square brackets [], while the rest of the definition shows the collocationally sensitive content. Thus, *surely* is <particular phenomenon_x [that unintentionally makes sb_{sp} experience {good - bad} thought_x that strongly tends to be true thought_x concerning phenomenon_x]>. *She will s. win* = 'She will win, which is a particular event that unintentionally makes sb_{sp} experience good thought that strongly tends to be true thought concerning event_x'. Cf. the definition of the adjective *sure* in §3.3.7a.

Although in majority of cases morphologically derived from adjectives, usually by means of the morpheme *-ly*, adverbs are semantically basic in comparison with the pertainym adjectives. Adverbs collocate with verbs and adjectives modifying verbs and adjectives both semantically and grammatically (e.g. *definitely decide/best*). On the other hand, their pertainym adjectives collocate with nouns that contain 'phenomenon', which makes such, abstract nouns semantically derived from verbs (e.g. *definite decision*).

3.6.2 Verb + adverb collocations are established when a seme denoting a phenomenon in a verb strikes chord with its match in an adverb. Thus, *stand easy* = *stand* <#sb_x#

makes sb_x's body exist in vertical bodily posture> (for the complete definition see §2.3.2a) + *easy* <event made by sb [using weak degree of energy, which is good]> because 'event made' fits with 'makes sb_x's body exist...', which is a kind of event (cf. *He was standing/*stood in front of the shop*). The collocation *come straight* rests on the repetition of 'move in direction of sth' of the verb *come* <#living thing that can move# moves in direction of sb_{sp/h}> in the adverb *straight*₁ <moving in direction of sth [using shortest space]>.

The same happens with adverb + adjective collocations. For instance, the collocation *wide awake* is produced in the harmony of the adjective *awake* <#living thing_x that can move# that is in state when thing_x's eyes are with space between eye-lids (= open)> and the adverb *wide*₃ <state [in strongly strong degree]>, the harmony achieved through mediation of *w. eyes*, which is the doubly indirect connection (§3.3.1d) within one of the adjective *wide*'s senses <((space_x between) opposite parts_x of) thing_x# with strong (degree of) amount of smaller space_x between opposite parts_x of thing_x>. Other doubly indirect connections occur in *w. hand/mouth*, instances of indirect connections are *w. arc/circle/loop*, while *w. collar/face/forehead/river/table* are direct.

Adverbs with initial 'state' in their definitions collocate with adjectives and stative verbs (see §2.3.1), while those that begin with 'event' are compatible with dynamic verbs (§2.3.2). Adverbs can collocate with nouns that contain 'amount', as well as with numbers; for instance, *full two hours* is *full* <amount [in strongly strong degree]> + *two* <amount one plus one> + *hour* <amount of 24th part of day as time unit>. Noun + adverb collocations are based on the connection with 'exist' implied. Thus, *Italy today* is short for *Italy as it exists today*, and *today* modifies the verb.

3.6.2a There is a major division of adverbs into adjuncts and sentential (sentence) adverbs or into predication and sentential adverbs (Thomason and Stelnaker 1973). Adjuncts comprise adverbs of manner (*carefully, cleverly, playfully, unexpectedly*), of time (*soon, never, temporarily*), place (*here, everywhere*), and degree (*a little, very, extremely*). Manner adverbs in their semantic definitions have 'in manner'. They are attached to verbs that denote a phenomenon made by a living thing that can move, typically a person's behaviour.

Sentential adverbs modify the whole sentence rather than solely the verb. They express the speaker's /writer's personal opinion (cf. Curme 1931: 132), a comment about the propositional content, and consequently they are not truth-conditional. They have ability to occur initially in the sentence, followed by a comma or pause, while other positions are also available. Thus, *evidently* is a disjunct adverb with the corresponding equation: *Evidently(,) he is lying = He is evidently lying = He is lying, evidently*, although some slight differences in meaning among these positions can be present in certain cases (Greenbaum 1969: 162-3).

The position of manner adverbs is (V) immediately before the verb or (O) following the object, while the same adverbs when used sententially take place (A) after the first word of the auxiliary, or may be used (F) clause-finally or (I) clause-initially. When there is no auxiliary, positions A and V coincide (Dixon 2005: 387). "A sentence adverb normally follows the first word of the auxiliary, or if the auxiliary consists only of tense the adverb immediately precedes the verb. Less preferred positions are as first or final element in the sentence, set off by appositional intonation" (Dixon 1977: 39). Assuming initial, medial and final positions is not the diagnostic feature of disjuncts, since manner adverbs also take these positions: (*Slowly*) *they (slowly) have (slowly) left the house (slowly)* (cf. Travis 1988: 291 in Dimković – Telebaković 2013: 9).

The sentence *John cleverly dropped his cup of coffee* is ambiguous between (a) 'John dropped his cup of coffee in a clever manner' (manner adverb) and (b) 'It was clever of John to drop his cup of coffee' (sentential adverb; Jackendoff 1972: 90). "*Stupidly* (and *cleverly*) maintain the same meaning when used in sentential or manner function; they just modify in different ways. [...] The difference is greater with *honestly*:" *I thought that I had marked the exam honestly* (manner). *I honestly thought that I had marked the exam* (sentential). (Dixon 2005: 388). Dixon's observation can be deepened by providing our semantic definitions for the two adverbs, which show that *stupidly* and *cleverly* contain both 'manner' and 'sb_{sp}'. We define *cleverly* as <phenomenon_x intentionally made by sb_x [in manner of sb_x who uses sb_x's good mind that unintentionally makes sb_{sp} experience good thought concerning phenomenon_x]>. The adverb's content proper (within the square brackets) enables highlighting any of the two parts: 'in manner of sb_x who uses sb_x's good mind' or 'phenomenon_x that makes sb_{sp} experience good thought'. When the first part is in focus, the adverb is used as a manner adverb, while emphasis on the second part leads to a sentential adverb. On the other hand, *honestly* has to be defined taking two sememes in consideration: **1** <sb_x uses symbols {language} to make expression of / experiences | thought_x [in manner that expresses morally good and true thought_x]> *I can't h. say what time I'll be home* (CIDE). *They must face it h.* (COBUILD) **2** <sb_{sp} [expressing thought that is true]> *I'll do it tomorrow, h. I will* (CIDE). *I don't mind, h. Do you h. think this is right?* (in questions sb_{sp} → sb_h) (COBUILD). *Honestly*₁ plays the role of a manner adverb, while *honestly*₂ leads to the sentential use.

Sentential adverbs and discourse markers contain 'sb_{sp}' in their definitions, i.e. 'as sb_{sp} experiences

mentally' (*actually, admittedly, after all, anyway, apparently, at least, but, cleverly, fact, frankly, luckily, moreover, nevertheless, perhaps, really, so, unnecessarily*). (Dixon (2005: 382) categorizes sentential adverbs into those morphologically derived from adjectives of SPEED (with 'phenomenon made in degree of amount of time' in our semantic definitions), QUALIFICATION (stance adjectives, which all contain 'sb_{sp} experiences thought - experiences emotion' in the analysis), HUMAN PROPENSITY (emotions and evaluations, ie. 'good - bad') and SIMILARITY ('compared to') type.) "They are illocutionary, ie. speakers' openly subjective comments on the proposition. Sententials are intonationally independent. They cannot be the focus of interrogation, negation and clefting (Mišković 1998: 140).

Further division of sententials leads to 'sb_{sp} thinks in a _____ manner when sb_{sp} says' (*Frankly, he is a bore. Seriously, this is my last offer*) and 'sb_{sp} feels _____ when sb_{sp} says' (*Happily/regrettably/unfortunately, John is married.*). The difference between *Frankly, you are a swine* and *I tell you frankly you're a swine* (cf. Lyons 1977: 783 and Wierzbicka 1986 in Mišković 1998: 133) is that in the former sentence there is an illocutionary act, while in the latter the illocution is explicit, which makes the difference between the possible answering *No, that's not true* in the former but not in the latter sentence.

Disjunct adverbs, termed "interpretative" in Allerton and Cruttenden 1974 and "stance adverbs" in Biber et al. 1999, are a kind of sentential adverbs. Disjuncts can appear initially in negative clauses (e.g. *Probably, he didn't leave quickly enough*), but cannot appear as a focus of interrogation (**Is he evidently/probably a fool? *Surprisingly /Probably/Foolishly, did he succeed? *Did he succeed surprisingly/probably/foolishly?* Allerton and Cruttenden 1974),⁸³ negation and clefting (**Semantics isn't confidentially a bore. *It is confidentially that semantics is a bore*; Mišković 1998: 139-140). The adverb

doubtfully cannot be used as a disjunct adverb as its pertainym *doubtful* does not contain 'speaker' unlike *hopefully*, which in spite of protests has gained usage as a sentence adverb, and which is like *happily*.⁸⁴

A subclass of disjuncts, epistemic adverbs *certainly*, *clearly*, *conceivably*, *definitely*, *obviously*, *possibly*, *presumably*, which lean on pertainym epistemic adjectives (see §3.3.6) contain 'sb_{sp}'s thought concerning phenomenon that is viewed as (in some degree) true and influences sb_{sp} to know phenomenon'. Since 'know' and 'true thought' are in combination with sb_{sp}, sentences modified by these adverbs are factive. Therefore, **Probably, they won, but they didn't win*. This is quite different from *Improbably, they won = They won, which was improbable* (Allerton and Cruttenden 1974: 7, 8), as the definition of *improbably* is <sb_{sp} is so surprised by true thought_x that sb_{sp} cannot believe thought_x> 'The fact is that they won, and I cannot believe this fact.' Epistemic adverbs can be clefted if accompanied by another constituent (Greenbaum 1969: 119), e.g. *It was certainly John that they selected as a delegate. It was probably Mary that was married to John*. This does not hold for attitudinal adverbs. **It was happily John that they selected as a delegate* **It was surprisingly Mary that was married to John*. Another subclass of disjuncts, attitudinal adjectives, as pertainyms of attitudinal adverbs, have 'sb' as an expansion of 'phenomenon' because in the construction 'sb' is the focus of information.

Adverbs with 'sb_{sp} thinking of sth (to be) immediately mentioned as sth new - not expected' enable their use in imperative sentences: *Nevertheless /Incidentally, come home*. Other sententials of the same class comprise: *first(ly)*, *alternatively*, *however*, *namely*, *(or) else*, *similarly*, *therefore*. Otherwise, this is not possible, as in **Surprisingly/Basically, come home* (Allerton and Cruttenden 1974). Degree adverbs have 'degree' (*a little*, *almost*, *altogether*, *any*, *at all*, *awfully*,

bad, bang, bitterly, fully, completely, downright, entirely, even, gradually, much, quite, really, totally, tremendously). Adverbs of degree are not compared when collocating with adjectives (including converted past participles) and other adverbs. The adverb *almost*₁ means <phenomenon_x unintentionally making sb_{sp}'s thought_x concerning phenomenon_x [possible in strong degree but not strongly strongly true]> e.g. *He a. fell* 'The phenomenon of his falling made sb experience thought concerning this phenomenon as possible in strong degree but not strongly strongly true'. There is at least one more sememe of *almost*: **2** <[a little less/more (degree) than] + quantitative determiner / amount>, e.g. *A. no one believed her. A. a month* (cf. *totally empty* and see §1.1.2.) Degree adverbs can be divided into focusing adverbs (*merely, even, only*) and intensifying adverbs. The intensifying degree adverb *simply* means <good - bad in strongly strong degree> modifies adjectives and nouns; e.g. *s. stupid/unacceptable /wrong*. The sememe 'strongly strong degree' includes 'does not exist', as in *I haven't seen her for s. ages. That is s. not true!* It is opposed to the adverbs **very, *more* (or **-er*), e.g. **v./m. able/dead/medieval* because this sememe implies that the extreme degree has already been reached. The same ban is the feature of the so-called classifying adjectives (*COBUILD*) or binary antonyms or reversives (Cruse 1986; with 'come to be' against 'come not to be', like *be born* vs. *die*).

Evaluative adverbs contain 'good' or 'bad' in their semantic definitions (*against, simply, importantly, interestingly, tremendously*). Of course, temporal adverbs contain 'time phenomenon' (*after, always, at once, often, never, rarely, soon*). Spatial adverbs contain 'be'/'move' + 'in(to)' (*aboard, above, across, ashore, away, back, below*). Modal adverbs contain '(un)expected' (*even, importantly, interestingly, obviously, sadly, sensibly, surprisingly*). The choice of 'good' and 'bad' both in adjectives and adverbs can be determined by trying

collocations of adjectives with the adverbs *terribly* /*tremendously* /*wonderfully* ('good'), *horribly* ('bad'), *absolutely*₁ /*exceedingly* /*incredibly* /*particularly* /*really* /*simply* /*utterly* ('good' or 'bad').

Conjunct adverbs are connectors such as *moreover*, *therefore*, *anyway*, *though*, *nevertheless* and *first of all*. (Cf. Quirk et al. 1985: 269-270, who join *probably* and *fortunately* to the class.)

Punctual adverbs (*immediately*, *suddenly*) do not co-occur with the imperfective aspect (Bellert 1977: 342 in Ivić 1988: 9).

3.6.3 Intensifying adverbs

3.6.3a The semantic field of intensifying adverbs, such as *extremely* and *utterly*, provides a handy group that can be introspected into in order to check the procedure and validity of adverbs' definitions. Greenbaum (1970: 25-26) offered a number of primary criteria for distinguishing intensifiers from manner adjuncts and other adverbs. (i) Intensifiers cannot serve as a response to interrogative sentences with *how* (*How does he need the money? *Badly*, but: *How does he treat his servants? Badly*.). (ii) "[I]ntensifiers are always fully acceptable before the verb in a declarative affirmative sentence whereas manner adjuncts often are not acceptable in that position" (*She badly needs the money*, but: **He badly treats his servants*). (iii) Intensifiers cannot be paraphrased by *in a _____ manner/way* (*He needs the money in a bad way /way*). (iv) "It cannot appear in initial position in a clause" (*Usually/*Greatly they admire his work*. (Greenbaum 1970: 27). (v) "It cannot be the focus of a cleft sentence" (*It's here/*thoroughly that they disapprove of his methods*. (vi) "It cannot be the focus of *only* in initial position" (*Only then/*perfectly did they understand the question*). (vii) "It can be modified by *so* followed by Verb-Subject inversion and a correlative clause" (*So*

utterly/**really* *did they all hate the film that...*) (Greenbaum 1970: 28). “[V]erbs of activity generally do not collocate with degree intensifiers” (Greenbaum 1970: 58).

In the first stage, the data on collocability of these adverbs with adjectives, whose source are mainly *CIDE*, *LTP* and *OCDSE*, supplemented by *BNC* and data on the Internet, will be given in the form of a matrix table. Owing to the accumulation of data from various sources, individual differences that would otherwise, bearing in mind lack of unity in the answers of Greenbaums’ s informants, be likely to arise, have been obliterated.

	<i>abso- lutely</i>	<i>com- pletely</i>	<i>enti- rely</i>	<i>extre- mely</i>	<i>highly fairly</i>	<i>per- fectly</i>	<i>utterly totally</i>	<i>wholly very</i>			
<i>acceptable</i>	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	-	+	+
<i>charming</i>	+	+	+	+	?	?	?	?	+	+	+
<i>clear</i>	+	+	+	+	+	?	+	+	-	+	+
<i>convincing</i>	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+
<i>devoted</i>	+*	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+
<i>evil</i>	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	+
<i>false</i>	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	-
<i>free (of charge)</i>	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-
<i>good</i>	?	?	?	+	+	-	+	?	-	+	+
<i>inadequate</i>	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	+	+	?	+*
<i>lacking</i>	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	+
<i>mistaken</i>	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	?
<i>normal</i>	+	+	+*	-	+	-	+	+	-	-	+
<i>opposed</i>	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	+	+*	+	+*
<i>persuasive</i>	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+
<i>predictable</i>	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
<i>reasonable</i>	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+**	-	+	-
<i>ridiculous</i>	+	+	+	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	+
<i>satisfying</i>	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+
<i>secure</i>	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	-
<i>selfish</i>	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	+	+	+	?
<i>separate</i>	-	+	+	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	+
<i>unacceptable</i>	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	+	+	?	+
<i>unexpected</i>	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+
<i>wrong</i>	+	+	+	-	-	-	?	+	+	+	+

* especially British English
(according to *OCD*)

** especially American English

Not all sememes of the lexemes on the list have been treated here. Thus *clear* has been chosen only in the sense 'easy to understand'. *Separate* has been treated in its physical rather than figurative sense. *Free* has been restricted to the meaning 'without paying', *opposed* is 'disagreeing'. *Good* has been included in the meaning 'good to senses - mind', while the "moral" *good* makes a different sememe. *Wrong* has been included in two senses: 'improper' (sb's action) and 'not true' (sb's thought), and they manifest the same reactances. In our analysis *mistaken* is *mistaken*₁.

Judging by the identical collocational potential in the table and the fact they manifest the same reactances, the adverbs *completely*, *entirely* and *totally* appear to be synonymous. To confirm or refute this statement, other collocations with verbs and other kinds of adjectives are necessary. The couple *mistaken* and *wrong* are near-synonyms and they almost fully share the set of collocates, which is promising for the validity of the investigation and of the results.

The adjective *selfish* is ambivalent, containing both 'good' and 'bad'. *Fairly selfish* is mentioned in *OCD* as a collocation, and we have found it in *You do have to be fairly selfish when you have gift. You cannot afford to let too many outside things get in the way* (said by Sarah Brightman), where 'bad' is suspended.

For the sake of clarity, *absolutely* had to be divided into two sememes.

Charming, *convincing* and *unexpected* often go with *not entirely*, *convincing* with *not wholly*. The two meanings of *charming* (§3.6.3 d) have been analysed indiscriminately at this stage.

We are going to search for the clue to the diversity of other collocates for which there are no two identical columns.

3.6.3b By applying our collocational method, we have established the following common content of the adjectives collocating with intensifying adverbs:

	proper meaning	collocating with adjectives that contain	but not with adjectives that contain
<i>absolutely</i> ₁	`strongly (informal) strongly'	`strongly strong degree' + `good - bad'	strong degree'
<i>absolutely</i> ₂	`strongly strongly'	`good - bad - true' or `not exist'	`in some aspect(s)'
<i>completely</i>	`strongly strongly' in all parts/aspects	{strongly}strong degree' + `good - bad - true' or `not exist'	`compared to reference point' or `in some aspect(s)'
<i>entirely</i>	`strongly strongly' in all parts/aspects	`strong degree' + `{good} - bad - true or `not exist'	`compared to reference point'
<i>extremely</i>	`strongly strongly'	`(strongly) strong degree	`not exist' or `(not) expect'
<i>fairly</i>	`almost strongly'	`strong degree' + `good - true'	`not true' or `not exist'
<i>highly</i> (formal)	`strongly'	`degree' + `good - true'	`not true'
<i>perfectly</i>	`strongly strongly'	`good' + `psychological phenomenon'	
<i>totally</i>	`strongly strongly' in all parts/aspects	{strongly} strong degree' + {bad} - good - true' / `not exist	`compared to reference point' or `in some aspect(s)'
<i>utterly</i>	`strongly strongly'	`strong degree' + `bad'	82
<i>very</i>	`strongly'	`(strong) degree'	`strongly strong degree' or `not exist'
<i>wholly</i> (formal)	`strongly strongly'	`(strongly) strong degree' + `good - bad - true' or `almost not exist'	

For *completely* and *totally* 'not exist' (= 'without sth') has been added, based on *c./t. dark/ignorant/silent* – cf. the definition of *total* in §2.1.7. The addition of relative adjectives (see §3.3) to the list places 'compared to reference point' among prohibiting factors in the matrix table.

*Absolutely*₁ and *absolutely*₂ both contain 'strongly strongly', but the former can be expressed as 'extremely' and the latter as 'completely' owing to the influence of the collocating adjectives. Collocators of *absolutely*₁ are adjectives which repeat the same 'strongly strongly' with an emotional pleonastic effect. Adjectives (like *acceptable, clear, confident, correct, essential, evil, false, full, doubtful, exhausted, honest, important, impossible* 'not possible', *necessary, packed, positive, right, satisfying, sensible, serious* 'not joking', *silent, sincere, sure, true, unacceptable, useless, vital, wrong*) that collocate with 'good - bad - true' or 'not exist' of *absolutely*₂ and lack 'strongly strongly' convey the meaning 'completely'. The same sememe occurs with verbs: *agree/believe/oppose/trust a*. Adjectives that contain 'in some aspect(s)' are incompatible with 'completely'. 'In some aspect(s)' is a feature that accompanies definitions of those rare adjectives which do not refer to entirety of their conceptual potential, such as *good* in our group, which renders *absolutely*₂ /*totally good* highly restricted in use.

The semes 'strongly strong' found in *perfectly* and '{good} - bad - true in {strongly} strong degree in all parts/aspects' in *completely* agree with the comment to the question *Is "completely good" proper English? If not, why?* placed on the site *English Language & Usage Stack Exchange*: "*That apple is perfectly good to eat* is not the same as saying *that apple is completely good to eat*: the apple might have some flaws, but none that would prevent it from being eaten". Since apples are mainly used as food, it would be difficult to find a proper use for *That apple is completely good*. As one of commentators

said, “people use the phrase *completely good* in the context of philosophical, ethical and theological arguments”. In other words, *perfectly good* is ‘strongly strongly good for the purpose’ (‘the purpose’ being a psychological category), whereas *completely good* is ‘strongly strongly good in all aspects’.

Wholly devoted usually refers to devotion to God, while *utterly devoted* implies wrong choice of the object of devotion. *Wholly* agrees with *absent* and *lacking* and other adjectives that allow partial existence within general absence or lack.

In order to maintain stylistic harmony, adjectives which definitely do not belong to formal style – *clear*, *free*, *good* and *normal* – do not collocate with *highly*.

3.6.3c When an adverb contains ‘strongly strongly’ and is adjoined to ‘strong(ly)’ of an adjective (e.g. *terribly serious*), it should be understood that ‘strongly strongly’ and ‘strong(ly)’ do not simply add up to make ‘strongly (most) strongly strong(ly)’. Rather, one of the first two semes ‘strongly’ of an adverb serves as a linking element for ‘strong(ly)’ of the adjective. Therefore, ‘strongly + strongly’ (*terribly*) + ‘strongly bad’ (*serious*) = ‘strongly strongly bad’ (e.g. *terribly serious mistake*; see §3.3.6). Unstressed (i.e. not bearing nuclear accent) *absolutely*₁ agrees with ‘strongly strong degree’ of “implicit superlatives” such as *absurd, adoring, amazing, annoying, appalling, astounded, awful, beautiful, brilliant, charming, crazy, delicious, disgusting, enormous, fantastic, fascinating, freezing, furious, horrible, huge, impossible* ‘extremely difficult’, *infuriating, insane, irresistible, lovely, marvellous, minute, ridiculous, scorching, stupid, terrible, tiny*, and *wonderful* (Cruse 1986: 217), which “seem to be able to acquire an expressive element if stressed” (Cruse 2004: 58). Usually, those adjectives that are preceded by *absolutely* cannot be preceded by *mildly/slightly*; e.g. *She was |absolutely |happy/*|pleased. She was mildly*

/slightly + pleased/?happy (cf. Hlebec 2012). Cruse notices that they are resistant to the submodifiers *very*, *rather*, *slightly* and the affixation with *-ish*. Such adjectives also avoid comparison. The “implicit superlatives” according to our analysis contain the feature ‘strongest’. That is why *absolutely the worst* is much better than *absolutely bad*.

The adverb *completely* does not collocate with *cheap*, *short* and *slow* (Cruse 1986: 206). As Cruse expounds, “[t]he value of *slow*, although it ‘tends towards’ zero speed, never actually reaches it, but approaches it”. Such “zero-oriented” adjectives never reach the lowest possible degree. We can add, the same restriction applies to their antonyms *expensive*, *long* and *fast* because there is no limit to the positive degree ‘great’ they embody. They cannot be *completely/totally + expensive/fast/long*, although the same ‘degree’ allows them to form comparison, meaning ‘reaching the limit in certain degree’. Thus, the adverbs *completely* and *totally* are hostile to adjectives which contain ‘compared to reference point’ because there is no ultimate point to be reached away from the reference point. Adjectives without ‘compared to reference point’ implicitly signal collocability with these two adverbs. Some adjectival definitions, like for example *bald* <# rbody part of sb# who is without hair> or *naked* <# rbody part of sb# who is not covered with things to be out on body>, with the same ‘part’ manifestly show that *partially* and *completely* are available (cf. *bald spot on the head; naked to the waist, half-naked, stark naked*).

3.6.3d By combining the data on adjectives in §3.6.3a with those acquired by means of certain other adverbial collocators we can present the following adjectival definitions:

acceptable *The terms were quite a. to₄ the tenant. a. that he should...; a. answer /conduct/proposal/solution /substitute; a.; ?more/*a little/*simply/*slightly a. <#sth# that influences sb as expected and in strong degree good to be used in social relation>*

charming **1** *quite/simply/?more/*slightly/*utterly c.; c. book/box/country /house /piglet /restaurant /song/village /voice; c. detail/feature/freshness (indirect) <# rpart of sth {small} made by sb_x / small living thing that can move# that unintentionally makes sb_{sp} feel good in {strongly}strong degree {by sense using light}>* **2** *c. man; quite/simply /?more/?utterly/*slightly c.; I find it c. that...; c. demeanour/manners/smile (indirect) <#(phenomenon_x made by / expression of mental phenomenon of) sb_x# who behaves with {strongly}strong degree of good manner and makes sb_{sp} feel good>. Fairly/perfectly charming are acceptable collocations with charming₁ and ₂, but utterly agrees with charming₂ only when used ironically, as in *He can be utterly c. It's c. that she chose to be a skeleton for Halloween instead of a princess. c. rogue.**

clear₂ *Try to make your intentions c. to₄ them. It isn't c. who actually sent the message. It is c. that she's wrong. c. evidence/idea/instruction; not exactly/quite/??slightly c. <#mental phenomenon# that makes sb_x experience in strong degree true thought and influences sb_x to know phenomenon>*

convincing *She was very c. about her reason to divorce; c. evidence ('thought'); Be clear and c. that the project is viable (this thought'). c. argument/excuse/explanation /story (indirect); hardly/entirely/*slightly c. <#(sth_x made by use of language by sb_x to express) thought_x / sb_x# that makes sb_y think that sb_x expresses in strong degree (this) true thought_x concerning sth_y (which is bad)>*

devoted *She spent her life d. to₅ poetry; d. friend/son; dictator's d. followers; Linguistics is a discipline d. to₅ understanding language (indirect). *slightly d. <#(habitualness made by) sb_x# who is influenced by sth_x in strong degree because sb_x views sth_x as good_x (when sth_x is bad)>*

evil *Are all people really₂ e.?.; Slavery is the most e. system. It was e. of him to plan such an outcome. e. racist; It is e. to abuse animals (indirect). e. deed (indirect); ?more /*slightly e.; *-er <#(phenomenon made by) sb# who in strong degree tends towards making bad social phenomenon>*

false *f. assumption/impression/promise; quite/simplely /*slightly/*more/*very f. This statement was f. (indirect); f. alarm (indirect) <#(sth made by use of symbols {language} to express) thought# that is strongly not true, which is bad>*

free *The breakfast is f. for₁ the guests of the hotel. f. drink/entrance; quite/simplely/*more /*slightly/*very f. <#sth_x# that is made - given by sb_x in social event to make sb_y experience - use sth_x for which payment does not exist (which is good)>*

good (semantic prime) *The food/lecture was surprisingly g.; g. movie; extremely/quite /*slightly g.; better (= 'more good') <#sth# that is in some aspect(s) in some - strong degree good to senses - mind> Good is rich in numerous manifestations of 'good', which represent different alloemes and sememes, with varying collocators. Thus, 'morally good' would sanction *absolutely* as a collocator and would activate 'in strong degree' (??**She is (morally) slightly good.*) - cf. 1.1.3 g. Although 'good' is a semantic prime, it ramifies into several "alloprimes" formed by adding particular aspects of goodness. The addition contributes to specification, as always when meaning is involved.*

inadequate *Your paper is woefully i.; i. food/law; i. for₆ living; i. to₁ meet one's needs; quite/simply/?more/*slightly i. <#phenomenon - amount - substance# that is, when sb wants |to make event - habitualness, in (strongly) strong degree bad>*

lacking This adjective has at least two meanings: **1** *His ability/intelligence/will was l.; Courage is certainly l. in him. a little/simply/slightly/??more/*very l. <#mental state# that (almost) does not exist in sb_x, which is bad>*

2 *He is l. in ability/intelligence/courage/self-confidence. The book is completely l. in originality (indirect; OALD). a little/simply /slightly/??more/*very l. <#(sth_x made by) sb# who (almost) does not experience psychological state>.*

mistaken **1** *He is m. about her identity; badly/seriously m.; m. belief/information/view (indirect); m. identity /loyalty/kindness/zeal (doubly indirect); quite/very (much) m.; m. AE in/of/to-infinitive; ?more/*slightly m.; *being m. <#(({{psychological}} state_x that unintentionally makes) thought experienced by) sb# who experiences in {strongly} strong degree not true thought concerning state_x>* **2** *She was m. in telling him the truth. It was m. of₃ her to₃ tell him the truth. She was m. to₃ tell him the truth. <(event_x made - experienced by) sb_x# who during short time makes sb_{sp} experience bad thought concerning event_x - sb_x>*

normal *n. It is n. to₁ drive a car when you are a businessman. It's only n. that he should help his mother. n. /circumstances/temperature; quite/more/*slightly n.; n. child (indirect) <#(sb who makes) phenomenon_x# that makes sb_{sp} experience {strong degree of good} thought concerning (sb_x who makes) phenomenon_x as expected when sb_x tends towards making habitualness>*

opposed *She was deeply₃ o. to₅ her daughter's marriage. They are diametrically o. about this important*

*subject. very/very much/*more/*slightly o. <#sb# who experiences strong mental phenomenon concerning sth_x as in strong degree bad and does not want to be influenced by sth_x>*

persuasive *He is very p. about leaving the country. His argument proved sufficiently p. to₄ the reviewer. p. analysis/evidence/manner/reason; p. argument/excuse (indirect); ??slightly p. <#(sth made by use of language to express) mental phenomenon / sb_x# that influences and makes sb_y think that sb_x in strong degree expresses true thought concerning sth (which is bad)>*

predictable *The results were largely p. from previous findings. Is it p. that the region will be struck by an earthquake in next decade?. p. event/time; quite /*slightly p. <#sth_x# that makes sb_{sp}/x know future phenomenon as in strong degree (good - bad and) true thought, source being sth_y>*

reasonable *Let's be r. about₂ that. It's not r. to₂ walk in such weather. It is r. that everyone who asks justice should do justice (Thomas Jefferson). *slightly r. <#(phenomenon_x made by) sb_x# who makes sb_{sp} experience good thought concerning expected phenomenon_x when sb_x wants / tends towards making phenomenon_x using strong degree of good mind>*

ridiculous *Don't be r.; You look r. in that hat. It was r. of₃ them to₃ buy a new flat. It's r. that they (should) charge for water. r. price; a little/almost/simply/slightly r.; ?more/very r. <#(phenomenon_x made - experienced by) sb_x# that makes sb_{sp} experience this {in (strongly) strong degree} bad thought concerning | sb_x / not expected phenomenon_x | when phenomenon_x is made - experienced using bad mind>*

satisfying *It is very s. to₅ know that they agreed. It is deeply₃ s. that they agreed. There's something s. about₂ giving a tip. s. job/result; s. medicine/vacuum-cleaner*

(indirect); *more/quite/really* s.; *??slightly* s. <#(thing_x that makes) phenomenon_x# that makes sb in strong degree experience good thought and feel good mental phenomenon concerning expected phenomenon_x>

secure *The house is s. against₃ theft/from₂ thieves. Keep your documents s.; feel s.; s. for₂ children; -er; *slightly* s. <#thing_x - substance_x - phenomenon_x - space_x# that affects living thing_y {sb_x} as good when thing_y {sb_x} wants to make phenomenon_y, that makes sb_x feel in strong degree good because thing_x - substance_x - phenomenon_x - space_x makes sb_y weak and not make bad phenomenon_z come to exist>

selfish *It was s. of₃ John to abandon Jack. It is s. that he is not talking about her success. He is being s.; s. argument/attitude/behaviour/demand* (indirect); *a little/slightly* s. <#(event {behaviour} made - experienced by) sb_x# who wants to make only sb_x | feel good / be with power to use sth {, which unintentionally makes sb_{sp} experience some - strong degree of bad thought}>

separate *s. bedroom/office; s. from₅; somewhat/*more / *slightly* s. <# r part_x of r thing_x# that during same time does not exist in same space in relation to (part_y of) thing_y, with (part_{x+y} of) thing_{x+y} not together> (Collocators of *separate* in its figurative meaning would look different, e.g. *wholly* s. would be all right.)

unacceptable *Her behaviour is u. to₄ most people. It is u. that they should₃ continue to break the law. u. cost/risk; simply/?slightly/*more* u. <#phenomenon_x# that influences and makes {a lot of} sb_{more than one} experience in {strongly} strong degree bad thought concerning not expected phenomenon_x>

unexpected *u. arrival/cordiality/death/result; u. visitor* (indirect); *a little/?more* u. <#(sb who makes) phenom-

enon# that is in strong degree not expected, which is good - bad>

wrong 1 (= not suitable, = *mistaken*₂) *She was w. in telling him the truth. It was w. of₃ her to₃ tell him the truth. She was w. to₃ tell him the truth. It was w. for her to₃ tell him the truth. It seemed w. to₁₂ her that Jim should₃ get a rise in salary. w. action/choice/decision /person for the job/thing to say; w. place/time; quite/simply/?slightly /??more/*very w.; *being w.; *-er <#((space - time of) phenomenon_x made by) sb_x# <who during short time unintentionally makes sb_{sp} experience bad thought (as experienced by sb_{sp}), concerning in strongly strong degree bad not expected phenomenon_x> **2** (= *mistaken*₁) *He must be w.; He is w. about₁ her identity; They were w. to₅ assume that Tom speaks Spanish.; w. belief/information/report /view (indirect); simply/very (according to OCD s.v. wrong adj)/*being/??more w., *-er; <#(sth made by use of language by / thought experienced by) sb# who during short time experiences not true thought concerning state that does not exist>. *Perfectly* can modify *wrong* when the speaker assumes an ironical attitude.**

Because of 'short time' the sentence **It is mistaken₂/wrong₁ of her to have said that* is ill formed. The time lapse between her words in the past and the speaker's opinion of her words is too long.

Acceptability of *more* and *very* usually go together, but if an adjective is formed by means of a negative prefix, even if *very* is all right, *more* tends to be stylistically odd, as in *?more unexpected* instead of *less expected*.

When collocating with adjectives that contain 'strongly strong', such as *charming, disgusting, extraordinary, false, free, inadequate, wrong*, the adverb *quite* acquires their intensifying sense, especially in BE.

Ridiculous shows a whole gamut of 'grading degree' – from zero degree, through 'strong degree' to 'strongly strong degree'.

Good must have 'degree' because it is gradable, and when morphologically compared, it has a specified reference point. But in the positive it is difficult to find its reference point (the speaker's expectation?). Thus, ?*How good is Mark [in terms of morality]*? Perhaps this also has to do with *good* participating in mitigation of the deprecatory member of overlapping antonyms, as in *John's a dull lad, but he's cleverer than Bill* unlike ?*Bill's a clever lad, but he's duller than John* (Cruse 1986: 207), or in *Mike is a bad boy, but he's better than Jim*; ?*Mike is a good boy, but he's worse than Jim*. *Jane's behaviour is unacceptable, but it is more acceptable than Jim's*. ?*Jane's behaviour is acceptable, but it is more unacceptable than Jim's*. Figuratively, when speakers mention *good*, they have stepped into an idyllic land of no return. They may move only within that area and meet various degrees of goodness.

4 SEMANTIC HIERARCHY

4.0 There are two main semantic paradigmatic relationships between lexemes: notion A expressed by lexeme A may be (a) 'kind of' or (b) 'part of', notion B expressed by lexeme B. Subdivision into kinds is called "taxonomic" organisation or "hyponymy" (or "superordination"), while that into parts is "partonomy" – see §3.5.1. Both phenomena have been amply presented in WordNet, the most extensive lexical database for the English language, based on psycholinguistic insights into the organization of semantic memory. "The common ground for partonomy and hyponymy, united by the term "endonymy" (Cruse 1986: 123), consists in the semantic element 'part of', the difference between them being the fact that in partonomy this element is based on the immediate perception of extra-linguistic world, which has its correlation in cognitive and linguistic structure, while in hyponymy there is no such direct perception and the idea 'part of' is purely notional [and is couched in terms of 'kind of']" (cf. Murphy 2003: 43). "There are many such collectives [as *clergy* and *furniture*] [...] which are superordinate to sets of lexemes in a hierarchical relationship that is ambivalent with respect to the distinction of hyponymy and the part – whole relation" (Lyons 1977: 316).

4.1 HYPONYMY AND REDUNDANCY RULES

In hyponymy a definitional marker (§1.1.2) is repeated in another sememe, while the distinguisher is added or subtracted. Notion A (hyponym) is 'kind of' superordinate

notion B (hyperonym). An example should clarify the issue. The noun notions 'vehicle' and 'bicycle' are in a hyponymic relationship, where *vehicle* is the superordinate and *bicycle* the hyponym: *vehicle* <man-made thing used for making things move on ground>; *bicycle* <man-made thing used for making sb_x (+ y) move on ground || with high and narrow surface on which sb sits, with two wheels one after another, which sb moves with legs> (cf. Palmer 1981: 85). In terms of semantic features, a lower category term contains more features than the corresponding higher category term (*boy* '-ADULT' '+ MALE', *child* '- ADULT'). Couched in different terms, if every potential referent of one sememe is at the same time a potential referent of another sememe, but not vice versa, then the former sememe is the hyponym of the latter.

If two notions are in the relation of hyponymy, sentences that contain them are said to be in the relation of "entailment" (cf. §1.1.3 e). Entailment is a sentential consequence of the paradigmatic relation of hyponymy. Thus, *This is a rose* entails *This is a flower*, but it is not the other way round. The latter sentence does not necessarily entail the former, although this possibility is not excluded. Likewise, *I saw a boy* entails *I saw a child* and *Turpin stole a horse* entails *Turpin took a horse* (Leech 1990: 134). But *Fido is a small mastiff* does not entail *Fido is a small dog* because norms for mastiffs and dogs do not coincide (Leech 1990:102).

In specific utterances the entailment is from a hyponym to a superordinate (as in the examples above), while in generic sentences it is the other way round (Leech 1990: 134-5). Thus, *Boys are a nuisance* does not entail *Children are a nuisance*, but implies *Some children are a nuisance*. In rare cases a hyponym does not entail a hyperonym; e.g. *Mike became a thief* does not entail *Mike became a transgressor* because *become* implies a change.

Mike may have already been a transgressor before by committing a misdeed other than theft.

In definitions, hyponymic relations hold for the content of nouns and their representatives in directives and directrices, as well as for non-finite clauses, pre- and post-directrices, and infinitives. This has been illustrated by numerous examples throughout the book. When a noun fills a slot wider in meaning than the noun, the noun restricts the slot's scope by means of transference.

"The formulation of a dictionary for the semantic component of a particular language can be greatly economized by taking advantage of a relation between certain pairs of semantic markers. The relation that serves this purpose is the category inclusion relation which holds between a pair of semantic markers when the category represented by one is a subcategory of that represented by another" (Katz and Postal 1964: 16). The existence of such obligatory superordinates has been called "redundancy rules" in generative semantics, which simplify descriptions. Thus ' \pm MALE' entails '+ ANIMATE', or to use mathematical notation for 'is a member of the set', here in the meaning 'included in a wider semantic category of' - 'colour' \subset 'sth experienced by sense', 'want' \subset 'expect' \subset 'experience mental phenomenon', 'want' or 'thought' \subset 'mental state', etc. "Hyperonyms are used to infer new collocations in the following way [...] : if the component C_1 has the superordinate H_1 , and H_1 forms a collocation with the component C_2 , then C_1 forms the collocation of the same type with C_2 . If the superordinate H of C_1 has no relevant collocations, a superordinate of H is tested for the same purpose, etc." (Bolshakov 2004: 184).

That redundancy rules have to do with hyponymy is obvious when part of a complex seme is repeated, as in 'sth made by use of symbols to make expression of mental phenomenon' \subset 'sth made by use of symbols', 'male - female living thing' \subset 'living thing', etc. The seme

'phenomenon' is equivalent to 'state - event - habitualness', while 'mental state' comprises 'thought - emotion - want' because hyperonymy is analysable as a sum of its hyponyms.

Here is a list of the most frequent non-obvious redundancy rules, superordinates placed to the right:

- 'amount' \subset 'state', 'part'
- 'behaviour' \subset 'manner'
- 'bodily phenomenon' \subset 'psychosomatic phenomenon'
- 'emotion' \subset 'mental phenomenon'
- 'energy' \subset 'phenomenon'
- 'event' \subset 'phenomenon'
- 'event made by sb_{with legal power}' \subset 'legal event'
- 'expression of mental phenomenon' \subset 'psychological phenomenon'
- 'form' \subset 'state', 'part'
- 'group' \subset 'sth_{more than one}'
- 'habitualness' \subset 'phenomenon'
- 'has to do with' \subset 'kind of '
- 'legal state' \subset 'mental state'
- 'man-made thing' \subset 'non-living thing'
- 'man-made thing helping (in)directly' \subset 'man-made thing used by sb'
- 'man-made thing used for moving' \subset 'man-made thing indirectly helping sb'
- 'mental phenomenon' \subset 'psychological phenomenon'
- 'perception' \subset 'psychological phenomenon'
- 'phenomenon' \subset 'sth'
- 'phenomenon made by use of language' \subset 'mental event'
- 'position' \subset 'state'
- 'psychological phenomenon' \subset 'psychosomatic phenomenon'
- 'sb' \subset 'sth'
- 'sensation' \subset 'bodily phenomenon'
- 'role of social power' \subset 'social role' \subset 'state'

'state' \subset 'phenomenon' (For Jackendoff (1991 in Goddard 1998: 65) a supercategory uniting semantic primes State and Event is called "Situation".)

'sth made by use of language in writing' \subset 'sth made by use of drawing symbols'

'strong' \square 'strong degree' (unless blocked by a rule that prevents comparison)

'substance' \subset 'sth'

'thing' \subset 'sth'

'thought' \subset 'mental state'

'time' \subset 'state'

'use' \subset 'make phenomenon'

'use language' \subset 'experience mental phenomenon', 'express mental phenomenon', 'use symbols'

'want' \subset 'mental state'

One and the same word may at the same time act as a superordinate and as a hyponym; e.g. *dog*₁ 'species' is a hyperonym of *dog*₂ 'male dog', and a hyponym of *animal*₁₋₃. (*Animal*₁ is the broadest category in contrast with 'vegetable', *animal*₂ is 'mammal' including humans and beasts, and *animal*₃ is 'beast' (Palmer 1981: 86).)

The relation of hyponymy holds between various degrees of intensity (*It's huge* entails *It's large*; Cruse 2004; 49; see §3.3.5). Namely, *huge* is <#thing - space_x# that takes strongly strongly great space_x in comparison with reference point> and is an amplification of *large* <#thing - space_x# that takes strongly great space_x in comparison with reference point >, which, in turn, is expanded from *big*₁ <#thing - space_x# that takes strong degree of amount of space_x in comparison with reference point>.

In order to distinguish hyponymy from cases like *kill* (repeated here from §1.1.2) <#sth {living thing_x}# makes #living thing_y# come to not exist any more {during short time}> and *die* <#living thing# comes to

not exist any more {during short time}>, where the great part of the content of the latter is repeated in the content of the former (Cruse 2004: 246), it is necessary to notice besides the repetition, the existence of an object directive in the former, which becomes the subject directive in the latter and makes an important functional shift.

Notwithstanding the observed tendency towards nesting there are no instances of hyponymy, such as #bad event# and #bad and strong event# followed by identical analyses of the same lexeme across different sememes of a single lexeme. Actually, such cases are ruled out by the present method because their existence would indicate that the definitions were wrong.

Classemes are recurrent, and complex directives often nest in an ordered hyponymous manner. Combinatory tendencies that apply to less complex semes automatically apply to more complex semes that are the expansions of the former because they share some elements. Thus, *crisis* is collocable with *serious*₂ ('bad event') and automatically with 'bad and strong event with a lot of sb_{more than one}' in the definition of the verb *rage*.

There is a plethora of complex nesting directives, such as 'bad event', 'bad and strong event', 'bad and strong mental event', 'bad and strong event with sb more than one', 'bad and strong event with a lot of sb_{more than one}', 'bad and strong event with a lot of sb_{more than one} in bad and strong state', 'bad and strong mental event with sb more than one who use language', which makes their identification difficult but still manageable.

4.2 Degrees of generality of categories involved in hyponymy may vary (cf. Taylor 1989: 47). The highest category is called a "unique beginner", or a "basic ontological category" such as SPACE, TIME, MATTER, QUANTITY and CHANGE by Jackendoff, or a "basic domain" by Langacker (cf. Cruse 2004: 138). There are few such categories: fruit, vegetable, clothing, tool, vehicle, furniture, plant, animal, indoors, outdoors (Tversky 1986:

64), substance, location, communication (Miller 1998 in Murphy 2003: 109). It is impossible to have a visual image of a unique beginner. It is likely that this macrogeneric notion coincides with those of a marker and a directive. Unique beginners have their matches in the following semantic definitions: "plant" is 'living thing that cannot move', "animal" is 'non-human living thing that can move'⁸⁵, "indoors" is 'in house', "outdoors" 'in nature', "substance" is 'substance', "location" equals 'particular space', "communication" – 'event made by use of language', "clothing" – 'man-made thing to be put on body', "tool" – 'man-made thing helping (in)directly', "vegetable" – 'part of living thing that cannot move, growing close to/under ground, used for eating {when cooked}' "fruit" – 'part of living thing that cannot move, growing on trees, used for eating when sweet {without being cooked}' (cf. Wierzbicka 1985: 300).

There is a lower, mesogeneric "basic category" (such as apple, fish, grass, tree, flower, lettuce, bird, shirt, home, beach, school, park, mountain), which is optimally informative in everyday life and is elicited in a large number of naming situations (Tversky 1986: 65). Thus, *I saw a bird/? a creature on the table. a flock of sheep/shy animals/*animals*). As Hofmann (1993: 27) puts it, "if there is a common word that means just what you want to say, you should use it rather than some more general word". The notion of basic category may vary according to the speaker. Investigators have found out that the level of oak was basic for people living in the country, while in urban societies the level of oak is not basic, and for an urban college student probably the level of tree being basic. Also, the basic level may shift so that for an aeroplane mechanic types of aeroplanes may be basic (Tversky 1986: 66). For professionals, iron is a basic category and consequently in technical collocations it may figure as a directive (see *puddle* in §2.1.5c).

Basic categories develop in mind prior to unique beginners (Lakoff 1987: 49). It seems that most

classemes correspond to categories labelled as unique beginners and basic categories.

The lowest, microgeneric category is the "terminal taxon" (Kay 1971), e.g. kinds of apple: pippin apple, golden delicious, codling, sweeting, russet, costard, Jonathan, etc.; kinds of birds: blue quail, swallow, sparrow, robin; kinds of trees: oak-tree, maple, poplar; kinds of schools: elementary school, secondary school, high school (cf. Rosch in Tversky 1986: 64). Terminal taxa have to be defined by using additional, highly specific semes (cf. defining *celery* and *parsley* in §2.4.6). "Though in most instances it is not too difficult to determine the features that characterize the upper hierarchical levels, it is much more difficult to determine the distinctive features of the lower levels. [...] Specialists in the classification of dogs will, of course, be aware of the distinctions of which the average person is totally ignorant, but such specialists possess what should be called a "technical" or "scientific" taxonomy, rather than a folk taxonomy" (Nida 1975: 91).

5 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

The analysis in this book unsettles the generally accepted opinion that collocations are usually unpredictable and arbitrary. Actually, the distribution of lexemes is a lodestar of defining, and vice versa, definitions enable prediction of collocates. Paraphrases that constitute the metalanguage of semantic definitions are guided by their collocational potential and thus they cannot be arbitrary. By applying the collocational method one can find motivation even for collocations with verbs that are generally considered to be "empty". Allerton's "locutional co-occurrence restrictions", which have been imagined as more or less arbitrary, appear to be a natural product of lexical definitions. Thus, *to* in *essential to* is, contrary to Allerton (1984: 31) not arbitrary, but issues from the meaning of *essential*. Also, unlike Allerton, we should not make a sharp distinction between syntactic and semantic co-occurrence restrictions because they are both of semantic nature.

The model of language offered by the collocational method definitely demonstrates the dominance of lexis over grammar and syntax. It is in harmony with Michael Lewis' view that language consists of grammaticalized lexis, not of lexicalized grammar (Lewis 1993). The collocational method undoubtedly shows that syntactic rules emanate from lexical definitions. As the leading Croatian linguist Radoslav Katičić (1982-83: 35) remarked: "It is useful to make a notional distinction between [syntax and semantics]; but nevertheless they make a veritable whole because the content of lexical units contributes to shaping and profiling the syntactic structure, while the structural elements of semantics, in

turn, carry certain content and thus contribute to the semantic entirety" (translated by B. H.).

The proof of the collocational method's validity lies in the applicability of semantic elements across various lexical definitions in which they recur. This validity is substantiated by double-checking. So, *with's* meaning of unity or connection has to be shared by *friend*. (The same 'together' as a near-synonym of 'unity' and 'connection' is more suitable to be used in a definition because a relationship such as unity or connection is better communicated by an adverb than by a noun.) To support our conclusion, there are collocations of the adjective *close* with the same paradigm of nouns: a *close friend/connection/correspondence/link/partner*, and this adjective also collocates with *together*. Another example is 'behave' occurring in at least two patterns: *IS BEING ADJ* and in *IT IS ADJ OF NP TO -INF*.

When the collocational method is applied, nothing needs to be added to definitions to make them meaningful, with rare exceptions (like *sad* §3.3.7a). In our approach entire definitions of nodes have been made up using definitions of their collocates. However, shaping a definition of a lexeme from definitions of its collocates is not merely a copy - paste job, because the order of semantic elements has to be established. The order of elements in such definitions is sometimes obligatory if the right sense is to be achieved, and sometimes it is open to variation.

Semantic definitions reached by means of the collocational approach fulfil the requirements posed by Grzegorek (1977: 6): "The semantic representation of any lexical item has to provide sufficient information in order to deduce from it at least the following relations of a given item to other items in the same lexicon:

- a. possible paraphrases of a given lexical item
- b. synonyms of a given lexical item
- c. semantic collocability of a given lexical item

- d. the semantic fields of a given lexical item and relationship to other members of the same semantic field.”

By gaining insight into semantic definitions the linguist can embark on a well grounded investigation that resembles the work of a mathematician and along with cognitive linguistics brings linguistics close to the world of exact sciences. Collocation is a respectable instrument for the investigation of language that may claim scientific status (cf. Louw 2010) and the collocational method paves the way for linguistics to become an exact science. It has analogy with astronomical methods such as the spectrographic analysis of celestial bodies to ascertain their composition. The object of semantic investigation – patterns of meaning in human brain, just like far away stars and planets, are inaccessible to senses and therefore indirect clues have to be resorted to.

Systematicity as revealed in our investigation holds at the most abstract level of language, while individual speakers tend to master it with more or less success. Being exposed to numerous utterances in which a certain lexeme is accompanied by other lexemes with restriction in their paradigmatic choice, learners of a language subconsciously grasp their semantic structure and thus gain competence to use them repetitively and productively. Children acquiring mother tongue are exposed to numerous instances of words in different situations and especially various collocations. The mesh of juxtaposed and mutually related words create the subconscious knowledge of their meanings, and these meanings have their correlates in semantic definitions. This is how we understand the notion “systematicity” in contrast to Pullum and Scholz (2007:375), who “endorse [...] the suggestion of Johnson (2004) that systematicity as a matter of substitutability of co-categorical constituents for one another does not appear to hold of natural languages at all.

A number of collocations may still defy systematicity, such as most morphological variants (e.g. some adjectives in *-ic ~ -ical*; cf. Bauer 1983: 122; Lipka 1992: 167-168), but many hitherto unpredictable collocations become transparently analysed and explained along the lines expounded here. The road to collocability becomes better paved when style is taken into account (cf. §§ 1.2.4, 2.4.3c, 2.4.5, 3.2.7c, 3.3.7b, 3.4.4, 3.6.3b).

Only "full" ("content" words) in addition to prepositions among the "grammar" words may enjoy a significant benefit of the collocational method. Other grammar words are defined by applying the knowledge of *classemes* and making up definitions that can be substituted for the grammar words. (cf. 3.1.3 and *that*).

Some, if not most grammar categories (like 'past', 'future', 'habitualness'), recur as *semes* in semantic definitions.

In semantic terms, no part of speech can be said to govern another part of speech. They simply agree or do not agree.

We hope to have surmounted the problem of disambiguation and mapping meaning onto use without resorting to "selectional" and "collocational preferences" (Wilks 1973, Hanks 2007, 2013). We have reduced the number of Hanks' "complementation patterns" by treating prepositions on par with content words.

Sameness has been shown to be of the utmost importance for semantic congruence underlying collocability and the need to repeat a *seme* when collocations are established is imperative (see §2.4.7c). That collocates share *semes* was already known to Lehrer (1974), Leech (1974) and Weinreich (1966a, all mentioned in Kövecses 1986: 130), who "maintain that word A can collocate with word B if a feature 'c' found in the meaning of word A is also present in the meaning of word B". When there is no such duplication in definitions, it occurs contextually as transference. Sharing *semes* is analogous to the covalent

bond in chemistry, formed by sharing the electrons of atoms in a molecule.

Establishing semantic definitions enables better insight into links between different sememes of a lexeme. Naturally, there are striking similarities among definitions (especially analyses) of various sememes of a single lexeme. This method may help in discovering more cases of regular polysemy and throw additional light on those that have been diagnosed.

The seme 'strong' taken in its basic meaning of intensity is a widely used feature. It may be claimed that even detransitivization and transitivization are a matter of notional strength. Namely, both unaccusatives and middles depend on the 'strength' hierarchy and on the relationship between deep roles played by directives, to be more precise. Also, the degree of direct causation corresponds to different cases of transitivity conversion (§2.5.2). There seems to be an association of 'strong' with the ideas of multitude ('a lot of'), the meaning of power in society, of importance, truth, the good and the bad (as shown in the polysemy of *serious* and *severe*). The seme 'power' is understood as the intensity of influence among people and often manifested as 'sb_{with power}'. The sub-types of 'sb_{with power}' have been found to be 'sb_{with social power}' (e.g. *appoint*, *name*, *nominate*), 'sb_{with legal power}' (*declare*₁, *pronounce*₁), 'sb_{with religious power}' (*excommunicate*), 'sb_{more than one}' (*elect*), 'sb_{with moral power}' (*promise*), 'sb_{with power of knowledge}' (*autopsy*), and 'sb_{with power}' (*pronounce*₂). It is reasonable to suspect that the simple seme 'strong' may have its counterpart in relatively intense electric current in the brain because this pervasive seme (often) exerts influence on the neighbouring words.

The shadow meaning, i.e. primary meaning which influences and "casts shadow" on another sense of a lexeme (Chafe 2000), plays a more important role in the

choice of collocates than usually believed – see §§1.1.3b and 2.5.12.

When appearing as alternatives within the same directive, the semes 'sb' and 'thing' should be treated as belonging to two separate sememes if judged by the zeugma test, at least in most cases.

Whenever a directive contains a number of classemes rather than a single one, there has to be a vague general idea that unites those classemes even though they belong to different sememes. As an illustration of this principle, we refer the reader to the analysis of the adjectives *flawless*, *immaculate*, *impeccable*, *unblemished* and *spotless* in §2.4.5.

We believe that our theory of language is near to capturing the essence of language and can vie with other schools of thought. It even surpasses them in some respects, sidestepping a lot of problems which they face. For instance, instead of thinking about constructions as transformations, it is more realistic to view them as a product of combining the individual meanings of their constituent lexemes. This method goes further than distributional semantics, with which it shares certain principles. Semantic definitions automatically take care of semantic roles and Fillmore's semantic frames.

A comparison of collocational and cognitive linguistics would take much space, but suffice it here to state that at least some of the findings of the latter can be traced indirectly by means of the former. To take an example, if emotional states are conceptualised as containers (Taylor 1989: 134), a similar conclusion can be reached by comparing the primary and a secondary meaning of the verb *fill*: **1** <#sth_x# makes #{thing with} space# come to be all with sth_{x/y}> f. *bowl/mug/bucket /room /museum /niche /cathedral /gallery /corner /eye /ear /lungs /belly /tooth*; f. *a hole with soil, f. battery; Clouds of flowers filled the air. Performances fill the museum. Ruddy light filled the horizon/air. Music filled the*

town. Noise filled their ears. **2** <#sth# makes #sb# come to be all with strong emotion - energy> *The music filled him with emotions. filled with admiration/anger /apprehension/dread/fear/foreboding/horror/remorse/terror/trepidation.* The same 'thing with space' corresponds to 'container' and 'sb come to be with strong emotion' matches 'emotional state'.

Also, the comparison of the primary and the secondary metaphoric meanings of *quench* (*q. fire* and *q. thirst*) may lead to the cognitivists' view that thirst is conceptualised as fire due to the burning sensation when the body lacks water.

A lot of disciplines, among them notably lexicography, language teaching, translatology, contrastive studies, history of language, neurolinguistics, psycholinguistics, and philosophy, stand to benefit from definitions revealed by the collocational method.

A good definition gives answers to a lot of issues in discourse analysis – producing and understanding discourse, the analysis of literary texts, the semantics of coherence, the conditions of semantic connection, accounting for textual lacunae, and others.

"Popular" definitions such as those in our study, can reduce if not eliminate the following problem: "Atkins and Levin (1991) have shown that the assertions of each lexicographer are rarely commensurable with those of others. [They] imply that there is no simple 'correct' way of analysing and defining the meaning of any given word [in lexicology]" (Hanks 2013: 147). Fontenelle (1997: 2) was more optimistic: "While *rose bushes* are bushes made of roses, it is crucial to realize that *petals* are part of a rose whereas *bunch* expresses a 'group' relationship in syntagmatic combination with *rose*. Making this relationship explicit will add a semantic dimension to a lexicon, which would dramatically improve the performance of a machine translation system or a reading comprehension tool[...]".

If psycholinguistics is to explain how words are mentally represented, semantic definitions reached by means of the collocational method may help psycholinguistics achieve that task (cf. Dragićević 2007: 368). Those who are interested in the principles of organization of units in mental dictionary can profit from semantic definitions. Complementarily, “although we can’t observe the mental grammar of English itself, we can observe the judgments of grammaticality and meaning that are produced by using it” (Jackendoff 1993: 46). This method is a step to an ideal mental lexicon, with definitions that more or less correspond to actual unconscious ideas in the mind of the speakers. They may also improve the understanding of word associations and of errors in linguistic performance. For example, the discovery that, as a general rule, language-disordered speakers have more trouble with verbs than with nouns (Berg 2000: 290) can be brought into correlation with the view that nouns are more compact, without directives, while verbs are more complex, containing one or quite often, two directives.

The collocational method enables insight into matters that surpass linguistics proper and encroach neurolinguistics, for instance when investigating linguistic structures in aphasic speech. A finding that supports this opinion is: “Wernicke’s aphasics talk in circles about objects they are unable to name, as when a patient says what you drink for water” (Akmajian et al. 1995: 518).

In an article Hlebec (2016) compares lexical correspondents of two languages defined by means of the collocational method. The English verb *appoint* with its synonyms *nominate* and *name* has been chosen and contrasted with the Serbian correspondent verbs *postaviti* and *(na)imenovati*. The meanings of grammar words (usually prepositions) and patterns that agree with these English verbs do not always match the meanings of the corresponding grammar items in Serbian, so that these differences bring about slight differences in the definitions

of the verbs. This difference in turn might correlate with the slightly different attitudes to social power between the speakers of the two languages. Similarly, by using his semantic differential technique Osgood (1970) found disagreements on the usage of certain English words and their Japanese correspondents, and he commented that “[a]ppropriate analysis of the *semantics* of interpersonal verbs may illuminate the rules which govern the *norms* of interpersonal behavior in that culture” (Osgood 1970: 136).

The collocational method uncovers *classemes* as semantic units that are characteristic of a particular language and culture. Boas found out that in the American Indian languages there is a diversity of obligatory grammatical categories, quite different from those in European languages (Boas 1911). In Bantya there are categories ‘person’, ‘spirit’, ‘natural pair’, ‘liquid’, ‘tool’, ‘language, custom, usage’, ‘animal’, ‘mass’, ‘abstraction’, ‘diminutive’, ‘augmentative’, ‘depreciative’, and ‘locative’ among others (Whatmough 1957: 200).

The issue of classifiers is of interest also in philosophy (e.g. Sommers 1963, Thomason 1972, Keil 1979).

Our analysis vindicates the notion of category, which has recently been questioned or even discarded in philosophy. But this notion does not conjure pigeonholed categories. Instead, a concept of fuzzy categories arises because *classemes* have a core meaning with an aura of additional *semes* that make up expanded variants of the core meaning.

Diachronic linguistics can make good use of the collocational method when semantic definitions for past periods are available.

Producing mentally based lexical definitions should lead to a better understanding of lexical and syntactic changes. It may also reflect itself positively on teaching foreign languages, which is engaged with collocations as a major problem. For example, Nesselhauf (2005)

discusses the difficulties for learners posed by certain groups of collocations.

If Ludwig Wittgenstein's maxim is valid about language analysis being the only remaining task of philosophy, then there is one more field where the collocational method can contribute.

It is incumbent on the collocational approach to language to determine the meanings of bound morphemes and the relationship between derivatives, what tendencies or rules govern derivational processes and in what way different parts of speech of the same base share semantic features. These are some of the remaining tasks.

We hope to have established a solid foundation for the further development of the collocational method in search for semantic definitions. The enterprise has been enormous and strenuous for one man so that some mistakes and inconsistencies are inevitable, but hopefully the merits outweigh the demerits.

Notes

¹ The definitions are: *calm* <environmental state when no movement - sound exists, which is strongly strong degree of state'>, *centre* <part of space having no dimension, which is strongly strong degree of state when all distances from the end part are (almost) same>, *cert* <mental state when sb does not experience doubt, which is strongly strong degree of state'>, *faint* <short-time state when sb_x cannot experience sb_x's mind and senses, which is strongly strong degree of state'>, *silence* <state when there is no sound, which is strongly strong degree of state'>, *stop* <state when sth comes to not move any longer, which is strongly strong degree of state'>.

² Mackenzie and Mel'čuk (1988: 77) show that the connotation of *pregnant* ('X is very full of Y') is justified by the existence of *pregnant*'s primary sense; they "share a non-trivial semantic component".

³ However, in *The bouquet consisted of red and white flowers* the inserted adjectives are informative enough to justify the utterance. Neither is *Flowers can be arranged in a bouquet* pleonastic because the predicate here specifies a possible form of flowers.

⁴ In this book 'experience' is always used in the meaning of the semantic prime *experience*₁ '#living thing# experiences psychosomatic state' rather than in the meaning of *experience*₂ '<#living thing_x# is affected by cause outside thing_x'.

⁵ Other collocates of the nouns *ass/camel/donkey/horse/lama/mule/zebra*, with 'non-human living thing that can move used to make sth move', can be objects of the transitive verbs *canter, curry, gallop, groom* (<#living thing_x that can move {sb}# makes (#)outer body part

{that covers body}(#) of (#)living thing_{x/y} that can move{horse}(#) come to be / look in good state> A female ape was grooming herself/her mate. She was perfectly groomed from head to toe. g. feet/hair/one's image/moustache/eyebrow/nail; beautifully groomed businessman), and subjects of the intransitive verbs *balk*, *bolt*, *gallop*, *jib*, *paw*, *prance*, *scratch*, *snort*, *spill* and *trot*. There is another *ride*'s sememe *ride*₂: <#sb_x# uses space - surface of man-made thing_x used to make sth move by ground> (r. *in bus*; r. *in/on cart*). In American English there is a similar sememe (r. *bus/elevator/subway*): <#sb_x# uses #man-made thing with space used for making sb move#>. *Bus* is <man-made thing with large space and surface used for making sb_{more than one} move by ground in town in direction of space_x, while space_y is source>. The sememes of *ride*₃ in *They rode him out of town*, *He rode the baby on his back* and *The course rides soft/hard/rough* require still other definitions: <#sb_x# makes #sb_y# move when sb_y uses surface of {living} thing (sb_x) used to make sth move by ground> (for the first two sentences), and <#ground surface_x# is in some state when living thing that can move uses surface_x to ride> (for the last sentence). (For other members of the seme 'ground' see §§2.1. 9 and 2.4.3c). And this has not exhausted the sememes of *ride* – see §2.1.5 c.

⁶ The collocation *hurl ideas (at sb)* is short for *hurl words that convey ideas*. The lexeme *word* means <form and part of sth made by use of language to make expression of mental phenomenon used in writing as unit with spaces between>, and 'mental phenomenon' contains the seme 'idea', which can be elided thanks to the phenomenon of connexity – see §3.5.2c II.

⁷ "If a cat loses a leg in an accident, does it cease to be a quadruped? The majority view is that it does not, which is slightly disturbing in that "having four legs" is obviously part of the definition of a quadruped. However, the matter

is fairly easily resolved [...]. [W]hat the definition defines is no *a n y* quadruped, but a *w e l l - f o r m e d* quadruped" (Cruse 2004: 54). With the support of idioms we define *cat* as in §1.2.2.

⁸ In another example, instead of positing 'body part with flesh' for the directive of the adjective *podgy*, it is more acceptable to presume a simpler seme 'body part' instead. Compare *podgy* <#body part with flesh# which has a lot of flesh>, where the first 'with flesh' is redundant, and '#body part# which has a lot of flesh', where the implication is that 'body part' has to be with 'flesh' in order to be able to collocate with such nouns as *hand* <hard end part of arm with flesh and skin, used for touching and holding>.

⁹ "The term was not originally Firth's and he may well have been influenced in its selection by H. E. Palmer, who from Tokyo wrote a monograph on the subject in the nineteen-thirties. [...] Palmer appeared quite properly to see collocation as highly abstract order of compatibility between linguistic elements but did not define the term with any degree of precision. Firth, for his part, appropriately thought of it as primarily lexical, as a means of restricting the 'vagranity of words' and of providing 'stylistic' delineation of his 'restricted languages'" (Mitchell 1975: 134).

¹⁰ "Each reading in the dictionary entry for a lexical item must contain a selection restriction, i. e. a formally expressed necessary and sufficient condition for that reading to combine with others" (Katz and Postal 1964: 15 in Hawkins 1986: 5; Katz and Fodor 1964 in Nesselhauf 2005: 19). Bolinger (1965) claimed that in order to specify the sentence *He broke the bachelor in two* as anomalous, one must add the marker 'pliable' to the entry for *bachelor*. The same process holds for all other innumerable anomalous sentences with *bachelor*, so that the number of markers must also be infinite. But according to Sanders, "a lexical item is specified anomalous in a setting if it does NOT have the marker

called for by the relevant selection restriction. If the restriction of *break* is (Rigid), then *he broke the bachelor in two* is anomalous because *bachelor* does not have the required marker—no marker need be added.” (Sanders 1973: 58).

¹¹ Aisenstadt (1981) also makes a distinction between open and restricted collocations on the basis of commutability. Authors adopting a phraseological approach often reserve the term “collocation” for restricted collocations and use the terms “free combinations” or “co-creations” for open collocations (e.g. Hausmann 1984).

¹² It is quite a different case with sememe *addled*₂ <#mind_x# that is in bad state when sb who wants to use mind_x cannot think in good manner>, which collocates with the nouns *brain, mind, head, and wit*, which share ‘mind’ and represent a directive. The directive #mind# is repeated in a number of adjectives, such as *deep, dull, lucid* and *shallow* or verbs such as *penetrate, pervert, preoccupy, puzzle* and *read*.

¹³ This meaning of *heavy* is similar to the one of *heavy* in *h. day /drinking /programme /schedule /smoking /traffic /workload. I had a h. week. My time-table is very h. The trees were h. with fruit* (with a simultaneous sense ‘weighty’). *Heavy* does have the meaning ‘strong’ in still another sememe *heavy*₃, as in *h. blow/fall/frost/defeat* (<#bad physical phenomenon# that is strong>), but *rain* is not a bad physical phenomenon.

¹⁴ “Whether *white* in *white coffee, white wine* and *white people* is idiomatic depends on whether or not we define the term as ‘with the lightest of the colours normally associated with the entity’” (Palmer 1981: 81). Since *white* ‘comparatively light’ in these phrases can be replaced with *black* ‘comparatively dark’, according to our criterion (§2.1.1 final paragraph) these collocations are used as phrase appellatives (§2.1.6).

¹⁵ “[U]tterances are stretches of *parole* produced by native speakers out of sentences generated by the system

of elements and rules which constitute *langue*" (Lyons 1968: 176).

¹⁶ Intentionality is conveyed by verbs that fill the slot in *I asked him to ____*, adjectives filling the slot in *Be ____* or *I asked him to be ____*, and nouns in *They accused her of ____*. *Study* is 'intentional' (*I asked him to study hard*), while *learn* (<#living thing that can move {sb}# [unintentionally] comes to know and experience mental phenomenon_x concerning #phenomenon_y#, source being sth>) is 'unintentional' (**I asked him to learn hard*). Likewise with adjectives: *I asked him to be alone/naked /sober /*intelligent /*sick /*tall /*impressive, *Be tall! *Don't be impressive!* (Quirk and Greenbaum 1973: 124), *They accused her of theft/*sickness*. It is appropriate to use imperative sentences only if the person addressed can do the activity intentionally and also if the imperative serves to convey a mere wish, e.g. *Understand that I can't do that* (Palmer 1981: 150). There are still other tests consisting of collocations with lexemes that contain 'intentional': *urge, refuse, promise, permit, decide, forget, afraid to, on purpose, in order to, should, must*, etc. The seme 'use' implies intentional causativity. Verbs denoting intentional events ("voluntative" verbs), such as *bravely, foolishly, cruelly, generously, kindly, naively, nobly, presumptuously, rashly, selfishly, tactfully, thoughtlessly, wickedly*, go with adverbs of praise and blame (King 1970).

¹⁷ The content of the second object directive is supported by the collocations *shoot /spatter + ammunition/arrow /bullet/dart/lead/misile/round/shot*. Hanks and Pustejovsky (2005: 16 –17) give the following definitions of the pertinent *fire*'s senses:

I Discharge a projectile from a gun at a target

1. [[person]] **fire** [[LEXET Firearm]] (at [[PhysObj]]) (11%)

IMPLICATURE: [[Person]] causes [[Firearm]] to discharge a projectile toward [[PhysObj = Target]]

COMMENT: Often passive.

LEXSET [Firearm <Artifact]: gun, pistol, revolver, rifle, cannon, mortar, blunderbuss, weapon, ...

2. [[person]] **fire** [[LEXET Projectile]] (off) (from LEXET Firearm]]) ({at [[PhysObj]]})

[Adv [Direction]]) (26 %)

IMPLICATURE: [[Person]] causes [[Firearm]] to discharge [[Projectile]] toward [[PhysObj = Target]]

COMMENT: Often passive.

LEXSET [[Projectile < Artifact]] bullet, round, shell, shot, volley, flare, rocket, burst, salvo, broadside, barrage, torpedo, grenade, missile, Exocet, blank (Verby. */N), ... p

LEXSET [Firearm <Artifact]] see pattern 1.

3. [[person]] **fire** [no OBJ] ({at [[PhysObj]]} | {on [[Human Group]]}) [Adv [Direction]]) (20%)

IMPLICATURE: [[Person]] causes a gun or other firearm to discharge a projectile (in a given direction

COMMENT: This is an 'unexpressed object' alternation of 1.

4. [[LEXSET Firearm]] **fire** [no OBJ] ({at [[PhysObj]]} | {on [[Human Group]]}) [Adv [Direction]]) (5%)

IMPLICATURE:) [[Firearm]] discharges a projectile toward [[PhysObj = Target]] or [[Human Group = Target]]

COMMENT: Inchoative alternation of 1.

18 "If the subject of a passive verb is the same as the direct object of the same word as an active verb, it is generally not necessary to propose separate patterns for the active and passive uses of that verb. The semantic relationship is entirely regular and predictable, the same meaning of the verb being activated whenever the passive subject and the active direct object are members of the same lexical set or have the same semantic type" (Hanks 2013: 188).

19 "It is necessary to distinguish a half a dozen or so semantically distinct *make* constructions depending on the nature of the causer (for example, whether the causer is a person or an event) and on the nature of complement (for

example, whether it depicts an intentional action, an involuntary action, or an event which happens to the causee), among other factors" (Goddard 1998: 270 quoting Wierzbicka forthcoming).

²⁰ The seme 'instantaneously come' is used with *suddenly*. The seme 'come' alone is not sufficient to stand for 'instantaneously' because it includes the imperfective 'is coming to', 'instantaneously' being incompatible with the imperfective aspect. If 'instantaneously comes' is neglected, the definition applies to the stative version, compatible with *still* and *always*. 'Experience psychological phenomenon concerning sth' has been inspired by the meaning of the preposition *about*₁, which occasionally occurs with this verb, the meaning of *as*₃ (*I always/still remember him as a boy*) is reflected in 'sb_{x/y} being in social role of sb', while '{good - bad} psychological phenomenon because of sth' has been copy-pasted from the definition of *for*₃.

²¹ Non-instantaneous verbs of transition are called "process verbs" in Leech (1987).

²² Atelic situations are without a goal to be reached. The famous test of telicness is "If one was VERBing but was interrupted while VERBing, has one VERBEd?" If the answer is *yes*, the verb is atelic, if the answer is *no*, the predication is telic. Cf. *I was writing a letter but I haven't written it* (telic) vs. **I was breathing but I haven't breathed* (atelic). Telicness is thought of as an aspectual parameter that has to take into account the whole predication and not only the verb; while *was making a chair* is telic, *was making chairs* is atelic (cf. Nehls 1975: 284, Comrie 1976a: 44-46; Depraetre and Reed 2000: 100). Therefore telicness relates to utterances and cannot be used as a device for establishing semantic definitions. However, certain semantic verb classes are always atelic (stative verbs in §2.3.1 and movement and rest verbs in §2.3.2b).

23 “Whenever an achievement term occurs in a continuous form, its interpretation will involve either iterativeness or a semantically related process leading up to the movement of the achievement. Thus, *John is reaching the summit* will have a reading as the related accomplishment *John is climbing toward the summit (in hopes of reaching it)* (Canavan 1983: 81). When such verbs are used with the progressive, they “indicate an *approach* to the transition, rather than the transition itself. *The train was arriving. The helicopter was landing. The old man was dying.*” (Leech 1987: 23).

24 Applying the collocational method, we have reached the following definitions of *hazard*’s five meanings (the first four have been covered by two definitions): **1** <#sb# uses language to make expression of (#)thought made expression of by language(#), which is perhaps true, concerning (#)sth(#)> *h. comparison/conjecture/attempt at defining /guess /inference /opinion /prediction /reason /suggestion* (first object); *I hazarded various Stuartesque destinations like Florida, Bali, Crete and Western Turkey* (second object); *She hazarded that the guard would not notice him.* **2** <#sb_x# uses #sth_x# that is worthy when sb_x can experience #event# which is bad (and so become without sth_x), hoping to come to experience sth_y more worthy> *He hazarded all his money in the attempt to save the business; The assassins h. only a small number of their fighters; h. company/job/life* (first object); *h. displeasure/laugh/loss of place/weather* (second object) **3** #sb_x# does #event when sb_x moves# which can be bad for sb_x *h. crossing /glance /journey/step*. Commenting on the first sentence in the group for *hazard*₁ above, Hanks (2013: 13) reports that out of context many readers “judge it to be crazy, meaningless, unidiomatic, or uninterpretable”. But actually the sentence comes from a novel of a good stylist. This lexicologist explains the meaning as an example of exploitation, being elliptical for ‘I hazarded a *guess* at various Stuartesque destinations’

because the preceding sentence was “...*some juvenile guessing game was required of me.*” Hanks uses the semantic type [[Speech Act]] as the filler in this case. He is aware that this is not precise enough as he says: “*Hazarding a definition* strays further still away from the prototypical phraseological norm, for it is questionable whether *definition* should be classed as a [[Speech Act]] at all. It is, rather, a [[Proposition]]”. He comes quite close to our first object directive content ‘thought made expression of by language’ when mentioning that “[o]pinion and inference are also kind of speech acts representing mental events” (Hanks 2013: 176). For *hazard*₂, Hanks (2013: 11) states that people hazard valued entities, which corresponds to ‘worthy’ in the semantic definition.

The collocational method does not reveal *guess* as the typical object of *hazard* because it takes care of categories rather than individual lexical items. In the phrase *hazard attempt at defining, attempt at* acts as a medium of connexity (see §3.5.2c) and the actual collocation is *hazard defining*.

²⁵ Collocations such as *cultivate + apples/bananas /creepers /flax /grass /grain /roses /tomatoes/vine/wheat* indicate that there must be one more object directive for the same verb, i.e. ‘non-human living thing that cannot move’, which is part of another sememe. If we wish to take care of this sememe, we have to make up another definition: <#sb# makes ground_x be in state that makes #non-human living thing that cannot move# which use ground_x, be larger and good for use>. Now, in order to show their unity, the definitions for the two sememes of *cultivate* can be conflated in: <#sb# makes (#)ground_x (#) be in state that makes (#){a lot of} non-human living things that cannot move(#) which use ground_x, exist, grow and and be good for use>.

The seme ‘ground’ also occurs in combination with ‘surface’ (when collocating with *on*, e.g. *walk on the*

ground) or with 'space' (*deep in the ground*) and 'area' (*walk in the field*), with the preposition *in*.

26 A distinguisher was defined as the part of the meaning of a lexeme that is not systematic (Katz and Fodor 1963). The existence of distinguishers was denied by Bolinger, Weinreich, Bierwisch and others (Lyons 1977: 327). Its forerunner is Leibniz's "differentiae", while this philosopher's "genus term" corresponds to the marker (Hanks 2013: 317). Some linguists use the term "distinguisher" for non-distinctive semes.

27 For example, "FOR TO sentences of intellectual judgement" have the following explication (Wierzbicka: 1988 130):

It was odd/surprising for X to do Z □

if someone had said: X will do Z

one would experience thought: one shouldn't think this when I knew: it happened

I thought: this is odd (this would surprise people)

I don't want to say: I felt surprised.

28 Hanks mentions the question "What's it for?" (more technically expressed as "What is its telic?" which corresponds to asking about the function of a thing by a lexicographer. "Manufactured artifacts in particular have a telic: a hammer is for hitting nails, a chair is for sitting on, a table is for putting things on, a painting is for expressing or inspiring an aesthetic experience" (Hanks 2013: 312).

29 Wilks (1973) defined *drink* as (ACTION)~ ((*ANI SUBJ) ((FLOW STUFF) OBJE)((SELF IN) (((*ANI (THRU PART)) TO) (BECAUSE))))). The formula was glossed by Wilks as 'an action preferably done by animate things (*ANI SUBJ); to liquids, or to substances that flow ((FLOW STUFF) OBJE); causing the liquid to be in the animate thing (SELF IN); and via (TO indicating the direction case) a particular aperture of the animate thing, the mouth'.

30 The definition of *believe* has been based on examples such as: *I b. you. He doesn't b. the story/a word of it/her lies. She believes this decision (to be right). She believes*

this decision to be wrong. I b. him (to be) honest. I b. him to be a spy. They b. him wrong. The boy is believed to be lost. I b. him to be working very hard. It is believed that the boy is lost. I was unable to b. that he should create such a theory. I b. that he works hard. I b. so/not. The same 'good' has been introduced on account of Bolinger's (1977: 126 – 128) observation that this verb prefers a positive non-finite complement (*I believe John to be telling the truth/?a lie. We believe that man to be sane/?demented*). We suspect that this tendency occurs under the influence of *believe*'s shadow meaning as in *I believe in ghosts/him/her ideas*, which we define as <#sb# experiences strong mental state concerning (#)sth(#) as existent {good}>.

³¹ In verbs such as *knit*, the definitional object is less general ('#(substance of) man-made thing {to be put on body}#'), while in those like *hit* it is more general '#thing#'. Contextual contrast and parallelism (Dixon 2005 : 307 – 308) also favour omitting the direct object.

³² The definition correctly predicts that **leave₁ from₅* is ungrammatical whereas *leave₁ for* is grammatical because 'space' in *from₅*, unlike *for₅*, is not the directrix.

³³ By opting for one of two possible objects, speakers focus their attention on one of the two entities. Therefore, *What Harry did to the hay was load it onto the wagon. What Harry did to the wagon was load it with hay*, the speaker being consistent, but **What Harry did to the wagon was load hay onto it.*What Harry did to the hay was load the wagon with it* where the speaker's attention is divided within the same sentence (Iwata 2004: 255). *She loaded another sack on to his saddle* (Laffut 2006: 146) contains *sack* in the singular, but *another* indicates that there are a number of sacks.

³⁴ Whalen's (1978: 9) comment on Apresjan's opinion about two meanings is that in "a case grammar model the difference between [*dig the earth* (OBJECT) and *dig a hole* (GOAL)], *shave the customer* (DESIGNATIVE) and *shave the*

beard (GOAL), *bake potatoes* (OBJECT) and *bake cakes* (GOAL), etc.] would be explained as a difference in role relationships and not in the meaning of the verb". The ultimate test of zeugma shows that Apresjan is right: *He dug a hole in the ground, He dug the ground to make holes*, but **He dug the ground and holes*.

35 Some linguists call this phenomenon "causative", "ergative", "transitive" or "non-accusative" alternation (cf. Levin 1993).

36 "Universe is a creation of separate entities of things which exist, change, and move. In our grammatical description of our language we classify their names as *nouns*. The uses which describe the being, the change, the movement of the entities in our worlds, we call *verbs*" (Conlin 1961: 71).

37 The same complex sense occurs as an object directive of the verbs *dodge/resolve/settle /skirt/treat*, as a subject directive of the verb *rest*, and as a collocator of the adjectives *knotty/major/sensitive/serious/thorny/touchy* (Hlebec1998: 111). Nouns such as *disagreement, question* and *headache* ('problem') indicate that the category of mental events covers not only emotions (**I feel₁ disagreement/headaches/question*) and thoughts (**the disagreement/headache/question that...*) but also some other mind events –see the list of redundancy rules in §4.1.

38 The opinion has been voiced that a *for*-phrase functions as EXPERIENCER (Silva and Thompson 1977: 119). Quite often the entity or the phenomenon that affects a person does make the person *e x p e r i e n c e* a thought, emotion, sensation or perception, but it is not always so, as in the *table* sentence. Therefore we had to introduce a new semantic role called "AFFECTED".

39 The English language requires that the verbs *demand* and *order* should be followed by a direct object because they contain '#sb#' with 'strong' implied. Wierzbicka (1988: 132) says that "FOR TO is less confident than TO". Her examples *He asked /begged for food* and **He*

ordered/demanded for food make a nice point. Somebody who is said to order or demand something_x from somebody_y is certainly thought of as being invested with authority in relation to somebody_y. 'Power' here should be understood as a notion with a relative value. That power is a kind of relation with asymmetry of participants and control of some over others as essential features has been argued in Fowler (1985) and Van Dijk (1996). See also Fairclough (1989), who treats power as one of key concepts in the field of his "critical discourse analysis".

⁴⁰ "[A] rule of English grammar requires an overt subject in an infinitive clause when the subject of the infinitive [...] is different from the subject of the main verb [...], but if the subject of the infinitive is the same as the subject of the main verb, there is a tacit subject" (Kreidler 1998: 161). In contrast with sentences that lack it, the preposition *for* performs the following functions: (a) non-identity of AGENTS /EXPERIENCERS: *My intention was to picnic* (I intended, I picnic) vs. *My intention was for us to picnic* (I intended, we picnic). *She was pleased to win* (she was pleased, she won) : *She was pleased for him to win*. (she was pleased, he won). *I shouted for John to take the dog for a walk*. **I shouted (for me) to take the dog for a walk* (the unlike subject constraint; Perlmutter 1971). (b) shift of a direct to an indirect PATIENT: *I asked Mark to₁ visit me*. vs. *I asked my brother f. Mark to₁ visit me*. (c) change of sb_{indef} to sb_x: *It was normal to do it* ('sb_{indef} did it'): *It was normal for her to do it* ('she, not sb_{indef}, did it'). *It₃'s time f. me to_{6a} go*. *It₃ takes much f. him to₂ react*.

In other words, as it is well known, for₇ includes a new AGENT – EXPERIENCER, different from that in the matrix sentence (also sb_{indef} becomes sb_y), while non-finite clauses are neutral in that respect and allow occasional introduction of such roles.

The preposition *for* is superfluous in *We believe /expect/want (*for) him to stay*. From *We believe /expect/want for him to stay* no change of meaning would issue, only it would be stylistically wrong. (Also, it is usually bad style to mention two identical morphemes, e.g. *friendly/*friendlily* or *The big clouds were starting to cover/?covering the sun* (COBUILD Grammar: 3.198) ?*I am concerned about knowing about it.*)

The preposition *for*₁₀ collocates with *to* infinitive_{2/3/4/5}, so that when *to* infinitive_{2/3/4/5} is unacceptable, so is *for*₁₀ (as with *definite, obvious, probable, sure*), as in **It is certain (for him) to win. *She is certain for*₁₀ *him to win* is wrong because that meaning is expressed by 'She is certain that he will win').

When the object of *for*₁₀ has the role of EXPERIENCER, *for*₁₀ comes quite close to the meaning of *for*₂ (as in *possible for a poor girl*). The preposition *for*₂ in equative sentences when not followed by *to* also changes the referent like *for*₁₀. *This is important* (i.e. for sb_{indef}) vs. *This is important for*₂ *him*.

⁴¹ *It is right for God to punish sinners* and *It is illegal for these houses to be occupied* is all right, while **It is true for God to exist* and **It is clear for these houses to be occupied* is unacceptable (Wierzbicka 1988: 126 - 127) because *right* and *illegal* contain 'expected' and 'not expected' respectively, whereas *true* and *clear* do not.

⁴² That the seme 'occupy' can be reduced to 'be in' is proved by the semantic equivalence of *Tom is in London* and *Tom - in London*, the difference being merely stylistic. The pre-directrix 'occupy' of *in*₁ is a synonym of 'exist in', used in order to avoid the repetition of the target lexeme *in*. We endeavour to use 'occupy' with verbs that passivize, and 'exist in' with those that don't. 'Exist in space' relates to the static *in*, as in *We chased squirrels in the park*, while 'come to exist in space' refers to the dynamic *in*, as in *I put the sweater in a box*. (For

Langacker (1987: 308), who comments on these sentences, *in the park* is a modifier of the nucleus *we chased*, whereas *in a box* is complement of the verb *put* “completing” or “elaborating” the conceptually dependent head.) The seme ‘coming to exist in space’ occurs after the verbs *divert*, *drown*, *flutter*, *put*, *reach*, *run*₃, *sink*₁ (see §2.2.12). The seme ‘in’ is not a semantic prime as it can be reduced to ‘(part of) space that is part of thing_x is same (= not different) part of space that is part of thing_y’. Hence, *The flower is in a vase* = ‘Space of the flower is the same as part of space of a vase’ or ‘The flower and a vase partly share space, while the space of a vase is larger’.

⁴³ Sememe *in*₆ has a widely applicable range of collocators and, being predictable and uninformative, will not be mentioned in the list of clues.)

⁴⁴ Silva and Thomson think that “the complements to [this type of] adjectives are always interpreted as actions because the semantic role of [this type of] adjective is to assert a judgment about the role of an agent in intentionally participating in a certain act” (1977: 116). However, as the example with *believe* above demonstrates, actions are typical and not the exclusive characteristic of this construction. Where these authors are right is the intentionality of the AGENT (cf. *He refused to believe in monsters. Do not believe in monsters!*, where the imperative proves contextual intentionality, **It was stupid of you to dream after a rich dinner. ? It was foolish of him to sneeze during the ceremony. He refrained from sneezing. ?He refused/decided to sneeze* (cf. Wierzbicka 1988: 34; Dreaming and sneezing are involuntary actions, unless somebody pretends to sneeze). But: *It was stupid of you to sleep with the electric fire on.* i.e. you had a choice to switch it off). The statement “With the of construction the adjective explicitly modifies the action as well as the person”

(Bolinger 1977: 143) is in compliance with 'bad event made by sb_x' coupled with 'sb_x' in the directive.

⁴⁵ There is a strong association between the causer and the idea of a good, bad or strong action or activity. This has been manifested in an experiment in which the subjects were asked to complete sentences of the type *A did sth to B because ...* Speakers tended to complete the sentence assigning cause to the person (either A or B) who does something good, bad or strong. For instance, in *The prisoner confessed to the guard because he....*, the pronoun *he* was attributed to the subject (prisoner, who must have done something bad if he is in prison). Other verbs of this type include *join, sell, telephone, chase, approach*. For this reason, a sentence which opposes this tendency, such as *Jim sold the bike to Henry because he could pay cash* has emphatic *he* in pronunciation (Garvey 1974, with no satisfactory explanation of the phenomenon). Namely, selling is viewed as stronger than buying, and without the emphasis, the tendency would be to interpret *he* as referring to Jim.

⁴⁶ The seme 'influencing' is sometimes obligatory, as in *explain to sb*, sometimes it is optional (*award, show, tell*). *I concede you that point/land. He extended him a warm welcome. He extended a warm welcome to him. They awarded her the prize. They awarded the prize to her. Bring me the book. Bring all these books to your boss. He taught me all I know. He taught bridge to all his friends.*

⁴⁷ The seme 'sb_h' is always understood when 'sb_{sp}' from a definition is applied to a direct question, so that the hearer and the speaker switch roles. For instance, *beautiful <#sth_x#* that makes sb_{sp} experience strongly good mental phenomenon when sb_{sp} experiences {sees} sth_x> occurs in the following two sentences with alternating sb_{sp} and sb_h: *She is really beautiful* 'She makes sb_{sp} experience strongly good mental phenomenon when sb_{sp} sees her'; *Is she really beautiful?* 'Does she

really make sb_h experience strongly good mental phenomenon when sb_h sees her?'

48 "The pre-form is an indefinite NP which presents the element *x* in the variable NP when the latter is formulated in the form of 'the *x* that...' (Declerck and Seki 1990: 18). A pre-form has to be indefinite because the hearer is not familiar with its content.

49 Klajn (1984-1985: 351) uses the term "pro-sentence" for *it* referring to clauses.

50 When Hornby in *OALD* classified [Cn.n] and [Dn.n] as two distinct patterns, he was lead by the meaning of the verbs that belong in these two patterns, not by their common formal pattern N + V + N + N. Both *The court considered Smith a trustworthy witness* (type [Cn.n]) and *Henry taught the children French* (type [Dn.n]) follow the same pattern, and in both types the second, but not the third N, can be realized as a pronoun. It was the meaning that made Hornby classify the second N of the former pattern as a direct object and as an indirect object in the latter pattern.

51 Analysts who have developed valency theory and dependency grammar have shed important light on syntactic structures, "but they have not seriously attempted to study significant lexical collocations or to show how the semantic type of one word can affect the meaning of another" (Hanks 2013: 6). "[R]efined methods based on syntactic and valency theory have yielded bigly disappointing results" (Hanks 2013: 420). "Like dependency grammars, early categorial grammars have nothing to say about lexicon as a separate component of grammatical theory. In these, to a great degree inductively based theories of linguistic description, the borderline between the set of grammatical rules and the set of lexical rules has remained insufficiently specified and unclear" (Moskovičević 1997: 37, translated by B. H.).

52 The gerund brings the unspecified merging of various occurrences of an event into one general fact. In this

respect the gerund, being a verbal noun “is comparable to an uncountable noun or mass noun: not one single occasion nor a series of occasions [as by to-infinitive] is meant [...], but the more abstract general state [...]” (Dirven 1989: 116). This is what we understand by habitualness. Habitual activities, such as swimming, riding bicycle and smoking are usually prohibited in public by *No swimming/riding bicycle/smoking*. Feeding elephants is not a universal habitual activity, so that instead of *?No feeding the elephants* it is customary to put up an inscription *Do not feed the elephants*. There is a parallel between gerund vs. infinitive and specific vs. non-specific (see 3.1.1d). “[I]t has been noticed that there is a syntactic and semantic correspondence between factivity and specificity (Kiparsky and Kiparsky 1971: 366)” (Hlebec 1984: 237). “The gerund [...] is (a) rather a noun form than a verb form, and (b) it perspectives the verb activity or state not as a separate occurrence, but rather as a more abstract and general fact” (Dirven 1989: 125). “The common ground for uniting these two categories seems to be the connotation of certainty; namely, both factive complements and specific references are perceived as certainty, while non-factive complements and non-specific references involve an attitude of uncertainty in the speaker” (Hlebec 1984: 237). The gerund is not used when there is a synonymic verbal noun: **staying/stay of tourists in hotels; singing of birds ≠ song of birds; barking of dog* (usually habitual or general) \approx *bark of dog* (of a particular dog).

⁵³ We consider subjectless non-finite constructions to be better termed “non-finite phrases” rather than “clauses” (e.g. *To expect help from him is unreasonable*. When the apparent subject of a sentence is actually an underlying object, as in *Peter is difficult to please*, the non-finite verb construction is without its own surface subject (*Peter to please* semantically stands for ‘to please Peter’), but there is an implicit, psychological subject ‘sb_{sp}’ or ‘sb_{indef}’, which justifies regarding it as a non-finite clause, if

semantic criterion is adopted: 'The speaker experiences thought concerning the state of pleasing Peter as difficult to come to exist.' On the other hand, if the grammatical analysis is applied, *Peter* acts the role of a subject. The semantic content of the sentence, as presented in the paraphrase above corresponds to our definition of the non-finite clause Type I below, so it is better to consider such constructions to be clauses rather than phrases. Non-finite clauses have been labelled "nexus"-constructions in Jespersen (1965 V) and "small clauses" (Beukema and Verheijen (1987: 109) or "reduced clauses" (Dixon 2005).

⁵⁴ The verb *hear* in *Have you ever heard of anybody doing something like that?* is *hear*₂, defined as <#sb_x# comes to experience thought_x concerning (#)phenomenon_y(#) by sound language, when sb_x comes to know sth concerning phenomenon_x and sb_y is base> and it is not a verb of perception. Therefore the interpretation 'Have you ever heard of anybody' would be wrong here.

⁵⁵ One should make a distinction between *be*₁ as a linking verb, used as a defining seme 'be' (which is an empty link, used as a mere signal that a characteristic belongs to the entity or for the sake of identification, often met in the definitions of adjectives and nouns) and *be*₂ 'exist'. The semes 'exist' and 'be' are separate semes (cf. the definition of *remain* in §3.4.8 and in the neighbouring sememes in polysemy), and yet sometimes they become mixed (reflected in the alternation 'exist - be').

Some languages other than English (Russian, Spanish, Irish, Hungarian, Siamese, Cambodian, Turkish, Semitic languages) use different means to express the two meanings of *be* (see Benveniste 1966). Laxing the distinction in English and some other languages in the fact that 'exist' is a semantic atom, while linking *be* is virtually devoid of meaning. This opposition, an indivisible meaning vs. empty meaning, makes the two extremes approach each other.

⁵⁶ It is not always possible to separate 'sb indefinite' from 'sb speaker'. "When no referential link with a nominal can be discovered in the linguistic context, an indefinite subject may be inferred, or else the 'I' of the speaker" (Quirk et al. 1972: 995).

⁵⁷ It can be noticed that in *to*_{1a}-infinitive the EXPERIENCER of wanting is the subject of the clause, whereas in *to*_{1b-c}-infinitive there is 'sb_{indef}', which indicates an EXPERIENCER/PATIENT different from the subject and introduces the idea of passivity. Namely, *The pear is ripe to*_{1a} *fall* has identical OBJECTIVES in 'the pear is ripe' and 'the pear tends to fall', but *She is ripe to*_{1b} *kiss* has 'she is ripe' and 'she can be kissed', i.e. 'sb_{indef} can kiss her'.

⁵⁸ Bolinger (1977: 146) contrasted **He was nervous to behave that way* on one hand and *He must have been nervous to behave* and *I think he was nervous to have behaved that way* on the other hand. This dovetails into our definition of the *to*₃-infinitive, which requires sb_{sp} and which is absent from the asterisked sentence.

⁵⁹ "[P]ossibly' and 'may', if each is being used epistemically, are harmonic, in that they both express the same degree of modality" (Lyons 1977: 807). We use 'may' as a seme in definitions in the sense of *may*₂.

⁶⁰ A *that*-clause denotes a mental construct or information and therefore typically occurs (a) with predicates of cognition such as *know*, [*ascertain*, *bear in mind*, *include*, *confirm*, *discover*, *dream*, *foresee*, *guess*_{1/2}, *imply*, *realise*, *sense*, *take into account*, *think*, *understand*; *clear*, *evident*, *obvious*, *true*, *possible*; *assumption*, *certainty*, *fact*, *idea*, *knowledge*, *possibility*, *speculation*, *suspicion*], (b) with predicates of communication such as *say* [*affirm*, *allege*, *answer*, *argue*, *bet*, *claim*, *command*, *complain*, *confess*, *confide*, *inform*, *insist*, *predict*, *remark*, *request*, *show*, *state*, *tell*, *urge*, *warn*, *write*] and (c) with aspectual predicates such as *seem* [, *appear*, *happen*, *chance*, *likely*, *sure*]. (Dirven 1989: 131 -132).

61 "Relative adjectives specify a certain parameter and indicate that the object(s) referred to exceed (or fall short of) a certain point within that parameter. This point can be indicated explicitly in comparative constructions such as [*John has a bigger house than Bill (has)*], it is understood implicitly in cases like [*John has a big house*] and hence must also be part of their readings [... E]ven the positive form of relative adjectives must have a reading similar to that of the comparative, the term for comparison being provided by the average element of a certain class" (Bierwisch 1970: 43).

62 We prefer to read into marked members of adjectives the seme 'compared to reference point', where the shifting reference point is either a norm for the category mentioned, which is the case in implicit comparison (*big₁ animal/elephant/mouse*) or a particular entity or phenomenon (*bigger/smaller than the hand*). Thus we claim that the meaning of *-er* ~ *more* is 'in stronger degree compared to the particular thing/phenomenon as a reference point' and support *shorter* to be interpreted as 'of lesser length', which Cruse (1986: 256-257) suggested as a possible solution to the problem concerning the difference in meaning between *longer* and *shorter*. The unmarked member occurs in questions, when the speaker is not informed about the reference point (*How □big₂ is that animal?*. i.e. 'What is the amount of space that that animal takes?'). *Big₁* and *2* could be fused into <#thing_x# that takes strong - some degree of amount of space in comparison with reference point>, a definition uniting two sememes.

63 Other synonymic terms are "indirect combinations" (Cruse 2004: 67), "synthetic connection" (cf. Taylor 1992: 5 ff.), "semantic transfer" (Leech 1990: 223). Adjectives with indirect connection have been labelled "separatives" by Ferris (1993: 112) since they draw attention to the separateness of an entity and a descriptive property. For Bolinger what we call indirect connection is "reference

modification", as in *He is a good teacher*. 'He is good at being a teacher' (Bolinger 1967 in Destefano 1972: 7), or in *a criminal lawyer* (Bolinger 1967: 15).

⁶⁴ Some authors have derived attributive adjectives from predicative relative clauses (Chomsky 1957; Smith 1961). Winter (1965) warned that deadverbial and denominal adjectives cannot be derived in this way. Transformational grammarians posed transformations even for these two types of adjectives. According to Barbara Fedorowitz-Bacz (1977: 39) the only possible sources of amplifiers would be something like: what is, really, a contribution; what is, definitely, an alternative; what is, exactly, the reason; one who actually is his housewife. This observation does not help much to establish the essence of their meaning. It only draws attention to the fact that they are substitutable for adverbs because they share some meaning with them.

⁶⁵ According to an investigation (Hlebec 1976), there is a marked tendency for the category of sentence (formal quantifiers being absent) to be interpreted as referring to one or all members of the class denoted by the agent of the construction, whereas noun phrases tend to be interpreted as referring to some members of the class. For instance, *Aminians are honest* \approx 'All Aminians are honest'; *honest Aminians* \approx 'Some Aminians are honest'. In other words, predication is associated with universal statements (no restriction in scope), while attribution is associated with existential statements (restriction in scope).

⁶⁶ ["Predicative position of an adjective] is the position of the adjective which instantiates a property explicitly assigned to the entity already identified by the subject of the sentence but which does not take part in identifying that subject [...] This relation is marked constructionally by the use of a form of the verb to be preceded by an expression identifying some entity and followed by the adjective instantiating the property" (Ferris 1993: 38). Ferris calls this relation "assignment of qualification".

67 It can be added that *young*, *old* and *little* when collocating with nouns that contain 'human living thing' ('sb') receive the same 'kind of' and behave as a weak variant of the classifying adjectives. "[F]or human beings age tends to be treated as a crucial determinant of KIND, rather than as one feature among many" (Wierzbicka 1988: 478). See the definition of *young* in §3.5.1.

68 "Reflected meaning is the meaning which arises [...] when one sense of a word forms part of our response to another sense. [...] The case when reflected meaning intrudes through the sheer strength of emotive suggestion is most strikingly illustrated by words which have a taboo meaning. [...] It has become increasingly difficult to use terms like *intercourse*, *ejaculation*, and *erection* in 'innocent' senses without conjuring up their sexual associations" (Leech 1990: 16).

69 The feature 'control' appears elsewhere; see *under* §3.1.2. I and *drive* §2.2.16c. (Even *drive*₁ as in *drive car*, contains 'control', but with a positive value.) It appears as one out of nine scalar parameters along which causative constructions vary according to Dixon (2000). For Glynn (2012: 13), the verb *run* has control senses 'manage', 'in charge of' and 'execute'. He does not see the connection between these senses and the literal motion senses. The association seems to be the meaning 'strong energy used' when thinking of the way streams flow or living beings haste.

70 Mel'čuk (1984: 275; 1987) mentions the lexical function **Magn**, "glossed roughly as 'very'", which appears in a good many words: *high* (*temperature*), *considerable*, *great*, *enormous* (*height*), *strong*, *intense* (*vibration*). Goddard and Wierzbicka (1994: 34) mention 'very' as a tentative prime, and in the edition of 2002 they confirm this status. In colloquial speech, especially AE, the adverb *mighty*, whose shadow meaning is that of the adjective *mighty* 'very strong', is used instead of *very*. The semes 'strong' and 'very' exist in the list of 28 semantic primes

in Hlebec (2007: 12 and 2010: 10), but now we have found them to be the same.

⁷¹ The definition of *absurd* is: <#phenomenon_x made by language# that makes sb_{sp} experience not expected and strongly not true degree of thought_x concerning phenomenon_y and influencing sb_{sp/x} as bad>, as in *an absolutely₁ a. sermon, patently/totally a. statement /suggestion. It's a. that he should think of it. There's something a. about it.* Another sememe of *absurd* <#(event made by/man-made thing used by) sth {sb}# who behaves - looks - wants in strongly not expected manner> (*That uniform makes them look a.; do a. things, It seemed a. to try to... It was a. of you to suggest...; an a. kind of hat; It is a. for a car to fly.*)

The reduplication in 'strongly strong' reminds us of the phenomenon observed in a good many languages, like Japanese *barabara* 'strongly strong rain', Bella Coola *s-tn* 'tree' vs. *s-tntn* 'trees', Hausa *suna* 'name' vs. *sunana-ki* 'names', Tsimshian *am* 'good' vs. *am'am* 'several good', Karok *pachup* 'kiss' vs. *pachupchup* 'kiss all over' (Crystal 2003: 176-177), Sanskrit *dama* 'house' vs. *dama dama* 'houses'. In most cases, as a manifestation of iconicity, reduplication expresses intensity or plurality. To mention that a headache is bad, when *headache* inherently contains the seme 'bad' results in the meaning 'strongly bad' or 'more than averagely bad' (Cruse 1986: 108, 214), i.e. 'bad in strong degree'.

⁷² Since the emphasizing adverb *very* collocates with *first* and *last*, but not with *second*, *third*, *fourth*, *middle*, *central*, etc., this is the clue leading to the inference that *first* and *last* should display 'strong' in their definitions. This seme is to be interpreted as 'cognitively and/or perceptually strong'. In phonetics, the initial and then the final position are much more conspicuous than the mid-position and it is easier to notice a thing at the edge of a group of similar things than in the middle.

73 Semantically, the adjectives [*wise, ridiculous, clever, kind, stupid, nice, important, pleasant, simple, unpleasant*] belong to the more general class of predicates which the speaker may use to make various comments about propositions, and which may therefore be referred to as 'comment' adjectives (Silva and Thompson 1977: 111).

74 *Election* is <legal phenomenon when a lot of sb_x more than one use symbols to make sb_y who is in contest with sb_z (more than one) come to be with social / religious power because all / most of sb_x want so>.

75 'Amount of money to be given' is exemplified by such nouns as *blackmail, commission, contribution, debt, duty₂, postage, rate, tariff, tax, and toll*.

76 Wierzbicka (1987: 207) uses a grammatical collocation to show the difference in meaning between *promise* and *vow*: "the person who makes a *vow* really wants to impose an obligation upon himself; but promises are closer, in this respect, to assurances than to vows: the speaker is concerned with the addressee (how to make him believe) not with himself (what to do to oneself). The syntax reflects this: one can say "He promised her that he would do it", as one can say "He assured her that he would do it", whereas one can't say *"He vowed her (God) that he would do it".

77 *Know₁* has a factive meaning, but *know₃* 'to have reputation' is non-factive, as in *They know him as a peaceful man, which he is not*, or more often in the passive: *Marco Polo is best known for his travels to the Far East, but in fact he never left Italy. I k. her to be honest, but they all tell me the opposite* (\neq 'I know₁ that she is honest', where 'She is honest' corresponds to 'phenomenon, i.e. state experienced by sb_x ').

78 *Quell* is without 'bad and strong state' (thus allowing *quell + disagreement /controversy /inflation*) and also collocates with 'bad emotion state' (*quell + anxiety/doubt /fear/nervousness/unease*), whereas *foment* is slightly

narrower in meaning since it requires 'a lot of' as a compulsory seme.

⁷⁹ Here is the complete portrait of the adjective *violent* :
1 <#(sb_x who makes / sth made with / state of) {bad and strong}> phenomenon with sb_x + y more than one in contest (when sb_x touches sb_y strongly and makes sb_y feel strongly bad / who use strong language)# that is strongly bad-strong> v. *argument/assault/attack/battle /behaviour /blow /clash /conflict /confrontation /crime /disorder /disturbance /encounter /hammering /protest /punch /quarrel /reaction /rebellion /regime/riot/row /stab /struggle/uprising/war/whipping; He became* v. (indirect); v. *father* (indirect); v. *scene/film/game/temper* (indirect)
2 <#environmental phenomenon# that is strongly bad and strong> v. *storm/weather* **3** <#bad and strong bodily phenomenon# that is strongly bad- strong> v. *death/diarrhoea/fit/cramp/pain* **4** <#emotion# that is strongly bad – strong> v. *anger/emotion/grief/hatred /impulse /passion/rage/urge* **5** <#colour# that is strongly strong> v. *purple*. Both *simply violent* and *very violent* are possible. For the occurrences *simply violent* and *very violent* an oscillating seme '(strongly) strongly bad' has to be posited (but cf. the prevalent restriction of *very* with 'strongly strong' in §3.3.6 a).

⁸⁰ "When we use *have* as a lexical verb in a dynamic sense, we form negatives and questions with *do* as an operator. Dynamic *have* can be used with progressive and perfect tenses and the imperative: *We don't h. a great deal of time. Did you h. a good trip? It was all some frightful dream he was having. Priscilla's had a bit of a sticky time, lately. H. a good game. Have* as a dynamic lexical verb (questions and negatives with *do*) shows a wealth of meanings in the many common fixed phrases we use it in: *to have... a baby/a bath/breakfast/a chat/a dream/a fright/a good time//a holiday/a look/a moment/a peep/a quarrel/a relationship/a shower/a swim/an understanding/a word* etc." (Broughton 1990: 125/126). When the defining seme is 'experience' or 'be affected by'

(in *have*_g, 13-20), the imperfective becomes grammatical if no stativity is implied, as in *We're having a good time at Monte Carlo. We're having a test/an exam/a lesson/class this morning* (Leech 1991: 173). *I was having difficulties. We're having the kids for the weekend.*

⁸¹ The semantic element 'strong' has been pointed out by Apresjan in Russian sentences 1. *Éto privodit ego v bešenstvo*. 'That drives him wild' 2. *Éto privodit ego v gnev*. 'That drives him angry' 3. *Éto privodit ego v zlost*. 'That drives him malicious', where "the degree of correctness of the sentence corresponds with the degree of intensity of emotion that is rendered by the substantive" (Kortland 1971: 57). According to the same author (Apresjan 2000: 38), *anger*, *wrath*, *rage* and *fury* differ in intensity (*wrath* is stronger than *anger*, and *rage* and *fury* are stronger than *wrath*).

⁸² *Completely* and *utterly* usually collocate with verbs of destruction (Cruise 2004: 73, 83). "[A]lmost all the verbs [collocating with *utterly*] have some 'negative' implication, suggesting disapproval, opposition, or failure. [...] This has been pointed out by others. [...] A similar range of verbs with 'negative' import is found in the tests with *completely*" (Greenbaum 1970: 73). *Completely* and *totally* also compose with adjectives containing 'state without sth' (c. *empty* and see *totally strange* in §2.3.7) and then they mean <[having strongly come to be in] state without>.)

⁸³ The reason for this restriction is that one cannot simultaneously express one's own opinion and ask the hearer about his/her. Since sentences with modal adjectives express a complex proposition, they can be transformed into corresponding interrogative forms: *Is it evident/possible/probable that John will come?* (Bellert 1977: 344 in Mihić Pijetlović 2015: 245). Namely complex forms can do the job that a single lexeme cannot (see §1.1.3).

⁸⁴ "Thus fashionable transatlantic abuse of *hopefully* to mean something like 'it is hoped' is spreading like the

plague in pretentious circles wherever English is spoken (Howard 1980: 40). "It can reasonably be argued that *hopefully* should be admitted to this selected band of adverbs [adverbs of cognition] that can be used in a condensed and absolute way [...] 'Apparently/regrettably/conceivably/presumably he has been drinking' can be analyzed to 'It is apparent/regrettable/conceivable/to be presumed that he has been drinking'. The argument for giving thumbs up to *hopefully* should be resisted, because *hopefully* is ambiguous while none of the other cognitive adverbs is; and because its new use is a pompous euphemism for the plainer verb: 'I, we, or they hope; or it is hoped.'" (Howard 1980: 43). "[M]any of [...] fine sentence adverbs, like *happily*, *honestly*, and *mercifully*, come from verb phrase adverbs [like *carefully*, which [...] refer to the actor, and they are virtually never ambiguous in context. The use of *hopefully* as a sentence adverb [...] is a perfectly sensible application of this derivational process" (Pinker 1995: 381, 382).

⁸⁵ Robert Thouless, a British psychologist, wrote that to define an animal as a living organism which is able to move about is wrong since some animals (e.g. some shell-fish) are not able to move about for the whole or for part of their lives, while some vegetables, such as the fresh-water alga *Volvox* do swim about (1953: 90). Obviously, what he was looking after was a scientific definition of animals and vegetables and to that purpose the definitions could not satisfy him. In this book we are interested in the semantic competence of native speakers. "They differ fundamentally from language-independent knowledge about animals that compendia such as the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* seek to state" (Wierzbicka 1985: 171). Oysters are untypical animals₁ (see §4.1), but they are animals nevertheless because in contradistinction to plants, they have no conspicuous sign of immobility; they lack roots to fix them to the ground. On the other hand, there are animal cell colonies (sea-fan, obelia) that look very much like plants, and they are

plants from a layman's point of view. Even the strict biologists' classification fails when some protozoa, such as the green flagellate, are in question as they are transitional forms between plants and animals.

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Index of lexical items

Numbers refer to sections. Numbers without brackets indicate sections which contain semantic definitions of the items in question. The abbreviation *n.* is short for *note*

a 3.1.1b II
abandon 3.3.5 (3.6.2a)
abate 3.4.5
abet 2.5.1b I ii
abolish 3.4.2
abort 2.4.3b, 2.5.1 c
about 3.1.2 I (3.3.7a)
abrogate 3.4.2
absolutely 3.6.3b, (3.3.7a, 3.6.3b, c)
absurd *n.* 71
acceptable 3.6.3d
accusation 3.5.4
act (3.5.4)
action 3.5.4
addled *n.* 12, *n.* 13
admire 2.3.1a
advise 1.1.3c I
after 3.1.3 (6)
against 3.1.2 I
agitate 2.5.1c
allow 2.2.16c
almost 3.6.2a (1.1.2)
although 3.1.3
amazed 2.4.3c
amend 3.4.2
amendment 3.5.4
among 3.1.2 I
anchor 3.2.2

and 3.1.3
 angry 3.3.4
 any 3.1.1a
 appeal v 2.2.5
 appeal n 3.5.4
 application 3.5.0
 appoint 3.4.3b
 approve 3.1.2 I of
 argue 2.5.3
 article 3.5.4
 as 3.1.2 I, 3.1.3 (3.4.3a)
 ask 1.1.3c I
 assert 3.4.4
 assume 2.5.2c I
 at 3.1.2 I
 atomic 3.3.2a I
 autopsy 2.4.5
 avid (3.3.1c II)
 awake 3.6.2

 backward 3.3.2a I
 bad (3.3.0)
 bag 3.3.1c III
 bait 3.3.2a I
 bake (2.2.1b) 2.5.1b I ii (2.5.2c II)
 ban v 3.4.2
 ban n 3.5.4
 beat 2.2.1a
 beautiful *n.* 47
 because 3.1.3
 become 2.3.2a
 before 3.1.3
 begin 2.4.5
 behaviour 2.4.7c
 belch 2.4.4
 believe (2.3.1a) (2.4.3c) 2.4.7d (3.1.4a II) (3.2.3a I ii)
 (3.2.10) (3.4.4) (3.4.8) (*n.* 30, 40, 44)
 belong 2.3.1b

between 3.1.2 I
 bicycle 4.1
 big 3.3.0, 4.1, *n.* 63 (3.3.1c II) (3.3.2a II)
 bird 1.1.3c I
 bitter (2.4.7c) 3.3.5d
 black 1.1.3f
 blind 3.3.6d
 blockade 3.5.4
 blond(e) 3.5.1
 bloody 3.3.2a II
 boat 1.2.4
 boisterous 2.1.4
 book 1.1.2 (3.4.2)
 boom 2.4.3c
 bouquet 1.1.3c II
 boy 3.5.1
 break 1.1.3d, 2.5.2c II, 3.4.2
 breeze 3.4.5
 bring 2.5.1b iii, 3.4.2
 brutal 3.3.6d
 burgle 3.2.2
 burst 2.5.2c II
 bus *n.* 5
 but 3.1.3
 buy 2.5.2c II
 by 3.1.2 I (3.4.3a)

calm *n.* 1
 can 3.2.7c (also 3.2.7c *may*)
 carry out 2.4.5
 carve 2.5.1b I ii
 case 3.5.4
 casualty 2.2.0
 cat 1.2.2
 catastrophe 3.3.6a
 cause 2.2.16c
 ceiling 3.5.4
 censorship 3.5.4

centre *n.1*
cert *n.1*
certain (3.2.6) 3.3.7a (3.3.7b)
chair 1.1.3a
charge 3.5.4
charming 3.6.3d
cheerful 3.3.1c
claim 3.5.4
clap 2.5.1c
clause 3.5.4
clean *v* 2.5.1b I i
clear *adj* 2.5.1b I, 3.6.3d
clear *v* 2.5.1b I i
cleverly 3.6.2a
clip 2.1.4
coil 2.5.4
come 3.4.1b
commission 3.5.4
completely (3.6.3b, c)
compose 3.2.8
concede 3.4.8
concerned 3.3.4
conclude 2.4.3c (3.2.3b)
conduct 2.4.5
conscriptio 3.5.4
consider 3.4.4
constitution 3.5.4
contain 2.3.1b
contravene 3.4.2
control *v* 2.2.1a
control *n* 3.5.4
convention 2.1.5a
convincing 3.6.3d
cook 2.5.1b I ii
cot 1.2.1
cottage 2.4.5
cruel 2.4.7b II (2.4.7 c)
cultivate 2.4.3c, *n.* 25

cup 2.4.6
 curry 2.5.1b I ii
 custom 2.1.5a
 cut 2.2.6, 2.5.1b I ii, 2.5.2c I, 3.1.2 I *from*, 3.4.6g

dare (3.2.7a) 3.2.7c
 dead adj 1.1.3b (3.3.2a II)
 decide 3.1.2 (3.2.3b)
 declare 3.4.3b
 deduce 2.4.3c
 deep adj 3.3.0
 definite (3.2.6) 3.3.7a
 delight 2.2.5
 demand 3.2.3a I ii
 demonstrate 2.3.1a
 dense 2.4.4
 desire 2.3.1a
 develop 2.2.13
 devoted 3.6.3d
 die 4.1
 dig 2.5.1b I ii
 dinner 1.1.3c I
 discuss 2.4.3b
 dispel 2.4.4
 divert 2.5.2c I
 divorce 2.5.3
 do 3.4.7
 doubt 2.4.3c
 draw 2.2.16b
 dribble 2.5.1b I iii
 drink 2.4.7a
 drip 2.5.1b I iii
 drive (2.2.16c) (3.4.1b) 3.3.5 (*n.69*)
 drown 2.2.4
 dry 3.3.5
 duty 2.4.4

early (3.3.1c II)

ease 3.5.4
easy 3.6.2
eat 1.1.3c II
effort 2.1.5a
elect 3.4.3b
election *n.74*
elude 3.1.2
embargo 3.5.4
endorse 3.4.2
enjoy 1.1.3g
entirely 3.6.3b
envy 2.1.5b II
escape 3.1.2
essential 3.3.7a (3.2.6) (3.3.7b)
establish 3.4.2
estimate 2.1.5a
estimation 2.1.5a
eventual 2.1.7
eventually 2.1.7
evil 3.6.3d
excavate 2.5.1c
excommunicate 3.4.3b
exert 3.5.4
exertion 2.1.5a
exhaust 2.5.2c II
expect 1.1.3c I, 3.2.4 a, 3.2.7c
experience *n.4*
experiment 2.4.5
expire 2.3.2b I
extremely 3.6.3

fall (3.4.1b)
faint adj 3.32b I
faint *n n.1*
fair 3.5.1
fairly (3.6.3b)
false 3.5.3, 3.6.3d
fast (3.3.1d)

fat 2.1.9
 favour 2.1.5a
 feed (2.5.2c II)
 feel 2.3.1a (2.3.1a) (3.3.4)
 ferocious 3.3.6d
 fertilize 2.1.9
 fierce 3.3.6d
 fight 2.5.3
 fill 5
 find 2.3.2b I, (3.2.4a) (3.2.4b) 3.3.2c I
 finger 3.5.2b
 fire 2.2.1b
 flash 2.3.2b
 flawless 2.4.5
 flock 3.5.1
 flower 1.1.3c II
 flush 2.5.2c I
 flutter 2.5.2a
 fly 1.1.3c I
 fog 2.4.4
 food 1.1.3c II
 foolish (3.2.6) 3.3.7a (3.3.7b)
 for (2.5.1b III) 3.2.4a (3.4.3a *declare, nominate*)
 (3.3.7a, b)
 force 2.2.16c
 forget 2.3.2b I
 forgive 2.5.1b II
 former 3.3.1c II
 free 3.6.3d
 French 1.1.3c I
 friend 3.3.1c II
 frighten 2.5.2c II
 fret 2.5.2a, 2.5.2c I
 from 3.1.2 I (3.4.3a *elect*)
 furious 3.3.4
 fuzziness 1.1.1, 6

 gain 2.5.2b

gallop 2.5.2a
 game 1.2.2
 gather 2.4.3c
 generate 2.5.2c I
 give 2.5.1b III
 glass 1.2.2
 gloomy (3.3.1c I)
 glow 2.3.2a
 go (3.4.1b)
 good (3.3.0) (3.3.1c II) 3.6.3d
 great (3.3.1c II) (3.3.2a II)
 groom *n.5*
 grow 2.5.2a
 guarantee 3.2.9

 hang 2.5.2c II
 happy (3.3.1c I) (3.3.1d) 3.3.7a (3.3.7b)
 hard (3.3.1c II)
 haste 2.1.7
 hasten 2.1.7
 hastily 2.1.7
 hasty 2.2.7
 have 3.4.6 (3.4.7)
 hazard *n.24*
 haze 2.4.4
 head 3.5.1
 hear 2.5.2c II (3.2.3a I) (*n.54*)
 heavy 2.1.5a (3.3.0) *n.13*
 hedge 2.4.3b, 2.4.4
 help 3.2.7b
 hereby 3.4.3a
 hesitant 2.4.3b
 highly 3.6.3b
 hiss 2.4.3c
 hit 2.3. 2b
 hold (3.4.1b)
 honestly 3.6.2a
 hopeful 3.3.1c I

hostage 3.4.3b

huge 4.1

hurl 1.2.1

hut 2.4.5

if 3.1.3

ill 3.2.3b i

imagine 3.4.4

immaculate 2.4.5

immunity 3.5.4

impeccable 2.4.5

imply 2.3.1a

important (3.2.6) 3.3.7a (3.3.7b)

impose 3.4.2 (3.5.3)

imposing 2.4.5

in 3.1.2 I

inadequate 3.6.3d

indicate 2.3.1a, 2.3.4b

infer 2.4.3c (3.2.3b)

injunction 3.5.4

inscribe 2.5.1b I ii

interest 2.2.3

interesting (3.2.6) 3.3.7a (3.3.7b)

into 3.1.2 I

invert 2.5.2c I

irrigate 2.4.3c

it (3.1.2 I for₁₀) 3.1.4a (3.2.8) (3.3.7a, b)

jumper 1.1.3c I

keep (3.4.1b)

kick 2.3.2b

kill 1.1.2

king (3.3.1c ii)

kiss 2.5.3

knit 2.5.1a ii, 2.5.1b

know 3.2.8 (*n.* 77)

lacking 3.6.3d
 large (3.3.0) 4.1
 law 3.5.4
 learn 1.1.3c I
 leave 2.5.1a iii (3.4.1b)
 legality 3.5.4
 legislation 3.5.4
 let 3.2.7a, b
 levy 3.4.0
 liar 1.1.3c II
 lift 3.4.2, 3.5.3
 light (3.3.0)
 like 2.2.5 (2.5.1a iii)
 likely (3.2.6) 3.3.7a (3.3.7b)
 live 2.3.2a
 load 2.2.1a
 long (3.3.0) (3.3.1)
 look 2.2.3
 lose 1.2.1 (1.2.1) (2.5.1c) 3.5.4
 lucky 3.3.7a (3.3.7b)

mad 3.3.4
 magic (3.3.1a)
 make 2.2.16b (2.2.16c) (3.4.7)
 man 1.1.2
 marginal 2.1.9
 may 3.2.7c can, may
 melt 3.5.3
 memorize 2.5.2c II
 mend 2.5.1b I ii
 mild 3.3.6a
 mist 2.4.4
 mistaken 3.6.3d
 mud 2.4.4
 mug 2.4.6
 must 3.2.7c

name 3.4.3b

near 3.3.2a III
needle 3.3.0
neigh 2.1.5a
neighbour 3.3.1a
nest 1.1.3c I
nominate 3.4.3b
normal 3.6.3d
not (2.4.3c)

obligation 2.4.4
obvious 3.3.7a
of 3.1.2 I
old 3.3.0 (3.3.1c II)
on 3.1.2 I (3.4.3 a declare)
open 2.2.4
operate 2.2.1a
opposed 3.6.3d
or 3.1.3
ought 3.2.7c (3.2.7a)
over 3.1.2 I (3.5.3)
overturn 3.5.4
own 3.4.6i

pale 1.1.3f
penalty 3.5.4
pension 3.5.4
perfect (3.3.1c II)
perfectly 3.6.3b
perform 2.4.5
permit 2.2.16c
persuade 2.2.16c
persuasive 3.6.3d
pertain 2.3.1b
phone book 2.4.5
pick 2.5.1b I i
pick up 2.4.4
pill 1.1.3c I
pinch 1.1.3c II

play 2.5.1b I iii
pleased 3.3.4
plump 3.3.1c iii
podgy *n.* 8
possible (3.2.6) (3.2.7c *may*) (3.3.7b)
powder 2.5.1b I i
predictable 3.6.3d
pregnant (2.4.7b) 2.4.7c (3.3.1a)
prevent 2.2.16c
probable 3.3.7a (3.3.7b)
promise (3.3.7a) 3.4.3b
pronounce 3.4.3b
prosecution 3.5.4
prove 3.4.8
puddle 2.1.5c
put 2.5.1b I i

quash 3.4.2
quell 3.5.3

radiate 2.3.2a
rage 3.5.3
rain 2.1.5a
raise 3.5.3
rancid 2.1.5a
ratify 3.4.2
raw 1.2.4
reach 2.3.2b I
reasonable 3.6.3d
recognize 2.3.2b I
red *adj* 3.3.0
regulation 3.5.4
relinquish 3.5.4
remain 3.4.8
remarkable (3.2.6) 3.3.7a (3.3.7b)
remember 2.3.1a
repeal 3.4.2
resemble 2.3.1b

reveal 3.1.2 I to
 review 1.1.2
 ride 1.1.3d, 2.1.5c, *n.* 5
 ridiculous 3.6.3d
 risk 2.5.1c
 river 1.1.3c II
 rule 3.5.4
 ruling 3.5.4
 run 1.1.3c II, 2.1.4, 2.2.1a,

 sad (3.2.6) 3.3.7a (3.3.7b)
 satisfying 3.6.3d
 say 3.2.8
 school 3.2.2
 screech 2.1.5a
 second (3.3.2b I)
 secure 3.6.3d
 see 2.2.3
 seem 2.2.16a (3.4.7)
 selfish 3.6.3d
 sell 2.5.2c II
 sensible (3.2.6) 3.3.7a (3.3.7b)
 sentence 3.5.4
 separate 3.6.3d
 serious 3.3.5b
 set in 2.4.3c
 severe 3.3.5c
 shaggy 3.3.1c I
 shake out 2.5.1b I i
 shave 2.5.1b I i
 sheep 1.2.2
 shelter 2.5.2a
 short 1.1.3e (3.3.0)
 should 3.2.7c (3.3.7a)
 shower 2.5.2c I
 sick 3.3.2b
 silence *n.* 1
 simply (3.3.7a) (3.6.2a)

since 3.1.3
sincere 2.4.7d (3.3.1c I)
sing 2.5.1a ii
sink 2.1.5c
sit 2.2.16c
sloppy 2.4.3c
slosh 2.5.2c II
slow (3.3.1d)
small (3.3.0) (3.3.2a II)
smear 2.5.1b I i
smog 2.4.4
smoke 2.2.17, 2.5.1b I ii
snap 2.5.2a
so adv (2.4.3c) (3.4.3a promise) (3.4.4)
so conjunction 3.1.3
sorry (3.3.7b)
sovereignty (3.5.4)
speak 3.1.3
speechless (3.3.2)
spot 2.3.2b I
spotless 2.4.5
spread 2.5.1b I i
stand 2.3.2a (3.6.2)
start 2.3.2b I
starter 3.5.2b
statute 3.5.4
stay 2.3.2a
step 2.3.2b I
sterile 2.1.9
stop v 2.3.2b I
stop n *n.* 1
strange (3.3.1c II)
stranger (3.3.1c II)
strike 2.2.17
strong 2.1.5a
struggle 1.1.3c I
strum 2.1.4
study *n.* 15

suckle 2.5.1b I iii
 suffer 2.4.7b
 suggest 2.3.1a, 3.2.10
 suit v 3.2.8
 suit n 3.5.4
 sure (3.2.6) 3.3.7a (3.3.7b)
 surely 3.6.1
 surprise 2.5.2d
 surprised 2.5.2d
 surprising 7
 surgeon 3.3.1c II
 surprising 3.3.7a (3.3.7b)
 swamp 2.5.2c II

talk 3.1.3
 tall 1.1.3e (3.3.0)
 tell 3.1.3
 terrible (3.3.0)
 than 3.1.3
 the 3.1.1a
 that 3.1.3 (3.3.7a)
 thick 1.1.3b, 2.4.4
 thin 2.4.4
 think 2.2.3
 thirsty (3.3.1c)
 till 3.1.3
 to preposition 3.1.2 I (3.2.6) (3.4.3a *declare, elect, name, nominate, promise*)
 to infinitive 3.2.6
 torrential 2.1.5a
 total 2.1.7
 totally 2.1.7 (3.6.3b, c)
 treat 2.5.1b I iii
 tree 1.2.4
 trust 1.1.3c II
 two Introduction

 ultramarine 1.1.3f

unacceptable 3.6.3d
 unblemished 2.4.5
 unceasingly 1.1.2
 uncontrollable 3.5.3
 under 3.1.2 I
 unexpected 3.6.3d
 unless 3.1.3
 uphold 3.4.2
 utter 3.3.2a II
 utterly (3.6.3b)

vanish 2.2.5
 vehicle 4.1
 verdant 2.1.9
 very (3.3.2a II) (3.3.6a) (3.3.7a) (3.6.2a) 3.6.3b
 violate 3.4.2
 violent *n.* 79

wait 2.3.2a
 waive 3.4.2
 walk 2.5.2a
 want 1.1.3c II
 war 3.2.2
 weed 2.5.1b I i
 when 3.1.3
 whether 3.1.3
 while 3.1.3
 wholly 3.6.3b
 wh-words 3.1.3 (3.3.7a) (3.4.3a)
 wide 3.6.2
 wild 3.3.5
 win 2.3.2b I, 3.5.4
 winner 2.4.7c
 wipe 2.5.1b I i
 wish 1.1.3c II
 with 3.1.2 I, 3.3.1c I
 word *n.* 6
 write 2.2.6

wrong 3.6.3

yeast 2.4.4

yesterday 3.6.1

young (3.3.1c I) 3.5.1 (*n.* 67)

Subject index

acceptability 1.1.2, 1.1.3d, 2.1.1, 2.2.1a, b, 2.4.7a, 2.5.1b, 3.3.2a II, 3.5.1, 3.6.3a, d; *et passim*

active zone 3.3.1b

actor 2.2.8, 2.2.16a, 3.2.6 1a

adjectives 3.1.2, 3.1.4, 3.3, 3.5.0, 3.5.2a

classifying 3.1.1b ii

comparison 3.3.0, 3.6.3c, *n.* 62

disjunct 3.2.6 (3), 3.2.5 last paragraph, 3.3.7

evaluative 3.3.0

adverbs 3.6

adjunct 3.3.7a *happy*, 3.6.2a, 3.6.3a

attitudinal 3.6.2a, 3.3.7

cognitive *n.* 85

conjunct 3.6.2a

discourse marker 3.6.2a

disjunct 3.6.2a

epistemic 3.6.2a, 3.3.7

evaluative 3.4.4, 3.6.1, 3.6.2a

intensifying 3.6.1, 3.6.3

modal 3.2.7c, 3.6.1, 3.6.2

of degree 3.6.1, 3.6.2a

of manner 3.6.1, 3.6.2a, 3.6.3a

punctual 3.6.2a

sentential 3.6.1, 3.6.2a, *n.* 85

spatial 3.6.1

temporal 3.6.1

- affected 3.4.5 *succumb*, 3.4.6e *have*₁₅₋₁₈, 24, 3.4.6i, 3.4.8, 3.5.4, *n.* 4, *n.*38, *n.* 81
 agent 2.2.0, 2.2.1, 2.2.2, 2.2.3, 2.2.4, 2.2.5, 2.2.6, 2.2.15, 2.2.16, 2.2.17, 2.5.2a, 2.5.2c I, II, 2.5.4, 3.2.4a, 3.2.6 (2a, 3), 3.2.7a, 3.2.8, 3.3.7b, *n.* 40, *et passim*
 alternation
 lexical-syntactic 2.5.1b I
 material (product) 2.5.1b I ii
 ambiguity 1.1.2, 2.4.3b
 analysis (part of definition) 2.4.7d, *et passim*
 antonyms 3.3.0
 argument 2.1.4, 2.2.0
 articles 2.1.5b, 2.2.6, 3.1.1, 3.2.2
 definite 3.1.1a, c, d, 3.3.2a III
 indefinite 3.1.1b, c, d, 3.3.2a IV, 3.4.3c
 aspect
 perfective 2.2.16, 2.3.1, 3.5.2b
 imperfective 2.3.1a, 2.3.2a, 2.4.7b I, 2.5.1b I (i), 3.3.2b II, 3.4.6i, 3.4.8b, 3.5.2b, 3.6.2a, *n.*20, *n.* 81
 aspectualities 2.3, 2.3.0

 be → verbs
 bound morphemes 2.1.5b
 bounded 2.4.7b I

 canonical features 1.1.3a, 1.2.4, 2.4.6, 2.4.7a, 3.4.3b
appoint
 category grammar 2.4.2
 causation 2.2.16a, 3.4.3b, 3.4.6g, i
 direct 2.2.16b
 indirect 2.2.16b, c, 3.2.3a ii, 3.2.7a ii
 internal 2.2.4, 2.2.16a, 3.4.6c, i
 cogitator 3.2.4a, 3.2.6, 3.5.0
 cognitive linguistics 2.4.3b, 3.1.2, 3.3.7a *sad*, 5
 colligations 2.1.5b, 3.3.0
 collocations
 arbitrariness 2.1.5a
 bound → fixed phrases

free 2.1.5a, 2.5.1a ii (2), 3.2.7c
 frequency 2.1.5a
 general 2.1.5a
 grammatical → colligations
 habitual 2.1.5a
 lexical 2.1.5b
 occasional 2.1.5a
 open → free
 personal 2.1.5a
 related 2.1.7
 restricted 2.1.5a, 2.5.1a ii (1a)
 technical jargon 2.1.5c
 collostructional analysis 2.4.2
 comitative 2.2.9
 commutation test 2.4.3c
 complements 3.2.4, 3.2.6 (2a), 3.2.4a, 3.3.2c
 componential analysis 2.4.2
 compounds 2.1.6, 3.3.1e, 3.3.5
 connection
 attributive 1.1.3c II, 2.1.5a *torrential*, 3.3.2
 direct 3.3.1 c, *et passim*
 indirect 3.3.1c
 non-inherent 3.3.1c II, 3.3.2a V
 partonomic 2.5.1c, 2.5.2c I, 3.3.1c III, 3.3.2, 4.0
 predicative 1.1.3c II
 connexity 3.5.2c
 contextual modulation → perspectivization
 contradiction → paradox
 corpus 2.1.1, 2.4.2, 2.4.3c
 contrafactivity 3.4.4

 definitions *passim*
 functions 1.1.1
 desiderata 1.1.1
 detransitivization 2.5.2c, 5
 directive 3.1.2, *et passim*
 directrix 2.4.7d, 2.5.1b I, 2.5.2e, 3.1.2
 distinguisher 1.1.2

distributionalists 2.4.2, 2.4.3c
 donor 2.2.7, 2.5.2c

elision of *to be* 3.2.4a
 encapsulation 1.1.3c II
 entailment 1.1.3e, 4.1
 epithet 3.3.1b
 equivocality 2.4.3b
 essive 2.2.15, 2.5.2c II
 evaluation 2.4.7c, 3.1.1.b II, 3.2.6 (3)
 experienced 2.2.3
 experiencer 2.2.3, 2.2.5, 2.2.16a, 2.2.17, 3.2.6 (2a, 3),
 3.2.7b, 3.3.1c II, 3.3.7b, 3.4.6c, *n.* 40, *n.* 57
 extralinguistic knowledge 1.2.1, 2.4.6, 2.4.7a, 3.3.7a
happy, 3.4.3a

facet 1.1.2, 3.4.2, 3.5.0
 factivity 2.2.18, 3.1.4a II, 3.2.7c *may*, 3.3.7a *certain*,
 3.4.3b *declare*, 3.4.4, 3.6.2a, *n.* 52. *n.* 78
 feature synthesis 2.4.7b
 fixed phrases 2.1.5a
 folk biology 2.4.7a
 fuctional proximity 3.4.6d
 function words 3.1
 fuzziness 1.1.2

generative semantics 2.4.2
 gerund 3.2.3a I i
 goal 2.2.12, 2.2.17
 government and binding theory 2.4.2

habitualness 2.1.5a, 3.2.3a I i, 3.3.1c ii
 hearer 2.2.18, 3.2.7c *ought*
 hedges 1.2.3e
 hyponymy 1.1.2, 3.5.2c I, 4.1

idioms 1.2.3a
 imperfective → progressive aspect

inceptive → inchoative

inchoative 3.4.6a

infinitive 3.2.6, 3.2.7b, 3.3.7a, b

bare 3.2.7

information (in discourse) 1.1.3c II, 3.1.3, 3.1.4a IV, V, 3.2.6 (3), 3.3.7 *possible*

ingressive → inchoative

instrument 2.2.1a, 2.2.6, 2.2.16a

intentionality 2.2.1a, 2.2.3, 2.2.5, 2.2.16a, 3.2.6, 3.4.3b

appoint, *n.16*, *n.19*, *n.44*, *et passim*

isotopy 1.1.3c I

knowledge

linguistic 2.4.7a

lexical field 2.1.9

lexical-functional grammar 2.4.2

lexical functions 2.4.2

lexical words 3.1.0, *et passim*

locative 2.2.10, 2.2.17

locative alternation 2.5.1b I i

locatum 2.2.12., 2.5.1b I (i), (iii), 2.5.2c I, 3.1.1a

make vs. do 2.1.5a

marker 2.1.5c, 2.4.7b

meaning

contextual 1.1, 2.4.3b

lexical 2.1.2, *et passim*

primary 1.1.3b

secondary 1.1.3b

shadow 1.1.3b, 3.3.7b, *n..30*, *n.71*

syntactic 1.1

mental lexicon 1.1.1, 2.1.5d

meronymy 3.5.1

metonymy 2.4.3b

negation 3.4.8 (a)

non-finite clause 3.2.3, 3.2.4a, b, 3.3.7b, 3.4.3a

nouns

countable 3.1.1b II, 3.2.2, 3.4.6c, 3.5
 uncountable 3.1.1b II

object 3.2.3a I ii

double 2.2.1b, 2.2.17, 2.5.1b, 3.4.3c
 grammatical 3.2.3a
 indirect 2.5.1b III
 semantic → semantic transitivity
 triple 2.5.1c, 3.4.3c
 objective 2.2.4, 2.5.2a, cI, II, *n.* 57
 origin 2.2.13

paradigmatic axis 1.1.2, 2.1.1., 2.1.2, 2.4.1, 2.4.2,
 2.4.3c, 3.3.1e, 3.5.2b,

paradox 1.1.3f, 2.1.4, 3.3.6b, 3.4.3b *declare* (1), 3.4.5

partitive possession 3.4.6b, 3.5.1

partitivity 3.5.2a

partonomy → partonomic connection

parts of speech 2.1.7, 3.0

patient 2.2.0, 2.2.2, 2.2.4, 2.2.5, 2.2.16a, 2.2.17, 2.3.4,
 2.52a, c I, c II, 3.2.4a, 3.2.6 (3), 3.2.7b, 3.4.6e, *n.* 40, *n.*
 57

patterns → syntactic constructions

perspectivization 1.1.2

pertainym 3.3.2a I, 3.3.7, 3.6.1, 3.6.2a

phrase appellatives 2.1.6

pleonasm 1.1.3c II, 2.14, 3.3.6 *fierce*, 3.3.7a *sure* (2)

polysemy 2.4.3b, *et passim*

regular 2.4.3b

post-directrix 3.1.2

power 3.4.3, 3.4.6a, c, i, 3.5.3

pragmatic features 3.1.3 *and*, *that*, 3.1.4

predicate 2.2.0

pre-directrix 2.4.7d, 3.1.2, *et passim*

progressive aspect → imperfective aspect

pronouns 3.1.4

proposition 2.1.4, 3.1.2, 3.3.2b II

recipient 2.2.7, 2.2.17, 2.3.4, 2.5.2b, 2.5.2c II, 3.4.6e
 redundancy 1.1.3c I, II
 redundancy rules 4.1
 reference 3.1.4a
 result 2.2.14
 roles 2.2

semantic atoms → semantic primes
 semantic preference 2.4.1
 semantic primes 1.1.1, 3.1.3 *if*, 3.5.0
 semantic tailoring 2.4.8
 slot-and-filler grammar 3.1.2
 source 2.2.11, 2.2.17
 speaker 2.2.18, 3.2.7c *can*
 specificness 3.1.1d
 statistics 2.4.2
 stimulus 2.2.5, 2.2.16a
 'strong' 1.1.3c I, 3.2.6 (5), 3.3.6a, 3.5.3, 7
 structured vector space model 2.4.2
 subcategorization 3.2.1
 subjunctive 3.2.9, 3.3.7a
 syntagmatic axis 2.1.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 2.4.3c, 3.2.2, 3.5.0,
 3.5.2b, c I
 syntactic constructions 3.1.3 *that*, 3.2.1, 3.2.4a, 3.2.6
 (3), 3.2.8, 3.3.2c, 3.3.7b, 3.4.1c, d, 3.4.8

taxonomy 4.0
 telic qualia 1.1.3g
that-clause 3.2.8, 3.2.10
 theory of norms and exploitations 2.4.2
 transference 2.4.7b, c
 transitivity 2.5
 ditransitivity → ditransitive verbs
 partitive 3.5.2b
 pseudointransitivity → pseudointransitive verbs
 semantic 2.5.1a ii, 3.5.2b
 syntactic 2.5.1a iii, 3.5.2b

typicality 1.2, 2.4.3b, 3.5.1, *et passim*

unaccusative 2.2.1b, 2.2.4., 2.2.16b, 2.5.2a, c II

unbounded 2.4.7b I

unintentional 2.2.1, 2.2.6

unmarked 3.3.0

vagueness 1.1.1, 1.1.2, 3.3.0, 3.3.1c II

verbs

absolute use 2.5.1a ii, 2.5.1a ii (2b)

achievements 2.3.2b I, 3.2.3b

ambient 2.3.3

be 3.2.4a, 3.2.5, 3.4.3a *name, nominate*, 3.4.8; elision

→ elision of *to be*

benefactive 2.3.4

causative 3.4.1d, 3.4.6e, *et passim*

ditransitive 2.5.1b II

durative 2.3.2

dynamic 2.3.2

evaluative 2.3.5

linking 3.1.4a V, 3.2.3a I ii, 3.4.1a, 3.4.8

of perception 3.2.3a I i, 3.2.7a I, 3.4.1a

of transfer 2.5.1b III

of transformation 3.4.1b

omitting 1.1.3c I

performative 3.4.3

privative 2.3.1a

pseudointransitive 2.5.1a ii (1a)

punctual 2.3.2b

reciprocal 2.5.3

reflexive 2.5.3

relational 2.3.1b, 3.4.6d

stative 2.3.1, 3.2.3b, 3.4.6a

voice

active *passim*

middle 2.2.1b, 2.2.4, 2.5.1a (i), 2.5.1b I (ii), (iii),
2.5.2c I, II

passive 2.2.1b, 3.2.4a, 3.4.6i, 3.4.8 (9)

'weak' 3.3.6a, 3.4.8
word classes
semantic 3.0

zeugma 1.1.2, 1.1.3d, 2.4.3b, 3.4.6i, *et passim*

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